

**SELECTIONS
FROM THE
IQBAL REVIEW**




**SELECTIONS
FROM THE
IQBAL REVIEW**



IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

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
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FOREWORD

The publication of the Iqbal Review started in April 1960. It is a quarterly Journal of which two issues are in English and two are in Urdu.

The Iqbal Review covers research and scholarly articles on Iqbal's life, poetry and thought. Although subjects like Philosophy, History, Art, Sociology, Religion, Literature and Islamic Studies also come in the purview of this Journal, the majority of articles so far published in it are about the life, poetry and thought of Iqbal.

Recently the Governing Body of the Iqbal Academy decided to publish, in two separate volumes, a selection of English and Urdu articles of the Iqbal Review and entrusted this work to me. The present volume consists of selected English articles which were published in the journal during April 1960 to April 1983.



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IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION

DR. M. RAFIUDDIN

We can have two different views about the manner in which the Universe, as we know it at present, has come into existence. We can believe either that it is the outcome of a sudden act or of a series of sudden isolated acts of creation in the past, or that it is the result of development through the ages. The latter view, which, of course, implies not only the evolution of a matter from previous states but also the evolution of all species, *including man*, from earlier and lower forms of life, is held by the evolutionists, while those who subscribe to the former view are known as the creationists.

Iqbal is definitely an evolutionist; for, according to him, it is a law of nature that an object can come into existence only gradually, as a result of a process of development stretched over an appropriate period of time;

چو فطرت سے تراشد پیکرے را
تماش سے کند در روز گارے

This law applies as much to the Universe as a whole as it does to every object in the Universe.

یہ کائنات ابھی ناتمام ہے شاید
کہ آرہی ہے دما دم صدائے کن فیکون

As the first couplet above indicates, Iqbal's view that creation takes the form of evolution is derived from his view of the attributes of Reality to which, of course, nature (*Fitrat*) holds the mirror.

According to Iqbal the reality of the Universe is an all-powerful consciousness which is conscious of itself. This entity which he denotes by the name of Self-consciousness or self (*khudi*) is the creator of the world:

خویشتن را چوں خودی بیدار کرد
آشکارا عالم پندار کرد

Since life is an attribute of consciousness and consciousness cannot be imagined apart from life, Iqbal sometimes uses the word *Life* (*Hayat* or *Zindagi*) for consciousness:

نقطہ نورے کہ نام او خودیست
زیر خاک ما شرار زندگیست

At other places, however, he uses the word life not so much for world-consciousness itself as for the *force* of the desire or the will of world-consciousness as it operates and incarnates itself in the material world:

چوں حیات عالم از زور خودیست
پس بقدر استواری زندگیست

The central and the most fundamental attribute of this self-consciousness or self of the world (of which a full reflection is to be found only in the human being who alone of all the creation has acquired self-consciousness) is to love an ideal and to act and strive for its realization. Its activity is caused entirely by the love of an ideal and is, therefore, entirely purposive. Love alone can create a wave of restlessness in the tranquility of its being and make its activity to flow like a tumultuous river:

آرزو ہنگامہ آرائے خودی
موج بیتابے ز دریائے خودی

“Reality” says Iqbal “is not a blind vital impulse... Its nature is through and through teleological”. As the self-consciousness of the world acts and strives for the realization of its ideal, it expresses and asserts itself and thereby actualizes its potentialities and displays its qualities and capacities in creation. Self-assertion or self-display is thus revealed as one of the characteristics of self-consciousness:

وا نمودن خویش را خونے خودیست
خفتہ در ہر ذرہ نیروئے خودیست

The Universe is the result of the creative activity of the World-Self and the ideal that the World-Self is realizing through this acti-

vity is the Perfect Man, *i.e.*, the Perfect Human Society, of the future:

ما از خدائے گم شدہ ایم او جستجوست
 چون ما نیاز مند و گرفتار آرزوست
 گاہے بہ برگ لالہ نویسند پیام خویش
 گاہے درون سینہ مرغان بہ ہاؤہوست
 در نرگس آرمید کہ بیند جمال ما
 چنداں کرشمہ دان کہ نگاہش بگفتگوست
 آہ سحر گہی کہ زند در فراق ما
 بیرون و اندرون زبر و زیر و چارسوست
 ہنگامہ بست از پئے دیدار خاکینے
 نظارہ را بہانہ تماشائے رنگ و بوست

The Perfect Man who is yet to come is the real meaning of creation. He is the final objective of all the creative activity of the World-Self which has already expressed itself in such a colourful variety of creation:

آیہ کائنات کا معنی دیر یاب تو
 نکلے تری تلاش میں قافلہ ہائے رنگ و بو

Since the creative activity of the World-Self in the Universe has a single purpose—the perfection of man—it must be a single and continuous process from its beginning to its end. This is not possible unless every state of the Universe emerges and evolves out of a previous state as every condition of a growing organism emerges and evolves out of its previous condition. This means that the universe as a whole and the various objects which make up the universe did not come into existence suddenly at a particular moment in the past but have acquired their present shape by a process of gradual development.

The whole of the creative activity of the World-Self which occurred in the past now belongs permanently to history and we have no means of reproducing it. But since the process of creation

is still going on and a portion of this creative activity is stretched before our eyes into the present we are eminently in a position to study it and to understand its nature as a whole. We see that nothing in this world happens abruptly and without passing through a series of earlier phases of development. A tree grows out of a seed by stages; an organism develops gradually out of a sperm; a gigantic industrial or commercial concern evolves slowly from an insignificant start; a mighty state has a modest beginning. There is no reason to suppose that objects used to come into existence suddenly in the past and that nature has now changed its old habit of creating abruptly and has started creating gradually and by stages. On the contrary, as far as the study of history enables us to penetrate into the past, we see that every state of the world was a growth out of a previous one. The modern civilized man has evolved out of the caveman of an ancient age who was only a little better than animals, and there have been innumerable stages of civilization from the cave-man to the man of today. We can infer most reasonably that the cave-man too must have had a career of his own with a beginning disappearing into the mists of a distant past of biological evolution.

The fact that the creative activity of the World-Self in the Universe has a single purpose, the perfection of man, means also that the *cause* of evolution is the desire of the Creator for the realization of that purpose. All the attributes and qualities of the Perfect Man of the future exist potentially in this desire of the Creator and become more and more actualized as the desire achieves a greater and greater realization. This desire alone was the driving force of the evolutionary process in the past and will continue to be its driving force in the future. It created Space and Time and the earliest form of the universe.

It is not possible to love an object or an idea without hating its antithesis. Hate, therefore, becomes a necessary concomitant of love. The love of the Creator, too, has its concomitant of Hate. Since the Creator loves everything that is favourable to His ideal, He hates everything that is unfavourable to it. The result is that the driving force of evolution expresses at each level of creation in particular forms of attraction and repulsion which are suitable to

that level. During the material stage of evolution, it expressed itself in the attraction and repulsion of the particles of matter on account of which matter continued to develop in complication and organization till all the physical laws came into existence and matter became ripe for the production of the first living cell. This explains why every physical law is either a form of attraction or a form of repulsion. On reaching the biological stage the driving force of evolution expressed itself in the animal's instinctive attraction for everything that is favourable to its existence and repulsion from everything that is unfavourable to it. As the animal expressed its instincts of attraction and repulsion in its activities, its biological constitution became more and more complicated and organized and its instincts, too, developed in number and quality, till man, the most highly organized animal, came into existence. This explains why every animal instinct or innate tendency we know of is either a form of attraction or a form of repulsion. Effort or struggle continued to be the key to biological progress and evolution throughout. As living creatures strove to realize their desires and purposes arising from their instincts their efforts or struggle brought the driving force of the desire of the world-self more and more into play with the result that they developed new characters and capacities needed by them for the realization of their ends and thus actualized a little more of the potentialities of life and came a step nearer to the final objective of evolution, namely, the human form of life, with all its qualities and characteristics. It is by effort or struggle that birds have grown wings and learnt to fly or walk or sing and we, on our part, have developed such complicated organs as the eyes, the ears, the hands, the teeth and the brain or such useful faculties as thought, intelligence, imagination and memory.

چيست اصل دیده بیدار ما بست صورت لذت دیدار ما
 کبک پا از شوخنی رفتار یافت بلبل از سعی نوا منقار یافت
 دست و دندان و دماغ و چشم و گوش فکر و تخیل و شعور و یاد و هوش
 زندگی مرکب چو در جنگاه تاخت بهر حفظ خویش این آلات ساخت

In man life has come to its own and regained its quality of self-

consciousness with its fundamental attribute of love for an ideal, *i.e.*, an idea of the highest beauty and perfection. As a self-conscious being man's urge for Beauty can be satisfied only by an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection, *i.e.*, an ideal which has all beautiful and admirable attributes that he can imagine and is free from all the defects and shortcomings that he can think of. That idea can be the idea of the Creator; for man cannot think of any idea more beautiful and more perfect than that. The driving force of evolution expresses itself again at the human stage, in man's love of everything that is favourable to the realization of his ideal and the hatred of everything that is unfavourable to it. This means that the greater the approach of man to his ideal, the greater is his approach to the stage of his own perfection which is the ideal of the Creator. Man has thus become a conscious and willing participant in the creative activity of the World-Self. Effort or struggle continues to be the key to progress at the ideological stage as it was at the biological stage of evolution. As man acts and strives for the realization of his ideal, he expresses and asserts himself and thereby brings the driving force of the desire of the Creator more and more into play with the result that he actualizes more and more of his potentialities and comes nearer and nearer to his own perfection. The more he actualizes his potentialities, the greater is the manifestation of the qualities of the Creator in His creation:

تلاش خود کنی جز او نہ بینی

تلاش او کنی جز خود نہ بینی

نمود اسکی نمود تیری نمود تیری نمود اسکی

خدا کو تو بے حجاب کردے خدا تجھے بے حجاب کردے

To say that struggle is necessary for evolution means that life meets, at every step, with some resistance which it has to overcome. This resistance comes in the way of life from life itself; it comes from the whole of life's past. Life that has grown offers resistance to life that has yet to grow. The reason is that the tendencies of life are not only formic but also mnemonic. Life not only acts and strives for the realization of its ends but also safeguards and preserves the ends

it has already achieved. For unless it preserves its achievements of the past it cannot make fresh achievements. The emergence of new qualities and characters is the direct result and the immediate end of the creative activity of life. But as soon as life has achieved an end its achievement becomes fixed, automatic and permanent which enables life to leave it there and pass on to the achievement of new ends. When it does so it meets with resistance from ends it has already achieved.

During the material stage of evolution the achievements of life are represented by the physical laws. They are automatic, permanent and immutable not because they were always so, but because they do not need to change now. They kept changing and growing for a long time in the past and when they had evolved themselves into a form most suitable for the development of animal life, they became set and fixed while change manifested itself at higher levels of life. During the animal stage life met resistance from the physical laws which it had itself evolved with a purpose. Living creatures had to struggle against these laws in order to protect and feed themselves and thereby to continue their life and race. The result of their struggle was the evolution of instincts in various directions consistent with the potentialities of life and the emergence of a large variety of species in the process. Thus the efforts of life to conquer the resistance of physical laws enabled it to achieve new victories in the form of instincts which, like the physical laws, became fixed, automatic and permanent in due course of time. We have also to note that the past of life at every distinct step of its biological evolution included not only the physical laws but also the instincts of all the species which had come into existence previous to that step. Hence every species of animals met resistance not only from the physical laws but also from the instinctive purposes of all the contemporary species; it had to participate in a widespread war between different species. The struggle of every species proceeded in accordance with a mode of behaviour prescribed by the instincts which it had already developed.

During the ideological stage of evolution that is now going on life is meeting resistance not only from the physical laws but also from

the instincts which like the physical laws it had itself developed for its own protection. For, human beings have not only to struggle against the physical laws in order to continue their existence but also against the exaggerated demands of the instincts in order to satisfy their urge for beauty and perfection which is their fundamental characteristic as self-conscious beings. The result of their struggle is the evolution of ideals in various directions consistent with the qualities of beauty and perfection and the emergence of a large number of ideological communities in the process. The past of life at every distinct step of its ideological evolution includes not only the physical laws and the instincts in man and other species but also the ideals of all the ideological communities which had come into existence previous to that step. Hence at this stage of evolution every ideological community meets resistance not only from the physical laws and the instincts but also from the objectives of all the contemporary ideological communities. The struggle of an ideological community proceeds in accordance with a moral code which exists potentially in its ideal and becomes actualized gradually in the life of the community. In due course of time it becomes fixed, automatic and permanent and is known as the constitutional, the civil and the military law of the community. At this stage if the members of the community desire to change over to a higher ideal they have to struggle against this law, in order to shatter its resistance. If they succeed the event is known as a Revolution, otherwise, a Rebellion.

The resistance that life meets from itself, however, does not retard its progress in the direction of its goal. On the contrary impediments stimulate its efforts and quicken its progress. As a river flows the hardest when it has to pass through a narrow gorge in the mountains and wears away the rocks that obstruct its passage, so the current of life is never so powerful as when it is facing a resistance and making an effort to overcome it. Life is not the least tolerant of resistance to itself in any form or shape and never makes a compromise with it. On the other hand, whenever it meets with resistance it musters the whole of its power in an effort to crush it and it never fails, no matter how formidable the resistance. The

result is not only that the resistance is swept away completely but also that life is able to acquire new powers and qualities and to rise to a still higher level of evolution. That, in fact, is the reason why life creates resistance for itself out of itself. Iqbal alludes to this aspect of the nature of life as follows:

در جهان تخم خصومت کاشت است خویشتن را غیر خود پنداشت است
سازد از خود پیکر اغیار را تا فزاید لذت پیکار را

In a poem entitled *irtiqā'* (evolution) Iqbal explains that it is the nature of life to court hardships and to meet and shatter its impediments boldly. Struggle, according to him, is the process by which life progresses at the material, biological and ideological stages of evolution. Hence the Muslim community has to struggle in order to live and progress.

حیات شعلہ مزاج و غیور و شور انگیز
سرشت اسکی ہے مشکل کشی جفا طلبی
سکوت شام سے تا نغمہ سحر گاہی
ہزار مرحلہ ہائے فغان نیم شبی
کشاکش زم و گرما تپ و تراش و خراش
ز خاک تیرہ درون تابہ شیشہ حلبی
مقام بست و کشاد و فشار و سوز و کشید
میان قطرہ نیشان و آتش عنبی
اسی کشاکش پیہم سے زندہ ہیں اقوام
یہی ہے راز تب و تاب ملت عربی

Iqbal compares the irresistible onward march of life through the various stages of its evolution to a swiftly running stream which faces the rocks and turns in all directions to avoid them or washes them away to make a smooth passage for itself:

وہ جوئے کہستان اچکتی ہوئی اٹکتی لچکتی سرکتی ہوئی
اچھلتی پھسلتی سنبھلتی ہوئی بڑے پیچ کھا کر نکلتی ہوئی

رکے جب تو سل چیر دیتی ہے یہ پہاڑوں کے دل چیر دیتی ہے یہ
ذرا دیکھ اے ساقتی لالہ فام سناتی ہے یہ زندگی کا پیام

دماغ رواں ہے ہم زندگی ہر اک شے سے پیدا ہم زندگی
اسی سے ہوئی ہے بدن کی نمود کہ شعلہ میں پوشیدہ ہے موج دود
گراں گرچہ ہے صحبت آب و گل خوش آئی اسے صحبت آب و گل
چمک اسکی بجلی میں تارے میں ہے یہ چاندی میں سونے میں پارے میں ہے
اسی کے ہیں کانٹے اسی کے بیول اسی کے بیابان اسی کے ہیں پھول
کہیں اسکی طاقت سے کہسار چور کہیں اسکے پھندے میں جبریل و حور
کہیں جبرہ شاہین سیماب رنگ لہو سے چکوروں کے آلودہ چنگ

ٹہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود کہ ہر لحظہ تازہ ہے شان وجود
سجھتا ہے تو راز ہے زندگی فقط ذوق پرواز ہے زندگی
بہت اسنے دیکھے ہیں پست و بلند سفر اسکو منزل سے بڑھکر پسند
الجبہ کر سجھنے میں لذت اسے تڑپنے بھڑکنے میں راحت اسے
ہوا جب اسے سامنا موت کا کٹھن تہا بزا تھامنا موت کا
اتر کر جہان مکافات میں رہی زندگی موت کی گہات میں
مذاق دوئی سے بنی زوج زوج الٹی دشت و کہسار سے فوج فوج

زمانے کے دریا میں بہتی ہوئی ستم اسکی موجوں کے سہتی ہوئی
تجسس کی راہیں بدلتی ہوئی دماغ دم نگاہیں بدلتی ہوئی
سبک اسکے ہاتھوں میں سنگ گراں پہاڑ اسکی ضربوں سے ریگ رواں
سفر اس کا انجام و آغاز ہے بھی اس کی تقویم کا راز ہے

At the biological stage of evolution some of the species succeeded in adapting themselves to their environment but proved unfit to

evolve into superior forms of life and hence continued to exist in the form they had achieved. Some of them, however, failed even to adapt themselves to their environment and, therefore, perished entirely. Although consciousness lost some of its achievements in this way, yet it more than compensated for their loss by creating new and more promising species to take the place of those that had disappeared. Similarly, at the ideological stage of evolution, some ideological communities disappear and others appear in their place. Again, individuals of every species belonging to one generation die in the course of time and a new generation is born to take its place and thus the process of evolution is continued. Iqbal alludes to this fact when he says:

گل اس شاح سے ٹوٹتے بھی رہے اور اس شاخ سے پھوٹتے بھی رہے
سمجھنے ہیں ناداں اسے بے ثبات ابھرتا ہے مٹ مٹ کے نقش حیات

The waste and destruction involved in the process of evolution are more than compensated by the valuable results achieved:

بہر یک گل خون صد گلشن کند ازپے یک نغمہ صد شیون کند
عذر این اسراف این سنگیں دلی خلق و تکمیل جمال معنوی

Life that was struggling slowly and steadily along the tedious path of evolution since the creation of the world emerged finally in the human form of life.

ازل سے ہے یہ کشمکش میں اسیر
ہوئی خاک آدم میں صورت پذیر

The self-consciousness of man reflects the Self-Consciousness of the Universe as the pupil of the eye reflects the firmament.

خودی کا نشیمن ترے دل میں ہے
فلک جس طرح آنکھ کے تل میں ہے

Since man developed the capacity to love ideals the process of evolution which was so far biological changed its character with the emergence of man and became ideological. The inevitable goal of ideological evolution is the emergence of an ideological community which loves and strives after an ideal of the highest beauty

and perfection. The love of that ideal—and that ideal is no other than the Self-Consciousness of the Universe itself—alone will lead man to the stage of his highest perfection. As he will admire, adore and serve his Creator he will develop more and more his love and knowledge of the Creator as well as his knowledge of himself. In other words he will become more and more self-conscious. As his self-consciousness or his love for the Creator grows within, he is able to express more and more the Creator's attributes of Beauty and Perfection externally in his moral, material and social life and thus comes nearer and nearer to the stage of his internal and external perfection. When the stage of his perfection will actually arrive, the war of nations will end and perfect peace will reign over the earth. Iqbal yearns for the arrival of the Perfect Man of the future who, he says, is a potentiality that is being actualized gradually by the process of evolution (the motion of the black-and-white horse of time: *ash'hab-i-dauran*).

اے سوارِ اسہبِ دورانِ بیا اے فروغِ دیدہٴ امکانِ بیا
رونیِ ہنگامہٴ ایجادِ سو درِ سوادِ دیدہٴ ہا آبادِ سو
سورشِ اقوامِ را خاموشِ کن نغمہٴ خودِ را بہمتِ گوشِ کن

Iqbal is the harbinger of the glorious age of human perfection which is approaching irresistibly as a result of the evolutionary process. Hence the true realization of his greatness will come only in future:

سبزہٴ نا روئیدہٴ زیبِ گلشنم گلِ بشاخِ اندرِ نہاںِ درِ دامنم
باسمِ از خاورِ رسیدِ و شبِ شکست شبیمِ نویرِ گلِ عالمِ نشیمنم
انتظارِ صبحِ خیرانِ مے کشم اے خوشا زردشتیانِ آتشم
نغمہٴ ام از زخمہٴ مے پرواستم مے نوائےٴ شاعرِ فرنا ستم
نغمہٴ مے از جہانِ دیگر است اس جرسِ را کاروائےٴ دیگر است

The emergence of self-consciousness in man as a result of the process of creation and evolution is a proof that it was the same self-consciousness that started this process in a distant past. As the seed which is the final product of the growth of a tree is also the source and the ultimate cause of its growth, so self-consciousness which has revealed

itself in man as the final product of the evolution of the Universe must also be the source and the ultimate cause of its evolution. The nature of human self-consciousness is, therefore, an adequate guide to us to understand the nature of world-self-conscious.

اسرار ازل جوئی بر خود نظرے واکن
یکتائی و بسیاری پنہائی و پیدائی

This is the meaning of the well-known saying:

من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه

(He who understands his own self, understands also the self of the Creator).

We know that the human self-consciousness loves an ideal and expresses and asserts itself in a creative activity for the realization of that ideal. Hence we conclude that the World-Self too loves an ideal and expresses and asserts itself in a creative activity for the realization of that ideal. When we study the creative activity of the self-consciousness of a human individual, say that of a potter who is moulding a pitcher of clay on his wheel, we find that it exhibits the following characteristics:

- (1) It has a beginning and an end.
- (2) It advances continuously from its beginning to its end passing through a number of intervening stages.
- (3) Its continuous progress from its beginning to its end is caused by the single purpose of the potter which makes it a single, indivisible act of creation.
- (4) Its purpose is no other than the ideal of the potter to create a perfect pitcher. It is, therefore, a search for beauty and perfection.
- (5) At each of its various stages its object is to refine and improve the product of the whole of its past in a particular direction implied in its final purpose and not to create anything new or special unrelated to the past.
- (6) The internal purpose of the potter manifests itself in the external form of his creation and its manifestation becomes more and more definite and clear as his creative activity proceeds.

Even when we consider the whole of the creative activity of the potter as an individual having a particular ideal of life we shall find that it has the same characteristics. These are in fact the characteristics of the creative activity of every human individual. This means that if self-consciousness is really the seed, the source and the ultimate cause of the universe, the creative activity of the World-Self-Consciousness in the universe has the following characteristics:

- (1) It has a beginning and an end.
- (2) It is advancing continuously from its beginning to its end passing through a number of intervening stages.
- (3) Its continuous progress from its beginning to its end is caused by the single purpose of the World-Self which makes it a single indivisible act of creation.
- (4) Its purpose is no other than the ideal of the World-Self to create a perfect Universe. It is, therefore, a search for Beauty and Perfection.
- (5) At each of its various stages its object is to refine and improve the product of the whole of its past in a particular direction implied in its final purpose and not to create anything new and special unrelated to the past.
- (6) The hidden purpose of the World-Self is manifesting itself in the external universe of its creation and its manifestation is becoming more and more definite and clear as its creative activity is proceeding.

Thus the Creator's attribute of self-consciousness is itself enough to lead us to the conclusion that the Universe cannot but be the result of a process of gradual evolution. This is what Iqbal means when he says:

چو فطرت سے تراشد پیکرے را
تمامش سے کند در روز گارے

This conclusion naturally implies that the human being has evolved out of the lower and less organized forms of life. The idea of evolution is perfectly consistent with the teachings of the Holy Qur'an. Iqbal writes in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*:

“According to the Quran man is not a stranger on this earth, ‘And we have caused you to grow from the earth’ says the Quran”. (p. 84)

Again he says

“The teaching of the Quran which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognizes a growing Universe and is animated by the hope of man’s eventual victory over evil.” (p. 81)

Sometimes the Qur’anic story of Adam is interpreted as an account of the first appearance of man on earth which is, therefore, considered to be sudden and not gradual as the theory of evolution implies. Iqbal, however, does not think that the story of Adam has anything to do with the first emergence of man on earth. Thus he writes:

“.....The purpose of the Quranic narration (of the legend of Adam) is not historical as in the case of the old Testament.....Indeed in the verses which deal with the *origin of man* as a living being the Quran uses the words *Bashar* or *Insan* and not Adam.” (p. 83)

“Thus we see that the Quranic legend of the fall has nothing to do with the first appearance of man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man’s rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self capable of doubt and disobedience.” (p. 85)

While discussing the re-emergence of man he writes:

“The Quran argues the phenomenon of the re-emergence of the ego on the analogy of his first emergence.”

“Man saith: ‘What! After I am dead, shall I in the end be brought forth alive? Doth not man bear in mind that We made him at first when he was nought? (xix: 67-68) (p. 120, 121).

“It is We Who have decreed that death should be among you. Yet are We not thereby hindered from replacing you with others, your likes, or from producing you in a form which

ye know not! Ye have known the first creation. Will you not reflect? How did man first emerge? This suggestive argument embodied in the last verses of the two passages quoted above did in fact open a new vista to Muslim philosophers. It was Jahiz (d. 225 A.H.) who first hinted at the changes in animal life caused by migrations and environment generally. The association known as the 'Brethren of Purity' further amplified the views of Jahiz. Ibn Maskawaih (d. 421 H.), however, was the first Muslim thinker to give a clear and in many respects thoroughly modern theory of the origin of man. It was only natural and perfectly consistent with the spirit of Quran that Rumi regarded the question of immortality as one of biological evolution and not a problem to be decided by arguments of a purely metaphysical nature, as some philosophers of Islam had thought. The theory of evolution, however, has brought despair and anxiety, instead of hope and enthusiasm for life, to the modern world. The reason is to be found in the unwarranted modern assumption that man's present structure, mental as well as physiological, is the last word in biological evolution and that death regarded as a biological event has no constructive meaning. The world of today needs a Rumi to create an attitude of hope and to kindle the fire of enthusiasm for life. His inimitable lines may be quoted here:

First man appeared in the class of inorganic things,
 Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.
 For years he lived as one of the plants,
 Remembering naught of his inorganic state so different;
 And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state,
 He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,
 Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants,
 Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;
 Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,
 Who know not the cause of their inclination to the breast.
 Again the great Creator as you know,

Drew man out of the animal into the human state.
Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now,
Of his first souls he has now no remembrance,
And he will be again changed from his present soul.”*

The two main aspects of the theory of evolution are (1) the fact of evolution and (2) the cause of evolution. We have seen that according to Iqbal (1) evolution is a fact and (2) the cause of evolution is the desire, the will or the purpose of an all-powerful Creator operating in the Universe. Every philosophical truth is supported sooner or later by scientific discoveries. It is very good that the scientists have already arrived at a *complete* agreement among themselves as regards the fact of evolution. They are now unanimous in their belief that evolution has actually occurred. “To-day,” say the writers of *The Science of Life*, “there is no denial of the fact of organic evolution, except on the part of manifestly ignorant, prejudicial or superstitious minds.” The scientists are, however, still divided into two main sections so far as their views about the cause of evolution are concerned. Some of them, led by Darwin and commonly known as the mechanists, believe that evolution results from the aimless functioning of the mechanical forces of nature. Others believe that it is the outcome of some hidden purpose working in and through living organisms. The views of the latter, known as purposivists, are, of course, favourable to the Iqbalian theory of evolution.

Unfortunately the common intellectual too often identifies the fact of evolution with its cause and ignores that to say that evolution has occurred is not the same thing as to believe in its cause as explained by a particular philosopher or scientist. It is, however, easy to see that to know a fact is not the same thing as to know its cause. A person, for example, may know that a railway engine moves and yet he may not be able to explain the cause of its motion or he may give an extremely erroneous explanation of it. A man who believes in the fact of evolution is generally imagined to be a Darwinist, although Darwinism is a theory relating to the cause of

*Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*—p. 814

evolution and not to its fact. Darwinism is not evolution, nor evolution is Darwinism.

Darwin, moreover, was not the originator of the idea of evolution. Several thinking men in the history of our race have thought of the possibility of the Universe having come into existence by a process of evolution. Adumbers of the idea of evolution are clearly traceable in such ancient writers as Lucretius and Empedocles. Aristotle, too, was inclined towards it. Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel were definitely evolutionists. The idea became a subject for scientific study *even in the domain of science* long before Darwin had said anything about it. The European who first put forward the idea of evolution in its modern scientific form was Buffon, the French naturalist. Goethe in Germany and St. Hilare in France received it with enthusiasm. The latter in fact called attention to the embryological evidence in its favour. But the true father of the modern theory of evolution is another French naturalist Lamarck whose epoch-making work on *Zoological Studies* was published in 1809. Unfortunately, however, Lamarck did not receive in his lifetime the recognition that he deserved. The idea of evolution was widely known and understood only after Charles Darwin (1809-82) had published his *Origin of Species* and Wallace had stated that he, working independently, had arrived at similar results. Darwin soon followed up his first publication by his *Descent of Man*. Since then the theory of evolution has found an increasing confirmation in practically every field of science especially in Physics, Astronomy, Geology, Biology, Sociology, Embryology, Palaeontology and Comparative Anatomy. Darwin not only collected and systematised all evidence for evolution that could be available in his own days, but also put forward the view that Natural Selection, through the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence, is in itself a complete explanation of the cause of evolution. It is this particular explanation of evolution that is known as Darwinism. Darwin's books, however, created a fierce controversy about the fact of evolution because they attracted the attention of the common intellectual, for the first time, to a theory which questioned his age-old beliefs and assumptions and which, though long in existence, was so far going

unnoticed. In this controversy some eminent biologists like Thomas Huxley and Ernest Haeckel championed the cause of evolution and defended the views of Darwin both as regards the occurrence of evolution and the factors responsible for its occurrence. Their critics, on the other hand, refuted these views wholesale with the result that Darwinism and evolution came to be identified with each other on both sides. While the scientists have now accepted the fact of evolution, the controversy about Darwinism still persists although it is perfectly true to say that Darwinism is rapidly losing its ground and its opponents are already on the way to a complete victory. Indeed if we take into consideration what we hear and read in scientific circles and journals again and again we have to conclude that even now there is no dearth of serious students of evolutionary science who believe that Darwinism has already collapsed.

Briefly the theory of Darwin is that it is in the nature of life to vary. The whole organism and its individual organs and functions are subject to minute variations which occur blindly and haphazardly in any and every direction. Moreover, all species of animals have to struggle against a hostile environment, against their enemies and dangers of every kind in order to feed and protect themselves and their offspring. In this struggle only the fittest species are able to maintain their race; all others perish. This means that nature favours the maintenance and further development of only that accidental change of shape, colour, structure, function or instinct which renders the animal better able to secure food for itself, to grasp its prey, to avoid or defeat its enemies, to protect its offspring, to propagate its species and so on. Without choice, without aim and without conscious purpose nature offers a wealth of variations, the conditions of existence act as a sieve, variations which correspond to them maintain themselves gliding through the meshes of the sieve, those that do not disappear. In this process of passive adaptation the forms of life are raised from the originally homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the simple to complex, and from the lower to the higher. The absence of purpose is the very essence of Darwinism. Variations arise fortuitously out of the organism and present themselves for selection in the struggle for existence,

They are not actively acquired by means of the struggle. If there is any purpose in evolution it is, according to Darwin, apparent and not real. Darwinists endeavour to explain the emergence of even the most complicated organ such as the eye and the most puzzling function such as the instinct of a bee, as a result of a series of accidents. This position is, of course, completely antagonistic to that of Iqbal.

Darwinism has passed through several stages and undergone several differentiations and transformations since its birth but its essence and main features have remained the same. Although it is primarily a biological theory, the Darwinists use it to answer all questions relating to Psychology, Metaphysics, Logic, Epistemology, Ethics, Aesthetics and even History, Economics and Politics. Indeed if Darwinism with its radical opposition to teleology and its stress on mechanical selection is really an adequate explanation of a part of the evolutionary process, it ought to be an adequate explanation of the whole of it. As was only natural, Darwinism has deeply influenced all subsequent developments of the human and social sciences. It has yielded many bitter fruits and the bitterest of them all is Marxism on account of which the world is now divided into two hostile camps, each ready to blow the other to atoms.

"My theory", said Darwin 'will lead to a whole philosophy'. He was right. But the philosophy that results from the theory of Darwin is a terrible shock to man's justified conviction of his own dignity over the rest of creation, which he thinks he enjoys by virtue of the nobility of his mind and spirit and the sanctity of his reason and free-will. For the implications of his theory are that the whole of this wonderful world of life is nothing but the blind and fortuitous play of the reckless forces of nature. It is completely devoid of plan or method. What is now a human being may have been a worm crawling in a gutter. The higher activities of man like Religion, Morality, Politics, Art, Science, Philosophy, Law and Education have no worth or value of their own, since their very basis, *i.e.*, the conscience of man and his desire for ideals of Beauty and Perfection, is the result of an accident, a chance product of ignoble tumult of animal impulses, desires and sensations.

which may not have come into existence at all.

The spirit of man revolts against such ideas and their scientific accuracy at once becomes doubtful. No wonder, therefore, that there were soon many powerful rebels in the Darwinist camp. Wallace, the co-discoverer of the Darwinian theory of the struggle for existence, ultimately came to believe in a spiritual explanation of evolution. Romanes, a prominent disciple of Darwin, ended in Christian theism. Fleischmann kept illustrating the orthodox Darwinian stand-point during many years of personal research, but finally developed into an outspoken opponent of not only the theory of selection but also of the doctrine of descent. Friedmann did the same. Driesch started with a mechanical theory of life but wrote a series of essays to show that life is fundamental and evolution is purposive. Among the founders of constructive theories of evolution opposed to Darwinism may be counted Lamarck, Etienne Geoffroy, St. Hilaire, Ersner, Kassowitz, W. Haacke, Nageli, De Vries, Driesch and Bergson. The scope of the present article does not permit me to give here even a brief outline of these theories. Suffice it to say that the commonest and the most prominent feature of all these theories is that a living organism has not to wait passively for natural selection and prolonged accumulation of minute variations. On the other hand there is a hidden purpose working in and through the organism which enables it spontaneously and of itself to bring forth what is necessary for self-maintenance, often what is new and different with an extensive range of possibilities. It is, for instance, able to produce protective adaptations against cold or heat, to regenerate lost parts, often to replace entire organs that have been lost and under certain circumstances to produce new organs altogether. There is no end to illustrations that have been adduced in support of this view. As such it is a mere caprice on the part of those Darwinists who still cling to the theory of natural selection and do not take into account the spontaneous capacities and characteristics of living organisms which constitute a definite proof of the teleological nature of evolution.

The emergence of conscious purpose in man itself, as one of his most important characteristics, constitutes an evidence in favour

of purposive evolution. The very word evolution implies purpose, since it means growth or movement towards higher and higher stages of development. Every kind of growth or development must have a destination from the very beginning, otherwise it will not be any growth or development at all. The highest product of the growth of a tree is the seed and the seed is implied in the tree at every stage of its growth. If the Universe has really evolved and developed upto its present stage does it not mean that purpose, one of the most precious products, of its development, was implied in it from the beginning, that purpose of some sort was present at every stage of its development? At the material stage it was entirely unconscious, at the biological stage it was half conscious, at the human stage it became completely conscious and deliberate.

Although science has proclaimed the justification of a belief in evolution, we have seen that Iqbal's belief in evolution is not the outcome of a desire for fashionable thinking. It is derived by him independently from the attributes of Reality as stated in the Holy Qur'an.

It does not depend upon the discovery of fossils or the successful search of the missing links in the theory of any particular scientist. Nor does it imply, as Darwin and other evolutionists of the West seem to believe, that man descends from the ape or any other non-human species, known to us to be in existence at present or to have been in existence in the past. The Iqbalian or the Qur'anic theory of evolution implies that man has developed out of man, out of his own earlier forms and not out of any other non-human species.

A human embryo passes through various stages of its development, but at no stage it is anything other than a human embryo. Similar is the case with the development of man as a species; it has passed through a number of stages of its own development but at none of these stages it was anything other than a human species. From the moment of its first emergence in matter, life continued to progress steadily and continuously along the line of evolution that was leading to the human form. All other species that came into existence were branches that shot out of this main trunk of the

tree of evolution. The main line of evolution was the right path of life that was destined to persist indefinitely while all other lines were deflections from this path that were doomed to disappear or vegetate without evolving.

WHITHER CIVILISATION?

The world's thinkers are stricken dumb. Is this going to be the end of all this progress and evolution of civilization, they ask, that men should destroy one another in mutual hatred and make human habitation impossible on this earth. Remember, man can be maintained on this earth only by honouring mankind, and this world will remain a battleground of ferocious beasts of prey unless and until the educational forces of the whole world are directed to inculcating in man respect for mankind. Only one unity is dependable and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life and the beautiful ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialise.

—IQBAL

(April, 60)

IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF ETERNITY

In ordinary language we use certain concepts which have acquired special meanings because of their common and frequent usage. The same concepts are sometimes used without any alteration in scientific and philosophical discourse. Aristotelean division of a proposition, for example, into subject and predicate led philosophers to the formulation of the concept of "substance" which was supposed to be the underlying substratum of attributes. This division was made for the sake of linguistic convenience. Whenever we have to refer to a sensible property of a thing, say, to the colour of a table, we use a name "the table" and then brownness or whiteness is predicated of it. We say "The table is brown". We have no other means to refer to the brownness of the table than making a distinction between "the table itself" and "brownness". The impression is given as if "the table itself" is over and above its sensible properties. Logically, the notion of the "table itself" is absurd. The table is the sum of its sensible properties. With the withdrawal of its sensible properties, the table will disappear; we will not be left with any sort of simple entity called "table-in-itself". Thus the philosophers of the past found themselves involved in metaphysical difficulties because of the ordinary usage of language.

Among other concepts born of ordinary language, there is the concept of time. Time, for a layman, is a succession of changes. We tend to think that changes, whether in our consciousness or in the objects of external world, are successional. This conception of time gives rise to serious difficulties. Zeno was the first thinker who pointed out these difficulties inherent in the ordinary conception of time.

A very important difficulty created by this conception of

time is that we have become accustomed to thinking in terms of "beginning" and "end". Every thing that exists, we tend to suppose, must have a beginning and an end. The words "before" and "after" are born of the commonsense conception of time according to which events happen in a successional manner and the duration between two events is regarded as "event-less". The succession of events is expressed in language by the words "before" and "after". By the commonsense conception of time, we have become accustomed to think of a thing or a happening with reference to its beginning and end. This is not only in the case of time that we have evolved a peculiar and rigid frame of reference, but our conception of the physical world is handed down to us by our remote ancestors. It requires great labour to change the habit of thinking in terms of those concepts whose roots shade off in the mist of antiquity. This is why the people of the past found it highly difficult to leave "geocentric" tendency and accept Copernicus's view that the earth moves around the sun.

Whenever we endeavour to understand Einstein's Theory of Relativity or any other theory presented in the light of this theory, we find that our previous concepts, which are rooted in common sense, are serious impediments. Iqbal's concept of eternity cannot be understood without the knowledge of the Theory of Relativity, and to understand the Theory of Relativity requires a fundamental change in our imagination and habits of thinking. Russell gives an interesting example to make the point clear :

"Let us suppose that a drug is administered to you which makes you temporarily unconscious, and that when you wake you have lost your memory but not your reasoning powers. Let us suppose further that while you were unconscious you were carried into a balloon, which, when you come to, is sailing—with the wind on a dark night—the night of the fifth of November if you are in England, or of the fourth of July if you are in America. You can see fire works which are being sent off from the ground, from trains, and from aeroplanes travelling in all directions, but you cannot see the ground or the trains or the aeroplanes because of the darkness. What sort of the picture of the world will you form? You will think that nothing is permanent: there are only brief flashes of light which, during their short existence, travel through the void in the most various and bizarre

curves. You cannot touch these flashes of light, you can only see them. Obviously your geometry and your physics and your metaphysics will be quite different from those of ordinary mortals. If an ordinary mortal were with you in the balloon, you will find his speech unintelligible. But if Einstein were with you, you will understand him more easily than the ordinary mortal would, because you would be free from a host of preconceptions which prevent most people from understanding him."¹

History of the Term. A brief account of the history of the term "eternity" will make it easy to understand what Iqbal has to say on the subject.

"Eternity" is derived from the Latin *aeternus*, a contraction of *aeviternus*, which, in turn, is derived from *aevum*, a word from the same root as the English words "ever" and "aye". In Greek, the corresponding adjectives are even more obviously connected with the notion of everlasting existence. This is the original sense of the word "eternal" and probably also the sense that is still the most common in ordinary language. But in certain philosophical contexts, the notion of everlasting existence is expressed rather by "sempiternal," eternal being reserved for the sense of "timeless".² We may say that eternal is that to which the category of time cannot be applied, for example, in mathematics and logic there are certain expressions which are regarded as "timeless". "Twice two are four" or "The straight line is the shortest distance between two points" are the sentences which are timeless. We can't say, "Twice two were four" or "The straight line will be the shortest distance between two points."

In the case of sempiternal, beginning in time is accepted but end in time is denied. The word "sempiternal" may be regarded as synonymous with "everlasting". Human ego is sempiternal or everlasting (or, as Iqbal calls it, immortal), if it has a beginning in time. The universe is eternal, if it has no beginning and no end in time.

Parmenides is the first Greek thinker who put forward a clear and definite theory of eternity.³ Only Being, Parmenides

1. Bertrand Russell, *A.B.C. of Relativity*, pp. 10-11.

2. *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, III, 64-65.

3. Although a conception of cyclical time-order is to be found in the

holds, is and Not-Being is not. Being cannot arise from Not-Being, because *ex nihilo nihil fit*. So Being has arisen from Being itself, that is, it has no beginning. Similarly, Being can pass on either into Being or into Not-Being. Not-Being is not. Hence Being will pass on into Being, which amounts to saying that Being has no end. Being is, therefore, "eternal". It neither was at any time nor will be, since it is now all at once *ouv ilav* "a single whole" [Parmenides, "The Way of Truth"].

In Parmenides, we discern a conception of the mode of existence which is in the timeless present. The same conception appears in Plato when he attributes eternity to Ideas or Forms and time to the mundane existence. Some critics contend that Plato had never asserted the objectivity of Forms and that by the eternity of Forms, he had meant what is understood by the timelessness of definitions or mathematical entities. They think that Plato's doctrine of the objectivity of Forms is the result of wrong interpretation of Aristotle. Whether Plato ascribed objectivity to Forms or took them as mathematical entities, the fact is beyond the shadow of doubt that he did believe in the eternity of Forms in the sense that they have no beginning and no end in time and that they are not subject to aging. Hence, one thing is to be noted that, like Zeno and Parmenides, Plato did not deny reality to time. In *Timaeus* (3pb5), he speaks of the creation of time. "Time was created with heaven." He also speaks of time as the moving image of eternity (*Timaeus*, 37d)

Aristotle's conception of eternity is somewhat different. He applies the term "eternity" to a number of beings. The universe as a whole, the celestial spheres, the moon, the matterless Intelligence and the Unmoved Mover—all are eternal in the sense of

Pythagorean society, yet it was never presented as clearly and definitely as Parmenides did. Parmenides is said to have been associated with the Pythagoreans in his youth. He might have learnt this doctrine from them. In Indian philosophy the concept of eternity had appeared much earlier than Parmenides or the Pythagoreans. As some historians of philosophy maintain that Pythagoras had visited India and that he learnt the doctrine of transmigration of souls from the *rishis* it may be said that the Greek concept of "eternity" is Indian in origin. This issue, however, deserves further research and separate treatment.

having no beginning and no end. When he speaks of the eternity of the universe and other moving objects, he means an infinite time by it, because, for him, change and time are identical and an infinite change implies an infinite time. The universe, he holds, is a ceaseless and gradual development of matter into form. Therefore, the question of its coming to an end does not arise. The moment will never come when the universe, as a whole, will achieve its end, i.e. Pure Form, in time. Although Pure Form is absolutely real, yet it is non-existent in the sense of being temporal and spatial. Pure Form is the unachievable end of the moving universe. At the same time, however, it is the beginning of the universe, so far as the logical order is concerned, because Form is that which is logically prior to matter. The form of a seed, say, an actual pine tree, is given as a potentiality before the seed, the matter of the pine tree, begins to grow.

Now, we can bring out the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of eternity. Plato's world of Ideas is completely free from temporal relations. But, like Parmenides, he does not deny the reality of time. On the other hand, he ascribes all temporal relations to the sphere of becoming and believes that eternal is that to which the category of time does not apply. Aristotle, retaining Platonic sense of eternity, refers to more than one eternal being. Aristotle has, along with the beings to which time is inapplicable, given eternity to time itself, the absence of which is a mark of eternity for Plato.

In subsequent thought these ideas are echoed and re-echoed in various degrees. In Jewish and Christian theology we come across a certain interpretation of God in which such expressions as "The First" and "The Last" are supposed to stand for the negation of temporal relations. Bahya and Maimonides take the terms "First" and "Last" and referring to God's absolute priority and posteriority,⁴ Augustine has drawn a distinction between the "ever-fixed" (*Semper Stantis*) and the "never-fixed" (*Numquam Stantis*) to explain the nature of eternity and time. Boethius is also of the opinion that the infinity of time should not be con-

4. *Hobol ha-Jababot*, I, 6. (Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, pp. 262-63).

fused with the eternity of God. "Wherefore, if we will give things their right names, following Plato, let us say that God is eternal and the world perpetual."⁵ In all medieval philosophic writings this distinction was maintained and a different term *aevum* was coined to signify the infinity of time and thereby keeping it apart from the eternity of God. Suarez has given a list of scholastic views on eternity.⁶ But he himself has given a special meaning to the term "eternity". He thinks that such statements as "God has no beginning and no end in time," and "Change and movement cannot be predicated of God," are negative definitions of the eternity of God. What God's eternity positively means is that His essence impiles His necessary existence; God's essence and His necessary existence are identical.

Now I briefly mention Spinoza's conception of eternity. In this regard, he has accepted the scholastic view that substance should exclude all temporal relations. He was aware of the distinction between the eternal and perpetual or what is sometimes called "sempiternal". The infinite duration of becoming should not be confused with the eternal existence of God. Indeed, in common speech, we speak of the eternity of the world when we mean its eternal duration in time, but this is an erroneous use of the term. It is only because of the defective terminology that we say "the world has existed from eternity". As we have already seen, Boethius had also tried to remedy this defect by introducing the use of the term "perpetual".⁷

Spinoza further distinguishes between the eternity of that which exists and the eternity of that which does not exist. Here he is referring to the self-evident ideas or axioms of Descartes. Axiomatic truths are eternal, but they are non-existent. Hence the eternity of these first principles should not be confused with the eternity of God. Wolfson refers to the "peculiar Cartesian passage" which Spinoza had in mind. "When we apprehend that it is impossible that anything can be formed of nothing, the

5. Stewart and Rand, Eds., *Consolatio Philosophiae*, VI, 402-03; Wolfson, op. cit., p. 263.

6. Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Disp. I, Sec. III.

7. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 366-67.

proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit* is not to be considered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind, and is a common notion or axiom."⁸

From the above passage, it becomes clear that Spinoza applies the term "eternity" to existent or, more appropriately, real beings. It is only God Whose essence involves existence. All other things have possible existence. God's essence implies His necessary existence. Now Spinoza defines eternity as an "attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God". When Spinoza says that essence involves existence, he means the fact of being "causeless". Since it is only in the case of God that His essence and existence are identical, God is to be regarded as *causa sui*—(causeless) or infinite—infinite in the sense of being undetermined by a cause. God, for Spinoza, is the cause of Himself: "By cause of itself, I understand that whose essence involves existence or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing" (Def. 1).

"By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself" (Def. 3).

"It pertains to the nature of substance to exist" (ibid., Prop. 7).

Two points in Spinoza's conception of eternity are to be noted.

(1) He has accepted the traditional view that Reality excludes all temporal relations and is, consequently, immovable, imperishable, indivisible (and is all that which the exclusion of time logically calls for).

(2) He has admitted the identity of essence and necessary existence only in the case of God Who is infinite.

Einstein's Conception. The traditional view of an infinite, eternal, indivisible and unmovable substance as the ultimate ground of every thing reappears in Newton's conception of "absolute space" in a different garb. The problem which troubled Newton was that of distinguishing relative motion from "absolute" motion in a universe which represents degrees of motion. To give a mechanical view of the universe, he looked for a point in

8. Ibid., p. 367.

space which was absolutely at rest. This is why he spoke of the possibility of somebody in the "remote regions of fixed stars or perhaps far beyond them" which is absolutely at rest. But he thinks that to prove this is impossible. Then he puts forward the notion of "absolute space" in order to determine the relative motion of planets. Lincoln Barnett remarks:

"... it seemed to Newton that space itself might serve as a fixed frame of reference to which the wheeling of the stars and galaxies could be related in terms of absolute motion. He regarded space as a physical reality, stationary and immovable, and while he could not support his conviction by any scientific argument, he nevertheless clung to it on theological grounds. For, to Newton space represented the divine omnipotence of God in nature."⁹

Thus to prove his law of Inertia, he put forward a hypothetical view of absolute space of ether which to him was absolutely at rest. "Absolute space, in virtue of its nature and without reference to any external object whatsoever, always remains immutable and immovable. . . . Relative space is a measure of or a movable part of the absolute space. Our senses designate it by its position with respect to other objects."¹⁰ Newton's conception of time is also similar. He says:

"Absolute true and mathematical time follows in itself and in virtue of its nature uniformly and without reference to any external object whatsoever. It is also called duration. Relative, apparent and ordinary time is a perceptible and external, either exact or unequal, measure of duration which we customarily use instead of true time such as hour, day, month, year. . . . All motions may be accelerated or retarded. Only the flow of absolute time cannot be changed. The same duration and the same persistence occurs in the existence of all things, whether the motion be rapid, slow or zero."¹¹

After Newton, Faraday gave a slightly modified conception of ether as the carrier of electric and magnetic forces. The case

9. Lincoln Barnett, *The Universe and Dr. Einstein*, p. 40.

10. Raziuddin Siddiqi, "Iqbal's Conception of Space and Time," *Iqbal, The Poet of Tomorrow*, p. 40

11. *Ibid.*

for ether was further strengthened by Maxwell's discovery that light is an electromagnetic phenomenon which consists of waves and is capable of propagation in vacuum at a constant pace. For the scientists of the second half of the nineteenth century, the notion of any kind of waves (e.g. sound waves, water waves) presupposed a medium to occur in. So, to account for the propagation of light as electromagnetic waves through vacuum, the conception of a very fine medium was put forward. This medium was denominated ether. Thus the mechanical scientists retained Newtonian absolute space.

In 1881, two American physicists, Michelson and Morley, performed an experiment by means of their delicate device "interferometer" which was made to record the velocity of light. Michelson-Morley experiment created doubts as to the actual existence of ether. "The one indisputable fact established by Michelson-Morley experiment was that the velocity of light is unaffected by the motion of the earth. Einstein seized on this as a revelation of universal law. If the velocity of light is constant regardless of the earth's motion, he reasoned, it must be constant regardless of the motion of any sun, moon, star, meteor or other system moving anywhere in the universe. From this he drew a broader generalization, and asserted that the laws of nature are the same for all uniformly moving systems. This simple statement is the essence of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity."¹²

Einstein held that there is no fixed frame of reference, i.e. there is no absolute space. The movements of planets, stars and galaxies are to be determined with respect to each other. Long before Einstein, Leibniz had visualised that space is merely an order of relations of things among themselves. If all things are withdrawn from the universe, space will also disappear.

The Newtonian conception of absolute time is also not acceptable to Einstein. There is no such thing as absolute, eternal and unvarying duration flowing from infinite past to infinite future. Like space, time is also a form of perception. If no event takes place, there will be no moment, no hour or no day. Just

12. Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

as space is a possible order of things, so is time a possible order of events. The subjectivity of time is explained in Einstein's own words :

"The experiences of an individual appear to us arranged in a series of events; in this series the single events which we remember appear to be ordered according to the criterion of 'earlier' and 'later'. There exists, therefore, for the individual, an I-time, or subjective time. This in itself is not measurable. I can, indeed, associate numbers with the events, in such a way that a greater number is associated with the later event than with an earlier one. This association I can define by means of clock by comparing the order of events furnished by the clock with the order of the given series of events. We understand by a clock something which provides a series of events which can be counted."¹³

Time, according to Einstein, is not an objective concept. The clocks and calendars to which we refer our experiences are geared to our solar system. Therefore there is no such thing as "the simultaneity of two events". Two events may be simultaneous for a person in one frame of reference but may not be simultaneous for another in a different frame of reference. At 7 p.m. from New York you telephone a friend of yours who is in London where it is midnight. You will say that you are talking "at the same time". This is because both of you are in the same frame of reference, i.e. the planet earth. For the person who is outside this system, these two events may not be simultaneous. Thus Einstein showed that the notion of absolute time is as false as the notion of absolute space. The universe we live in does not consist of two fundamentally different and independent categories of space and time as Descartes had held. Space and time, on the contrary, are relative and dependent on each other. We should not speak of absolute time or absolute space because our universe is made up of single "space-time-continuum" in which both space and time are equally important. Now, the old conception of three-dimensional world is replaced by the notion of four dimensions of the world, i.e. breadth, length, depth and "time".

It is now time we should try to portray the picture of the

13. Quoted in *ibid.*

universe in the light of the Theory of Relativity. This is known as Relativistic Cosmology. But before we try to understand the nature of Einsteinian universe, we should take note of a few possible types of worlds. In what follows a few models or types are given in which our world may exist.

Suppose a bug is confined on a straight line. The bug cannot move sideways or up and down. Its movement will be restricted to backward or forward. Now the bug's movement is confined to the straight line which has a definite measurement, the world of the bug will be *finite*. And since the bug cannot go beyond the ends of the segment of that line, its world will be regarded as *finite and bounded*.

If the bug is placed on the perimeter of a circle, it can still move forward and backward. However, in this case, its movement will not be hindered by the "ends". So, on the perimeter of a circle, the bug will keep on moving without ever confronting any barrier. Its world, now, is *unbounded*. But since the perimeter of the circle is a definite measurable length its world will be still *finite*.

You can have the idea of two-dimensional world, if you put the bug on the surface of a square or a sphere. In the case of a square, the bug can move in any direction, forward and backward and also sideways. But it cannot move off the surface. Since the area of the surface is measurable, its world is finite; and since it cannot keep going in a straight line through the edges of the square, its world is bounded. In this case its two-dimensional world is *finite and bounded*. Now, in the case of a sphere if the bug is not allowed to go off the surface, its two-dimensional world will be *finite and unbounded*. Again, if it is put on an infinitely large flat plane, its two-dimensional world will be *infinite and unbounded*.

You can have a rough idea of three-dimensional world if you put the bug in a spherical hollow shell. This will be its three-dimensional world, because it can move up and down in addition to forward and backward and sideways. This three-dimensional world will be *finite*; since the area of the shell will be measurable and *bounded*; since the movement of the bug in a straight line will be barred by the wall of the shell.

In order to have a picture of three-dimensional world which is finite and unbounded, you should suppose that the bug lives with a whole family of bugs in a space which has no physical boundaries. Now assume that each and every bug is very huge and massive. This group of bugs cannot disintegrate because of its gravitational attraction as a whole. Thus no bug will be in a position to leave its family. Moreover, the gravitational attraction is so strong that light rays will not be able to leave the mass of bugs either. Therefore, whenever any bug will try to see in the direction of space beyond the group, its sight will curve back towards the group, always producing "bugs in his eyes," and it will never be able to see beyond the group—"straight ahead" for each bug always will mean towards the centre of the group. The bugs will not be conscious of any physical barrier; though, as far as they know, they will live in a world which is unbounded. Their world is finite since the size of the group as a whole is *finite* and the group constitutes their world.

An example of a three-dimensional world which is *infinite* and *unbounded* could exist for a bug if we left it alone to roam all by itself in an infinite space without any gravitational masses or other forces to hinder it. Or, if there were other bugs present, their universe could still be infinite in an infinite free space, provided that gravitational attraction could be turned off and on like other types of physical attraction.¹⁴

According to Newton, the universe was like a finite island in an infinite ocean of space. Therefore we can say that the Newtonian universe is *finite* and *bounded*.

Einstein does not subscribe to Newton's view for the following main reasons.

(1) Newton's theory implies that the light and energy continuously radiated by the stars would go off into the vast space beyond the stars, never to return. If this is true, then the energy of the universe will gradually dissipate and a day will come when the universe will disappear.

(2) Einstein had mathematical reasons to reject the Newton-

14. This illustration has been taken from Coleman, *Relativity for the Layman*, p. 105.

ian conception of the universe. In a world situated in the vast ocean of space, the average density of matter throughout the universe would have to be zero. The laws of Newton were predicted on the fact that light travelled in a straight line. The General Theory of Relativity showed, however, that light rays are deflected by gravitational masses. On the basis of the results of the General Theory, Einstein concluded that our universe is *finite and unbounded*. The universe is finite because the entire mass of the universe is measurable and, according to his calculation, the radius of the universe is about 200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 miles.

Iqbal's Conception. Iqbal is a great admirer of Einstein. He agrees with him that the conception of an Absolute Space is unworkable both on philosophical and scientific grounds :

“ . . . The scientific view of nature as pure materiality is associated with the Newtonian view of space as an absolute void in which things are situated. This attitude of science has, no doubt, ensured its speedy progress; but the bifurcation of total experience into two opposite domains of mind and matter has to-day forced it, in view of its own domestic difficulties, to consider the problems which, in the beginning of its career, it completely ignored. The criticism of the foundations of the mathematical sciences has fully disclosed that the hypothesis of a pure materiality, an enduring stuff situated in an absolute space, is unworkable.”¹⁵

He accepts Professor Whitehead's presentation of the Relativity Theory :

“ . . . Modern science regards Nature not as something static, situate in an infinite void, but a structure of interrelated events out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time.”¹⁶

Although Iqbal accepts the notion of space-time-continuum,¹⁷ yet he attaches priority and superiority to time. The relation of space and time is like the relation of body and mind. Iqbal thinks that to take into consideration all the characteristics relevant to

15. *Reconstruction*, pp. 35-36.

16 Ibid., p. 65.

17. In *Javid Nāmah*, the spirit Zarwān stands for space-time continuum.

philosophical interpretation of the world is beyond the purview of science. Hence we should turn to our own inner conscious experience for a further understanding of the nature of time.

Iqbal, like Bergson, draws a distinction between serial time and pure or real time. McTaggart had not recognised this distinction. Hence he was erroneously led to deny the reality of time. A close reflection on our own inner mental life reveals the fact that our consciousness is not made up of static and distinct states. Our conscious life is a perpetual and indivisible flow of change in which past keeps on accumulating in the present and it "gnaws" into future. Future is merely an open possibility; it is not an already drawn line upon which we are to travel. "If we regard past, present, and future, as essential to time, then we picture time as a straight line, part of which we have travelled and left behind, and part lies yet untravelled before us. This is taking time, not as a living creative movement, but as a static absolute."¹⁸ This real time is "pure duration" as Bergson called it. Serial time is the intellectual apprehension of pure duration. Intellect carves out distinct and static bits from the indivisible flow of real time. Real time or pure duration is change without succession. It is associated with the appreciative ego. Serial time is the time of the efficient ego.

Now, ultimate reality according to Iqbal is a rationally directed creative will in which life, consciousness and purpose are organically united. For Bergson, creative movement of life was not teleological. He thought that purpose would deprive the vital flow of creativity; evolution would become determined. Iqbal, however, thinks that purpose is not a distant goal towards which the Divine energy is directed. It is on the other hand, inner necessity. Hence the presence of purpose does not affect the creative nature of ultimate reality. This ultimate reality Iqbal conceives as a self and calls it Ultimate Ego or Supreme Ego. Nature is its self-expression. In his own words:

"A critical interpretation of the sequence of time as revealed in ourselves has led us to the notion of the ultimate Reality as pure duration in which thought, life, and purpose inter-penetrate to

18. *Reconstruction*, p. 58.

form an organic unity. We cannot conceive this unity except as the unity of a self—an all-embracing concrete self—the ultimate source of all individual life and thought. . . . To exist in pure duration is to be a self, and to be a self is to be able to say 'I am'. Only that truly exists which can say 'I am'. It is the degree of the intuition of 'I-amness' that determines the place of a thing in the scale of being. We too say 'I am'. But our 'I-amness' is dependent and arises out of the distinction between the self and the not-self. The ultimate Self, in the words of the Quran 'can afford to dispense with all the worlds' To Him the not-self does not present itself as a confronting 'other', or else it would have to be, like our finite self, in spatial relation with the confronting 'other'. What we call Nature or the not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God. His 'I-amness' is independent, elemental, absolute. Of such a self it is impossible for us to form an adequate conception. As the Quran says, 'Naught' is like Him; yet 'He hears and sees' Now a self is unthinkable without a character, *i.e.*, a uniform mode of behaviour. Nature, as we have seen, is not a mass of pure materiality occupying a void. It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate Self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phrase of the Quran it is the habit of Allah. From the human point of view it is an interpretation which, in our present situation, we put on the creative activity of the Absolute Ego. At a particular moment in its forward moment it is finite; but since the self to which it is organic is creative, it is liable to increase, and is consequently boundless in the sense that no limit to its extension is final. Its boundlessness is potential, not actual. Nature, then, must be understood as a living, ever-growing organism whose growth has no final external limits. Its only limit is internal, *i.e.*, the immanent self which animates and sustains the whole. As the Quran says: 'And verily unto thy Lord is the limit' (53 : 14)."¹⁹

The Universe is an expression of God and all existents are organically related to Him as ideas, desires, emotions, caprices, etc., are related to the finite human mind.

In Muslim theology, the problem of time is discussed alongside the problem of ultimate Reality. This is, Iqbal points out, for two main reasons:

"[i] according to the Quran, the alternation of day and night

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

is one of the greatest signs of God, and [ii] partly to the Prophet's identification of God with *Dahr* (time)."²⁰

Now the time of the Ultimate Ego or God is fundamentally opposed to the time of finite egos. Time, according to an ordinary ego, is a succession of individual "nows". This view of time, which was accepted by the Ash'arites and Newton, gave rise to serious difficulties referred to by Iqbal :

"... From this view it obviously follows that between every two individual 'nows' or moments of time, there is an unoccupied moment of time, that is to say, a void of time. The absurdity of this conclusion is due to the fact that they [the Ash'arites] looked at the subject of their inquiry from a wholly objective point of view. They took no lesson from the history of Greek thought, which had adopted the same point of view and had reached no results. In our own time Newton described time as 'something which in itself and from its own nature flows equally'. The metaphor of stream implied in this description suggests serious objections to Newton's equally objective view of time. We cannot understand how a thing is affected on its immersion in this stream, and how it differs from things that do not participate in its flow. Nor can we form any idea of the beginning, the end, and the boundaries of time if we try to understand it on the analogy of a stream. Moreover, if flow, movement, or 'passage' is the last word as to the nature of time, there must be another time to time the movement of the first time, and another which times the second time, and so on to infinity."²¹

Iqbal does not accept the traditional view of time as a succession of individual moments. He, on the other hand, refers to Professor Rougier (*Rougier* in *Reconstruction*), Professor Alexander and Mulla Jalal-ud-Din Dawwani and concludes that "infinite varieties of time [are] relative to the varying grades of being intervening between materiality and pure spirituality."²² Time of gross and material bodies is successional and divisible into past, present and future. Though the time of spiritual beings is also successional, yet its passage is such that a whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of an immaterial being. Time at the level of God, becomes absolutely non-successional. Iqbal writes :

20. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

"Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach Divine time—time which is absolutely free from the quality of passage, and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence, and change. It is above eternity; it has neither beginning nor end. . . . Thus Divine time is what the Quran describes as the 'Mother of Books' in which the whole of history, freed from the net of causal sequence, is gathered up in a single super-eternal 'now'."²³

Here we should note that Iqbal has made a distinction between the appreciative self and the efficient self. Serial time belongs to the efficient self and it is only partially helpful in understanding the nature of reality. Appreciative self, however, lives in pure duration or Divine time and grasps the whole of reality in a single, indivisible act of perception. Here the reader should recall Russell's example given in the beginning of this article. If under the effect of the drug administered to you, you have lost your previous memories but not your reasoning power and now sitting in the balloon you form a new conception of the world, your geometry, your physics and your metaphysics will be absolutely different from those of ordinary mortals. Your thoughts and your language will be unintelligible for an ordinary mortal. But you will understand what Einstein would say because you have caused that fundamental change in your imagination which is a prerequisite for understanding his views. Our habits of thinking and our concepts are geared to serial time or the time of efficient self. So we tend to suppose that everything has a beginning and an end. But if we are free from a "host of preconceptions" and live in pure duration or Divine time, then the question "What is the beginning and the end of the universe?" will lose all meaning and significance. A deeper analysis of conscious experience, thinks Iqbal, enables us to attain to the level of appreciative self where the opposition of change and permanence, of serial and real time, is reconciled.²⁴ Iqbal writes :

" . . . The life of the self consists in its movement from

23. Ibid.

24. Iqbal's interpretation of *Barzakh* can very well be understood in the light of Russell's example. Death is not the end of an ego. After the death and before resurrection, the ego remains in *Barzakh*, a place where it attains adjustment to a new spatio-temporal order.

appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, and atomic time is born out of this movement. Thus the character of our conscious experience—our point of departure in all knowledge—gives us a clue to the concept which reconciles the opposition of permanence and change, of time regarded as an organic whole or eternity, and time regarded as atomic. If then we accept the guidance of our conscious experience, and conceive the life of the all-inclusive Ego on the analogy of the finite ego, the time of the Ultimate Ego is revealed as change without succession, *i.e.*, an organic whole which appears atomic because of the creative movement of the ego. This is what Mir Damad and Mulla Baqir [*sic*] mean when they say that time is born with the act of Creation by which the Ultimate Ego realizes and measures, so to speak, the infinite wealth of His own undetermined creative possibilities. On the one hand, therefore, the ego lives in eternity, by which term I mean non-successional change; on the other, it lives in serial time, which I conceive as organically related to eternity in the sense that it is a measure of non-successional change. In this sense alone it is possible to understand the Quranic verse: 'To God belongs the alternation of day and night.'"²⁵

It has now become clear that, according to Iqbal, the ultimate Reality is a Self Who expresses Himself in the laws and behaviour of Nature. He is the absolute "First" and "Last," *i.e.* has no beginning and no end. Finite egos "proceed" from Him and live like "pearls" in the flow of "Divine energy". Iqbal thinks that human ego has a beginning in time. But once having come into existence, it will not perish, *i.e.* it is immortal. Human ego then, as already pointed out, is sempiternal in medieval terminology. Only God or Supreme Ego is eternal because He has no beginning and no end. Iqbal's position has become somewhat pantheistic. But he has at several places avoided pantheism and rather criticised it. If Nature is organically related to God and finite egos proceed from Him, then the question arises "What fundamental difference is there between God and finite egos and how finite egos retain their identity?"

This question, though very important and significant, is outside the scope of this article. I have dealt with it elsewhere.²⁶

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

26. *Vide* my article: "Wafā'-i Insānī kā Wafā'-i Kabīr se Ta'alluq—Iqbal kī Nazar Men," *Awrāq*, October 1975.

IQBAL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

BY

JAMEELA KHATCON

Iqbal cannot be classed under any of the three schools of philosophical thought: the empiricist, the rationalist or the intuitionist. In his theory of knowledge, sense perception, reason and intuition, all are combined in an organic whole. He knew full well that light from one direction alone could not illumine the whole of reality in all its manifestations. The ontological problem needs to be approached from all angles, scientific and religious, in order to secure some articulate, luminous and well-established grounds. It is in the light of this view that he advances his theory of knowledge, which promises both direct evidence and indirect experience of God or Reality—the former by intuition or immediate experience and the latter by reflective thought.

Rationalism, though not admired, is not wholly condemned and discarded by him. On the contrary, according to him, if rationalism is not divorced from concrete reality, it represents truth. This is visible from his own attitude and is also betrayed by his admiration for prophets and mystics and non-mystic rationalists, whose quest and yearning for a coherent system of ideas resting on a rational foundation and rendering religion more secure and fruitful is well-known¹. He admits and justifies the metaphysical methods. In his words, "Now since the transformation and guidance of man's inner and outer life is the essential aim of religion, it is obvious that the religious truths which it embodies must not remain unsettled. No one would hazard action on the basis of doubtful principles of conduct. Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may even ignore a rational metaphysics;

1. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 1944, P. 3.

indeed it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the opposition of experience and justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself.”² But rationalism, as preached by Iqbal, is not based upon logical categories or mere abstract representations. Born of and nursed in the realism of purely abstract ideas it is not divorced from concrete reality. It has a definite function to perform which should not, however, be over-emphasised to the detriment of other knowledge-yielding elements—at the expense of sense experience and other sources of knowledge.

Thus, while Iqbal embraces rationalism, he is not prepared to justify it at the cost of sense experience. Abstract thinking apart from the latter is of no consequence and even dangerous. He criticises Socrates, Plato, Mu‘tazilites and other thinkers for avoiding visible reality as unreliable and misleading.

Socrates restricts the field of inquiry to the human problems particularly to morality. “Trees”, he says, “can teach me nothing.” Even within the human field he believes knowledge is possible only through concepts.³ Only reason could give true and ultimate knowledge; sensation gives only imagination or at the most belief.

Plato also accuses sense-perception as capable of giving mere opinion and not real knowledge. He rests all knowledge upon pure reason and weaves the whole fabric of Supreme and Ultimate Reality out of ideas, taken as Eternal and Really Real. This attitude towards sense-perception is not without a parallel in the subsequent thought. Ibn Rushd and Al-Ghazali, the former while defending and the latter while attacking Greek Philosophy, have trodden the same path as far as the avoidance of empirical reality is concerned.

Iqbal attacks Ibn Rushd as well as Al-Ghazali. He contends that Ibn Rushd, through his doctrine of Immortality of the Active Intellect, takes a view opposed to what the Qur’an has to say about the value and destiny of the human ego, and thus obscures man’s vision of himself, his God and his world. Similarly, Al-Ghazali’s

2. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *Op. Cit.* P. 2.

3. J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, P. 154.

philosophical scepticism is held by him as an unsafe basis for religion; it is also not wholly justified by the spirit of the Qur'an⁴.

All this shows that Iqbal is in favour of taking full cognizance of the visible and concrete reality. He does not encourage man's contemplative spirit to the extent that it may lead to his withdrawal from the world of matter, which, with its temporal flux and shifting phenomena, is organically related to Ultimate Reality. Hence, for the purposes of knowledge, it is entirely inconceivable to turn away from the material world and to withdraw into a purely contemplative circuit. There is no possibility of complete separation or independence of thought from concrete experience.⁵ On the contrary, one should take his start from here because it is the mental comprehension of the concrete that makes it possible for the intellect of man to pass beyond the concrete.⁵ He invites us to take account of and to be fully awake to the material phenomena with all their passing and changing scenes and sights—heaven and earth, sun and stars, clouds and mountains, deserts and oceans.⁶ They are the signs of the Ultimate Reality and it is the duty of one to reflect on these signs and not to pass by them as if one is like the deaf and the blind, for one who does not see these signs in this life will remain blind to the realities of the life to come⁷. They are the manifestations of Divine Effulgence and reflective observation into their ultimate nature reveals the secret of Divine Reality⁸.

As a matter of fact, Iqbal takes an eclectic view of the whole question. He preaches neither reason nor sense-perception exclusively. Sensation being a chaotic jumble, upholds Iqbal, cannot lead to knowledge. It is reason that imparts harmony, organisation and coherence to this chaotic jumble and moulds it into a knowledge-yielding pattern. He pleads for reflective observation and scientific experiment. He takes full advantage of modern empirical science, though he never stops short at the visible aspect of Reality as the

4. Iqbal, *Op. Cit.* P. 4-7.

5. *Ibid.*, P. 131.

6. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril* Pp. 178-179 (The Spirit of Earth Welcomes The Advent of Adam).

7. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, P. 128.

8. Sir Mohammad Iqbal: *Pas Chih Bayad Kard Ai Aqwam-i-Sharq*, P. 57.

last word in the realm of existence. The sensible Reality is only a symbol of the Ultimate Reality, and the empirical attitude would bring us into contact with it.

Qur'an also takes both the conceptual and non-conceptual attitude towards existence. It recognizes the rationalistic attitude as the cause of the superiority of man over angels, and goes on to say that man has the ability to name things which endows him with the power of capturing them intellectually and thereby rising in the level of existence. But concepts here are not abstract logical entities. They are based on facts of sensation and are indissolubly united with the sensible and observable aspect of Reality. In other words, the knowledge of things is described by Qur'an as the knowledge of names.⁹ Again, Qur'an repeatedly invites man to take account of the physical phenomena. As Iqbal puts it, the Qur'an "sees in the humble be a recipient of Divine Inspiration and constantly calls upon the reader to observe the perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of day and night, the clouds, the starry heavens, and the planets swimming through infinite space"¹⁰. Iqbal fully agrees with the non-classical attitude of Qur'an and develops his own theory in consonance with it. Qur'an has a place for both metaphysics and empirical sciences. And it is through metaphysical search-light that Iqbal examines scientific researches and develops his own theory.

But Iqbal is fully alive to the limitations and short comings of knowledge gained through the normal channels. Firstly, scientific investigation and analytic thought have inherent limitations which are unavoidable. Scientific analysis is never complete and exhaustive in its nature. Reality is an organic whole. Its parts are united by vital internal connections. This underlying relationship confers a wholeness in the diversities and pluralities. Analysis would select a part of reality which, when taken apart, would become lifeless, shorn of the qualities it has by virtue of its integral position within a whole. It is rendered meaningless apart from its relations, as a part separated from its pattern, a single dot or line taken out from

9. Iqbal, *Payam-i-Mashriq*, P. 6.

10. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, P. 3.

the whole picture. Besides, analysis because of the immense complexity of its object can never attain ideal completeness. The ideal analysis involves the description of all the constitutive elements of a subject. It fails if any single element escapes notice or the units reached in the process are not ultimate. However, such an ideal cannot be accomplished, hampered as we are by our limitations. If we go a step further we find that the defect of analysis would also distort synthesis which is based upon it. In synthesis those elements only are combined that are discovered in the process of analysis. Thus the incompleteness of analysis results in the incompleteness of synthesis. It is obvious that an object discovered in this manner is not what it actually is but merely what it is mentally construed. Even if the completeness of analysis is taken for granted, what we cannot afford to overlook is the importance of the vital inner connections underlying the whole reality, which are lost through the analytic procedure. Spaulding, who believes that the whole is nothing but "the parts and their properties and the relations relating the parts and the possibly specific properties of the whole,"¹¹ has tried to remedy this defect of analysis. He asserts that the knowledge of the parts when accompanied with the knowledge of their relations could give the knowledge of the whole. This assertion carries some truth in the mechanical realm but is futile in its application to the knowledge of an organic whole. "The properties of the whole can be known from the observation of the behaviour of the whole as a whole; analysis does not disclose them."¹² Iqbal has kept this fact in view and does not over-emphasise the role of the analytic method, though he assigns to it a legitimate place in the practical domain. According to him, empirical sciences give a sectional and fragmentary knowledge of reality which, though trust worthy, verifiable and even useful so far as the prediction and control of events of nature go, does not explain Ultimate Reality in its entirety. Glorify as they do in an artificial, selective and sectional process which uses concepts relatively applicable to different levels of experience, they fail to

11. Spaulding, *The New Realism* P. 161. (1922),

12. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, P. 43.

give the complete view of Reality.¹³ It is an irony that our analytic thought first puts a veil on the face of Reality¹⁴ and then endeavours to penetrate through it. Its path is zigzag and intricate; its approach and progress are gradual and slow.¹⁵

Yet another difficulty besets the knowledge of ultimate reality. The subjective element, as the constituent element in the sensible Reality, has rendered the really Real unknowable. Kant goes so far as to reduce even space and time to subjective modes or forms of apprehending Reality; they are no more objective realities, empirical concepts or outward intuitions. They are merely the constructions or forms of inner sense, the necessary *a-priori* representations underlying all outer intuitions.¹⁶ The manifold of senses when it reaches us, has lost its purity; in order to reach us it has to fulfil the formal conditions and is bound to pass through the coloured glasses of space and time. "The thing in itself is only the limiting idea. Its function is merely regulative. If there is some actuality corresponding to the idea it falls outside the boundaries of experience and consequently its existence cannot be rationally demonstrated."¹⁷ Iqbal also believes that serial time and space are subjective and not objective realities.¹⁸ But he disagrees with Kant in so far as the acquisition of the knowledge of Ultimate Reality is concerned. The Ultimate Reality lies outside the normal level of experience, inaccessible to sense-perception and pure reason. But the normal level is not the only knowledge-yielding level.¹⁹

Though Iqbal is convinced that serial time and space are subjective, he departs from the view that they are the final and inflexible mental forms determining and limiting all knowledge. He takes the view that our intuitive experience is not determined and systematised by space and time. When we dive within our own self and pass

13. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, P. 43.

14. Iqbal, *Payam-i-Mashriq*, P. 35.

15. Iqbal: *Javid Nama*, P. 17-18.

16. Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*, Pp. 67-77.

17. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, P. 181.

18. Iqbal, *Ibid*, Pp. 52-53; also, Iqbal: *Zabur-i-'Ajam* Pp. 215-216.

19. Iqbal, *Ibid*, P. 181.

from sense-perception to intuition of the self, we perceive Reality, not as a concept or intellectual construction, not as a solid block or substratum underlying or holding together all experience, but as a dynamic and creative flow living in pure duration in which time is divested of spatiality and appears in its organic wholeness. However, it is no less true that this stage is attainable only through profound meditation, when the appreciative self gets the upper hand and all its potentialities are unfolded. It is now that the psychological experience expands into the intuition of Ultimate Reality—God. It discloses Ultimate Reality as a flux, a dynamic and creative flow that involves a progressive synthesis of various stages, in which life, thought and purpose all interpenetrate to form an organic whole.²⁰

Iqbal identifies intuition or immediate experience with love. Intuition or love would unfold to him new spheres of illumination, wherein unroll vistas of Reality comprehending Divine Presence itself. In contrast, the knowledge yielded by intellect is sectional, piece-meal and fragmentary because it is involved in the labyrinth of space and time. The knowledge through intuition is not imparted partially and by *innuendo*. It is grounded in the deeper and higher self of man. It is *incorporeal* and eternal and leads directly to the *incorporeal* and the eternal.²¹ Knowledge through love or intuition means knowledge through the heart, wherein we have change but no succession, pure duration but no serial time.²² It comes with a surer step, has a higher and more profound air of authority about it and is born out of direct and immediate luminousness. But it should not be construed that intuition is antagonistic to analytic thought or intellect. Love and intellect both aim at the knowledge of reality and differ only in the courses they adopt. The intellect grasps and views certain parts of reality as abstracted from the whole; it gives only the temporal aspect of reality. Intuition reveals the reality in its wholeness and fulness. It is the method which takes things as a whole without waiting for analysis.

20. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* Pp. 52-57.

21. Iqbal, *Javid Namah*, Pp. 1-18.

22. *Ibid*, P. 4.

Through a comprehensive grasp it gives the deepest truth. It forms that point of vantage which affords a perspective of the whole domain of Reality. Rather, it is the gateway at which Truth and Reality "rap and knock and enter our soul." Intuition and intellect together may be visualised as a double-edged sword in man's hand. With one edge he invades the Ultimate Reality; with the other he invades the Universe. In other words, the ego has two eyes: with one eye he sees and approaches the inner and invisible Reality, with the other, the visible Reality. If the ego sees with one eye, it commits a great sin; if it uses both eyes it reaches its destination.²³ Neither of them constitutes the exhaustive method or the only road to truth. Both should be employed and potentiated in the pursuit of exhaustive knowledge. They have a common source and are complementary to each other. Intuition is only a higher developmental state of intellect, and in order to view Reality as a whole it is necessary that we supplement intuition with intellect.²⁴ Intellect, when it is fused with love, becomes, as it were, illuminated by Divine Light; similarly, love when buttressed by intellect becomes more powerful and potent.²⁵ Knowledge based entirely upon reason and intellect, the intricate labyrinth of abstract reasoning, can lead to that articulation of beliefs which constitutes proof and demonstrated knowledge. But unless intellect is supplemented with intuition, this knowledge would become narrow, partial and lifeless and would lead to stagnation and pedantry. Intuition is its life and spirit; it is its "*ruh ul-qudus*" without which it would be reduced to a mere magic show, too impotent and crippled to lead us on to fruitful results.²⁶ Intellect, if not guided by love, becomes devilish or satanic—an evil force. It generates darkness and leads the world to blind power, chaos and destruction. Unanimated by love it is dead and lifeless, and its arrow, unguided as it is, flies without aim.²⁷ Let it be quickened and guided by intuition, love, yearning, and it

23. Iqbal, *Zabur-i-'Ajam*, Pp. 207-208.

24. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, P. 2-3.

25. Iqbal, *Javid Nama*, P. 71.

26. *Ibid*, P. 4.

27. Iqbal, *Javid Nama*, Pp. 82-83.

shall yield knowledge par excellence—good, rounded and indispensable knowledge—knowledge which is power, encompassing heaven and deriving light from the stars, which contains the description of the whole existence and to which is related the destiny of the whole of existence. Intellect infused with intuition gives celestial and divine knowledge.²⁸ Intuition or love is thus the very law of life and regulative power. It expands and enriches personality, and confers vision. At the same time, it is corrective of intellect and abstract thought, of science and common sense.

If the above analysis is correct, the unqualified dismissal of the role of intuition or love in the achievement of knowledge as unscientific by the apostles of reason would appear to be highly unreasonable.

Though intuition is a mode of dealing with Reality in which sense-perception has no part to play, yet it gives knowledge, which is as concrete as that yielded by any other experience.²⁹

Intuition has its peculiar characteristics which differentiate it from intellect and sense-perception. They can be enumerated as follows:

1. It gives the direct and immediate experience of Absolute Reality or God. "God is not a mathematical entity or a system of concepts mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience."³⁰ Intuition gives the experience of God as sense-experience gives the experience of perceptible reality. And as regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense-data for our knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God.³¹
2. Mystic experience is characterised with un-analysable wholeness. It gives reality as an indivisible organic unity, not as broken segments with many missing links. The reason is that it does not entangle itself in a sectional treatment of

28. *Ibid*, Pp. 82-83.

29. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, P. 16.

30. *Ibid*, P. 19.

31. *Ibid*, P. 18-19.

reality, which would allow only a selective study of certain parts of its visible aspects. This *modus operandi* is the delight of rational consciousness, which specialises in analysis and synthesis as dictated by the practical needs of adaptation to our environment.³² As for example, out of the innumerable sense-data in a room, our rational consciousness selects only that which on synthesis would yield us the single experience of a table.³³ In mystic experience which includes the cognitive element in its minimum degree, there is no possibility of such analysis. It is unique in so far as it ranges beyond these frontiers and brings us into contact with the total passage of reality, in which all the diverse stimuli run into one another forming a single un-analysable unity, and in which the ordinary distinctness of subject and object does not exist.³⁴ But we should not run away with the idea that mystic experience is some "mysterious faculty"³⁵ having no continuity with ordinary consciousness, as maintained by William James.

3. God or Ultimate and Perfect Reality is both immanent and transcendent. He not only permeates and encompasses the universe but also His domain rolls beyond it. He is the unique Other Self that transcends and encompasses the private personality of the finite individual Self. Mystic experience brings the mystic into direct communion with God, "momentarily suppressing"³⁶ his own individuality. He is for the time being submerged in Supreme Reality and loses consciousness of himself as a distinct and private personality. But he emerges from his experience all the richer for in this brief moment of intimate association with God he has perceived Him as an Independent Other Self and as a Concrete Individual.

32. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, P. 19.

33. *Ibid*, P. 19.

34. *Ibid*, P. 19.

35. *Ibid*, P. 16.

36. *Ibid*, P. 19.

It is, therefore, erroneous to presume that the mystic state is "a mere retirement into the mists of pure subjectivity."³⁷ Far from being so the contents of this experience are as objective as the knowledge yielded by an ordinary social experience. This may sound strange because we tend to believe that all objective experience must necessarily stem from sense-perception. But it is an extremely fallacious view. For, if it were true, we could never be sure of the reality of our social experience in so far as we know others as conscious beings. Granted that the knowledge of visible reality is based on sense-perception; granted also that the knowledge of our own inner and outer self is based on inner reflection and sense-perception, but when it comes to the knowledge of other conscious beings as such we are undergoing immediate experience—we are inferring the existence of a similar consciousness in them on the analogy of our own emotional states, which are exhibited by the two of us by similar physical movements. We do not tarry to work out or belabour the analogy in our daily lives; but the knowledge that the individual before us is a conscious being floods our mind as an immediate experience, which is further supplemented by his response to our signals, a fact which gives completeness to our fragmentary meanings. We never entertain any doubt about the validity of this knowledge because of its inferential quality. In the ultimate analysis the mystic and the social experience are parallel to each other; and they therefore belong to the same category.³⁸

4. The mystic experience is direct and immediate and hence does not lend itself to communication as such. It is feeling rather than thought but like all other feelings it has a thought element which gives it direction and shapes it into an idea. It has two aspects: non-temporal and temporal. The non-temporal aspect is feeling, whereas the temporal aspect is

37. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, P. 21.

38. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, P. 21.

idea. The non-temporal aspect is also not without a sense of direction. Feeling is outward-pushing as idea is outward-reporting. Feeling is ever directed towards something that is feeling, some objective which transforms its characteristic instability into stability. It gives the direct vision of reality. But mystic experience, untouched as it is by discursive intellect, would not lend itself to transmission in logical forms. Nevertheless it seeks expression in thought and can be conveyed as interpreted by the prophet or the mystic who has experienced it.³⁹

5. The mystic experience reveals Reality as an eternal whole unbounded by past and future, as a single eternal now and establishes the unreality of the serial character of space and establishes the unreality of the serial character of space and time. But this state does not abide. It gives the vision of reality and soon fades away leaving a sense of authority behind it.⁴⁰ "Both the mystic and prophet return to the normal levels of experience; but with this difference that the return of the prophet may be fraught with infinite meaning for mankind."⁴¹

The path to intuition, according to Iqbal, lies through religion. The intuition of the self as a psychological experience is approachable to all even at the normal level. But the higher intuition or the intuition of God is achieved gradually through a definite course only as the religious consciousness expands in intensity and richness. It consists of three stages, faith, thought and discovery. The first is the period when the individual, through his adherence to the unconditional command, cultivates self-discipline. Here we have the undemurring surrender to Divine Law without the interference of reason or logical demonstration. It enables man to find his niche in the set-up of political and social life. But so far as the evolution of man's inner self is concerned it is of no consequence. This

39. *Ibid*, Pp. 21-22.

40. *Ibid*, P. 23.

41. *Ibid*, Pp. 23-24.

stage leads to the next where reason and rational understanding manifest themselves as the source and ground of the authority of discipline, thus basing religion on metaphysics or philosophy. This is followed by the third and highest stage where philosophy gives place to psychology and the individual develops a yearning to attain direct contact with Divine Reality. "It is here that religion becomes a matter of assimilation of life and power; and the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness".⁴² The Book is not imposed as something external but is revealed to a prophet. It is the period of discovery or intuition. "The climax of religious life, however, is the discovery of the ego as an individual deeper than his conceptually describable habitual self-hood. It is in contact with the Most Real that the ego discovers its uniqueness, its metaphysical status and the possibility of improvement in that status. Strictly speaking, the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories. It can embody itself only in a world-making or world-shaking act; and in this form alone the content of this timeless experience can diffuse itself in the time-movement, and make itself effectively visible to the eye of history. It seems that the method of dealing with Reality by means of concepts is not at all a serious way of dealing with it. Science does not care whether its electron is a real entity or not. It may be a mere symbol, a mere convention. Religion, which is essentially a mode of actual living, is the only serious way of handling Reality."⁴³ Science deals with concepts, factual reality or the "causality-bound aspect of nature", but the physical, sensible and external causality-bound aspect of nature does not exhaust the realm of Reality. The other aspect of reality is not less important than the visible one. It invades consciousness from another direction, untouched by rational thought dealing with the optically present universe. This broad path can

42. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, P. 183.

43. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, P. 183.

be opened through religion only, because religion concerns itself with deed, which is the outcome of the constant attitude of man's whole personality or structure to reality. The deed, "*i.e.* the control of man's physiological and psychological processes", is dynamically related to reality and prepares the finite self for immediate association with Infinite Ego."⁴⁴

Hence, religion, as Iqbal would have it, is not a mere collection of dogmas or theological formulae: "Conservatism is as bad in religion as in any other department of human activity. It destroys the ego's creative freedom and closes up the paths of fresh spiritual enterprise."⁴⁵ Religion in its highest manifestation does not imply the life-denying and fact-avoiding attitude. It does not work as an external imposition on the free and spontaneous expression of human personality. On the contrary, it is the open sesame to fresh and more fruitful directions to communicate with the Ultimately Real. It awakens and actualises the level lying close to the normal level, directing one's vision to the inner side of the self. It regenerates the inner powers and possibilities of the human self. It expands and enriches the fields of human thought and emotion. It unlocks fresh spiritual sources. During this period man gets the power to overcome his intellectual reconstruction and to penetrate the crust of causal sequence and spatio-temporal manifold. He comes into contact with the everlasting and eternal source of life and power.

Here we have a picture of Iqbal's theory of knowledge in which he endeavours to give us a clue to the Ultimate Reality. Whether the perfect knowledge of the actual and The Ultimate Reality, of the final nature and essence of things is possible is a very subtle question. Iqbal's answer to it is an unhesitating, bold and optimistic affirmation. Reality can be known, grasped and comprehended not only in its partial and fragmentary aspect but also in its completeness. The great merit and virtue of his theory lies in the fact that he does not adopt and exalt any one method at the cost of the others.

(April 60)

44. *Ibid*, 182.

45. *Ibid*, 182.

THE HEGELIAN KEY TO UNDERSTANDING IQBAL

Absar Ahmad

The Hegelian influence is clear both in Iqbal's criticism of the cosmological argument as well as in his combined criticism of the ontological and teleological arguments. Iqbal's comments on the ontological and teleological arguments contain a whole epistemology and an entire metaphysic, and his position is, I would suggest, only quasi-Hegelian. Consider, for example, the following two statements by Iqbal:

(1) Apropos of the cosmological argument: "The true infinite does not exclude the finite; it embraces the finite without effacing its finitude, and explains and justifies its being."¹

(2) Apropos of the ontological and teleological argument: "... thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end."²

It is my contention that the Hegelian influence here is unmistakable even though his name is not explicitly mentioned. This suggestion of a Hegelian influence is, therefore, an interpretation, but in its absence Iqbal's statements are not intelligible. In the present climate of modern English-speaking philosophy, statements of the type "the true infinite does not exclude the finite" and "thought is the ultimate ground of the original nature of things and constitutes the very essence of their being"

1. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 30.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

would at least raise, and left unqualified perhaps deserve, considerable suspicion and incredulity; indeed, the more positivistically inclined linguistic philosophers would hardly hesitate in branding them as patent nonsense. The complexion of this problem is radically altered when we attempt to understand Iqbal's statements within the context of the Hegelian system. My aim here is the very modest one of trying to make sense of Iqbal's arguments in the context of Hegel's philosophy. Clearly then we are committed to some minimum exposition of that philosophy. But I must emphasise that this "minimum exposition" is not intended to be a condensed account of the Hegelian system. It is simply an attempt to indicate certain salient features in their barest outline so that we may get a reasonable view of the nature and purpose of the Hegelian philosophy—and sufficient, hopefully, to show that Iqbal's theses are intelligible only as integral components of such a system.

The Hegelian System

(1) *Hegel's Circle.* The Hegelian philosophy is, arguably, the most ambitious system developed within the Western tradition. It presents at its very core the apparent paradox of setting out to resolve that which, in ordinary thought and experience, is irresolvable, to unite that which cannot be united: God and Man, Spirit and Nature, Thought and Being, Subject and Object. It is a self-contained circle—an oft-recurring image throughout Hegel's writings—and one which is unprecedented alike in its comprehensiveness as well as its immunity to external criticism. Hegel himself characterises his enterprise in the Introduction (following the famous Preface) to the *Phenomenology of Mind*, thus:

“... the pathway of the natural consciousness which is striving toward a true knowledge, or the path of the soul which is making its way through the sequence of its own transformations as through way stations prescribed to it by its very nature, that it may, by purifying itself, lift itself to the level of Spirit and

attain cognizance of what is in itself through the completed experience of its own self."³

For Hegel philosophical truth cannot be merely stated, asserted, or, even, in the traditional manner, argued or demonstrated. Truth is rather the culmination of a long, arduous and complex process of development—the whole elaborate movement being subsumed (though not simply cancelled) in the final result. Accordingly, such terms as “emerge,” “final outcome,” “consummation” assume a special significance and occur frequently in his writings.⁴ The following rigorously selected textual passages well indicate the nature and style of the Hegelian philosophy.

From the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Mind*: “This becoming of science in general or of knowledge is what this phenomenology of the spirit represents. . . . To become true knowledge, to generate the element of science which is a pure concept itself, it has to work its way through a long journey.” Later on, in the same section, “The individual must also pass through the contents of the educational stages of the general spirit. . . . The world spirit has had the patience to pass through these forms in the long expanse of time, taking upon itself the tremendous labour of world history. . . .” And further, “consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what lies within its experience; . . . The Spirit, however, becomes an object, for the Spirit is this movement of becoming something other for itself, i.e. an object for itself, and then to sublimate this otherness. And experience is the name we give to just this movement. . . .

3 (a) See Heidegger's opening note in his *Hegel's Concept of Experience*, p. 7.

(b) “. . . the wealth of human experience actually described in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a most eloquent demonstration that Hegel's method is far more ‘empirical’ than that of philosophers who call themselves empiricists” (K. R. Dove, *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 [June 1970], p. 624).

4. “. . . What logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition . . . the notion of logic has its genesis in the course of the exposition. . . .” (Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 43).

Science may organise itself only through the life of the Concept;⁵ the determinedness which some would take externally from the scheme to affix it to existence is in science the self-moving soul of the abundant content." (A related statement occurs at the very beginning of the conclusion: "I find the distinctive mark of science in the self-movement of the concept. . . .) Further variations on this theme—"what therefore matters in the study of science is taking upon oneself the exertion of the concept. . . . The content should be made to move itself by virtue of its own nature, i.e. through the self as its own self, and then to contemplate this movement. One should not intrude into the immanent rhythm of the concept. . . . The concept is the object's own self which presents itself as its becoming. . . . It is the concept that moves itself and takes its determinations back into itself. In this movement the resting subject itself perishes. . . . The return of the concept into itself must be represented expressly. This movement which takes the place of that which proof was once supposed to accomplish is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself."

The following statements occur near the end of the Preface: "True thoughts and scientific insight are to be won only through the work of the concept. . . . We must have the conviction that it is of the nature of truth to prevail when its time has come, and that truth appears only when its time has come. . . ."

From the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Mind*: "This dialectical movement, which consciousness exercises on itself—on its knowledge as well as its object—is, insofar as the new, true object emerges to consciousness as the result of it, precisely that which is called experience."

From the *Science of Logic*: "This spiritual movement which, in its simple undifferentiatedness, gives itself its own determinedness its quality with itself, which therefore is the immanent development of the Notion, this movement is the absolute method of knowing and at the same time is the immanent soul of the content itself. I maintain that it is this self-construing method alone

5. A key Hegelian term—"Begriff," translated as concept or notion.

which enables philosophy to be an objective, demonstrated science. . . . What logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition. . . . The Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of exposition. . . . Now if logic has not undergone any change since Aristotle . . . then surely the conclusion which should be drawn is that it is all the more in need of a total reconstruction; for Spirit, after its labours over two thousand years, must have attained to a higher consciousness about its thinking and about its own pure, essential nature. . . . The exposition of what alone can be the true method of philosophical science falls within the treatment of logic itself; for the method is the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.”

Some of the features exemplified above together with the image of the circle are vigorously, and not ineloquently, expressed by Hegel in the section headed “With what must the science begin?” at the beginning of *The Science of Logic*:

“. . . Absolute Spirit which reveals itself as a concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the end of the development is known as freely externalising itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate being—opening or unfolding itself (sich entoabliessend) into the creation of a world which contains all that fell into the development which preceded that result and which through this reversal of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed into something dependent on the result as principle. The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first. . . . Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determination.”

(2) *The Nature of the Content*. According to Hegel, religion and philosophy have the same content.⁶ The following statement

⁶ The matter has been put very well by Lauer: “The ‘Philosophy of Religion’ of which Hegel speaks is not a philosophising about religion; it is the thinking philosophically what religion thinks religiously” (Q. Lauer, *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. by D. E. Christensen).

is especially worthy of note (Introduction to *The Science of Logic*): "... Logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm of truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind." And again, even more plainly, in the very opening section of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel writes: "The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion. In both the subject is truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the truth."

Further, Hegel identifies logic with metaphysics. Thus in the Preface to the first edition of *The Science of Logic* he writes of "the Science of Logic which constitutes metaphysics proper of purely speculative philosophy". And again in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* (Section 24): "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts."

(3) *The Elements of the System*. The concept of the Notion (*Begriff*) is perhaps the most centrally important idea in the entire Hegelian philosophy. The last chapter of the *Encyclopaedia Logic* (Chapter 9, third sub-division of logic: the doctrine of the notion) commences thus: "The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realised. It is a systematic whole" and, further on: "The Notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fullness of all content ... The Notion is a true concrete; for the reason that it involves Being and Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in the unity of thought. The movement of the Notion is development: by which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present."

If the spirit of the whole Hegelian philosophy could somehow be expressed briefly and schematically, the most succinct formula would be "the internal self-movement of the Notion". This process of self-movement is the famous dialectic—the process

through which Spirit undergoes self-negation and self-reconciliation (by overreaching its self-negated form). Being, the Notion, dialectic, negation, and overreaching are, in fact, the key terms in the Hegelian system. The three major components of the system are Logic, Nature and Spirit. Emil Fackenheim's brilliant work *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* enunciates "the principle of the Hegelian middle". "And we shall seek to grasp it by interpreting Hegel's thought as a threefold mediation, of which each phase involves the other two. Elements of all three phases are found scattered throughout Hegel's works." Fackenheim elaborates on this and goes on to quote the Hegelian passage which "states the principle of the threefold mediation clearly, tersely, and completely." The passage opens thus: "Everything rational shows itself to be a threefold union or syllogism, in that each of the members takes the place both of one of the extremes and the mediating middle. This is especially the case with the three members of philosophical science, i.e. the logical Idea, Nature and Spirit."

(4) *The Nature of the Problem of Knowledge.* Hegel had the very deep insight that there could be no "external" examination of knowledge. Therefore, anything like the Kantian beginning is entirely mistaken. He writes in the *Science of Logic* (Preface to the second edition): "Since, therefore, subjective thought is our very own, innermost act, and the objective notion of things constitutes their essential import, we cannot go outside this our act, we cannot stand above it, and just as little can we go beyond the nature of things." And again in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*: "But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of the Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until we had learned to swim." Accordingly the assessment of knowledge must necessarily remain a purely "internal" procedure. Thus he writes in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Mind*: "The fundamental standard of measurement would be in us . . . since consciousness provides

itself with its own standard, investigation will be a comparison of consciousness with its own self." Hegel then develops this argument, and resolves the problem of the correspondence between knowledge and that (object) which is known, in terms of his concept of the Notion. K. R. Dove⁷ has characterised this phase of Hegel's thought as a revolutionary departure from the time-honoured approach to the problem of knowledge (based on the abstract distinction between knowledge and truth).

This rapid excursus into Hegel's philosophy enables us to return to the two Hegelian themes in Iqbal (viz. the unity of thought and being, and the finite-infinite relationship) more profitably.

The Unity of Thought and Being

Ivan Soll has recently argued that the abolition of the separation of the knowing subject from its object is the major function of *The Phenomenology of Mind*. There can be no doubt that this is one of the most important motifs in the entire Hegelian system. Soll relates this to Hegel's case against Kant: "According to Hegel, the denial of knowledge of things-in-themselves rests on the separation of the knowing subject from its object." Thus we read in the Preface to *The Phenomenology of Mind*:

"It is the standpoint of the consciousness to know of objective things in opposition of itself, and to know of itself in opposition to them (Section 7, 'The Element of Knowledge'). The development of philosophical science, through the internal self-movement of the concept, overcomes this dichotomy—'Being is mediated absolutely; it is substantial content which is just as immediately property of the ego, self-like, or Concept. With this the Phenomenology of the Spirit is concluded. What the spirit prepares for itself in this phenomenology is the element of knowledge.' In this element the moments of the spirit spread themselves out in the form of simplicity which knows its object as itself. They no longer fall apart into the opposition of being and knowledge but abide in the simplicity of knowledge."

In *The Science of Logic* we find plainer and more forceful

7. Vide *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, June 1970.

statement of these theses :

“These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness ; but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason . . . then they are errors the refutation of which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is philosophy.”

And, further, Logic is “defined as the science of pure thought, the principle of which is pure knowing, the unity which is not abstract but a living, concrete unity in virtue of the fact that in it the opposition in consciousness between a self-determined entity, a subject, and a second such entity, an object, is known to be overcome ; being is known to be the pure Notion in its own self, and the pure Notion to be the true being. These, then, are the two *moments* contained in logic.”

The Finite and the Infinite

The peculiarly Hegelian identification of logic, metaphysics and philosophy of religion is well exemplified by the theme of the relationship between the finite and the infinite. At the very outset of his *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, Hegel observes that he has “chosen a subject that is connected with the other set of lectures which I gave on logic . . . a kind of supplement to that set inasmuch as it is concerned only with the particular aspect of the fundamental conception of logic.” The finite-infinite relationship is only the most abstract aspect of “this wealth of relationship which exists between the human spirit and God,” and “the logical relation is at the same time also the basis of the movement of the fullness of content”. Indeed, the tension between the finite and the infinite is at the very heart of Hegel’s entire metaphysical enterprise. Fackenheim has expressed this admirably :

“Hegel has not forgotten that the time which he sees as ripe for ‘science’ is also (like all time)—one of conflict, chance and brute fact, and that he—a self rising to absolute thought—is also a contingent self in the midst of time. Many years after the

composition of the *Phenomenology* Hegel wrote: 'I raise myself in thought to the Absolute. . . . Thus being infinite consciousness; yet at the same time I am finite consciousness. . . . Both aspects seek each other and flee each other. . . . I am the struggle between them.' This struggle—and 'the struggle to resolve the struggle'—is in the end the sole theme of the *Phenomenology* and, indeed, of the whole Hegelian philosophy."

The purely logical aspect of the finite-infinite relationship is described thus in the *Science of Logic*:

"The Notion of the infinite as it first presents itself is this, that being in its being-in-itself determiness itself as finite and transcends the limitation. It is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation and become infinite. Thus the infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to the finite, as if the finite had enduring being apart from or subordinate to the infinite."

The transition to the "principles of theology" in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* is noteworthy:

"And what men call the proofs of God's existence are, rightly understood, ways of describing and analysing the native course of the mind, the course of thought thinking the data of the senses. The rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the supersensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and nothing but thought."

The finite-infinite relationship recurs again in the *Lectures on the Proofs of God's Existence*. Thus, apropos of the Cosmological Proof Hegel writes:

"Finite Being does not continue to be an Other: there is no gulf between the infinite and the finite. The finite is something that cancels itself, loses itself in something higher, so that its truth is the Infinite, what has Being in-and-for-itself."

And in relation to the Teleological Proof:

"The finitude of finite minds is not true Being; it is, by its very nature, dialectic, which implies that it abrogates itself, negates itself, and the negation of this finitude is affirmation as infinitude, as something universal in-and-for-itself. This is the highest form of the transition; for the transition is here Spirit itself."

The logical concept of the Notion, the finite-infinite relationship, the epistemological (and metaphysical) thesis of the unity of thought and being and the theological idea of the existence of God all cohere in a uniquely Hegelian manner in the following remarkable statement (which occurs near the end of the *Lectures on the Proofs of God's Existence*):

“In the case of the finite, existence does not correspond to the Notion. On the other hand, in the case of the Infinite, which is determined within itself, the reality must correspond to the Notion ; this is the Ideal, the unity of subject and object.”

(October 80)

METAPHYSICS OF PERSIA AND IQBĀL

— *Manzoor Ahmad*

Islāmic philosophy or, as it is sometimes called, Arabic philosophy can as well be called Persian philosophy. Except for the fact that most of it is written in the Arabic language there is nothing Arabic about it. Many of the philosophers who excelled in scholastic thought in the metaphysics of mysticism and in using Greek philosophy for interpreting Islām were Persians. So large is their number that, over half a century ago, the development of metaphysics in Persia, which is but a paradigm of Muslim philosophy, served Iqbāl as the subject of a Ph. D. thesis. This thesis was subsequently published in Pakistan several times. It may be interesting to note the indigenous Persian traits in Islāmic thought in the face of the claim made by Western scholars that all Muslim philosophy is merely a footnote on Greek thought. We are not, however, at the moment concerned with this aspect of Muslim philosophy. The subject of our inquiry is the development of Iqbāl's thought from his earlier to his later period with a view, especially, to finding out whether there was any substantial change in it, as has been claimed by some Iqbāl scholars. For the purposes of that inquiry we will concentrate on his two main philosophical works, i.e., *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* and *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām*.¹

While giving permission for the translation of *Metaphysics* to Mīr Hasan al-Dīn, Iqbāl has been reported to have told the translator that the book had been written eighteen years earlier. "Since then", he is reported to have added, "many new things have come to light and there has been a change in my own views. There are

¹ S. M. Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, ed. M. M. Sharīf (3rd impression; Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbāl, 1964); and *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islām* (Reprint; Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968). Hereafter these works will be referred to as *Metaphysics* and *Reconstruction* respectively.

books written in the German language separately on al-Ghazzālī, Tūsī, etc., which were not available at the time of my writing this book. I should think that there is but little in this book which would now escape criticism."¹

The statement that Iqbāl's ideas underwent a change was accepted on its face value without much deliberation. A remark to this effect appears in the foreword of a reprint of *Metaphysics* by Prof. M. M. Sharīf: "It [*Metaphysics*] was written at a time when he [Iqbāl] was an admirer of pantheism — a world view which he completely repudiated a few years later."² This remark, which was presumably based on the fact that Iqbāl mentions Ibn al-'Arabī, the great exponent of pantheism, in glowing terms in *Metaphysics*, while he does not mention Rūmī at all, is borne out by a number of statements made by Iqbāl himself.

In a letter to Muhammad Niyāz al-Dīn Khān, he writes:

This Neo-Platonism which I have mentioned in my article is a distorted form of the philosophy of Plato, which was made into a creed by one of his followers, Plotinus. Amongst the Muslims, this creed was spread through the translations by the Christians of Harrān and it gradually became a part of the religion of Islām. To me it is completely un-Islāmic and has no relevance to the philosophy of the *Qur'ān*. The structure of mysticism has been built on this Greek impertinence.³

He writes in another letter: "As far as I know, *Fuṣūṣ* contains nothing but atheism and heresy."⁴

Explaining his disgust with mysticism, he writes "When mysticism tries to become a philosophy and, with hair-splitting arguments about cosmology and the essence of God, presents a theory of direct personal experience of God, then my soul revolts against it".⁵ In an article published in *Vakil* under the title "Mysteries of Self and

¹ Mīr Ḥasan al-Dīn, *Falsafa-i 'Azam* [trans. of *Metaphysics*] (Ḥaydarābād: Aḥmadia Press, n.d.), p. iii.

² Foreword to *Metaphysics*.

³ *Makātib-i Iqbāl*, ed. S.A. Raḥmān (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbāl, n.d.), p. I.

⁴ *Iqbāl Nāma*, ed. Shaykh 'Aṭā Allāh (Lahore: Shaykh Muḥammad Ashraf, 1951), vol. I, 44.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Sūfism",¹ he expresses his opinion in more detailed and candid terms:

I do not feel shy to admit that I have entertained, for a long time, the ideas which are specially entertained by some *Ṣūfīs* and which, on later reflection, I found to be completely un-Islāmic. For instance, Ibn al-'Arabī's concept of the eternity of perfect souls, or pantheism, or the concept of six graded emanation, or certain other beliefs mentioned by 'Abd al-Karīm Al-Jīlī in his book *Al-Insān al-Kāmil*.²

Iqbāl thinks that such beliefs are alien to Islām and have been wrongly, though with good intentions, grafted into the apologetics of Islām. The concept of the eternity of souls can be, according to him, traced back to Plotinus, and was later adopted by Ibn Sīnā and Fārābī, because of which they were declared heretics by al-Ghazzālī. The theory of emanation originates from the same source and was later adopted by Suhrawardī Maqtūl for justifying certain elements in the Zoroastrian religion. Once such alien concepts find credence into Muslim thinkers, pantheism becomes the logical end-stage of their ontology.

One can find many other references to the same effect in letters and articles which Iqbāl wrote from time to time and which provoked a strong reaction from certain religious circles in the sub-continent. It seems that Iqbāl in these writings is totally rejecting the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujūd*, which is normally accepted by the *Ṣūfīs*. In response to criticism against his views he later tries to make a distinction between Persian *Ṣūfīsm* and Islāmic *Ṣūfīsm* and explains his motivation for doing so. Thus, in reply to one such criticism by Ḥasan Niẓāmī, he declares that his aim is not to destroy the *Ṣūfī* movement. What, he says, he is opposed to is Persian mysticism and which is a sort of asceticism and not a part of Islām.³

He further makes a reference to different philosophical positions (*wahdat al-wujūd* being one of them) taken by certain philosophers in interpreting religious beliefs. He thinks that pantheism

¹ Reprinted in *Maqālāt-i Iqbāl*, ed. S. A. Vāḥid [Wāḥid] (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963) pp. 160-170. Henceforth this work will be referred to as *Maqālāt*.

² *Maqālāt*, p. 161.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

is not a religious problem, but a problem of philosophy. "The discussions on unity and diversity have nothing to do with Islām. Oneness of God is the cardinal principle of Islām, the opposite of which is *shirk*, and not diversity."¹

It seems to me that the *raison d'être* of Iqbāl's rejection of what he calls Persian mysticism is its allegedly unwholesome effect on human personality, especially when it is accepted as a way of life rather than a philosophical position.² He says it in so many words and at one place quotes a Punjābī couplet:

تھے ہم پوت پٹھان کے دل کے دل دیں توڑ
شرن پڑے رگھناتھ کے سکیں نہ تنکا توڑ

(I was a *Pathān* and could defeat whole armies in battle; but since I sat at the feet of *Ragnath* [who believed in the principle of the immanence of God] I cannot even break a piece of straw.)³

The consensus of opinion about Iqbāl's attitude towards mysticism can be summed up as follows :

- a) Iqbāl subscribed to or sympathised with a pantheistic point of view not only as a way of life, but as a philosophical system in his earlier writings, particularly in his *Metaphysics*.
- b) Later he changed from this position to a different one, which found its fullest and mature expression in *Reconstruction* about which we shall have more to say in the following pages.
- c) One of the major motivations for this change lies in the practical effects of a pantheistic outlook on the life and attitudes of a person and on his moral and social behaviour.

It appears that, at times, Iqbāl is at pains to explain that it is a particular type of mysticism to which he is opposed, i.e., of the type of Hāfiẓ and Ibn al-'Arabī. This is a significant point, and a very pertinent question can be asked about the conceptual distinctions between the mysticism he is opposed to and his own later

¹ Maḥmūd Niẓāmī (ed.), *Malfuzāt* (Lahore: Naryan Dutta Sahgal & Sons, n. d.), p.107.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Maqālāt*, p. 164.

philosophy in *Reconstruction*. There are strong indications that, in spite of his categorical rejection of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s metaphysical mysticism, he has not been able completely to eliminate it from his later thought.¹

There seems to be one thing in common in most of the writings on Islāmic mysticism: the writers, including Iqbāl himself, make a distinction between mysticism as a way of purifying the soul, on the one hand, and as a metaphysical theory, on the other. But, unfortunately, the two have been mixed up both by Iqbāl and by his commentators, in the treatment of the subject. This was to be expected, and is to a certain extent natural, as the two aspects, though distinct, are closely related to one another. The philosophy of *wajūd* is an intricate subject, the difficulties of which have been accentuated by the recondite style of Ibn al-‘Arabī and others — a style which was purposely adopted for restricting their teachings to the élite and the initiated. These writers presumably apprehended that their writings are liable to being misunderstood or misinterpreted by the common man. They themselves hardly advocate the type of inactivity or fatalism in everyday life that Iqbāl is so concerned about. Iqbāl himself, wittingly or unwittingly, seems to have followed the double path of warning the common man against a fatalistic approach to life and at the same time expounding an ontology not very dissimilar to that of Ibn al-‘Arabī or Ḥāfiẓ. Let us see how he did this.

When Iqbāl talks against the metaphysics of mysticism, he sounds very much like an exponent of ‘anti-system’. He himself was a philosopher and was well aware of how the problem of philosophy arises. His own anti-system approach has flowered in the form of a system known as the philosophy of self. It has a particular metaphysics, a theory of knowledge and a theory of truth. It deals with morality and the concept of good and evil, and ordains a destiny for man. As Prof. Sharīf puts it, it is a complete system of thought

¹ The word pantheism which is sometimes used for Ibn al-‘Arabī’s metaphysics of mysticism is inappropriate. It seems that a special effort has been made by ṣūfīs, including Ibn al-‘Arabī with an elaborate metaphysics, to keep Islāmic mysticism clean of the philosophy of *ḥulūl* or *hama ūst* which should be translated as pantheism. Thus an attack of Iqbāl on Ibn al-‘Arabī as a representative of pantheism becomes tangential.

based on the reality of the self and has its affinities with the philosophical systems of Alexander, James Ward and McTaggart.¹ The mystical flavour and the religious approach of this philosophy invite its comparison with the theory of *waḥdat al-wujūd* for elucidating the point we are trying to make.

The theory of *waḥdat al-wujūd* begins with the observation that this universe is contingent in itself and in time. In this general form this statement has been taken as true throughout Islāmic thought, except for some philosophers who believed in the eternity of matter; but even they, at the same time, tried to reconcile the idea of the eternity of matter with belief in the contingent nature of the created universe. As an immediate consequence of the above observation there arises a problem for *waḥdat al-wujūd*, and that is about the process through which One reality could express itself in the diversity of the world. The solution to this problem can be briefly stated as follows: Before this universe came into existence there was only the being of God, and nothing else existed. The being of God has two aspects. In one of His aspects God is the necessarily existent being and possesses all the perfect attributes. The other aspect of His being is looked at from the point of view of His attributes. Knowledge being one of the most fundamental of these, He is termed as the Knower. It is believed that it would be vacuous to say that He is the Knower unless there are objects of knowledge, as it is vacuous to say that one hears or sees without there being objects of hearing or sight. These objects in the knowledge of God are those possibilities that have not yet been actualised or realised. They have not yet been subjected to the command 'Be' (كن). Before such a command is given, these attributes or, as they are technically known, *a'yān-i thābitah* (Divine essences or Divine ideas) are contained in the Knowledge of God; and since the being of God is also the Knower from eternity, and Knowledge without objects of Knowledge is not possible, therefore these Divine essences are also eternally copresent with Him. They have neither been created in time nor occupy a place in space; hence they are eternal. The activity of creation is a name given to the act of externalization of these ideas

¹ M. M. Sharīf, "Iqbāl's Conception of God" in *Iqbāl as a Thinker*, ed. M. M. Sharīf (4th impression; Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1956). pp. 123-126.

eternally copresent in the Knowledge of God. Whatever we see in the world around us was pre-existent in the Knowledge of God in the form of essences. When He willed or desired to create, He only had to direct His attention to the *a'yān-i thābitah* and they immediately saw the light of day. The addressees of the word '*kun*' were these very *a'yān* in Divine Knowledge.¹

The theory *a'yān-i thābitah* was an immediate consequence of another philosophical premise taken for granted by the adherents of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. This was the famous postulate, directly lifted from Greek philosophy, that nothing can come into existence from absolute non-existence (*ex nihilo nihil fit*). The phenomenon was taken to be a logical impossibility, as non-existence is the negation of existence, pure and simple, and does not have any ontological consequences. The believers of *waḥdat al-wujūd* wanted, further, to draw a distinction between the theory of total immanence [pantheism] and their own point of view. Hence they were keen to develop a metaphysics of their own for distinguishing themselves from pantheists, who establish an identity between the particular existents and the necessarily existent Being. They repudiate the idea that God Himself has adopted different shapes etc., nor, they say, has He divided Himself into multiple particulars. Both these views are strongly resented by Muslim Ṣūfīs, though at times language creates problems for a proper exposition of their point of view. Once pantheism or the theory of total immanence (*ḥulūl*) is rejected and the sanctity of the concept of unity is preserved as against multiplicity, the only course open for the *wujūdī* philosophers is to advance the theory of eternal essences in Divine Knowledge and a process of emanation as an explanation of the diversity in the universe. These eternal essences or Divine ideas have their own potentialities of expression and are activated by an act of God, which is comparable to the throwing of light on darkness. There are obvious parallelisms between this theory and that of form and matter in Greek philosophy, though in details the two are quite dissimilar.

¹ See for a precise account of the metaphysics of *waḥdat al-wujūd*: Ashraf 'Alī Thanawī, *Zuhūr al-'Adam bi-Nūr al-Qidam* (Deoband: Ashraf al-'Ulūm, 1964), pp. 641-665.

This is a very sketchy account of the metaphysics of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. Nevertheless it is sufficient to mark and identify the divergences, or similarities that exist between this philosophy, supposed to be running through *Metaphysics*, and the later philosophy of Iqbāl.

A glance over *Reconstruction* brings out the points of distinction between Iqbāl's earlier Persian or pantheistic approach and his later one. The main points are as follows:

1) The view of the universe presented in the philosophy of *waḥdat al-wujūd* is complete, whereas in the later philosophy of Iqbāl it is still undergoing completion.

2) *Waḥdat al-wujūd*, as is evident from its nomenclature, is the philosophy of the unity of Being, whereas in Iqbāl we find a pluralistic approach.

3) In the philosophy of *waḥdat al-wujūd* freedom of the human will has no reality, whereas one of the fundamental aspects of Iqbāl's philosophy is the concept of real freedom for the human ego or self, so much so that through this freedom the nature of ultimate reality is revealed. Freedom is a methodological as well as an ontological concept for Iqbāl.¹

This is, by no means, an exhaustive description of the alleged points of difference between the earlier and the later thought of Iqbāl or between Persian mysticism and the philosophy of the ego. We have to delve a little deeper into these points for a clearer understanding of the issue under discussion.

Iqbāl's later philosophy envisages this universe not as a complete and finished product, but as covering the stages of completion. Nothing can, according to him, be finally and dogmatically asserted about it. Creation is a continuous process, in which human beings are taking their due share and every moment creating new situations and products. This universe is a colony or collection of individuals or egos; the number of these egos is not determined. In every temporal unit new individuals are being added, who in their turn add to the activity of creation. Life is not something ready-made;

¹ See chapters III & IV of *Reconstruction* for a detailed account of these points.

new desires always create new changes in it. There is nothing permanent in life except change. It is eternally in a state of becoming. Owing to its continuous activity it remains on an endless journey.¹

Life, which is the fundamental reality of the universe, was in the beginning a blind instinctive force completely devoid of a purpose. When it came into conflict with matter and contracted the power of resistance, it learned to climb the ladder of evolution. Lost in the wilderness of being for a long time, it acquired, at least, a power of discerning values and attaching to various actions. Value consciousness was a revolutionary change in the pattern of life and became its dearest possession. The process of creation was now conjoined with value consciousness. Life thus developed norms and purposes, and every act of change became a directed act suffused with values. Value consciousness provided the juxtaposition of the ideal and the actual, the actual being incomplete and deficient, yearning to complete and perfect itself through a continuous effort. This is, in brief, the ontological position taken in the later works of Iqbāl.²

On the face of it there seem to be two different positions adopted in the earlier and the later thought of Iqbāl; and they also have their historical parallels. The concepts of being and becoming can easily be traced to Greek philosophy. Those who say that only change is permanent may be reminded of Heraclitus' famous maxim that one cannot step into the same river twice. From Bergson to William James this aspect of life and reality is asserted again and again. Iqbāl, no doubt, had these views in mind, and shows very clear strains of vitalistic philosophy as against the concept of the block universe of the absolutists. Nevertheless it would be a hasty generalisation to identify his philosophy with the vitalism of Bergson or the pluralism of James and to overlook the deeper strains in his metaphysics, which still come from religious sources and from his earlier so-called repudiated position based upon Persian mysticism. Much depends on finding a right clue for interpreting his assertions about this universe as not being a finished product, but in a process of continuous creation.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 106 f.

² Cf. Yūsuf Ḥusain Khān, *Rūḥ-i Iqbāl* (2nd ed.; Ḥaydarābād: Idāra-i Ishā'at-i Urdu, 1944), pp. 114 ff.

It would be a platitude to say that we constantly observe motion and change in this universe and that nothing seems to have permanence in this world. It is obvious that this platitude rests on the point of view of the observer looking at things around him. This view point, as it is asserted both by Iqbāl and by mystic philosophers, is bound up by the limitations of space-time and other necessary conditions of perception like those of quality, quantity, modality, etc. It is a limited and particular point of view, which is contrasted with an unlimited and absolute view of a transcendent being. Then a question is asked: could there be a possibility of lifting these limitations, even for a certain amount of time, and having an inkling of what it would be like to have an absolute view of the facts. The mystics talk of lifting the veil of sensory perception by removing the limitations of space and time and of having a direct and immediate perception of the real. They envisage a gradual process, needing a special effort under expert guidance through which such an immediate experience could be obtained; but the immediate experience still remains localised in a particular individual, and hence no complete identity of the perception by the particular of the absolute could be obtained. The particularity goes on decreasing infinitely, but never crosses the limit completely, as, after every limit, there is yet another, *ad infinitum*.¹ This may be a debatable point, as there are in it suggestions of the possibility of a complete identity when the individual loses his particularity altogether and becomes one with the universal; but this is a point where most of the adherents of *wujūd* would like to posit the rather subtle concept of the individual not himself becoming identical with the infinite and yet achieving a point of view of totality. We believe that at this point there is an agreement between Islāmic mysticism and Iqbāl's philosophy. Iqbāl, reaching this position in a similar fashion, points out that when an individual, breaking the limitations of space and serial time, pays attention to his self, he finds in his immediate intuition an awareness of a pure mobility which is comparable to *la dure* of Bergson. From this station he gets a peep at the source of motion and change in the universe, and in this

¹ The concept of transcendence of God is never totally given up; it always remains as complementary to immanence.

experience he discovers the highest category of reality. This methodology is common between *waḥdat al-wujūd* and Iqbāl's philosophy. Both use the immediate and direct experience of the individual as indicative of the experience of God. In *waḥdat al-wujūd*, the individual, through immediate experience of God,¹ comes in contact with the Divine essences, but it does not preclude the possibility that the divine experience itself is not a continuous activity, notwithstanding the disputable point about the detailed knowledge of the consequences of God's activity, as against the contention that He knows the universals only. Whether God knows only Divine essences (universals) or has the knowledge of particulars (i.e., all the potentialities of the universals which could be actualized), it does not contradict Iqbāl's contention that the act of creation is continuous. The philosophy of *waḥdat al-wujūd* regards the universality of direct and immediate experience as the most fundamental characteristic; so is the case with Iqbāl.² The statements in the philosophy of Iqbāl² to the effect that the universe is not a finished product do not mean to imply that in the universe new facts come into being without any determination whatsoever from pure non-existence, which even God, the Omnipotent and the Omniscient, is unaware of. The same is true of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. For Iqbāl the chain of new facts coming into existence every moment represents the internal possibilities of Being, becoming actual. From our localized point of view the creation of the universe is a never-ending process, which would continue eternally because of the eternity of the will of God — one of His fundamental attributes. We cannot put a limit either to the knowledge or to the will of God. Though we are unable to read through the *preserved tablet* from beginning to end, the whole of the creation is preserved in it. Call it the inner possibilities of Being, as Iqbāl would like to call it, or give it the name of Divine essences, as the philosophy of *waḥdat al-wujūd* visualizes; the consequences are the same, i.e., the resultant continuity of the process of creation or emanation.

¹ The only significant distinction between this experience and that to which Iqbāl refers as religious experience seems to be that the former is passive and gained by training the self to an inert state, whereas the latter is arrived at through activity of the self. This distinction, even if not verbal, is irrelevant for our purpose.

² *Reconstruction*, pp. 127 and 181.

Seen against this metaphysical background, the philosophy of *wahdat al-wujūd*, like that of Iqbāl, envisages no passive concept of God as is sometimes implied by particular mystical attitudes. Knowledge and will are the two fundamental attributes of God, and neither of them can be considered as logically prior to the other in the process of creation; they are rather co-existent and complementary to each other. Hence no mystic metaphysics in Islām can conceive of a static universe or a passive God Who is only the 'Knower' and not the 'Creator'. Mere consciousness of a completed universe without active participation in its creation is never implied in the metaphysics of *wahdat al-wujūd*. Ash'arite atomistic philosophy, to which Iqbāl subscribes, dismisses the concept of mechanical causation and in its place advances the concept of Divine causation, which is not disfavoured by mystical metaphysics in spite of its disregarding atomism.

The divergence between Iqbāl's later thought and the metaphysics of mysticism is also sometimes emphasized with regard to the status of external objects, i.e., the created world. It is said that mystical metaphysics implies the ideational or mental nature of the objects, whereas Iqbāl conceives them to be real. This observation is based on a superficial view of the philosophy of *wahdat al-wujūd* and also on misapplication of the categories of mental and non-mental, in their ordinary sense, to the metaphysics of mysticism. The logic of mysticism is of a different order and these categories are not applicable to it. These categories assume two distinct modes of existence, one external and the other internal, implying that externality is a necessary property of the objects around us, which are independent of all mental relations. For all practical, everyday, purposes this may be so, and is not denied even by mysticism. Nevertheless the logic of *wahdat al-wujūd* grades reality into tiers, and mental and non-mental are not mutually exclusive, but only juxtaposed concepts. Being is graded, and mental is not a predicate of existence. To say that an object is mental, in this sense, is uninformative and merely analytical. Within this all-inclusive concept of existence there are various tiers, which possess a reality of their own, and each tier has its own logic. This is the distinction which Islāmic mysticism tries to maintain between itself and the philosophy of pure pantheism. The externality of objects is not a mere appearance; it has a reality of its own and is governed by its

own laws, which are laws of a particular aspect. Looked at from the point of view of the absolute, it may not be termed as externality, but the absolute point of view is not the only point of view. There are other points of view about reality, which are as much a part and parcel of total reality as the absolute one. Hence the differentiation between mental and non-mental is either a verbal distinction or is a result of confounding two different categories.

The point at issue in the juxtaposition of the mental and the non-mental lies in the concept of a 'block universe', which is an alleged implication of the philosophy of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. This impression is created when *waḥdat al-wujūd* is wrongly compared with the idealistic philosophy of the West. In spite of certain parallels between the two, they are not identical modes of thought. As we have said above, in the Being of God the two fundamental attributes of Knowledge and Will are eternally complementary and, therefore, there is no warrant for the conclusion that the activity of either of them could be exhausted in time. Hence it would be wrong to conclude that creative activity is not continuously at work in this universe. The Will of God continuously reflects the Knowledge of God, a process which the calculus of formal logic fails to comprehend. The two universes of Knowledge and Will do not fit into the same framework, namely, that of the law of contradiction. The same has often been expressed by pointing to the two domains of comprehension, one partial and the other total. Looked at from the former angle, reality seems to be incomplete and hence imperfect; it is engaged in an eternal process of evolution for its perfection, thus moving towards a fixed goal. But, seen from the other angle, it is a complete system, perfectly individuated, which is both the traveller and the destiny. From this latter angle it is neither static nor moving, because both these concepts are applicable to the former category only. In this perspective Iqbāl's remarks become significant when he says that the perfection of the creative ego does not lie in its unchanging nature, but in its continuous activity.¹ The being of God is self-sufficient; hence it does not move for attaining a goal external to itself. It moves to manifest the infinite possibilities inherent in itself. The paradoxes in the understanding of this movement in the Being of God arise, because,

¹ See *Reconstruction*, pp. 59 ff.

according to Iqbāl, we apply a wrong logic to it. We try to measure the Divine motion with the numerical concept of time and end up in the antinomies of reason. We can only use this concept on the resultant activity of Being, and not on Being itself, where it would be as meaningless as it is to ask 'what o'clock is it on the sun now?'.

The second point of dispute we mentioned above between Iqbāl's later thought and the so-called Persian mysticism is that of monism and pluralism. For Iqbāl the chief character of the ego is its individuality. A diffused reality in which individuals could not be identified is characterless. The universe is a colony of individuals and God Himself is an individual, though a perfect one. Iqbāl's philosophy is reminiscent of Leibnizian monadology, though he does not say that his monads are windowless. The spiritual nature of these individuals and of reality as a whole is retained and so is it by *waḥdat al-wujūd*. The only difference between the two is that Iqbāl lays more emphasis on one aspect of the diffused spirituality, i.e., the pluralistic, whereas, *waḥdat al-wujūd* stresses its monistic aspect. The Being of God in *waḥdat al-wujūd*, though immanent in the nature of things, yet, at the same time, transcendent, is necessarily existent. Although this philosophy sometimes talks in terms of appearances, nevertheless, the appearances have a status of their own. They are appearances only when they are compared with reality. They are called 'non-existent' only when the predicate of *existence* is conceived of as applied to God. Otherwise, in so far as the laws of nature and the world of common sense are concerned, these appearances are real in their own right. Events are explained in terms of laws of causation, and social obligations are carried out *as if* this world was a real world. The distinction between 'phenomena' and 'noumena' is meant for two types of individuals, i.e., the common man and the initiated; yet to say categorically about mysticism that it takes the world around us as a mere illusion would be misleading in the Islāmic context. This is the reason why the distinction between Iqbāl's later and earlier thought becomes more or less verbal. Iqbāl never talks about plurality in the sense that this world is completely independent of Divine Consciousness. Though it is a colony of individuals, there is the same creative spirit which keeps every individual active. Again it is through this creative spirit that these individuals form

themselves into a well-knit system gradually moving towards perfection. The only concepts that seem to be pulling apart in the two points of view are those which prescribe the means for an end towards which these individuals are striving. *Waḥdat al-wujūd* speaks about losing oneself totally or a complete annihilation of one's self, whereas Iqbāl talks of perfecting one's self. But if we look still closer we will find that this difference is only in the methodology and not in the end-stage of this process. The end-stage concept of Islāmic mysticism is that of a complete identification of the will of the individual with the Will of God. In one case this identification is achieved by self-annihilation, and in the other by developing a consciousness through free creative activity and by realizing that the creative activity of the self is the Divine activity. That is why Iqbāl makes a distinction between the prophetic consciousness and the mystic consciousness, considering the former to be far superior to the latter. The aim of the mystic consciousness is to keep the individual consciousness extinct when the union with God is achieved. On the other hand, the prophetic consciousness stages a come-back to this world of 'reality' and asserts itself in making and ordering this universe.

Notwithstanding these differences in emphasis between Iqbāl and *waḥdat al-wujūd*, those points which have a significance for human conduct are the same in both the philosophies. If we look at the points of dispute between them in the light of what we have said above in connection with the creative activity of Being, we would find that their much-publicised difference is a difference between two languages rather than between two sets of facts.

The third point referred to above is that of determinism or fatalism and freedom of will. Iqbāl is said to have adhered to the former in his earlier philosophy, which he gave up later. This problem arises as a direct implication of a pluralistic ontology and the concept of continuous creation. As a matter of fact, it was to safeguard the concept of freedom that Iqbāl had to have recourse to the Ash'arite philosophy of continuous creation. The concept of freedom, thus, is logically prior to the metaphysics of creation and Iqbāl's reaction against *waḥdat al-wujūd* is wholly based on the consciousness of a free ego.¹

¹ See *Reconstruction*, pp. 106 ff.

In so far as the ethical implications of *waḥdat al-wujūd* and Iqbāl's philosophy are concerned, the choice does not lie between fatalism and freedom, as has been wrongly supposed. Absolute freedom has the same moral consequences as fatalism. Iqbāl wants to reject explanations of human action in terms of mechanical causality, on the one hand, and esoteric spiritual causality, on the other. He speaks of a 'free personal causality', which is 'the essential feature of a purposive act'. The causal chain wherein we try to find a place for the ego is itself an artificial construction of the ego for its own purposes. For Iqbāl the destiny of a thing is not an unrelenting fate working from without. It is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities, which lie within the depth of its nature. The same idea has been expressed by the metaphysics of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, though in a different language. Since the world around us has a status of its own in reality, the moral principles *vis-a-vis* this world have the same status; neither is the logic of this sphere of reality applicable to another, nor *vice-versa*. The 'realizable possibilities' of which Iqbāl speaks are for *waḥdat al-wujūd* manifestations arising out of the interplay of Divine attention and Divine essences.

Ibn al-'Arabi expresses the same by saying, "God bestows on a thing that which its essential nature demands"¹, or, at another place, "Whatever has been definitely determined about us is in conformity with our nature; further, we ourselves are determining it according to our aptitude."² "It is not possible for an 'ayn' (Divine idea) to be manifested externally as far as its essence or attribute or action is concerned, except in accordance with its aptitude."³ This is the open possibility, named as freedom by Iqbāl.

We have tried to expose the platitude underlying the assertion that Iqbāl's later philosophy is opposed to his former ideas. The platitude, when analysed, breaks down to a difference between two languages and not between two ontologies. The reason for this confusion is not far to seek. It consists, first, in mixing together the

¹ Quoted by M. Valiuddin [Walī al-Dīn], *The Qur'ānic Mysticism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1959), pp. 127 ff.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

pragmatic expediencies of the moral life and the metaphysical necessities of a spiritual system with God as the unifying force. Had it been realized that moral necessities could be safeguarded without necessarily linking them to a spiritualistic metaphysics, much of the confusion could have been averted. The second reason for not seeing the identity between the so-called Persian mysticism and Iqbālian thought is that we have been misled by the structure of the two languages that these systems speak. Since the facts these languages are referring to when they present a metaphysics are not verifiable in the same way in which common everyday language statements are verified, delineation of the meaning of the two is a difficult task and cannot be achieved unless a bigger perspective of the Islāmic religion is kept in view, about which Iqbāl is concerned in both his former and his later philosophy.

(October, 71)

CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE ASRAR-O-RUMUZ

And

IQBAL'S MONADOLOGY

A. H. Kamali*

The *Asrar-i-Khudi* and the *Rumuz-i-Bikhudi* were published in 1915 and 1918 respectively. Iqbal started composing them in 1911. Thus the years from 1911 to 1918 may be treated as *Mathnavi* period of his life. It was rather during this period and in the course of composing them, that he felt himself to be at the threshold of a new vision of life and reality. His father had asked him in 1910-11 to write a *mathnavi* in Persian after Bu Ali Qalandar. He complied with the advice and applied his poetic talent to the task, which, in the words of Atiya Faizi "enlarged his scope of vision, and made him direct attention to philosophical literature in great strength, his lyrical mood seemed to drop from him . . . Poets like Shelley and Byron were receding in the background."¹ Thus he was led to new conclusions about the nature of man and the living reality.

Being very first mark of his newly acquired sense of reality, the conceptual model of the *Mathnavi* formed only a passing phase of his advancing thought which gradually culminated in the *Six Lectures* delivered in 1929 and the *Javid Nama* published in 1934, definitely written and composed mostly beyond the metaphysical categories of the *Mathnavi*.

It is remarkable to note that a large part of the *Piyam i-Mashriq* published in 1923 and important poems of the *Bang i-Dara*, published in 1924, were written in or had the dominant strand of the *Mathnavi* phase of Iqbal's life. *Zubur i-Ajam* published in 1927 belongs to the advanced stage of the evolution of his thought and *Armaghan-i-Hijaz*, his last work, glitters with a new conceptual model. Here, our main purpose is to analyse the *conceptual model* of the *Mathnavis*, and expose its limitation for the purposes of Iqbal's philosophy. The problem is all the more important because most of the popular and technical version of Iqbal's philosophy returns to *Mathnavi model* as basic frame of reference for explaining and systematizing his outlook and metaphysics.

Fortunately, we are in possession of an important testimony about the nature of Iqbal's sensibility in 1918 as radically departing from the metaphysical postulates of the *Mathnavi*. While translating the *Asrar* into English, R.A. Nicholson felt it necessary to seek clarification from Iqbal about the most subtle points of his philosophy. The latter prepared a statement of his philosophy, not of course a complete statement, as he himself estimated it. In that statement, which Nicholson included in the Introduction of his Translation, Iqbal spelled out his sensibility, i.e. fundamental

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1. Atiya Begum, *Iqbal* (Lahore, 1969), p. 75.

world-feeling of his own as 'All life is individual. There is no such thing as Universal life'. But, theoretical discipline of the *Mathnavi* shrouds this basic intuition. And what more? It is encumbered with a consciousness which is stirred up by the feeling of a Universal life.

The form of existence is an effect of the self
Whatever thou seest is a Secret of the Self¹.

The dialectic of this Universal Life is cogitated as if:

When the self awoke to consciousness
It revealed the universe of thought.
A hundred worlds are hidden in its essence.
Self-affirmation brings not-self to light.²

In terms of antiquity, it were a Vedic model; in terms of the Muslim past a legacy of the Magian encrustation; and in terms of the modern Western Civilization a hiatus of Fichte and Hegel in the body of Muslim Culture. Thus, it includes:

By the self, the seed of opposition is grown in the world!
It imagines itself to be other than itself.
It makes from itself the forms of others.
In order to multiply the pleasure of strife.
It is slaying by the strength of its arms
That it may become conscious of its strength.
For the sake of a single rose it destroys a hundred gardens.
For one sky, it produces hundred new moons.
The world is effect of the self.
Whatever thou seest is secret of the self.³

One Universal sway, in short, pervades and manifests itself in every thing. Since antiquity, this conceptual manifold dominates every articulation of those cultures, which germinate from the magnitudinal consciousness, having its prime life symbol painted in Universal sway. Being under its influence at that time, Iqbal also poetized the image of universal life as under "Falsafa i-Gham", included in *Bang-i-Dara* (p. 168):

"Singing flows down the rivulet from mountains. Glitters its mirror like the face of a haurie. Then, it has a fall upon the rock, and breaks apart its mirror into lovely gems. Out of the episode, now the water is become stars. Thus the current-in-surge is spread into a world of droplets. But in this very separation of theirs lies the message of Union. After a few pace, the current regathers its course like a silvery thread . . . The stream of life, in reality, is one. By descending from height it has dispersed (itself) into the multitude of human beings."

1. The Secret of the Self, ll. 187-8.

2. Ibid., 189-192.

3. Ibid., 193-96, 201-2.

This image of reality is what we mean by the magnitudinal consciousness, and metaphysically speaking, it denotes what we call the universal life or Cosmic Sway. Its postulational core rests on the feeling of limitless, indistinct, undifferentiated continuum as underlying essence of being or substratum of reality behind the veil of every phenomenon. The feeling is also saturated with a kind of dialectic of some germinal episode due to which distinctions have emerged from the continuum, and the harvest of multiplicity is reaped in the valley of nothingness. To this feeling, emerging individualities strike as if they are passing moments of the Universal thrust and are nominal in existence. Thus, they are only for a while. No matter what they are, for they are limited forms of the same sway, and are destined to be naught after a while in its collective rushing on.

This model erupts into its own prototype of time theories. Reality, peeped through it, appears as a cycle. Its collective thrust moves the wheel of time which may be represented as moving along an oscillating linear track of rising and falling individualities patterning into a cycle of change from *not being* into *being* and from *being* into *nothingness*.

Representing the living dialectic of the Cosmic force, the pattern is designated as arrow of time. What is time? It is one with the dialectic of the collective, cosmic, universal continuum.

Like many of the poems of *Bang-i-Dara*, most of the *Payam-i-Mashriq* projects Iqbal of the *Mathnavi* period as we have earlier pointed out. In it is a beautiful poem "Nawa-i-Waqt" conveying this theory of time as mentioned above, natural to the philosophy of Universal life. Thus, speaks Time:

In my sleeve is the Sun, in my robe the stars:
 If thou looketh within me, I am nothing.
 If looketh thou within thyself, I am life itself.
 My abodes are cities and deserts, palaces and lonely dens.
 I am the ailment and pain; I am the healing balm and joy
 unbound.
 I am the world destroying sword:
 I am the fount of life eternal;
 Chingiz and Timerlane raised but a handful of the dust of my
 storm.

The conflagration of the West is a mere spark from my fire.¹

Being the universal sway itself, Time is arbitre upon all things. As generator of history, it permeates every aspect of being. Consequently, it cannot be held externally. The ripples at the surface of being contain it from within. Thus, 'if looketh thou in thyself,' 'Time is life itself.' It asks you to "see the strange phenomenon.

¹ Translation by Prof. M. M. Sharif, *Payam i-Mashriq*, p. 102.

I am at rest and yet in motion." On the image of ocean, the universal life is a continuum. There are ripples and waves, but underneath is quiet, calm, and unfathomable spread of water: 'I am at rest and yet in motion.' In its melody, you will hear the notes:

From the cup of my present get the glimpse of Tomorrow.
See hidden within me hundreds of glorious worlds
Hundreds of whirling stars, and hundreds of sky Azure.

Thus, in the philosophies of Cosmic Sway, the swaying force in the ocean of being is identified as Time; and Time produces everything. Yester and morrow consequently, spring from it. A deeper penetration within allows you feel its thrust in all hither and thither, within every phenomenon including your own self. According to this way of thinking, your metaphysical status, the ontological nature of human ego, is just like that of a bubble or wave. If you look at a dancing bubble or a wave in motion, from within, it is all but a parametre of vibration of the ocean, and looks like a point in a dynamic field; the field of which has it been a determination. Thus, the time sings as:

Thou loveth a Laila, I am the desert wherein thou roamst
wild.

Like the soul am I free of thy how and why.

There is a romantic fervour in the song. But it retains object-true representation of its theme :

Thou art the secret of my being,
I am the secret of thine.
In thy soul I lie hidden: out of thy soul I arise.
I am the traveller, thou the destination,
I am the field, thou the harvest.

'I am the *traveller*' means that Time or thrust of the Cosmic force is fashioner of all things. All change is from it; the revolution of history, rise and fall of nations. And it does not work from without, like an external force invading from without. It works from within us. 'In thy soul I lie hidden, and out of thy soul I arise.' In the succession of phenomena, in the unceasing transition of accidents, it is Time, its Arrow, the Cosmic urge, which appears into new dawn and changes day into night, and then turns night into day. It lies within and works from within.

The above conceptual model has certain irresistible implications on which a superstructure of thought might be raised as follows:

- (i) All things, at their bottom, are expressions of a single elan vital, or cosmic sway;
- (ii) Being expressions by their nature, they are also elan vital in their particularity; and
- (iii) Therefore, their being lies in their being elan vital, *i.e.* unceasing thrust.

An expression is, however, different from a mark or seal. The latter is cold and dead as soon as it is marked or sealed, whereas an expression is alive and continuously moves. Bubble and wave, being vibrant with the life of the ocean during their existence, are true expressions in their essence. Time-philosophies view things as of the status of expression, while some of the old philosophies viewed them as of the nature of a mark or seal; once marked, they are no more living. Time-philosophies, as modern version of the Cosmic sway postulate, advance beyond by taking all phenomena as living and humming with drive.

In the *Asrar* Iqbal posited his intuition in the ready made system of the above mentioned conceptual model, and thereby conditioned his meanings with the limits imposed by it. Thus, though he had felt that ego is ultimately inexplicable fact of experience, yet, by versifying it in the conceptual model of the cosmic sway, made it an explicable fact. In the model, ego degenerates into a dancing bubble, a living effect, a mere expression. The bubble lies in its dancing. The ego on the like of it, lies in its activity. The dancing bubble from within is bottomless. Dive into it, the unceasing flow of the formless ocean is there. The bubble ceases to exist. On its like is the bottomless ego. The unceasing thrust, in surge beneath it, is cosmic life itself, in which every limit is naught. In this model, ego cannot have a claim to be an in-itself. It is a mere stirring or a vibration; *i.e.* a complete function of the cosmic force. It remains activity, no doubt; but, by its essence, it must be finally identical with the universal life. The relation between it and universal life is that of a part and the whole. The part has no self-possessed essence of its own. Being a mere partial discrimination within the whole, only a form it has. By essence, it is identical with its whole, though the whole is not identical with its part; for the part being limited, cannot contain the whole.

Such were the conceptual commitments of the *Mathnavis*, at a time when Iqbal was under the exposure of a powerful vision that "*ego is a finite centre and this finite centre is the fundamental fact of the Universe.*" This radical insight into the nature of ego however entailed that the essence of ego lies concentrated within its own being, and that negating both, its being a mark or its being an expression, it must be an unbreakable monad. In its depths, the ego is thus, unlike a roaming wave or dancing bubble with opening into the unfathomable ocean of being, the indefinite or indistinct continuum, existential continuum of the cosmic life. The conceptual apparatus of the Universal elan vital is summarily banished by the birth of this new consciousness of the monadic character of ego, which was born with Iqbal.

In the choice of his poetic similes, if not in that of his conceptual tools as vehicle of his vision, Iqbal exercised extraordinary acumen in the right direction. He scrapped the simile of bubble and used

instead that of jewel for ego. Its significance and symbolic content has not been duly realized by popular commentators of Iqbal. It was selected by him, not so much to teach the cult of power as to convey the metaphysical idea, viz. ontological character of ego as an ultimate truth, well bounded on all sides, inexplicably concentrated within its own fold, and existentially different from and other than the larger *reality*. In the light of what precedes, we may use another simile: that of pearl. A pearl is different from tide. It is *small*, too small, but having its essence identical with what it is in itself, existentially it preserves itself in the limitless ocean. On the other hand, the surge of the mightiest tide has no essence and self-preserving identity of its own. Being thoroughly bottomless, it rises from and recedes into the unlimitable continuum that underlies it.

Iqbal's *Mathnavi* provoked many of the Indian mystics, especially his remarks on Hafiz were source of much indignation to them. Polemics, statements, and poems appeared against him in different papers. He was forced to write rejoinders, in which those features of the *Mathnavi Asrar* were brought into light which were not quite manifest in it, yet which were very much pertinent to its theme for the representation of his new image of reality. In his rejoinders, Iqbal emphasized the stand-point of *distinction* as pivot of his philosophical outlook. It means that the image of falling and disappearing wave into infinite continuum was no longer part of his idea of ego. It does not however mean that he renounced the model of universal life as means of his philosophical outlook. Indeed, the model was common ground between him and the Indian Sufis at that time. He was using an advanced model of the same genre, gradually perfected as it were, in the evolution of the modern western thought, especially since Schelling, Fichte and Hegel, of whom his Sufi contemporaries had no idea. This advanced model of the cosmic life had its own method for accommodating the particulars and their distinctness. It did not involve sacrifice of the premises of Cosmic permeation of one reality, in any significant way. Thus, a schema emerged in which no rising wave perishes. In other words, if a bubble is formed in the splashes of water, it continues to exist. But the cosmic sway, the limitless continuum of the ocean does not thereby cease to pervade the being or to be the essence of the bubble. So also in the vibration of the wave and movements of all the entities which lie within it, it is universal force which permeates inexorably and manifests itself untiringly in their expressions, though the latter do not die out. In this way, at its metaphysical foundation, the model retains Life Force as ontologically unmultipliable and indivisible Agent in all the diversification of phenomena and of all the multitude of forms and names. Thus, modernization of the Cosmic Life allows only that much existence to things which pertains

to mere forms and distinct names. The Cosmic Life alone is true actor behind all the finite things; the latter enjoying only instrumental existence. This explanation makes it clear that may it be extinction or distinction, informing the being of a particular, ontologically speaking, the world-feeling and the conceptual model born of it as inherent in the magnitudinal consciousness does not change. Thus, one may harbour no doubt about the things in their having separable designations, without dragging oneself into negation of the same old model. All particulars, as gleaned through this view, are immersed in and at the mercy of the Cosmic Power working immanently through each of them. Each distinct thing unfolds some particular aspect, empirical or phenomenal position of the same indivisible universal life. At this place we are exactly describing the image of reality in terms of Hegelian and post-Hegelian Monism. It produces the spell of its closeness with the intuition which filled Iqbal's heart. In it as in the older model of the Cosmic life, ego is just a thrust, a dynamism; all of its being is an urge: it is an act. But what does it posit? It posits a moment, a *here and now* of the universal *elan vital*. Thus, the advanced model is all but a simulation of the type of philosophical feeling which aroused Iqbal with a new theme for his *Mathnavis*. Iqbal's assertion of *distinction* even within the limits of this model, enraged the sufis of India.

Iqbal drew on Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1034/1624) for defending his position. It may be noted that Indian Sufis of the time were protagonists of extinction while the Shyakh had distinguished himself by upholding the principle of distinction. But there was no logical rapport between Iqbal's sensibility and the philosophical idioms of the Shaykh, who had viewed the things as only *distinct* forms in the mirror of nothingness. Later, Shah Waliullah (d. 1176/1762) correctly and exhaustively proved that no significant difference in the positions of extinction and distinction, in that of Ibn al Arabi (d. 638/1240) and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1034/1624), could be ascertained. To Iqbal, ego is not a form in the mirror of nothingness, but is a *distinct, finite* existent. Obviously, his sense of reality was different in its texture from that of the Shaykh. It is further remarkable to note that Iqbal denounced Plato's general and particular theory, viz. the mystic theory of reflection making the world a reflection of the generals. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's philosophical views exactly rested on this very theory. Platonism in spirit is however a philosophy of *distinction*. The particulars are distinct from the Universals themselves, according to its premises. In Muslim tradition Platonism was absorbed in knowledgeable circles as the philosophy of *Ishraq*. The Shaykh's philosophy represented a curious system of ontology on its basis. At no stage of his life, Iqbal showed an inclination towards this philosophical system though

he always kept the Shaykh in very high esteem as a saint, who strove after the reforms of Muslim society, particularly for restoring its communal identity; and heroically passed through all trials for his mission. Iqbal's anti-Platonism shows that the *bare* idea of distinction in itself is of no value in the spirit of his philosophy.

The Sufi tradition of India mostly followed the Cosmic Sway model of Ibn-al-Arabi. It was a static model, while Iqbal of the *Mathnavi* period as has been said a short while ago, expressed his thought through an advanced *systematics* of the same model. In the traditional model, as of Ibn al Arabi type, the underlying continuum, as we have emphasised earlier, is identical with none of its parts, i.e. with the waves or manifestations. In other words, though the whole is manifest in the parts, yet transcends them. Consequently, Reality in its totality 'produces the strange phenomena of being at rest and yet in motion.' This was the outlook of the believers in *Wahdatul-wujud* with Immanence and Transcendence as its integral moments. The perfectly dynamical model, which becomes completely explicit in the *Rumuzi-Bikhudi*, differs from it by obliteration of the distinction between immanence and transcendence in the Cosmic Sway of life. Just think of the limitless ocean, and rethink all of it as emerging into wave, leaving no remainder in reserve. Now, there remains no transcendental stillness beyond the surface. All is wave. This thought yields, what we know as dynamic model of the Cosmic Sway which means that all has emerged in wave, and the wave is in motion. It was Hegel (d. 1831) who visualized reality to be of this nature. Since the time of Hegel, this model has been the main spring board of the philosophical flights in Western Culture, in whose depth lies the magnitudinal consciousness determining the evolution of its thought, as it were, in our time. Its premises may be put in ordinary language as (1) there is no transcendence beyond the appearance; (2) the real is completely immanent in its appearance; and (3) the totality of appearance is reality. Thus the unmultipliable cosmic life is absolutely one with and manifest in the manifold of its expressions, according to these premises. This was Hegelian revolution in outlook, whereas the earlier Stereo-Type had allowed the distinction between the noumenal reality and phenomenal actuality as that between the ocean and the wave in the metaphysics of existence. Now the noumenal reality, the limitless ocean of being, is completely identical with and is given in the phenomenal actuality of its momentary waves. This model, since its very inception profoundly modified the feel of the magnitudinal consciousness inherent in the Western Civilization and has caused its most splendid systems of thought as of Schopenhauer (d. 1860), Hartmann (d. 1903), Bergson (d. 1941), and Samuel Alexander (d. 1938). According to these, the Cosmic Life is a principle not behind but within the phenomena. Whatever

it is, it must be a thoroughly immanent principle, living manifestedly in its appearances. Being indivisible and all-pervading immanent causality, it binds together all existent expressions of its being in one irrevocable mighty flow, towards a Single Cosmic destiny. It is Time. The immanent cosmic life is Time. The Model is embellished with a thorough-going Historicism, entailing that there is nothing beyond History, Change and Time; not at all. All reality, in the totality of its expressions, is posited in its now, which is inevitably surpassed in a next now. The Cosmic force gushes forth, its moments splash into being and exhaust themselves in its flow. It is incessant becoming with infinity of distinctions rising and falling. Like waves, all things emerge and submerge in its universal drive. There is no *timeless* reality beyond it. All is in the wheel of time. The Collective Force, universal life, is all in all. Everything is a bloom of its temporality. The egos are its phenomenal channels. It traverses its path through them, and blows them to its own (cosmic) destiny. All history is dust storm of its march.

This model preserves the egos, but perforate them by a universal causality. It concedes to their distinct existence, but no deeper than a form or an expression or a particular name. Their will to act is phenomenal expression of the thrust of the cosmic life, which untiringly displays the character of its incessant flow in the dialectic of the rise and fall of people, composition and corruption of the moments of time, generation, degeneration and regeneration of nature. This Historicism is absolute collectivism, objectified in the infinity of individual expressions, all tossed together in the numerical unity of its drive. Absolutely, there is no difference between extinction or distinction of a particular thing in its limitless continuum. Every distinct soul is just extinct in the massiveness of the collective force, the limitless drive of the unlimitable continuum. Thus the ego qua ego, in Historicism, is an existential stillness and qua dynamism is an aspect of an infinite surge. It is however, an open possibility. But, of whom? Not of its own I-amness, never; it is open possibility of the *Cosmic Drive*. Its being as such, its self-consciousness is only a mode, a particular arrangement, of the all-pervading cosmic thrust, which permeates all and is of the essence of the universal life. That this particular arrangement is ultimate mode of the universal force having all of its unfathomable aspects realized in it, is a necessary prop of this model raised by Hegel and fortified by his right wing successors.

The *Rumuz i-Bikhudi* posited its thought contents in the above architechtonic. In scope and aims, the *Rumuz* was rendering of a complete theology and philosophy of religion for the Muslim community, expounding in its verses relation between the individual and community; the constitution of the Ummah,

the law of Islam; Change, Decadence and Conformity; Social Solidarity; visible focus of 'group life; collective ideals and perfection of the community; etc., etc. And it was all stuck to Historicism, the post-Hegelian replica of collective sway; all against the spirit of Iqbal's own sense of reality. *The Six Lectures* delivered in 1929 some ten years after its composition, re-exploring more or less the same field of discussion embodied more faithfully the spirit of Iqbal's vision. The intuition which had been only in a nascent State during 1916-18, by now bloomed into maturity and became articulate. Iqbal of the *Lectures* was a philosopher, who stood on his own grounds and was in no need of the borrowed models to state his meanings or to build up the philosophy inherent in Islam. Consequently, the thought content of the *Lectures* was free from the conceptual encumbrances of the *Rumuz*. To state the principle of movement in Islam, he was not now required to duplicate a Hegel or a Schopenhauer or a Royce as in that "the perfection of communal life is attained when community, like the individual, discovers the sensation of self"; and in that "the propagation and perfection of this sensation can be realized through guarding the communal tradition"—he had stated in the *Rumuz*.

Historicism had been part of his philosophical make, when he composed the *Rumuz* but not now, when he prepared the *Lectures*. According to Historicism all Life is history. A self is different from other selves by its biography and a community is individuated from other communities by its history. Communal tradition is conservation of the past in the present as inner core and main dynamics of its existence. If you change your tradition, you change your identity; if you disown your history, you disown yourself. The past all in all accompanies you and it is you what you are; your composition, life and meaning. It is your particular genius—genius of a people. You cannot overcome it. The preceding deductions are necessary inferences and immediate conclusions from historization of the universal life. Thus, the ego, or I-amness, bulging out into the future, is all a particular collection and conservation of yesters. What it has to be is result of what it has been. Its destiny is accomplishment of its origin. Then Iblis was right to boast of his genesis! By historization, the Cosmic Sway model sprouts into a genesis-looking civilization. The present as such has no value of its own. Its being lies in its being a thorough-bred effect of the past, in its being a vehicle of the movement of Time, of the elan vital flowing into the future, but all from past and along with past. No instant of the self transcends or escapes this binding chain of time and therefore *I-amness* from all sides in all of its aspects is fettered by it. Ego, in this model, has no ontological composition except by way of a memory condensed in *I-amness*.

Similar is the nature of human groups. They are condensation of collective memory in a nucleus of *collective I-amness*—all past organizing into a complex super—monad. This conception of the life of ego deeply infiltrates the *Mathnavis*. Iqbal expounded his idea of self and social philosophy in the *Mysteries of Selflessness*, on its basis:

Know then it is the connecting threads of days
 That stiches up thy Life's Loose manuscript.
 This self-same thread sews us a shirt
 Its needle the remembrance of old yarn.
 What thing is history, O self unaware
 A fable or a legendary tale?
 Nay, it is the thing that maketh thee aware of thy true self,
 alert unto the task.
 A seasoned traveller; this is the source
 Of the soul's ardour. This is the nerve that knit
 The body of the whole Community.
 This whets thee like a dagger on its sheath
 To dash thee in the face of all the world.
 What is life? A wave.
 Of consciousness of continuity.
 A gurgling wine that flames the revellers.¹

Iqbal surmounted this philosophical model in the *Reconstruction*. Memory or historical genius of a people does not occupy a metaphysical place in the *Lectures*. Memory now appears as simply an aspect of knowledge. Being reservoir of experience, it is an instrument of the adjustment process just like all other species of knowledge. But, there, in the model of Cosmic Life, in Historicism as it were, memory or history is constitutive ontological principle, the very life, essence, building material and the form of ego. And it is rooted in collective unconscious—the formidable infinite Continuum on the surface of which, the Cosmic Life bulges out in the frame of an I-experience. Iqbal progressively went beyond the limits of this model. Thus, in the end, he was successful in formulating a new exposition of the nature of ego, as basic principle of his monadology, free from historicism. Ego exists beyond memory. It is not a function of the memory. On the other hand, memory is the function of ego. By its nature, ego is of the nature of volition, which is essentially different from remembrance or retention. I-amness is a will in action focussed in its own fold. In experience, it presents itself as a tension, and not as a record or an experience of continuity, hence its power of de-identification from the pull of history—According to the premises of Historicism,

1. Arberry's translation, pp. 59-60.

in contrast, ego, being an integration and condensation of the past, has no power to rise above the chain of Time and shape itself according to its own image. Iqbal's exposition of ego and its life in the *Reconstruction* implies its generic freedom from history and provides foundation to a telesis-looking civilization. In line with it he restated his social philosophy, which in the *Mathnavis* had been under the shadow of the History-bound metaphysics.

To understand the metaphysical bases of the social philosophy as stated in the *Mathnavi Rumuz*, we must discuss one more aspect of Historicism. If we look into the earlier simple models of the Cosmic Sway theories, more particularly, their emanationistic and Sufi models, we find them very poor in content, so poor that phenomena of social life are just out of their comprehension. They had no provision for totalities. And since society is an aggregative phenomenon, they cannot represent it. Thus if a wave emerges, according to their image, it appears from the infinite continuum, and returns to it. But, Historicism gives an ingenious twist to the image and makes it marvellous. It takes note of the totalities, or collectivities. A wave does not rise, but waves, many waves rise. Each rising wave diffuses into others. All of them emerge into a big tide. The tides, by diffusion into one another, produce storms. These are the *tides* and *storms*, and not *single waves*, which exhaust or disappear into the limitless mass of the ocean. This enriched imagery is the main contribution of Historicism for ontological representation of the Cosmic life in social phenomena. Every individual I-amness has to surge into the social tide. No earlier model of the Cosmic Life had implied that the return (=forward) journey of the individual is through the tide, the collective, but Historicism implied it as necessary aspect of the life of ego. Iqbal adopted it for stating his social views in *Rumuz*. Let us peep reality through it. Ego is not a simple thing. Thousands of memory prints melt into one another and ego is born. A multitude of individual egos merge likewise, with one another and collective ego flows out; it is society. The model preserves its postulational rhythm; undifferentiation - differentiation - undifferentiation. The life force scatters into tiny life centres, which in turn submerge into a big whole, a collectivity, an expanded ego - I-amness. Thus viewed, Society is not a 'we'; it is 'I', super-individual I-amness. The individual limits are abrogated, the selves have become selfless, but by this, they have passed into a collective unity; thus they have expanded. The collective ego is indivisible unity of *I-amness* which permeates everything, every memory, every experience, every frame, which earlier was a separate monad. The

multitude of the phenomenal life centres is manifestation of a noumenal active principle; the collective ego. Philosophy of this kind is modern mysticism, rather contemporary *wahdat al wujud*. The *Mathnavi Mysteries of selflessness* was fastened to it.

Self negates itself in the Community

That it may be

No more a petal, but a rosary.

When in the Congregation he is lost

It is like a drop which seeking to expand

Becomes an ocean.¹

This super individual self, the collective monad must have a law, a visible focus, an ideal. Iqbal expounded all those important requirements in that *Mathnavi*. He faithfully stated the Islamic props of social organization. But as this statement was stuck to the metaphysics of collectivism, interpretation of its important concepts was liable to the distortion imposed by the collectivizing categories.

As it has been clarified earlier, society according to the categories of collectivism is one will, one thought, one action, one indivisible I-amness, a massive sway. As it grows, the individual egos are segregated and submerged into its unity and indivisible I-amness. Their autonomies and volitions are simply abolished in this *wahdat al Wujud*, continuously in evolution from less socialization to more socialization, from a superficial collection to a more and more intensive collectivism, until the perfection and complete existence of the super I-amness is in realization before which no individual I-amness is in existence. All are cancelled, negated and summated at its height. It is the station of *Jama al Jama* of contemporary mysticism, prescribing a particular sense of social solidarity. One voice, one opinion, one experience, one party, one property, one conscience become its logical implications. At its height, it negates every sub-group, every party, every opinion, every conscience beyond it. Now, if the Muslim Society is cast on this model, then *Kabā* as visible focus and *shariah* of Islam as its law mean very little in terms of Islam; they cannot impart life to it. Fortunately, the Muslim people never practised this kind of theory of social solidarity in their history. Iqbal's further development as we have emphasized earlier, consisted of clarification of his philosophical concepts and restating them in terms of more appropriate categories. His monadology, as it finally evolved, had no scope for collectivism no mystification of society. Like all the orthodox muslims, he believed that 'differences of the Ummah or dissension in opinion is a mercy.' He developed an organic sense of unity as principle of social organization and discarded the view that society is a super

1. Arberry's translation, p. 7.

individual monad. According to him, society is a mode of Living of the individual egos, a necessary mode of course, in which the individuals are more powerful than they are in their loneliness. Similarly, social system is a policy of producing living unity between them. Only in a good social system, the individuals are in their individuality. A healthy society overcomes and removes all obstructions which are source of weakening the individuals. Socialization is a process whereby individual persons intensify their individual *I-anness*, and overcome extinction. Thus, the concepts of unity, social solidarity, discipline, individualism etc. attain their own constructive and healthy meanings in the evolution of Iqbal's thought as he expressed them in his maturer works:

The 'I' is truth, it is no illusion
 Don't look upon it as a fruitless field.
 When it ripens, it becomes eternal.¹

He imparts purposiveness to the nature of society in the same spirit:

My heart burns on the loneliness of God.
 In order, therefore, to maintain intact His Ego society,
 I saw in my dust the seed of selfhood.
 And keep a constant vigil over my 'I'.²

Society is union of these egos and separation-in-union. We have to reinterpret the *mathnavis* on the basis of *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*. All answers in the latter are against the philosophical postulates of Cosmic Life, Historicism and Collectivism. Iqbal gave positive answers in it straightly on the basis of his own ontology. It cannot be said of his monadology that it was a reproduction of Leibniz, Fichte, Hegel or Bergson. The latter were philosophers of Cosmic sway, Iqbal finally was not. He took time to develop his own model and came out of their influence. Thus all of his deductions and conclusions have to be reinterpreted in terms of his own ontology and monadology.

With a song of agony
 With a sweet, soft melody,
 To a dying world a thirst
 Lo : Life's flagon I have burst.³

1. *Zabur-i-Ajam*, p. 235 ff.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 239 ff ; Dar's translation, pp. 45-50.

3. *Ibid.*, Invocation, Arberry's Translation.

DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF THE WEST AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

S. MOHAMMAD TAQI

Although Galileo and Newton gave Mechanistic Foundations to human knowledge the development of scientific ideas has gradually drifted away from Mechanism to Dynamism, and it seems that the idea of 'movement' or 'change' occupies central position in our knowledge of the universe. As a consequence of their evolution in science western thought in our time shows more and more leanings towards the dynamic interpretation of reality.

But close examination reveals that the contemporary western philosophies of Dynamism are subject to dormant contradictions and have implications that the philosophy of self is bound to encounter in order to consolidate its own dynamic world-view on unmistakable footings. The philosophy of self which has been propounded in Indo-Pak sub-continent since Iqbal claims to reveal a dynamism in the nature of reality, which in all its essentials is something different from the sort of dynamism these western theories project in the structure of the Universe.

Dynamical conception of the world as it were advocated by the leaders of science and philosophy in the contemporary west is closely associated with the reality character of the appearance. They believe, to put it in general terms, that the world consists of sense-data, ideas, or impressions and since these fleeting presentations are never stationary, the world in its essence is not static. This dynamical conception is based on the concept of the 'Temporal' while the dynamic view of the theory of self is raised on deeper bases, it is grounded in the concept of the 'Duration'. It is therefore quite necessary for a philosopher of self to expose hollowness of the concept of dynamism as it pervades the current western theories according to whom the only reality which this imperfect and mortal man can ever reach or hope to decipher is a ceaseless flux and boundless vacuum. Becoming supreme in the whole realm of scientific thought, this theory has thrown into disrepute the history-long quest for the underlying reality behind the fleeting phenomena.

The distinction in philosophy between appearance and reality—the phenomenon and the noumenon,—is an old one. Appearance consists of motion and change. This appearance or change is what Dewey and Russell and many others believe to be the ultimate reality, with which we have, willy nilly, to be content, as human knowledge is restricted and cannot overstep the boundaries set up by appearances. To them appearance is reality and there is no need of further ground for this reality.

The doctrine of the reality of phenomena or appearances fits in easily with the dynamical conception of the universe as propounded by the leaders of modern science which regards motion as the ultimate and final reality.

This idea of the world as appearances and phenomena is, to my mind, a heinous logical fallacy which has had the effect of retarding philosophical enquiries and sapping the basis of higher strata of conceptualization.

Appearances and phenomena are, in the terminology of modern science, four-dimensional continua which consist of time as their cardinal ingredient. Now, time equates fully with motion. This means that appearances and phenomena consist of motion as well as space. The question of space does not concern us at the present stage of our inquiry. But so far as motion is concerned, it is obvious that motion and appearance are coextensive and the fact that they are co-extensive clearly means that appearance can, without any loss of meaning, be substituted with motion. Thus, the whole discussion revolves round the fundamental notion of motion. But motion, in turn, is co-terminous with energy which is convertible into matter. The logical way, therefore, to begin our discussion would be to make energy our central point of investigation.

At this stage of our discussion, the questions which suggest themselves are: firstly, is energy appearance or reality? Secondly, does energy have any relation to space; if so, what is the nature of this relationship? If energy is accepted as the final reality, space would naturally have to step down to the second general genus in the hierarchy of genera, leaving the place of the most general genus to energy which would then be considered as the highest generalisation the human mind is capable of.

But if space, as abstracted from energy and matter (which have

become co-extensive), is regarded as the most general genus, the alternative of appearance would altogether vanish into thin air. In this case, space would become the only eternal and everlasting reality in the cosmos. It is necessary to emphasise here the fact that the word 'space', as employed in the present discussion, denotes a complete abstraction from energy and matter. Thus, conceived as above and beyond the clutches of time and energy, space is, I propose, the only reality behind the fleeting phenomena and appearances. It is infinite and existent eternally, its infinitude being all rational and on all sides. Time, motion and change denote similar, one-directional activity. In this uni-directional activity, 'before', 'herenow' and 'after' are three essential stages. 'Before' is merging in 'herenow' while 'herenow' is in its turn becoming 'after'. This process of becoming 'before', 'herenow' and 'after' presupposes continuous nothingness left over behind every 'before' because every 'before' leaves nothingness behind at its merger with 'herenow'. This condition of being is a situation in which nothingness precedes 'before' and it is what is described as contingent. Thus, 'before', 'herenow' and 'after' are all contingent as all of them leave nothingness in their wake. But the contingency of all these three necessitates the contingency of time itself since time is composed of these three units only. Now, time is co-terminant with motion and change; motion is co-extensive with energy and energy is convertible into matter, which shows that all these four, along with time, are contingent. But if time, motion, energy, change and matter are all thought to be contingent, they cannot be considered as the ultimate reality. Ultimate reality, I dare say, is changeless and timeless. It cannot change as otherwise it will lose the peculiarity of being the ultimate reality.

Change, which is the essence of time, energy and motion, has some peculiar qualities of its own which deprive it of its right of the ultimate reality. Firstly, because every change presupposes the existence of space prior to itself, space has a greater right to be called ultimate reality. Secondly, change by its very nature, is finite. Change denotes the finitude while the ultimate reality cannot be * finite. The third reason as to why change cannot be regarded as the ultimate reality is more important than the former two.

Change, by its very nature, has three states as its fundamental

* 'The Finite Universe' in the Proceedings of the Forth Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress, PP 143-148.

units. These are 'before', 'herenow' and 'after'. Between these three states (a,b,c) two more states intervene. The state coming between a and b covers innumerable possibilities. Also, the state y which intervenes between b and c, has innumerable possibilities too. Then again, a third state z comes after c, having an infinite field of innumerable possibilities.

These six states, a,b,c and x,y,z are all the possible and conceivable stages through which every change has somehow to pass. Now, if change is considered as the final reality, the question would arise as to which one of the six states is the final reality. Change as such is comprised of only first three stages a, b and c. The question is: at what point in a,b or c the motion becomes real in the ultimate sense of the word? Is it reality at a,b or c or at all of them collectively? Whatever answer this question may have, the fact remains that the very existence of these states excludes the possibility of reality. Of these three states, everyone has something more or something less than the other two, as it were very clearly shown by the fact that these are three states, not one. Here, the famous principle that no two things in the world can in all respects be identical, applies very aptly, as otherwise they would be one, not two. Thus, everyone of the three states of change has some excess or diminution in relation to the other two. If, therefore, the three states of change are considered as the final reality, they would naturally consist of something more or something less than reality since all of them are severally considered realities.

Therefore, the diminution or excess of reality at every stage in comparison with the other two stages is unavoidable. But this makes reality unreal as neither more nor less than reality is to be considered reality. One is more and the other is less than reality and, therefore, both of them are a little bit different from reality. And this is reduction to absurdity.

Thus, change alongwith motion, time, energy and matter cannot be considered as reality. But in the case of space, the situation is altogether different. Space can be abstracted away from time, motion, etc. Thus abstracted, it can be regarded as the final reality, acting as it does as the final resting place of all our notions and external motions in the universe. The view that time can be merged with space, as Einstien innocently believed, is quite inadmissible. Time is essentially an activity. The serious mistake that Einstien commits in regard to the merger of time and space in his theory of relativity is *due to a con-*

fusion between the meanings of the words 'space' and 'place'. The word 'place' has a significance of very limited applicability while space is the most general notion the human mind is able to conceive. Interpreted thus, space as distinct from place is a kind of conception which cannot be equated with the concept of activity.

Indeed some very obvious and clear differences exist between the conceptions of space and time. A very apparent difference is that space can be abstracted from time *while time cannot be conceived of as existing without space.* Metaphysically speaking, the very notion of time requires that it should not be regarded as anything more than a contingent entity. At the same time, the view that space is contingent is patently ridiculous. The idea the word 'space' conveys is the widest possible notion a human mind can comprehend. This widest possible notion is comprised of what is termed as the Universe and the non-activity preceding it and reigning beyond the farthest conceivable confines of this universe. Space thus defined and the idea connoted by the word 'time' as explained above represent two quite different categories. One is completely fundamental while the other is a mere auxiliary.

Space is the ultimate reality while time, along with other similar processes, is simply a derivative of it. It is only a particular manifestation of the Ultimate Reality which is infinite in all directions, ubiquitous, and all-inclusive.

The western theorists of the present age universalize time, and thus make the whole concept of reality superfluous. Time cannot be ultimate. It is space which is presentation of the ultimate reality. The philosophy of self, as it was propounded by Iqbal and leading thinkers internalizes this truth in the concept of 'spacious presence'.

The category of 'spacious presence' with which the ultimate ego is omnipresent in objective terms is projected in the category of space. The dynamic aspect of this objective consciousness is posited in the notion of 'Duration'. When Iqbal disowns the 'time as a mechanical concept', he was in fact visualizing a higher order of reality in the idea of Duration.

This 'Duration' is reality without succession. A reality which is without succession is supratemporal, which provides the ground for

the fleeting temporal things, the appearances and the presentations. As an abstract concept this duration is space.

I have already pointed out that the notion of space loses its significance when it is used in the sense of a 'place,' Iqbal has this sense of the word 'space', when like Bergson, he speaks of the spatialization of time. But when the word 'space' is restored to its full meanings as the infinite boundless objectivity, the human mind can ever comprehend, it transcends the 'localizations' and in the order of consciousness is reproduced as the 'specious presence'.

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IQBAL'S LECTURE ON *IJTIHAD*

Muhammad Khalid Masud

Iqbal's lecture on *ijtihād* ("The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam") constitutes the sixth chapter in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. The first six of the seven chapters in this book were delivered as lectures in the Universities of Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh during the years 1928 and 1930.

Although much has been written about these lectures, yet the one on *ijtihād* has not earned as much scholarly attention as it deserved. It has been evaluated variably by commentators, mostly with a slight regard [for the originality of its thought. The reasons for the complacency or indifference of the scholars to this lecture are worth investigating. In fact, this lecture has suffered from these attitudes from the day it was delivered. The history of the writing, presentation and publication of this lecture is curiously stretched over a longer period than any of Iqbal's writings. An investigation about the dates of the various stages of this lecture is quite interesting as well as revealing. The limited space of this paper does not allow to elaborate upon the relevance and significance of such an investigation for an understanding of this lecture. This requires a separate study.¹ This paper only attempts to ascertain the dates of the various phases of this lecture. We are, therefore, limiting ourselves to the following questions :

- (1) When was the first draft of Iqbal's lecture on *ijtihād* written ?
- (2) When did Iqbal start the actual writing of the lecture and how many years did its preparation take ?

1. Ref. Author's unpublished monograph on *Iqbal Aur Ijtihād*.

- (3) When was the lecture delivered in Lahore ?
- (4) When was it presented in South India ?

Before we begin exploring answers to these questions it is essential to preface this attempt with a brief introduction to the problem of *ijtihād* with the salient points in this lecture.

Ijtihād is an Arabic word which literally means "to exert one's efforts". Technically it is defined usually as "the putting forth of every effort in order to determine with a degree of probability the question of Islamic law". Although the technical definition did not even implicitly limit *ijtihād* to mean to found a school of law, yet in common parlance the term came to be understood as such. Whenever someone claimed *ijtihād* he was condemned in certain quarters as a heretic and innovator. No *ijtihād* was necessary or allowed after the establishment of the schools of law in Islam. These were, therefore, extremely confident and intrepid souls who chose to speak on this problem from time to time. Naturally they had to face a bitter opposition.

Iqbal does not completely accept the conventional definition of *ijtihād* in his lecture. He rather defines *ijtihād* as a principle of movement in Islam, hence the title of his lecture. In this lecture Iqbal analyses various definitions of *ijtihād* and rejects the static view implied therein. He discusses the phenomenon of the relapse of *ijtihād*. Among the causes of its immobility, he enumerates the following :

- (1) Orthodox reaction to rationalist movements such as the Mu'tazilah ;
- (2) apprehensions about Sufism ; and
- (3) destruction of Baghdad.

These factors forced the Islamic society to discontinue *ijtihād* activities. This analysis leads Iqbal to a discussion of the history and working of *ijtihād* in modern times. He discusses "Wahhabism" and traces its origin to Iba Taimīyyah. The impact of Wahhābī movement continued in modern era and culminated in the reform movements in Islam. He does not entirely approve of these reforms in Turkey. He particularly singles out Zia Gokalp as a symbol of modern trends in Islam in Turkey, and criticises his views

on the emancipation of women. After this analysis he comes to grapple with the actual problem of *ijtihād* in the present situation. In his view the crux of the problem lies in facing certain fundamental facts. He emphasises that until the rise of the Abbasids there was no written law of Islam apart from the Qur'ān. Secondly, during the first four centuries of Islam the activities of *ijtihād* which culminated in the appearance of nineteen schools of law, not only demonstrates the dynamism of Islamic law but also points out that the formulation of Islamic law was the result of these activities. With these preliminary remarks Iqbal goes on to discuss the four sources of Islamic law, i.e. the Qur'ān, *Hadīth*, *Ijmā'* and *Qiyās*. He brings out the dynamic character of these principles. He gives an entirely new interpretation to the institution of *iimā'*. Instead of letting it remain a passive material source of legal reasoning, he proposes it to become an active functional source in the form of a legislative assembly.

Having summarised Iqbal's views, let us now turn to the questions we have raised above.

I

It was in 1904 that Iqbal first expressed his views on the problems of *ijtihād* in an article entitled: "Qaumī Zindagī". He said:

"If we contemplate on the present situation we will come to the conclusion that as, in order to support the fundamentals of religion, we need a new theology, similarly we need great jurists for the reinterpretation of Islamic law. The jurist must be able not only to codify Islamic law on a modern pattern but he should also be capable of extending these principles, by his power of imagination, to cover all the possible situations of the present-day social needs. As far as I know there is no one such single jurist born yet in the Islamic world. Considering the significance and volume of the work it appears that this requires definitely more than one mind."²

From this excerpt we may see that, firstly, Iqbal was conscious of the insufficiency of *fiqh* for the present-day needs. Secondly,

2. Iqbal, "Qaumī Zindagī," *Makhzan*, October 1904, vide 'Abd al-Vāhid Mu'inī, *Maqālāt-i Iqbāl* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963), p. 55.

therefore, he felt the need for its reinterpretation. Thirdly, he had come to the conclusion that *ijtihād* required a collective effort instead of individual attempts.

Although the remarks about *ijtihād* in this article clearly demonstrated Iqbal's grasp of the problem, yet it took Iqbal a decade or so to fully develop his views on *ijtihād*. He delivered a lecture on this problem first in Lahore in 1924 and then in South India perhaps in 1930. It was eventually published as the sixth chapter of the *Reconstruction*.

The question, however, arises : when was the first draft of this lecture completed? Iqbal's biographers and commentators have given different dates. The earliest date is given by Sayyid 'Abd al-Vāḥid al-Mu'īnī as 1920,³ and the latest as 1925 is suggested by Rashīd Aḥmad Ṣiddīqī.⁴ As we shall see shortly, the first date is too early and the second is too late. We know this from the internal evidences such as Iqbal's letters or the reminiscences of his contemporaries.

During the writing of this article Iqbal consulted a number of scholars. His correspondence with Sayyid Sulaimān Nadvī on this point is dated 1925.⁵ The letters to 'Abd al-Mājid Daryābādī in which he refers to this lecture also dates as 22 March 1925.⁶ From this we can conclude that possibly Iqbal had started writing the article in 1920 and kept on improving it until 1925. There are, however, two substantial evidences that put this date a bit differently. One is a letter that Iqbal wrote to a certain friend of his, Sayyid Muḥammad Sa'īd al-Dīn Ja'farī, on 3 August 1922, in which he said : "I am writing a comprehensive article in English entitled : 'The Idea of *Ijtiḥād* in the Law of Islam.'"⁷

3. S.A. Vahid, Ed., *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. xiv.

4. R.A. Ṣiddīqī, "Ba Yād-i Iqbāl," *Jawhar*, Dehli, 1938. Reappeared in R.A. Ṣiddīqī, *Iqbāl : Shakhṣīyyat Aur Shā'irī* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1976), p. 3.

5. Sh. 'Aṭā' Allāh, Ed., *Iqbāl Nāmah* [Collection of Iqbal's Letters], (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, n.d.), I, 13.

6. Ibid.

7. Vide B.A. Dar, Ed., *Anwār-i Iqbāl* [Collection of Iqbal's Letters], (Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1967), p. 285.

This shows that it would not be correct to say that the article was completed in 1920. It is evident that until 1922 he was still occupied with the compilation of this article.

It would be equally wrong to conclude on the basis of Iqbal's correspondence with Nadvī and Daryābādī in 1925 that the article was completed as late as 1925. Firstly, because the letters, particularly that of Daryābādī, imply that the article was already completed and Iqbal was asking his addressee for his comments. Secondly, it is now certainly known, as we will explain shortly, that Iqbal delivered this lecture in Lahore in December 1924. We would not deny, however, the possibility of several drafts having been written on various dates. Also it is still a question whether Iqbal delivered the same lecture in South India which he did in Lahore.

II

We have seen that Iqbal's interest in the problem of *ijtihād* began in 1904 and he started drafting his lecture in question probably in 1920 and delivered it in 1924 and again in 1930. Naturally the question arises why it took Iqbal so long to prepare this lecture. Even if it is admitted that Iqbal kept on improving and revising his draft, the need for such revisions is still to be explained. The very first answer one can give is that the subject was very delicate as well as controversial. Iqbal was apprehensive of the reaction of the conservative '*ulamā*' and the general public. This is why, whereas in 1904 his medium of expression was Urdu, in his later years his addressees were the English-reading public.

In relation to this we must also keep in view that Iqbal was highly conscious of his limitations. His lack of knowledge about Arabic sources, especially on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, made him more and more cautious. There is yet another factor to be taken into account. The books on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence were not readily available to him in those years, particularly Abū Ishāq al-Shāṭibī's *Al-Muwāfaqāt*⁸ and Shawkānī's

8. For a study of Shāṭibī's legal thought, see the present writer's *Islamic Legal Philosophy*, Islamabad, 1977.

Irshād al-Fuḥūl on which he drew extensively, became available only in 1924. In fact, he was one of the first Indian Muslims to have used them. To make up for his mastery of Arabic sources he turned to as many scholars and as many times as was possible for him. We know from Chaghatā'ī's⁹ account that he consulted extensively the following scholars when he was in Ludhiana: Maulānā Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān, Muftī Na'īm, Miyān 'Abdul Ḥayy and Maulānā Muḥammad Amīn.

In Lahore he was constantly in touch with Maulānā Aṣghar 'Alī Rūḥī and Maulānā Ghulām Murshid. As we have already mentioned, he was also in correspondence with Sayyid Sulaimān Nadvī on this point. These consultations and deliberations on these advices did demand time.

Furthermore, the book which particularly incited Iqbal to define his view was that by N.P. Aghnides, *Mohammedan Theories of Finance*.¹⁰ Aghnides was a Christian Greek from Turkey who was sent in 1911 to Columbia University, New York, by the Turkish Government. He wrote this book as his Ph.D. dissertation for the University in 1916.¹¹ The book was published soon after, but Iqbal came to know of it only in 1923 when a certain Raḥmat 'Alī in New York sent it to him for his comments.¹² Aghnides shows a good command of original Arabic sources of Islamic jurisprudence. In his formulation of the problem he adopted the approach of an Orientalist. This provided Iqbal with a view of *ijtihād* which was refreshingly different from the conventional one. It was, however, as Iqbal observed, erroneous at many places.

The points where Iqbal found himself differing with Aghnides gave him an opportunity to reconstruct his views more profoundly. We would like to point out only three important points of difference between Aghnides and Iqbal. Firstly, Aghnides criticises Islamic law as a mechanical system.¹³ This criticism had deep

9. Dr 'Abdallāh Chaghatā'ī, "Allāmah Iqbāl Kay Madrās Kay Lekcharon Kā Pas Manẓar" [Background of Iqbal's Lectures], *Daily Imroze*, Lahore, 22 April 1956.

10. First published by Columbia University, New York, in 1916.

11. *Ibid.*, and Appendix.

12. Chaghatā'ī, *op. cit.*

13. Aghnides, *Mohammedan Theories of Finance* (Lahore: Premier Book House, 1961, reprint), p. 143.

reaction on Iqbal's thinking. In fact, one can say that Aghnides' characterisation of this concept as mechanical compelled Iqbal to reinterpret the whole development of Islamic thought in order to stress its dynamic rather than mechanical nature. If we study the seven lectures in the *Reconstruction* we find this theme running through the whole book almost as a refrain. Iqbal rejects the characterisation of Islamic worldview as static. He singles out the notion of *ijtihād* as the principle of movement *par excellence*.

The second point of contention with Aghnides was the question of *Hadīth*. While Aghnides accepted the traditionalist point of view in taking all the *aḥādīth* as a reliable source of law,¹⁴ Iqbal did not fully endorse his idea.¹⁵

The third point of difference was the question of *ijmā'*. Aghnides says that, according to some Muslim jurists, *ijmā'* can repeal the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.¹⁶ Iqbal disagreed with him on this point as well.¹⁷

It shows that the problem of *ijtihād* was not a simple one. It involved the whole ambit of Islamic thought. The modern social problems gave it an entirely new dimension. Adding to it a lack of command on original sources inhibited Iqbal to progress rapidly.

III

Dr Iqbal, in one of his letters, states that he delivered the lecture on the problems of *ijtihād* in Lahore, but he does not mention any date. Dr Ghulām Jilānī Barq, in one of his interviews, recalls that this lecture was delivered in Lahore after Iqbal's return from South India.¹⁸ This remark places the date around 1929-30. This, however, is not acceptable in view of a number of evidences that we shall discuss shortly.

Faqīr Sayyid Vaḥīduddīn has given this date as 1925.¹⁹ It is

14. Ibid., p. 35.

15. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p. 173.

16. Aghnides, op. cit., p. 88.

17. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 174.

18. *Viāe Raḥīm Bakhsh Shāhīn, Awrāq-i Gum Gashah* [ʿAllāmah Iqbāl Kī Ghayr Mudawwanah Taḥrīren], (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975), pp. 191-93.

19. Faqīr Sayyid Vaḥīduddīn, *Rūzgār-i Faqīr* (Karachi: Lion Art Press, 1968), II, 87.

probably a conjectural remark. A more concise and succinct account of this lecture is given by Dr 'Abdallāh Chaghatā'ī.²⁰ He explains that this lecture was delivered before Iqbal's journey to South India. He also mentions that it was delivered on 13 December 1924. This is confirmed by an announcement in *Zamīndār*, Lahore. We also know that Iqbal delivered almost all of his lectures in Lahore at various annual sessions of Anjuman-i Hīmāyat-i Islām, before his journey to South India. This fact has been very ably documented by Hanīf Shāhid in his book *Iqbāl Aur Anjuman-i Hīmāyat-i Islām*.²¹

The announcement in the *Zamīndār* is a very solid and comprehensive evidence on this point. Hence we would like to quote it *verbatim* :

“‘Allāmah Shaikh Muḥammad Iqbāl will read a very important paper today, the 13th December, at 6.30 p.m. in Habībiyah Hall in Islamiyah College. The paper is entitled as : ‘Ijtihād in Islam’. Shaikh ‘Abd al-Qādir will preside. The article will be in English.’”²²

From this evidence there should have remained no doubt that the exact date of the delivery of this lecture in Lahore was 13 December 1924. Dr 'Abdallāh Chaghatā'ī adds that there also appeared comments, reviews and criticism of this lecture in the Lahore press. However curious it may be, we have not been able to find any news reports or comments in the Urdu and English press in the days after the lecture was delivered.

IV

Iqbal was invited to deliver lectures at the University of Madras in 1928. In this tour he also visited Hyderabad. He made another lecture tour in 1930. It has, however, been difficult to find out when and where *ijtihād* lecture was given. It is certainly known that the lecture was not given in his first tour to Madras in 1928-29.

20. Chaghatā'ī, *op. cit.*

21. M. Hanīf Shāhid, *Iqbāl Aur Anjuman-i Hīmāyat-i Islām* (Lahore : Anjuman-i Hīmāyat-i Islām, 1976), p. 110.

22. The Daily (?) *Zamīndār*, Lahore, 12 Dec. 1924. I am grateful to the Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore, for allowing me to consult their files.

It is hard to explain why, when the lecture was already prepared and had in fact been delivered in Lahore, should it not be included in the first three lectures delivered at Madras. There is only one indirect reference to the effect that it was given at Hyderabad in 1930.²³ Besides this we have no other evidence on this point.

The fact that, despite its availability, the lecture was not delivered in Madras, raises a number of questions. With the present status of information on this point we can explain this delay only by referring to Iqbal's apprehensions of the criticism of his views on *ijtihād*. He had experienced it in his correspondence with Maulānā Daryābādī. It is also possible that when he presented this lecture in Lahore he might have been criticised by a section of his audience. This is, however, only a surmise. It is also possible that, although the lecture was prepared, Iqbal was not confident enough to present it to his Madras audience. He still wanted time to improve and revise it before the final presentation. Now, if this is true, then the question arises whether the present lecture included in the *Reconstruction* is actually the revised version of the Lahore lecture or it is the same. It would have been interesting to compare the drafts of both these lectures, but, unfortunately, the text of the Lahore lecture is not available. The original manuscripts or the drafts of these papers might hold the key to explain this point, but so far scholars have not been able to trace the original manuscripts.²⁴

(October 78)

23. I am thankful to Professor M. Saeed Sheikh, Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, for information on this point.

24. In an interview, Dr Jāvīd Iqbāl has recently confirmed that the said MS is not extant. See recorded interview : Islamic Research Institute Library.

IQBAL'S CONTRIBUTION TO 'LIBERALISM' IN MODERN ISLAM

DR. JAVID IQBAL

In the eighteenth century the moral, political and economic deterioration of Islam under the Ottoman, the Russian and the British rule had reached its climax. This general decadence was followed by the growth of 'puritanic' reform movements in Arabia, North Africa, South Russia and India.

Although these movements were not linked with one another and it was a mere coincidence that they existed in numerous parts of the Muslim world more or less at the same time, they were identical with regard to their object which was to purify Islam from the corruptions introduced by Sufism, conservatism and the arbitrary Ottoman Sultanate. The Muslims were influenced everywhere by these 'puritanic' reform movements, for the reformers preached a return to the original simplicity of Islam by laying emphasis on God's Unity, the sufficiency of the Qur'an and the Tradition as precedents for the Muslims, and the complete rejection of all innovations or heresies. Notwithstanding the fact that these movements encouraged communal tendencies among the Muslims, particularly of those countries where they constituted a minority, these movements remained, generally speaking, entirely internal in character, because Islam, at that stage, had not become fully conscious of the threat of European expansion.

By the close of the eighteenth century the economic considerations of the European Colonial Powers necessitated a penetration in the world of Islam. This penetration resulted, in some cases, in the occupation, and in other, the economic exploitation of the Muslim countries on the part of the European Powers. The contact with the West led to the infiltration of such new ideas as constitutionalism, secularism, nationalism and radicalism into the world of Islam. But by the time the Muslims abandoned their passive role the outer 'fringe' of the Islamic world had fallen into the hands of the Great Powers. The Muslims of the 'heart' or the 'core' of the world of Islam at any rate, looked forward to holding their own at least in those territories where they predominated. Accor-

dingly Islamic 'puritanism' of the later half of the eighteenth century culminated in the condemnation of Western civilisation. The followers of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd-al-Wahhab in Arabia, Muhammad al-Sanusi in North Africa, and Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly in India were violently anti-Western.

However, within a generation or two, the 'puritanic' beginning of the Muslim revival broadened into what has been termed 'liberalism', and the work of Islamizing the Western ideas was taken up by Midhat Pasha in Turkey, Mufti 'Alam Jan in South Russia, Sheikh Muhammad 'Abduh in Egypt and Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India. For a time it appeared that the two groups (the 'puritans' and the 'liberals') would develop in opposition to one another. But as both the groups were still apprehensive of external European threat, they contributed jointly towards the religious and territorial defence of Islam. In connection with the reconciliation of these two seemingly antagonistic trends of 'puritanism' and 'liberalism' within Modern Islam, the name of Jamal-al-Din Afghani has been frequently mentioned. He laid stress on the acquisition of the technique of European progress and exhorted the Muslims to grasp the secret of Western power. Actually it was due to the influence of Jamal-al-Din Afghani that 'liberalism' together with 'puritanism' developed into 'Pan-Islamism', and shortly after the 1914-1918 War, when the Ottoman Empire was being dis-membered, 'Pan-Islamism' further developed into 'Muslim nationalism'. 'Liberalism', 'Pan-Islamism' and 'Muslim nationalism' therefore, were movements which were stimulated by external European pressure.

In the Indian sub-continent 'liberalism' seems to have developed hand in hand with 'political conservatism'. Perhaps with the exception of Shibli and his followers who had 'radical' tendencies and who found no objection to joining the Indian national movement, the 'liberalism' of all the other reformers of the Indian sub-continent was based on the Muslim separatist policy, and was confined to the uplift of the Muslims generally and particularly of the Indian sub-continent.

A glance at the works of Muhammad Iqbal, the last of the great 'liberal' reformers, from 1907 onwards, reveals that all his ethico-philosophical teachings, *e.g.*, his stress on the importance of the Individual and the Community, his vigorous optimism, his emphasis on creative activity, his constant striving for the absolutely new—were motivated by one permeating desire, the consolidation of Islam generally and particularly

of the Indian sub-continent. In his 'liberalism' were blended the 'political conservatism' of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (like Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Iqbal was opposed to the idea of the Muslims joining the Indian national movement, and consequently he was not in favour of surrendering separate electorates, the 'radicalism' of Muhammad Shibli (like Muhammad Shibli, Iqbal was aware of the need of economic uplift of the Muslim agriculturists), and the 'Pan-Islamism' of Jamal-al-Din Afghani. This synthesis made it possible for Iqbal to interpret 'Muslim nationalism' as the political emancipation of numerous races, speaking different languages, but professing Islam and inhabiting those territories which comprise the world of Islam, without that emancipation coming into conflict with the general principles of equality, fraternity and solidarity among the Muslims as established by their religious usage and cultural coherence.

Islam, he asserted, is hostile to nationalism when nationalism isolates itself from Islam and as a political creed, based exclusively on race, colour, language or territory, puts forth rival claims in opposition to those of Islam. However, patriotism or a readiness to lay down one's life for one's country, belief, historical traditions or culture, is, according to him, an integral part of a Muslim's faith.

Iqbal envisaged an international Islam when he preached that Islam was neither 'nationalism' nor 'imperialism' but a 'commonwealth of nations' which accepted the racial diversity and the ever-changing geographical demarcations only for the facility of reference and not for limiting the social horizon of its members.

Life viewed from the standpoint of Islam was his principal theme and a philosophical foundation was provided for that basic theme. Iqbal, unlike his predecessors, was neither polemical nor apologetic. He boldly attempted a socio-political reconstruction of the Muslims by insisting on the development of 'Self' through which the Muslims could achieve freedom and power once again. He preached that the Muslims should endeavour to cultivate Islamic character and thereby become perfect as individuals. Islamic community, in his opinion, was a unique community composed of unique individuals. Thus through Islam he provided an 'ego' of their own particularly to the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent.

In replacing nationalism by Islam as a nation-building force, Iqbal helped the growth of 'Muslim nationalism' which in its turn led to the

secession of Islam from the Indian sub-continent. A nation was constituted on the basis of Islam as a culture or a civilization and this nation eventually managed to secure self-determination as well as territorial specification.

As for an Islamic interpretation of 'constitutionalism', Iqbal regarded the Turk's decision to abolish the Caliphate as perfectly sound. He approved of the growth of a republican spirit in the Muslim countries, which was, in his opinion, a return to the original purity of Islam. He was likewise pleased at the establishment of legislative assemblies in the Muslim lands. These developments, he maintained, necessitated the revision of old Muslim institutions in the light of modern experience. Accordingly he laid emphasis on the need for a reform in Muslim Law as well as Muslim legal education, and recommended the revival of *Ijtihad* for a re-interpretation of Islamic Law in the light of modern experience, but in such a way that the original spirit of that Law was not lost.

Iqbal denounced 'secularism' which had resulted from the fundamental duality of spirit and matter in Christianity, and which led to the exclusion of religion from the life of the Western states.

Iqbal even provided the Muslims with an Islamic interpretation of 'socialism'. He was greatly impressed by the economic implications of the Muslim Law of Inheritance, and believed that Islam could create a new world where the social rank of man would be determined not by his caste or colour, or the amount of dividend he earned, but by the kind of life he lived. From the standpoint of Islam human society was founded on 'the equality of spirits' not on 'the equality of stomachs'; and, notwithstanding private ownership which was regarded as a trust, Islam did not allow capital to accumulate in such a way as to dominate the real producer of wealth.

Iqbal influenced the course of events in Muslim India through the force of his poetry and writings, but he died before Pakistan actually came into being. It is necessary that the 'liberal' spirit, to which Iqbal and his predecessors contributed, should be kept alive in Pakistan, and also that 'liberalism' should be safeguarded and protected from being abused at the hands of those who are not acquainted with the sources, history and limitations of this movement. Islam is good for all times. It tends to look forward with the help and under the guidance of its past experience, therefore we must be always ready and prepared to adapt our ways of life to changing conditions *without losing our integrity*.

(October 60)

A STUDY OF IQBAL'S VIEWS ON 'IJMA'.

DR. S.M. YUSUF

Iqbal penned his lecture on "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam" (No VI in *The Reconstruction*) at a time when Turkey was hailed as "the element of stability in the world of Islam". No doubt, the stirrings of new life in Turkey in the wake of World War I touched off a wave of excitement throughout the world of Islam. Iqbal's appraisal of the potentialities for good or evil of the new trends in Modern Turkey is worth a critical study in the light of the facts of subsequent history. Today one cannot help feeling that at several places in the above lecture the emotionalism of the revivalist gets the upper hand of the cool analyst and the calm thinker. For example, one is at a loss to see, as Iqbal would like one to do, "that following a line more in tune with the spirit of Islam he (i.e., Sa'id Halim Pasha of the Religious Reform Party) reaches practically the same conclusion as the Nationalist Party, that is to say, the freedom of *Ijtihad* with a view to rebuild the law of *shari'ah* in the light of modern thought and experience". One can only wish that Iqbal had lived longer to see that the Nationalists only sought the freedom to displace the *shari'ah* and not to rebuild the law thereof. Even if the Nationalists called it 'free *Ijtihad*', it is clearly a case of free-thinking—free from, and without any reference to, the *shari'ah*.

It is clear that, like all modern thinkers, Iqbal was distracted by the thought of "the immobility of Islam during the last 500 years". He was afraid that if the new reforms of Modern Turkey were condemned outright the 'immobility' might get a fresh lease of life. That is why he would say: "The structure of Islam as a religio-political system, no doubt, does permit such a view (the separation of Church and State), though personally I think it is a mistake to suppose that the idea of State is more dominant and rules all other ideas embodied in the system of Islam". As if it were just a minor mistake! Further: "Turkey's *Ijtihad* is that, according to the spirit of Islam, the Caliphate or *Imamate* can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly. The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India, so far as I know, have not yet expressed themselves on the point. Personally, I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. The republican form of government is not only

thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam". True, but just a simple question: Is it the Caliphate/*Imamate* that is vested in the elected Assembly? If so, then what about the separation of Church and State? And further on, "Most people in India will condemn the displacement of Arabic by Turkish. For reasons which will appear later the poet(Zia)'s *Ijtihad* is open to grave objections, but it must be admitted that the reform suggested by him is not without a parallel in the past history of Islam". Iqbal is merely pleading a bad case, pointing to unreliable evidence for mitigation of sentence. Ibn Tumart was an eccentric who could only have erred on the side of unrelenting opposition to 'shirk' and 'bidah'. He was so particular about the Qur'an in Arabic that he invented a novel method of teaching the 'Fatiha' to the barbarous Masmuda. 'He called individuals of them by a word or sentence from this *Sura*: the first was called "al-hamdu lillahi", the second "rabbil", the third "alamin" and so on. He then told them to give their names in the order in which he placed them till he succeeded in getting them to repeat the first *sura* of the Qur'an.' But at the same time Ibn Tumart was anxious that the ignorant Berbers should understand, and be inspired by, the *Tawhid* (the opposite of 'shirk'). That is why he utilised his gift of extraordinary proficiency in the Berber language to compose a treatise called the *Tawhid*, which he himself taught and insisted on everyone of his followers to learn. In course of time the *Tawhid* and other collections of the writings and commentaries of Ibn Tumart in the Berber language became popular until his opponents, anxious to fight him with his own weapons, called this circulation of Berber treatises, in preference to the Qur'an as they must have put it, a 'bidah' par excellence. All the reliable histories like the *Tarikh* of Ibn Khaldun, *al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya*, the *Mujib* of al-Marrakushi, and the *Rawd al-Qirtas* of Ibn Abi Zar, make no reference to the strange things about him mentioned by Iqbal. The modern researcher, Uthman al-Kaak, reaches the same conclusion as given above (*Al-Barbar*, Tunis, 1956, p.115/116). But even if the parallel is established, parallelism does not necessarily mitigate the gravity of objections; it also accentuates the same if the ultimate results are taken into consideration. Ironically enough, the *Tawhid* of Ibn Tumart survives only in its Arabic translation and the attachment to Arabic is so great that even in the last century two persons who dared to bring out a Berber version of the Qur'an were killed outright (*Al-Barbar* p.116-117) Is not Turkey before our very eyes hard put to it to save the legacy of Ataturk from the nemesis of time?

Having chosen at random a few pointers to the mood that dominated Iqbal at the time of the emergence of Modern Turkey, we shall now proceed to the main subject of this article viz., a critical examination of Iqbal's observations on *Ijma*. This is exactly what he has to say about it:-

"The third source of Mohammedan Law is *Ijma*, which is in my opinion perhaps the most important legal notion in Islam. It is, however, strange that this important notion, while invoking great academic discussions in early Islam, remained practically a mere idea, and rarely assumed the form of a permanent institution in any Mohammedan country. Possibly its transformation into a permanent legislative institution was contrary to the political interests of the kind of absolute monarchy that grew up in Islam immediately after the fourth Caliph. It was, I think, favourable to the interest of the Omayyad and the Abbaside Caliphs to leave the power of *Ijtihad* to individual *Mujtahids* rather than encourage the formation of a permanent assembly which might become too powerful for them. It is, however, extremely satisfactory to note that the pressure of new world forces and the political experience of European nations are impressing on the mind of modern Islam the value and possibilities of the idea of *Ijma*. The growth of republican spirit, and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great step in advance. The transfer of the power of *Ijtihad* from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form *Ijma* can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs. In this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our legal system and give it an evolutionary outlook. In India, however, difficulties are likely to arise; for it is doubtful whether a non-Muslim legislative assembly can exercise the power of *Ijtihad*.....

"One more question may be asked as to the legislative activity of a modern Muslim assembly which must consist, at least for the present, mostly of men possessing no knowledge of the subtleties of Mohammedan Law. Such an assembly may make grave mistakes in their interpretation of law. How can we exclude or at east reduce the possibilities of erroneous interpretation? The Persian constitution of 1906 provided a separate ecclesiastical committee of *Ulema*—'conversant with the affairs of the world'—having power to supervise the legislative activity of the *Mejlis*. This, in my opinion, dangerous arrangement is probably necessary in view of the Persian constitutional theory.

According to that theory, I believe, the king is a mere custodian of the realm which really belongs to the absent Imam. The *Ulema*, as representatives of the Imam, consider themselves entitled to supervise the whole life of the community; though I fail to understand how, in the absence of an apostolic succession, they establish their claim to represent the Imam. But whatever may be the Persian constitutional theory, the arrangement is not free from danger and may be tried, if at all, only as a temporary measure in *Sunni* countries. The *Ulema* should form a vital part of a Muslim legislative assembly helping and guiding free discussion on questions relating to law. The only effective remedy for the possibilities of erroneous interpretations is to reform the present system of legal education in Mohammedan countries, to extend its sphere, and to combine it with an intelligent study of modern jurisprudence."

It is obvious that Iqbal is pained at the lack of organisation and of permanent 'institutions' for legislation in Islam. This, I am afraid, only shows an inadequate appreciation of the true nature of Islamic society and the bases and the processes set forth for its growth and evolution. So far as *Ijtihad* and *Ijma* are concerned, it is in their very nature that they are diffused among the whole community in such a way as to defy all attempts at regularisation and organisation into rigid mechanical institutions which, as practical experience will amply bear out, are dangerously exposed to rigging and regimentation. It is the inalienable non-transferable privilege of every Muslim possessing the necessary qualities for the task to exercise his mind and form his individual judgment in regard to the new situations arising out of the forward march of life—history, culture and civilisation. Any question of representation, delegation or election is completely beside the point. Even the number of *mujtahids* is indeterminable; it is bound to vary from time to time and place to place according to the nature and extent of education and culture. Further, the recognition of a *mujtahid* is not won through a counting of votes or the award of certificates by statutory bodies. The recognition is *commanded* by the *mujtahid* from the general body of believers through his personal qualities as revealed during a whole life time and not on the eve of a hectic election campaign. No periodicity, no registration of electorate and no mechanical method are needed for this purpose. When the individual *mujtahids* have put forward their opinions there sets forth a process of conflict and survival of the fittest comparable to the natural selection in the physical world. Both follow certain well-known principles and laws, which are nevertheless immeasurable in mathematical terms. The process is slow

sometimes very very slow—it may take a generation or even more and nobody can set the pace for it. The reason is that there is no silencing of the opposition or browbeating of the minority by the majority. The opposition is not killed; it is tolerated until it dies its own natural death. There is no snapping and no guillotine. Of course, it requires a great deal of patience but the result—a consensus of the free will of the entire community—is worth much more than that. Once *Ijma* is achieved there remains no dissident minority waiting for its turn to impose its own point of view. That is why there have been very few instances of the later generations going back upon the *Ijma* of a previous generation. Theoretically it may be permissible but practically it is redundant. A community which shows patience and tolerance for about a generation has a right to expect a high degree of permanence and stability for the decisions taken collectively by it. If there is a change in the situation it is sure to call for a fresh *Ijtihad*, there being no question of the reversal of a previous one.

Those who lament that the progressive doctrine of *Ijma* was turned into a handmaid of conservatism are simply mistaken. To imitate the externals of the constitutional and political life of Europe is not much different from the borrowing of the externals of European civilisation which Iqbal has denounced so strongly and graphically. It must also be borne in mind that there can be no such thing as *Ijtihad* for the sake of *Ijtihad*; *Ijtihad* is only forced by the genuine needs of an unprecedented situation, which cannot be met otherwise. Even a certain amount of reluctance to 'innovate' is quite understandable in view of the caution against turning the law into a plaything of 'hawa' (هوى)—the deviationist tendencies inherent in man. The truth underlying the general impression about the closing of the Gate of *Ijtihad* is only this: By the time the Islamic civilisation reached the Golden Age the corpus of Islamic law had developed sufficiently enough to cope with the various needs of a complex life so much so that there remained no actual need for fresh efforts in the field (unless the *Ijtihad* were taken as a mere game of cricket). In proof of the same it can safely be asserted that the corpus of Islamic law as evolved during the early centuries of Islam continued down to the modern times to minister to all the needs of family life, public activity, highly developed industry, crafts, international commerce, international relations, war and peace. Particularly the fact is remarkable that the vast and vigorous economic activity of the Muslims extending from Spain to Canton and involving all sorts of transactions was governed by no law other than that which is dubbed today as 'static.' It is really to be regretted that this fascina-

ting aspect of Muslim civilisation is still awaiting painstaking researches which may help the construction of a complete picture. Nevertheless the broad fact that the lack of *Ijtihad*, as it is asserted, seldom let down or handicapped the Muslims in any department of life is incontrovertible. It would be true to say that life was static: for the non-Muslim peoples the Middle Ages were all but darkness, for the Muslims it was an age of decline—no progress in science, no inventions, no change in the means of agriculture, industry and transport, in short, no change in the life-situations. But that is precisely the reason why there was no need for *Ijtihad*. The Muslims of those days knew their needs better than the protagonists of *Ijtihad* today. The real need of the time was not so much the forward movement of *Ijtihad* as the codification of law. This latter task was undertaken in right earnest particularly in India and Turkey, of which we have the monuments today in the form of the *Fatawa* and the *Majalla*.

Theoretically, of course, the door of *Ijtihad* has always remained open and actually many a bold spirit has throughout been entering the same with appreciable gusto. But let it be remembered that *Ijtihad* is the exclusive and jealously guarded privilege of the competent and the knowledgeable. Modern legislative councils, constituted as they are on the Western model, cannot but violate this privilege outrageously. Iqbal is well aware of the same yet his anxiety for regularisation and fondness for 'institutions' are so great that he attempts a compromise and a reconciliation. The apparently generous and somewhat flattering concession that the Ulema should *guide* the deliberations and the laymen *contribute* to the same is a vague illusion. All the Muslim countries have been making one experiment after the other in this direction until now the hypocrisy lurking in it is fully laid bare. The history of constitution-making in Pakistan, where the religious feeling is strong, offers a striking illustration of the same. A union between the competent and the layman is an utter impossibility, a contradiction in terms, if not deliberate dishonesty. What contribution, for example, can a layman make to the deliberations of a board of medical experts? A layman can only give an account of his ailment, he can only present the problem (and even his understanding of the nature of the problem is not to be relied upon—an experienced medical practitioner is always on the guard against being misled by the story of the patient) but he can never have a voice in the prescription of the remedy. In the West the layman has a voice, a full vote, because legislation springs from the *ignorant will* of the common man (just take the offensive examples of alcoholism, homosexuality, adultery, racia-

lism, colonialism and imperialism) without reference to the Will of God or even the true nature of man. Conformity to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* as one of the principles of law-making and even that conformity to be ultimately judged and determined by a lay assembly is nothing but lay statesmanship. The layman, when confronted with the competent (*alim*) in such a circumstance, is bound to behave impudently. The point that we were driving at is that the grave errors which Iqbal visualised as 'possible' are just inevitable. Iqbal's was only a long-ing optimistic vision of the future; for us it is pathetic history of the past and painful experience of the present.

Ijtihad is often rendered as 'independent judgment.' The rendering, though not incorrect, is liable to give a wrong impression. For the sake of precision, I would call it 'individual effort' to arrive at a judgment as proximate to the pattern of Divine Wisdom and Guidance as can be. Such an effort is neither independent nor free; it is so well-grounded in the sum total of Divine Guidance—the Word of Allah and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet—that the resultant judgment is merely an unfolding of the Divine Will through the agency of human reason—in contradistinction from the meditation of the Prophet—in the manner of the germination of a seed. Otherwise the product of pure reason will only form an interpolation into the *shariah*. To qualify the *Ijtihad* with 'free' is in itself suspicious; the qualifying adjective may just discredit the so-called *Ijtihad*. Obviously, Iqbal has been constrained to use the qualified term (FREE *Ijtihad*) because of the weakness of the position of the Modern Turks in relation to the accepted traditions of *fiqh* and *Usul* in Islam. Can we have a category of FREE Science? Every fresh advance in science represents an effort (*ijtihad*) of human reason along scientific lines. Weightlessness in space poses a new problem for the scientist; an answer to the question of correct human behaviour in the unprecedented situation must naturally conform to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* of science. Prescription of some charms and *mantras* would be the FREE scientific *Ijtihad*—the exact counterpart of the so-called free *Ijtihad* in Islam. And let it be repeated that just as an atomic scientist would regard a 'layman' as an intruder into his laboratory endangering the lives of both of them as well as hundreds and thousands of human beings around, similarly an *alim* is in duty bound to refuse to be juxtaposed with a layman councillor, * who, all appearances and even good intentions notwithstanding, constitutes a virtual

* Even the *mutakallim* and the *muhaddith* (specialist in *hadith* who is not supposed to possess a knowledge of the subtleties of law) are excluded from *Ijtihad* and *Ijma*. Vide *Usulal-shashe*, ch. III.

danger to the rectitude and piety of the multitude of the followers of Islam.

Really *Ijtihad* can be free only in one sense i.e., in the sense of the freedom of the conscience of the *Mujtahid* from political pressure and surveillance to temporal authority. Paradoxically enough, this is best achieved in the absence of a rigid mechanism and regularised institution. It is always easier to influence and corrupt a concentrated well-defined body, even though it be an elected one (in the mechanical Western way) than an unlimited body of independent scholars recognised spontaneously by the people at large for their personal qualities and achievements. The view that the Abbasid Caliphs were afraid lest 'a permanent assembly became too powerful for them' is falsified by the evidence of history. On the contrary, it was the *Mujtahids* themselves who resisted the attempts of the caliphs to accord statutory recognition to them because they were afraid that such recognition might be a handle for regimentation. The life of Abu Hanifa amply proves the point. It was also Imam Malik who persisted from the time of Abu Jafar al-Mansur to that of Harun al-Rashid in his stout opposition to the suggestion that his *Muatta* be promulgated as the official code of the Empire. Mention must also be made of the advice of Ibn al-Muqaffa to the Caliph Mansur as contained in the *Risalat al-Sahaba* (*Rasail al-Bulagha*, 4th Ed., 1954 p.117 *et seq.*). Ibn al-Muqaffa was steeped in the traditions of centralisation in vogue at the Persian Court. He urged the Caliph to end the irregularity and the informality about the different, sometimes conflicting, judgments of the independent individual *Mujtahids*. But the Caliph dared not do that for fear of rousing the public opinion, led by the Ulema themselves, against him. This should not cause any surprise at all. Is it not a fact that all the attempts of the modernists to regularise the activity of the Ulema have so far ended in failure; they only generated a feeling of distrust and suspicion so wide-spread as to be uncontrollable?

I remember some years back there was a dollar-powered stunt to bring about a Christian-Muslim *entente* to safeguard religion against godlessness. When it came to finding a counterpart of the Vatican in the world of Islam even the Azhar could not muster the courage to assume that flattering role. Some of the Muslims must have felt ashamed of the lack of organisation among them but, as a matter of fact, it only proved how Islam and the truly Islamic conscience of the community as a whole were fortified against the pressures of power-politics both within and without. Thanks to the absence of rigid or-

ganisation, no one is able to lay his hands on Islam; when anyone tries to hammer Islam he ultimately finds to his chagrin that he has only been beating in the air.

How true and perspicuous the following exposition of *Ijma* by a Western scholar of Islam:-

'The Islamic religious structure, true to its egalitarian principles and conscience, had never countenanced any form of external organisation or any kind of hierarchy. Although it recognised *Ijma*, consensus of the doctors, as a valid source of the doctrine, there was neither Council nor Curia to promulgate its decisions. The volitional element that runs through all the pre-Ottoman religious institutions, and that made their efficacy dependent on their appeal to the will rather than on careful regulation of duties and powers, was naturally at its strongest in this sphere. To 'broaden down from precedent to precedent' was characteristic of Islamic usage long before the birth of the British constitution. Each forward step was secured by tacit assent on the part of those who were most qualified to express an opinion, and from whom the rank and file took their cue. No one was prevented from opposing and trying to gain support for his opposition, but within a generation or two controversy on the point at issue would die out.'

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IQBAL'S THEORY OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND ISLAMIC UNIVERSALISM

Dr Manzooruddin Ahmad

Introduction. The Muslim Renaissance in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was primarily inspired and activated by Sayyid Ahmad Khan,¹ and Dr Sir Muhammad Iqbal.² Sayyid Ahmad Khan, pragmatic genius as he was, had laid its foundation in the late nineteenth century; and later in the twentieth century, Dr Iqbal, through his poetic vision and political insight, as reflected in his writings, speeches, and political works, elaborated for the Indian Muslims a political ideology which could form the basis for a separate Muslim State—later to be known as the Islamic

1. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) was the vanguard of Islamic Renaissance in India; for details of his numerous works of reform, see W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, (Lahore: 1973 B.A. Dar, *Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, (Lahore: 1957), J.M.S. Baljon, Jr. *Reforms Thought Religion Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, (London, 1949); an earlier biographical work by G.F.I. Graham, *Life and Work of Syed Ahmed*, C.S.I., (Edin 1885) and also see a recent work, David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1978).

2. The Poet-Philosopher of the East, Allama Dr Shajkh Sir Muhammad Iqbal was born in Sialkot, Punjab on the 22nd of February, 1873, and died in Lahore on the 21st of April, 1938. After completing his education in India, Iqbal went to Europe for higher education at Cambridge, and in Germany. He got his Ph.D. in Philosophy, and Law degree, and returned to India, took up teaching, and later took to legal practice. Subsequently, he took part in Indian politics. Among his prose works in English are *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (Cambridge, 1908), *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (London, 1934) containing his seven Lectures delivered at Madras and other places. Among his poetical works are collections of Urdu poems, *Bāng-i Darā*, *Bāl-i Jabrīl Darb-i Kalim*, *Armughān-i Hijaz*, and also the collections of Persian language, *Asrār-i Khudī*, *Rumuz-i Baihhudī*, *Javid Namah*, *Zabūr-i Ajam*, *Plyam-i Mashriq*, *Pas Chih Bāyad Kard A Aquām-i Sharq*. Most of his poetical works have already been translated into several languages by noted Orientalists like A. J. Arberry, R. A. Nicholson, A. Schimmel, Abdul Wahab Azzam, Kiernan.

Republic of Pakistan, leaving the great task of its creation and organisation to Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-i Azam (the Great Leader).

The political ideology of Pakistan, as elaborated by Iqbal, is deeply rooted in the Islamic values contained in the Quranic teachings, and the traditions (*Sunnah*) of the Prophet, the founder of the world community of Islam. A close study of Iqbal's works shows that, for Iqbal the political ideology of Pakistan would primarily be composed of two basic elements, namely, the Quranic concept of the universal *Millah* (community) and his concept of the *Self* (*khudī*). It was, in fact, within such an ideological framework that Iqbal was confronted with the problem of redefining the political status of the Indian Muslims in accordance with the contemporary political terminology. In order to achieve this objective, Iqbal had expounded the Two-Nation Theory as the basis for claiming the right of self-determination of the Indian Muslims for carving out a separate Muslim State. Thus, naturally, the concepts of the universal community—*Millat* and the Two—Nation Theory constitute the crux of the political philosophy of Pakistan. However, obviously, the inherent contradictions between these two propositions creates a theoretical difficulty of a fundamental nature. The question arises as to how Iqbal proposed to reconcile Islamic universalism with modern territorial nationalism. Unless the inherent dichotomy is resolved, the political ideology of Pakistan would remain vague, and confusing, and would fail to bring about the much desired national integration of its diverse elements, namely, regions, classes, and other primary groups. The purpose of this paper is to examine in some depth Iqbal's concept of *Millat* and his theory of Two-Nations and see how he proposed to reconcile these apparently contradictory propositions.

Self-Community. Iqbal's concepts of Self (*Khudī*) and community (*Millat*) are fundamentally derived from the Quranic source. The individual believer in Islam is described in the Qur'ān as Muslim (one who surrenders his will to the will of Allah) and *Mumin* (one who has faith in the oneness of Allah) whom the Muslim mystics usually call the perfect man (*insān-i kāmil*). According to the Quranic cosmology, Adam, the first man, was created as the masterpiece of God's creations—highest of all beings (*ashraf al-makhlūqāt*) and was endowed with the

Divine virtue of knowledge (*allamah al-ismā³*) and the rare gift of free will. Obviously, therefore, in the Qur'ān man is called the vicegerent of Allah on the earth (*khalīfah⁴*). In a nutshell, it is the potentiality of self-awareness, moral consciousness, and spiritual vitality for ceaseless struggle which distinguish man from other creatures.

Man, by submitting his will to the will of Allah, emancipates his *self* with all its attributes and potentialities from the shackles of his natural frailties, and emerges as the master of his own destiny in the cosmic vastness. Islam, the submission to Allah, in fact implies a fundamental change of human personality as his psyche moves from the state of intellectual and spiritual chaos described in the Qur'ān as *kufur* (unbelief) to higher level of moral consciousness—*Imān* (belief).⁵ Iqbal's concept of the self, in substance, is a philosophical exposition of the Quranic view of the perfect man—the *Mumin*. In contrasting the believer with the unbeliever, Iqbal says :

کافر کی یہ پہچان کہ آفاق میں گم ہے
مومن کی یہ پہچان کہ گم اس میں ہیں آفاق!⁶

The hall-mark of the unbeliever is the fact that He is lost in the cosmos ;

in contrast, the true

Believer's mark is that the cosmos itself subsists

Within his Self.

In another verse, Iqbal says :

خودی کے زور سے دنیا پہ چھا جا مقامِ رنگ و بو کا راز پا جا⁷

With the power of self-awareness

Comprehend the world !

And discover the secret of this place of

Color and fragrance.

In Muslim theology there has been going on an eternal controversy over the question of Free Will (*qadr*) and Necessity

3. Qur'an, - ii : 31

4. Ibid., ii : 30.

5. Manzooruddin, Ahmed, *The Muslim Political Theory in the Modern Age*, forthcoming volume.

6. *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, Urdu*, (Lahore : Shaikh Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1973), p. 506.

7. Ibid., p. 377

(Jabr). In the following verse, Iqbal, dilating over the subject, asserts that man by cultivating and disciplining his self is truly capable of achieving mastery over Destiny :

خودی کو کر بلند اتنا کہ ہر تقدیر سے پہلے
خدا بندے سے خود پوچھے بتا تیری رضا کیا ہے⁸

Elevate your Self to such heights *
That before Destiny (intervenes)
God Himself may ask His Slave,
"Tell ! what doeth thou will !"

For Iqbal,

خودی وہ بحر ہے جس کا کوئی کنارہ نہیں
تو آبِ جو اسے سدجھا اگر تو چارہ نہیں⁹

Self is like an ocean without shore,
However, there is no way if thou shouldst
Mistake it for a stream.

Iqbal seems to have discovered the secret of self by his keen observation of nature of things as he reflects :

ہر چیز ہے محوِ خودِ نمائی ہر ذرہ اسیرِ کبریائی
بے ذوقِ نمودِ زندگی ، موتِ تعمیرِ خودی میں ہے خدائی¹⁰

Every object is obsessed
With self-expression,
And each particle is subservient to God.
Without the urge of expression, Life itself
(Turns) into Death, as the (Essence)
Divinity lies in the cultivation of the Self.

Iqbal believes that those who are initiated into the secrets of the Self hold exalted position :

یہ پیام دے گئی ہے مجھے بادِ صبحگاہی
کہ خودی کے عارفوں کا ہے مقام پادشاہی
تری زندگی اسی سے ، تری آبرو اسی سے
جو رہی خودی تو شاہی ، نہ رہی تو روسیاهی¹¹

8. Ibid., p. 347.

10. Ibid., p. 345.

9. Ibid., p. 336.

11. Ibid., p. 37.

The morning breeze has given the message
That men who are aware of the Self
Hold royal station.
Thine life springs from it, and
Thine honour is contingent upon it.
With self-awareness one attains royalty ;
And devoid of it, only disgrace.

For Iqbal self-awareness is the substance of Islamic message to mankind when he says :

روح اسلام کی ہے نورِ خودی ، نارِ خودی
زندگانی کے لیے ، نارِ خودی نور و حضور !
یہی ہر چیز کی تقویم ، یہی اصل نمود
گرچہ اس روح کو فطرت نے رکھا ہے مستور¹²

The light of the self, and the fire of the self
Constitute the very essence of Islam,
The fire of the Self nourishes life with Enlightenment
And Consciousness.
This is the nature of every object, and this is the
Cause of growth, however, the Nature has concealed
Its essence.

Iqbal goes beyond Nietzsche's super-man in expounding his philosophy of the Self in Islamic context when he asserts that God-centered self-awareness is the highest level of human consciousness. Following his spiritual mentor, Rūmī, Iqbal asserts that Nietzsche's super-man constitutes only the first stage in the evolutionary process of growth of human self. In fact Nietzsche's blurred vision had totally missed the other two crucial stages— (i) selflessness—the social context of self realisation ; and (ii) Divine consciousness—the discovery of the Self in relation to God. In elaborating these higher stages of self-awareness, Iqbal refers to Nietzsche in the following verse :

اگر ہوتا وہ مجذوبِ فرنگی اس زمانے میں
تو اقبال اس کو سمجھاتا مقامِ کبریٰ کیا ہے؟¹³

If that Western *Majdhūb* (one who is lost in his

12. Ibid., pp. 492-93.

13. Ibid., p. 348.

Own Self) were alive today, surely Iqbal would
Have explained to him the level of
Divine Consciousness.

Man's journey of self-awareness is clearly reflected in the Quranic dictum—There is no god except Allah. The dictum implies two stages—(1) the first of negation that nothing and no mortal can claim supernatural powers; and (2) the second of affirmation of God Almighty. For Iqbal, Nietzsche could not go beyond the first stage in enunciating his concept of the super-man. The *Mumin* in Islam, by demolishing the images of all false gods, realises his true self as the axis of the universe, and hence is transformed into the super-man of Nietzsche. But his journey does not end here. The Islamic individual, the *Mumin*, moves ahead, in the course of his spiritual ascension, towards the next stage—selflessness or self-abnegation, and recognises the social context of his own self. This is the stage when the Islamic individual merges himself with other fellow Muslims to constitute what the Qur'ān describes *Millah*. The focal point of integration of the *Millat* constitutes the third stage—when all individual believers surrender their individual wills to the will of God Almighty subordinating themselves to the Divine Laws—the *Sharī'ah*. Thus faith in God Almighty provides an eternal principle of unity of mind, of will, and of body for all individual believers.

Iqbal, in his famous poem composed in Persian language entitled *Asrār-i Khudi*¹⁴ (*The Secret of the Self*) expounds his theory of the unique Islamic individual, and in a later poetic work—*Rumūz-i Bekhudi*¹⁵ (*The Mysteries of the Selflessness*) he integrates his concept of Self within the framework of the Islamic theory of *Millat* (community). The Islamic individual in the ultimate end turns out neither to be like Hobessian Leviathan, nor like Nietzschean super-man, but finds himself as a truly free man growing within the framework of a God-centred community—the *Millat*. In this manner, Islam resolves the irreconcilable dichotomy of free will, and necessity, liberty and authority, and individual and the State.

14. M. Iqbal's famous work in Persian, see its English translation by R. A. Nicholson, *The Secrets of the Self*, (Lahore, 1944), an earlier edition was published in London, 1920, see also Arberry's *Notes on Iqbal's Asrar-i Khudi*, Lahore: 1955).

15. M. Iqbal, *Ramuz-i Bekhudi*, (Lahore, 1918), see its English rendering by A. J. Arberry, *The Mysteries of the Selflessness*, (London, 1953).

It is the faith in God Almighty which distinguishes a true believer from either Nietzscheian super-man or Hobessian Leviathan. Dilating upon the mysterious powers of faith Iqbal says :

جب اس انگارہ خاکی میں ہوتا ہے یقین پیدا
تو کر لیتا ہے یہ بال و پر روح الامیں پیدا
غلامی میں نہ کام آتی ہیں شمشیریں نہ تدبیریں
جو ہو ذوق یقین پیدا تو کٹ جاتی ہیں زنجیریں
کوئی اندازہ کر سکتا ہے اس کے زور و بازو کا ؟
نگاہِ مردِ مومن سے بدن جاتی ہیں تقدیریں !¹⁶

As faith is born within this burning dust (man),
He can create (for himself) wings of the Celestial Angel
(Gabriel).

In slavery, nither swords nor strateagems are of any avail,
Only with fervent faith one can break the chains.
Who can assess the strength of his (believer's) muscles ?
The gaze of a believer can upturn even the Fates !

According to Iqbal, the essential attributes of a true believer are faith, ceaseless effort, and universal love as he say :

یقین محکم ، عمل پیہم ، محبت فاحِ عالم
جہادِ زندگی میں ہیں یہ مردوں کی شمشیریں¹⁷

Abiding faith, unceasing effort, and
World -conquering love
Are like swords to brave men
In the battlefield of life.

The faith in *Tawhīd* (monotheism), on the one hand, creates pschic cohesion within the individual self, and on the other provides a principle of unity for the community (*Millat*). Thus the Islamic individuals are bound together by ideological bonds within the framework of the *Millat*—community. In other words, the individual, isolated from the community, remains insecure, weak and powerless ; his energies are scattered and his aims narrow, diffuse and indefinite.¹⁸ Emphasizing on the principle of unity,

16. M. Iqbal, *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal*, p. 271

17. Ibid., p. 272

18. K.G. Sajyidain, *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy* (4th Ed. Lahore, 1954), p. 69.

Iqbal says :¹⁹

آبرو باقی تری ملت کی جمعیت سے تھی
جب یہ جمعیت گئی، دریا میں رسوا تو ہوا¹⁹

It is the unity which sustained the glory of thine community;
With the loss of this unity, there was only disgrace for thee
in the world.

The individual himself without this unity would be aimless, as he says in the following verse :

فرد قائم ربطِ ملت سے ، تنہا کچھ ہے نہیں
موج ہے دریا میں ، اور بیرونِ دریا کچھ نہیں²⁰

The individual remains steadfast only
With the bond of community ;
Alone he is nowhere
Like a wave in the ocean,
But outside nothing.

Thus the bond of community (*rabṭ-i-millat*) is the key concept for the perservation of the self. The bond resting on the faith of the individuals provides substance and form to the *Millat* Iqbal elaborates this point in his poem entitled : *Ṭulū'-i Islām*

یقین افراد کا سرمایہ تعمیرِ ملت ہے
یہی قوت ہے جو صورت گر تقدیرِ ملت ہے²¹

The fatih of all individuals provides material
For community-building ;
It is the force which shapes
The destiny of the community.

Therefore, Iqbal categorically rejects all other bonds of social unity—race, nationality, geography, etc., as un-Islamic. For Iqbal *Millat* is firmly founded on the bedrock of human unity. In his poem, *Dunyā-i Islām (The World of Islam)*, Iqbal exhorts all the believers of Islam to unite as it was the only true prescription for their redemption and regeneration. He says :

19. *Kulliyāt* (Urdu) p. 190.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 273.

ربط و ملت ضبط ایضا ہے مشرق کی نجات
ایشیا والے ہیں اس نکتے سے اب تک بیخبر²²

The bond and unity of the sacred community
Was the only way of deliverance for the Orient ;
The Asians are still unaware of this point.

Iqbal in expounding his theory of the community (Millat), further rejects secular foundations of politics, and he calls upon the believers :

پھر سیاست چھوڑ کر داخل حصارِ دین ہو
سلک و دولت ہے فقط حفظِ حرم کا اک ٹمہر
ایک ہوں مسلم حرم کی پاسبانی کے لیے
نیل کے ساحل سے لے کر تا بجاکِ کاشغر²³

Once again shun politics, and
Seek shelter within the walls of Religion ;
As Country and State are only fruits of
The protection of the Sanctuary.
Let all Muslims unite
For safeguarding the Sanctuary
From the bank of Nile
To the land of Kashghar.

What stands in the way of Islamic unity? The rampant racialism among the Muslims was the greatest enemy of Islamic unity. Therefore, if Muslims persist to believe in racialism, they were destined to vanish as he says :

جو کرے گا امتیاز رنگ و خوں مٹ جائے گا
ترک خرگاہی ہو یا اعرابی والا گہر!
نسل اگر مسلم کی مذہب پر مقدم ہو گئی
اڑ گیا دنیا سے تو مانندِ خاکِ رہگزر!²⁴

Whosoever believes in discrimination
On the basis of race or colour is doomed ;
No matter whether the Turk or the Arab.
If race of Muslims takes precedence over Religion,

22. Ibid., p. 264.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

(Rest assured) Thou wilt vanish away from the world
Like the dust of the beaten track.

Millat and Nationalism. Iqbal, after a careful and critical study and observation, totally rejects the theory and practice of modern nationalism as it militates against humanistic ideals of Islam. Although like many other Muslim leaders, Iqbal had started his intellectual career as an ardent nationalist, yet with gradual maturing of his thought, he turned towards Islamic political theory for inspiration. In the earlier phase of his poetic life, particularly in his collection of poems entitled *Bāng-i Darā* several poems deal with the theme of patriotism, and nationalism. In the very first poem, *Himaliyah*, Iqbal says :

اے پہاڑ! اے فصیلِ کشورِ ہندوستان
چومتا ہے تری پیشانی کو جھک کر آسمان²⁶

O ! Himaliya ! O ! fortress of the land of Hindustan !
Sky stoops down to kiss your forehead.

Similarly in his *Tāranah-i Hindī*, Iqbal expresses his purest feelings patriotism and nationalism :

سارے جہاں سے اچھا ہندوستان ہمارا
ہم بلبلیں ہیں اس کی یہ گلستاں ہمارا
مذہب نہیں سکھاتا آپس میں پیر رکھنا
ہندی میں ہم ، وطن ہے ہندوستان ہمارا²⁶

Our Hindustan is best in the world.
It's like a garden, and we are its nightingales.
Religion does not teach us to be each other's enemy.
All of us are Indians, and India is our Country.

Iqbal's belief in the cult of nationalism and patriotism had reached its climax in his poem, *Nayā Shiwālah* (New Temple) in which he proudly declared that patriotism was a sacred Religion for him as each particle of the dust of the Country was a god :

پتھر کی مورتوں میں سمجھا ہے تو خدا ہے
خاکِ وطن کا مجھ کو ہر ذرہ دیوتا ہے

Thou doest imagine that God resides in the images of stone :

But for me each particle of the dust of the Country is a god.

In the above verse one can hardly miss the resounding echo of a Contemporary Iranian poet. Pūr Dāwūd who in his poem *Na'rah-i Pūr Dāwūd* (Call of Pūr Dāwūd) says :

گر ہر سی و کیش پور داؤد آں جوانِ پارسی ایران می پرستد

If you ask what is Pūr Dāwūd's creed ?
That young Persian worships Iran.

However, Iqbal was soon disillusioned with the cult of nationalism and patriotism. Consequently he turned to the study of Islam, and discovered that Islamic universalism and humanism cannot be contained within the narrow framework of contemporary nationalism. In an early lyric, Iqbal points to the obvious contradictions between nationalism and Islamic *Millat* :

نرالا سارے جہاں سے اس کو عرب کے معمار نے بنایا
بنا ہمارے حصارِ ملت کی اتحادِ وطن نہیں ہے²⁷

The Arabian architect (the Prophet) has fashioned it (*Millat*)
on a model unique in the world.

The unity of the Country is not the foundation of the
rampart of our Community (*Millat*).

Later in 1908 in his poem, *Bilād-i Islāmiyah* (Muslim World) Iqbal introduces a new political concept which he prefers to call *Qawmiyyat-i Islām* (Islamic nationalism). In his view if Islamic nationalism were to be ultimately pinned down to the notion of *territory*, neither India, nor Iran, nor Syria, nor for that matter any specific area can be considered as the true *homeland* of Islam, but rather it is the land of Yathrib (Medina) which is the true home of all Muslims²⁹ :

ہے اگر قومیتِ اسلام پابندِ مقام
ہند ہی بنیاد ہے اس کی ، نہ فارس ہے ، نہ شام
آہ ! یثرب ! دیس ہے مسلم کا تو ماویٰ ہے تو
نقطہٴ جاذبِ تاثر کی شعاؤں کا ہے تو

جب تلک باقی ہے تو دنیا میں ، باقی ہم بھی ہیں
صبح ہے تو اس چمن میں گوہرِ شبنم بھی ہیں²⁸

If Islamic nationalism were bound with a place,
Its foundation is neither India, nor Persia, nor Syria.
O Yathrib ! that art the home and refuge of Muslim,
Thou art the focal point of attraction of the rays of feelings.
So long as thou liveth in this world, we also shall live.
If thou art the dawn of this garden, so would also be there
dew-pearls.

However, in his poem *Tarānah-i Millī* (The Song of the Community) Iqbal rediscovers the global context of Islamic nationalism when he says :

چین و عرب ہمارا ، ہندوستان ہمارا
مسلم ہیں ہم ، وطن ہے سارا جہاں ہمارا²⁹

China and Arabia are ours, so is India ours.
We are Muslims, and the whole world is our Country.

In another poem, *Waṭāniyat* (Patriotism) Iqbal examines the idea of country as a political concept, and sharply focusses on the inherent contradictions between Country and Religion in the following verse :

ان تازہ خداؤں میں بڑا سب سے وطن ہے
جو پیرہن اس کا ہے وہ مذہب کا کفن ہے³⁰

Country is the supreme among all the contemporary gods ;
Its cloak is the shroud of Religion.

In elaborating the evil consequences of the impact of nationalism on the Muslim world, Iqbal observes :

یہ بت کہ تراشیدہ تہذیبِ نوری ہے غارت گرِ کاشانہٴ دینِ نبوی ہے
بازو ترا توحید کی قوت سے قوی ہے اسلام ترا دیس ہے تو مصطفوی ہے
نظارہٴ دہرینہ زمانے کو دکھا دے
اے مصطفوی خاک میں اس بت کو ملا دے³¹

This image (of nationalism) as fashioned by the contemporary civilisation.

28. Ibid., pp. 147-48.

30. Ibid., p. 160.

29. Ibid., p. 159.

31. Ibid.

Destroys the home of prophetic faith.

Your muscles obtain strength from the power of Monotheism.

Islam is thine home, and thou art the follower of the Prophet.

Show to the World a glimpse of the old days?

O follower of the Prophet ! crush this image in the dust.

In the same poem, Iqbal emphasises on the non-territoriality and the universality of the Islamic *Millat*, and says :

ہو قیدِ مقامی تو نتیجہ ہے تباہی رہ بحر میں آزادِ وطن صورت ماہی

گفتارِ سیاست میں وطن اور ہی کچھ ہے
ارشادِ نبوت میں وطن اور ہی کچھ ہے³²

If one were bound with a place, the result will be utter destruction,

Thou should'st live like a fish in the ocean independent of country.

In the parlance of politics "country" means something different ;

And according to the saying of the Prophet country is something else.

Therefore, Iqbal categorically denounces nationalism as evil because it divides mankind into national factions, and so also does it destroy the very roots of Islamic nationalism :

اقوام میں مخلوقِ خدا بٹی ہے اس سے
قومیتِ اسلام کی جڑ کٹی ہے اس سے³³

God's creation is divided into nations by nationalism.

The roots of Islamic nationality is destroyed by it.

Reflecting on the true basis of Islamic nationalism, Iqbal suggests that we should clearly distinguish between Western brand of nationalism and Islamic view as the former was grounded in man's loyalty to the Country, while the latter emphasises on the power of Religion as the only integrating force of the Muslim Community :

اپنی ملت پر قیاس اقوامِ مغرب سے نہ کر
 خاص ہے ترکیب میں قومِ رسولِ ہاشمی
 ان کی جمعیت کا ہے ملک و نسب پر انحصار
 قوتِ مذہب سے مستحکم ہے جمعیت تری³⁴

You should not equate your Community (*Millat*) with
 Western nations ;

The Nation of the Prophet is unique in its composition ;
 Their unity (Western nations') depends on country and race,
 (But) your unity derives stability from the power of Religion.

Thus for Iqbal, Islamic *Millat* is a nation *sui generis* because
 it was founded in monotheism (*Tawhīd*). Therefore, it transcends
 all barriers of race, colour, language, and territory ; in fact it aims
 at achieving integration of all mankind into a moral body *par
 excellence* as Iqbal observes :

یہی مقصودِ فطرت ہے ، یہی رزِ مسلمانی
 اخوت کی جہانگیری ، محبت کی فراوانی !
 بتانِ رنگ و خوں کو توڑ ملت میں گم ہو جا
 نہ تورانی رہے باقی ، نہ ایرانی ، نہ افغانی³⁵

That is the purpose of Nature, that is also the secret
 of Islamicness.

World-encompassing brotherhood, and abundance of Love.
 Break the images of colour, race, and get lost in the community.
 So that there may be neither Turk, nor Iranian, nor Afghan.

Iqbal advises all Muslims to associate themselves with the
 central organ of the Islamic *Millat*, as the self-awareness reinforced
 by collective consciousness can truly regenerate Divine powers
 of the *Millat* ⁷

قوسوں کے لیے موت ہے مرکز سے جدائی !
 ہو صاحبِ مرکز تو خودی کیا ہے ؟ خدائی !³⁶

Disassociation with the Centre signifies death of a nation :
 But if attached with the Centre, self-awareness turns
 into Divinity.

34. Ibid., p. 248.

35. Ibid., p. 270.

36. Ibid., p. 637.

Millat and Internationalism, Iqbal believed that, in substance, the Islamic unity was more comprehensive than the contemporary form of international organisations such as the League of Nations. By definition, international associations recognised only sovereign national States and individual human beings have little direct involvement in international affairs. On the contrary, the Islamic unity does not recognize the modern idea of the national State, as fundamentally in its essence, it aimed at creating a global human society—genuinely universal in its scope, humanistic in its goals, and ecumenical in its approach. In a poem entitled *Mecca and Geneva* Iqbal compares and contrasts Islamic theory of universal unity with the League of Nations, and says :

اس دور میں اقوام کی صحبت بھی ہوئی عام
 پوشیدہ نگاہوں سے رہی وحدتِ آدم !
 تفریقِ ملل حکمتِ افرنگ کا مقصود
 اسلام کا مقصود فقط ملتِ آدم !
 مکے نے دیا خاکِ جنیوا کو یہ پیغام
 جمعیتِ اقوام کہ جمعیتِ آدم؟³⁷

In this age, association of Nations has become widespread ;
 However, the unity of Mankind still remains out of sight.
 The goal of the Western policy was to maintain distinction
 of all Nations ;

But the goal of Islam was only to preserve the Community
 of Adam.

Mecca gave this message to the land of Geneva ;
 What was the true goal ? the league of Mankind
 or the League of Nations.

Elsewhere, in his poem , "*Jam'iiyyat-i-Aqwām*" (The League
 of Nations) Iqbal says :

بیچاری کئی روز سے دم توڑ رہی ہے
 ڈر ہے خبرِ بد نہ مرے منہ سے نکل جائے
 تقدیر تو مبرم نظر آتی ہے و لیکن
 پیرانِ کلیسا کی دعا یہ ہے کہ ٹل جائے

ممکن ہے کہ داشتہٴ پیرک افرنگ
ابلیس کے تعویذ سے کچھ روز سنبھل جائے! ³⁸

The poor (League) has been suffering from death pangs
for some time ;

I am afraid lest I may give out foreboding of bad news
(about its end).

It is destined to die but the high priests of the Church
have been praying for its life.

Probably this old mistress of Europe

May get a lease of life under the spell of satanic amulet.

This poem was written during the last phase of his life, and appears in the *Armughan-i Hijāz*. In the above verses, Iqbal, after analysing in his mind the causes of failure of the League of Nations, had acutely felt that it was doomed to failure. He calls it "old mistress of European powers" as it was originally designed to serve their interests. At another place, Iqbal had succinctly described it as "a society of thieves" for distribution of graveyards. It is true that the Great Powers were successfully exploiting this international forum for their nefarious imperialistic designs, and national interests at the expense of the exploited nations and peoples. Consequently, the League had completely failed to achieve its objectives of establishing international peace, and was unable to prevent recurrence of another world war. Therefore, for Iqbal, the League was doomed to failure under continuing pressures of imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism. In his poetic vision, he could clearly see that durable international peace could be established only if the League of Nations were transformed into a genuine League of Mankind—free from all forms of exploitation, colonialism, imperialism, and nationalism. As a matter of fact, he believed that such an organisation could very well be set up in the Orient with its centre at Tehran rather than Geneva. It could take in its initial stages the form of a League of Oriental Nations, as Iqbal says :

طهران ہوگر عالمِ مشرق کا جنسوا شاید کرۂ ارض کی تقدیر بدل جائے ³⁹

If only Tehran could take the place of Geneva for the
Oriental world

Then hopefully the fortune of this good earth might turn
for the better !

38. Ibid., p. 618.

39. Ibid., p. 609

In the above poem entitled *The League of Oriental Nations*, Iqbal had clearly envisioned the emergence of *the Third World* which has remained for centuries the object of exploitation by the Western Powers. Like Iqbal, many other intellectuals of the world of Islam were also thinking along the same lines.⁴⁰ In the end Iqbal came to the conclusion: "It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a League of Nations, which recognises artificial boundaries and racial distinction for facility of reference only and not for restricting the social horizon of its members".⁴¹

Millat and Two-Nation Theory. Iqbal, after elaborating the basic postulates of Islamic ideology and its relevance to individual, society, and mankind, turned his attention to the Indian Muslims who were simultaneously menaced by British imperialism, and danger of permanent Hindu domination. Caught in the vortex of Indian politics, therefore, the basic problem of the Indian Muslims was how to regenerate their individual and collective selves, and also preserve their Islamic identity. A satisfactory solution of the problem implied policies and actions at three different levels: (1) reconstruction of Muslim society in the Indian subcontinent according to the Islamic ideology; (2) facing the upsurge of Indian nationalism in order to preserve the Islamic identity of the Indian Muslims; and (3) integration of the Indian Muslims with the rest of the Islamic *Millat*.

Iqbal had intensely felt the progressive decline of the Muslim society in general, and the Indian Muslims in particular; and, therefore, he was deeply concerned with the problem of reconstruction of religious thought in Islam. In his philosophical works, *Metaphysics* and *Reconstruction*, Iqbal examined Islamic thought in all its aspects, and attempted to present the Quranic interpretations in the light of twentieth-century requirements in a coherent form. In his poetical works, he went further to elaborate a set of concepts—*Self*, *Community*, socio-political implications of the Islamic doctrine of *Tawhīd*, Islamic democracy, economy and other relevant concepts. Iqbal advised all Muslims to restore

40. Manzoourddin Ahmed, *Pakistan. The Emerging Islamic State*, (Karachi: Allies Book Corporation, 1967), p. 65, particularly see reference to Sanhoury's *Le Califat*, and his interpretation of the *Khilāfat* as a League of Oriental Nations.

41. Quoted by A. Anwar Beg, *The poet of the East*, p. 260.

Islamic values in theory and practice in order to bring about the much-needed Islamic renaissance. In short, Iqbal offered Islamic ideology as an alternative to all contemporary ideologies.

Iqbal believed that the Islamic ideology could not be effectively implemented without attaining independence from British colonial rule. However, at the same time, he wanted independence in order to reconstruct Indian Muslim community in accordance with the Islamic ideology. Therefore, Iqbal was confronted, as other Muslim leaders were, with the upsurge of Indian nationalism. If Iqbal were to accept the thesis of the All-Indian National Congress that all Indians were a single nation, the Muslim minority would be submerged with the Hindu majority, and thus they would lose their Islamic identity and hence would be permanently segregated from the rest of the Muslim world. Therefore, Iqbal felt constrained to redefine the political status of the Indian Muslims in accordance with the modern theory of nationalism as a nation distinctly different from the Hindu majority. The crux of the Hindu-Muslim conflict arose from the fact that Hindu-dominated Congress believed in secular nationalism. On the other hand, for Iqbal religion was a comprehensive code of life. Dilating on the unity of religion and politics, during his Madras lectures, Iqbal had observed :

I strongly feel the necessity of religious instruction in your educational institutions. The fact is that I, as an Indian, give precedence to religion over *Swarajya* (political independence). Personally, I shall have nothing to do with a *Swarajya* divorced from religion.⁴²

The above observation of Iqbal clearly brings out the altogether different Muslim approach to political independence. For Indian Muslims political independence implied an opportunity to reconstruct their society in accordance with the Islamic ideology. This view was inherently opposed to the cult of political nationalism which was being preached by the All-India Congress. Therefore, Iqbal proceeded to demolish the premises on which the Congress view of united Indian nationalism was founded. Firstly, the Congress argued that the Indian people, irrespective of their differences of race, religion, and language, were a political nationality through their common subjection to the British rule. Secondly, the Congress argued that India had always been in the

42. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 253.

course of its chequered history, a single country. Thirdly, they were of the view that the religious groups like Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs were only religious communities which composed the political nationality of all Indians. Ultimately all these premises were based on the general assumption that *religion* could not be a genuine basis for nationalism. Obviously such a view of nationalism was in direct conflict with the Islamic ideology which Iqbal had elaborated in his works.

In response to the Congress view of a common Indian nationality, Iqbal put forward his theory of religio-cultural nationalism according to which Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nationalities. In tracing the impact of Islam on the Indian Muslims, Iqbal had observed :

"It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity-by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal, has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country where Islam, as a *people-building force*, has worked at its best."⁴³

Therefore, Iqbal's view was not acceptable to the Congress leaders who were not willing to concede a separate national status to the Indian Muslims. However, they were willing to provide in the future constitution of India for safeguards to all the religious communities including the Muslims. Consequently, the All-India Muslim League was described as communal organisation. This would have reduced the Indian Muslims merely to a religious minority. Also this would have ultimately undermined the unique character of the Indian Muslims as a community in two ways—firstly, it would imply a complete break from the universal *Millat*; and secondly, it would reduce them to a helpless minority. In defending Muslim communalism, Iqbal observed in his famous Presidential Address of 1930 :⁴³

"And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the

43. Jamil-ud-din, Ahmad, *Historic Documents of the Freedom Movement*, (Lahore : Publishers United, Ltd., 1970), p. 121

Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands, is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India, the principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Yet I love communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole past as a living factor in my present consciousness.⁴⁴

At this stage of his political career, Iqbal was willing to accept the solution of Hindu-Muslim conflict within the framework of a paraphernalised federal system, in which the Indian Muslims would enjoy full autonomous status in the provinces in which they were in majority. However, the Congress was not willing to accept a weak central government, and, therefore, they were not to concede autonomous status to the Muslim majority provinces. Therefore full Iqbal proceeded to assert that the problem of India was "international and not national" and submitted :

"We are seventy millions and far more homogenous than any other people in India. Indeed, the Muslims of India are the only people who can fitly be described as a *nation in the modern sense of the word*. The Hindus, though ahead of us almost in all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which *Islam* has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are anxious to become a nation but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of travail, and, in the case of Hindu India, involves a complete overhauling of her social structure."⁴⁵

In the above paragraph, Iqbal has clearly defined political status of the Indian Muslims as a separate nationality; and, therefore, they were entitled to claim a separate homeland in accordance with the recognised principle of national self-determination. In his famous Presidential Address, Iqbal, in outlining a programme of political action for the Indian Muslims, mooted the idea of a separate Muslims State in the Indian subcontinent :

"I would like to see that Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government, within the British empire or without the British empire, the

44. Ibid., p. 125

45. Ibid., p. 135.

formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me the final destiny of Muslims at least of North-West India.⁴⁶

In substance, Iqbal's vision of a separate Muslim State was incorporated in the famous Lahore Resolution of 23 March 1940 at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League under the leadership of late Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Subsequently, in 1946 at Legislators' Convention in Delhi, the new State was officially named Pakistan. On 14 August 1947 Pakistan emerged as a new Muslim State on the map of South Asia.

However, for Iqbal the establishment of a Muslim State in the Indian subcontinent was not end by itself but it was a means to achieve a higher goal—consolidation of the *World-Millat*. Thus the contradiction between Iqbal's theory of the Islamic *Millat* and his proposal for the establishment of a Consolidated Muslim State in the north-west Indian region was, in fact more apparent than real. In this connection sometimes question has been raised : how could Iqbal reconcile Islamic universalism inherent in his theory of *Millat* with his Two-Nation theory based on territorial nationalism for Indian Muslims. Early in 1930, Iqbal dealing with this question in his famous Presidential Address, had observed that the crux of the Indian problem was that the Hindu-Muslim conflict was a much deeper ideological cleavage between Islam and nationalism, and "therefore, the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is unthinkable to a Muslim." In dilating upon the subject he further observed :

"India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east, and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia."⁴⁷

The implication of the above statement was that Indian Muslims had always constituted a distinctive community in the subcontinent. The Indian Muslims, by virtue of a common faith and history, are closely bound together with the rest of the Islamic *Millat* living in the West Asia, and at the same time have their peculiarly Indian features. Therefore, in lending support to Two-Nation theory, Iqbal was chiefly concerned with the consolidation of the Muslim community in the North-West Indian region where they constituted majority. For this purpose, he used the theory of

46. Ibid., p. 126.

47. Ibid., p. 124

modern nationalism in order to counter the arguments of the All-India National Congress in defence of a united Indian nationalism. Therefore, after consolidating Muslim community in the North-West region of the subcontinent in accordance with the precepts of Islamic ideology, the Muslims would naturally move towards achieving higher goals of political consolidation of the World-*Ummah* which may ultimately take the form of what Iqbal had described as League of Oriental Nations.

Iqbal's vision was, indeed, prophetic. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan bears testimony to his political insight and statesmanship in so far as he had demanded the creation of a separate Muslim State based on his Two-Nation theory. On the other hand, the recent global resurgence of Islamic ideology throughout the length and breadth of the Muslim world, as witnessed in Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, and elsewhere has generated a new political thrust towards creating an organisational framework for the Muslim world, in the form of institutions like Muslim Heads of States Conference, Muslim Foreign Ministers' Conference, Islamic Secretariat and numerous financial institutions, such as Islamic Bank, Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Muslim News Agency, etc. In these developments, one can clearly see the emergence of Iqbal's vision of a Muslim Commonwealth of Nations as a reality. Pakistan as the Islamic Republic has incorporated in its Constitution provisions forging bonds of unity among Muslim States as a State policy; and this has remained a cardinal principle of her foreign policy.

(October 82)

IQBAL AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ISLAMIC LAW

KHURSHID AHMAD

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, on one occasion, said:

“Today, Islam’s greatest need is the reconstruction of the Islamic law and its re-codification in such a way that it may provide the Islamic answer to the hundreds of thousands of new questions that have been posed by the modern economic, political, social, national and international developments.”¹

In a letter to Maulana Sayyid Sulayman Nadvi, he wrote:

“It is my firm conviction that he who critically reviews modern jurisprudence from the Qur’anic viewpoint, reconstructs it, and establishes the truth and eternality of Qur’anic laws, would be the real leader and pioneer of Islamic renaissance and the greatest benefactor of humanity at large. This is the time for action; for in my humble opinion, Islam today is on trial and never in the long range of Islamic history was it faced with such a challenge as the one that besets it today.”²

Iqbal, it seems, was extremely preoccupied with the idea of the reconstruction of Islamic law. He was looking with sober anxiety at the currents and cross-currents of thought in the Muslim world. He was worried at the spectacle of the growing alien influences in the world of Islam and wanted to awaken the intelligentsia to the dangers of indiscriminate assimilation.

Law is the sheet-anchor of a culture. It deals with life in all its multifarious aspects. Every science is its domain, every field is its jurisdiction. It guides and controls human life in every walk of activity. As such its importance is paramount. Iqbal realised this

1. *Hayat-e-Anwar*, p. 160, quoted A.R. Khan, *Iqbal aur Mister*, Gosha-i-Adab, Lahore, (1956) p. 67.

2. *Iqbal Namah*, Ed. Shaikh Ataullah, Ashraf Publications, Lahore, Vol. I., p. 50.

cardinal importance of law and looked with grief at the gradual disintegration of the law and custom that had held together the Muslim society.

Although the contact of Islam and the Modern Western Civilization began in the seventeenth century yet it entered a crucial stage only in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. In these later periods the political supremacy of the Muslims was on the wane. The Muslim world was succumbing, at a heavy pace, to the encroachments of Western imperialism. Under the sheltering care of imperialism, Western education and Western technology were creeping into the world of Islam. New ideas began to fill the air, new techniques began to hold the sway. These forces disturbed the old order to its roots. The Muslim world was thrown into convulsion.

Two diametrically opposite reactions emerged in this age of crisis. One was that of undiluted conservatism and the other that of uncontrolled modernism. The conservatives sought refuge in the asylum of 'no change'. They became rigid in their outlook and approach. Every change, they thought, would be a change for the worst. So, they concluded, that the only way to save the Islamic law and culture, in this hour of chaos and confusion, was to stick to the past stubbornly and guard the old order jealously.

The modernists, on the other hand, were swept away with the current of the time. They thought that the royal road to glory lay in the imitation of the West. The Muslim revival, in their view, could be achieved only through adopting Western technique, Western law, Western education and Western modes of thought and behaviour. They saw no contradiction between Islam and the modern West and pleaded for the adoption of Western civilization so that Muslims could also emerge as a progressive nation.

These two reactions manifested themselves in every walk of life, but they were most poignant in the field of law, for law is the epitome of the whole life. The conservatives stood for rigid adherence to *fiqh*, the modernists wanted to change the entire law in the light of the new thought and practice and to adopt western codes of law in one way or the other.

It was at this moment of our history that Iqbal appeared on the

intellectual firmament of the Muslim world. He studied the situation very dispassionately and disapproved both these reactions which betrayed lack of depth and realism. He tried to point out the golden mean.

Careful reflection reveals that neither rigid conservatism nor unbridled modernism can deliver the goods. The conservatist approach is unrealistic. Life is a process of continuous change. History is moving ahead. Society is being moulded into newer folds. New situations are arising, new relationships are being reared and new problems are cropping up. It is imperative to take note of this change and see how the tenets of Islam can be applied to these new conditions. It would be futile to try to *put a brake* to change, for that would stop all movement and clog the wheels of progress. It would be still more futile to *ignore* the change and try to stick to things that *might* have become inapplicable to the new situations. In any case this approach is foredoomed to failure. It cannot but result in driving religion out of the social field and affecting an estrangement between law and life. It would arrest the evolution of the Islamic law. And fossilisation of law means fossilisation of the entire civilization. This attitude cannot work.

The modernist approach, on the other hand, is still more shallow, unrealistic and unsuited to our conditions.

This approach of the so-called liberals is in fact not a reform movement. It is tantamount to the rejection of Islam. Its ultimate result would be the discarding of Islam. For, the liberties they are taking with Islam cannot come under the category of *ijtihad*, they amount to a departure from the law of Islam. These people try to maintain the Islamic terminology, but give it an entirely new meaning—a meaning that cannot fit into the scheme of Islam. Even a leading Western critic of Islam, Professor Joseph Schacht, had to admit that what these 'progressives' are driving at is not Islam, it is the very anti-thesis of it. He writes in a recent essay:

"The method used by the modernist legislators savors of unrestrained eclecticism: the 'independent reasoning' that they claim goes far beyond any that was practiced in the formative period of Muhammadan law; any opinion held at some time in

the past is likely to be taken out of its context and used as an argument. On the one hand the modernist legislators are inclined to deny the religious character of the central chapters of the sacred law; on the other, they are apt to use arbitrary and forced interpretations of Koran and traditions whenever it suits their purpose. Materially, they are bold innovators who want to be modern at all costs; formally, they try to avoid the semblance of interfering with the essential contents of the sacred law. Their ideals and their arguments come from the West, but they do not wish to reject the sacred law openly as Turkey has done."³

This is the position of the modernists. But they have failed to realise that Islamic law is basically different from the modern Western law. Both have arisen out of different situations. Their sources are vitally different and there is no parallel between their history and institutions. An imitation of the West in this respect cannot but breed chaos and confusion.

Secondly, they do not realise that the conditions in the Muslim world *today* are diametrically opposed to those that prevailed in Europe during the periods of Renaissance and Reformation. The history, the traditions, and the cultural background of Islam and the modern West are totally different. In such a situation how can Western institutions work in this part of the world.

Thirdly, law is nothing but a representation of the norms and values of a community. If the people have not discarded these values, how can a law, based on some other set of values, work among them. The famous jurist Lord Wright rightly says:

"Law is not an end in itself. It is a part in the system of Government of the nation in which it functions and it has to justify itself by its ability to subserve the ends of government, that is, to help to promote the ordered existence of the nation and the good life of the people".⁴

Another leading English Judge, Sir Patrick Devlin, in a recent Address to the British Academy, says:

3. Joseph Schacht, in his article "The Law," *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, Ed. G. E. Von Grunbaum (University of Chicago Press) 1955 p. 83.

4. Lord Wright, *Interpretation of Modern Legal Philosophies*, p. 794.

“Law exists for the protection of society. It does not discharge its function by protecting the individual from injury, annoyance, corruption, and exploitation; the law must protect also the institutions and the community of ideas, political and moral, without which people cannot live together. Society cannot ignore the morality of the individual more than it can his loyalty; it flourishes on both and without either it dies. . . . The morals which under lie the law must be derived from the sense of right and wrong which resides in the community as a whole.”⁵

This being the situation, if the Muslim community were to adopt a system of laws derived from the norms of a culture which is not their own, the grafting is bound to create a serious problem. At least the following three complexities are certain to arise:

- (i) Such a law will have to be imposed despotically and dictatorially, for it cannot be introduced in a society like that of the Muslims, in a democratic manner. This is admitted by Dr. Northrop when he says: “I believe this is one of the reasons why such law usually has to be put in first by a dictator. It cannot come in as a mass movement because the masses are in the old tradition.”⁶
- (ii) Even if it is imposed from above, it will engender a social schism and conflict and a growing disrespect, disregard and ultimately violation of law. The reason being that on account of its irrelevance, nay, antagonism with the spirit of Muslim culture it is bound to be hated and despised by the community.
- (iii) It will lead to disintegration of the society and will result in cultural confusion.

Lastly, these people ignore that the West itself has lost much and gained little through the secularisation of law, so much so that Iqbal said: “*Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement.*” Western thinkers also seem to be realising this mistake more and more and some of their leading

5. Sir Patrick Devlin, *The Enforcement of Morals*, Maccabaeian Lecture in Jurisprudence of the British Academy (1959) p. 23.

6. Dr. Filmer S.C. Northrop, *Colloquium on Islamic Culture*, Princeton University Press (1953) p. 109.

authorities are now suggesting that their own system of law is wanting.

To have an idea of what the state of mind of some of the leading authorities in modern law and jurisprudence is, we refer to the following authorities. Professor G. W. Paton says:

“Philosophy has not yet evolved an acceptable scale of values; *its answer to the fundamental problems of jurisprudence is still confused.*”⁷

Morris Cohen, in his book *Reason and Nature*, says:

“No ideal so far suggested is both formally necessary and materially adequate to determine definitely which of our actually conflicting interests should justly prevail.”

W. Friedmann comes to the following conclusion:

“What is the purpose of life? is the fundamental question to be answered by legal theory. In many endeavours to give an answer the principal movements in legal thought veer between certain fundamental values of life. *Western civilization at any rate has hitherto been unable to agree even theoretically on the ultimate values and purposes of life.* So persistently has the pendulum swung backward and forward between certain anti-nomic values that we cannot but register a tension which perpetually produced new efforts and a search for harmony.”⁸

The same author also asserts that:

“The tale of natural law is a tale of the search of mankind for absolute justice and of its failure. . . . *The problem is as acute and as unsolved as ever.* With changing social and political conditions the notions on natural law have changed. The only thing that has remained constant is the appeal to something higher than positive law. . . . It is easy to deride natural law as it is easy to deride the futility of mankind’s social and political life in general, *in its unceasing but hitherto vain search for a way out of the injustice and imperfection, for which so far Western civilization at any rate has found no other solution but to move between one extreme and another.*”⁹

7. G. W. Paton, *A Textbook of Jurisprudence*, Oxford University Press (1946), p. 106.

8. W. Friedmann, *Legal Theory*, London (2nd ed. 1953) p. 465.

9. W. Friedmann, *Ibid.*, p. 17-18.

The feeling is also now dawning that some religious basis is essential for law and the legal system which humanity needs must be grounded in religion.¹⁰ This being the state of modern legal thought, how can a law which is failing in its own lands come to the rescue of the world of Islam. According to Iqbal:

زندہ کر سکتی ہے ایران و عرب کو کیونکر
وہ فرنگی مدنیت کہ جو ہے خود لب گور

How can it infuse new life into Iran and Arabia when the Western polity is itself moribund?

Iqbal realised the futility and hollowness of both these approaches and exposed the dangers of conservatism and modernism in an illuminating way. He pleaded for a balanced approach, for he believed that:

“Only we must not forget that life is not change, pure and simple. It has within it elements of conservation also. While enjoying his creative activity, and always focussing his energies on the discovery of new vistas of life, man has a feeling of uneasiness in the presence of his own unfoldment. In his forward movement he cannot help looking back to his past, and faces his own inward expansion with a certain movement of fear. The spirit of man, in its forward movement is restrained by forces which seem to be working in the opposite direction. This is only another way of saying that life moves with the weight of its own past on its back, and that in any view of social change the value and function of the forces of conservatism cannot be lost sight of. It is with this organic insight into the essential teachings of the Quran that Modern Rationalism ought to approach our existing institutions. No people can afford to reject their past entirely; for it is their past that has made their personal identity. And in a society like Islam the problem of a revision of old institutions becomes still more delicate, and the responsibility of the reformer assumes a far more serious aspect. Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the

10. See W. Friedmann, *Ibid*, p. 450. Also: Sir Patrick Develin, *opt. cit.* p. 6-7 and 10-25, and Sir Alfred Denning, *The Changing Law*, last chapter.

final combination of humanity by drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing a self-consciousness of their own. This was not an easy task to accomplish. Yet Islam, by means of its well-conceived institutions, has succeeded to a very great extent in creating something like a collective will and conscience in this heterogeneous mass. In the evolution of such a society even the immutability of socially harmless rules relating to eating and drinking, purity or impurity, has a life-value of its own, in as much as it tends to give such society a specific inwardness, and further secures that external and internal uniformity which counteracts the forces of heterogeneity always latent in a society of a composite character. The critic of these institutions must therefore try to secure, before he undertakes to handle them, a clear insight into the ultimate significance of the social experiment embodied in Islam. He must look at their structure, not from the standpoint of social advantage or disadvantage to this or that country, but from the point of view of the larger purpose which is being gradually worked out in the life of mankind as a whole."¹¹

This rather lengthy quotation from Iqbal clearly reveals *his approach to the task of reconstruction*. He was eager to see the Muslims march ahead—but he was not a lover of “movement” as such, but a movement in the *right direction*, through the *right process* and in pursuit of *right objectives*. Thus Iqbal was neither a liberal in the current sense of the word, nor a conservative in the often-expressed meaning of it. His approach was balanced and he wanted to steer ahead, avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis of modernism and conservatism. He had no brief for either.

This being Iqbal's approach, now let us see how he proposed to accomplish the task of the reconstruction of Islamic law and what is the nature of his contribution to the legal thought of contemporary Islam.

11. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore (1954), pp. 166-67.

Iqbal's Contribution

In the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent there had been, for some-time past, a clamour for *ijtihad* but no one succeeded in articulating the need for *ijtihad* and in pointing out the process of growth and evolution in Islamic law. Iqbal's greatest contribution is that he clearly brought out in view the need for *ijtihad* and gave a new stirriag to the Muslim thought in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

Iqbal's analysis, it seems, was that Muslims are willy-nilly drifting away from Islam because they are faced with a paradox. They see a new world around them and want to move ahead. But they have no definite Islamic guidance before them. They are labouring under the misconception that Islamic law is a closed system, devoid of any potentialities of evolution and growth and unable to provide solutions to the questions of the day. This misconception has been strengthened because of the unrealistic rigidity of certain '*ulama*' and the introduction of Western education which has perverted values of the educated classes and has given currency to those baseless objections to Islam and its law which have been put forward by certain Western critics of Islam. Because of this, Muslims themselves began to believe in these objections and criticisms and thus were helplessly drifting away from Islam, under the strain of something similar to an inferiority complex. Iqbal embarked upon a project to show:

"Whether the history and structure of the law in Islam indicate the possibility of any fresh interpretation of its principles. In other words, the question I want to raise is—Is the law of Islam capable of evolution?"

Iqbal focussed the attention of the intelligentsia on this question and himself admirably discussed the different aspects of the problem.

Permanence and Change in Islamic Law

1. He, first of all, removed the misconception that life is change

pure and simple. He pointed towards the fact of an unbroken continuity in history. He asserted that life is composed of elements of permanance and change. If there are no eternal values and principles, nothing but chaotic relativism would be the result. And if every minute detail is made unchangeable, the structure would crack under the prèssure of changing situations. He says:

“The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanance and change. It must possess eternal principle to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all possibilities of change which, according to the Quran, is one of the greatest ‘signs’ of God, tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature. The failure of Europe in political and social sciences illustrates the former principle, the immobility of Islam during the last 500 years illustrates the latter.”¹²

Islam propounds the basic values of life, the legal norms, and sets the limits which are not to be transgressed. After setting the four corners of life, it gives man freedom to move ahead and apply those norms and principles in every age and epoch. The basic principles are eternal. They are not the product of any human mind that is subject to the limitations of space and time. They are truths based on revelation and hold good for all time to come. But they do not go to regulate every little detail of life—which are to be decided in every age by an application of these principles. And as there is an unending continuity in life and culture, “each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems.”¹³

Sources of Islamic Law

2. Iqbal undertook a critical study of the sources of Islamic law and showed that they contain within them the potentialities of evolution and of meeting newer situations. He maintained the

12. Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 147-148.

13. Iqbal, *Ibid*, p. 168.

orthodox classification of the sources of *fiqh*, viz., Qur'an, *Sunnah*, *Ijma'* and *Qiyas* and threw light upon the potentialities they hold for the future.

The Qur'an is the basic source of law and, being the Divine Revelation as it is, gives the eternal principles for human guidance. These principles are the corner-stone of Islamic law, the very foundation of it. This Holy Book, on the one hand, sets the basic eternal principles of life, and on the other, endows man with a new revolutionary outlook and awakens in him a unique insight into life, so that he may reform and refashion the entire field of life in accordance with the spirit of Islam.

The *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet is the second great source of Islam. Iqbal regarded the *sunnah* of the Prophet as the real binding force of the Muslim society. He regarded the authentic traditions as an indisputable authority in law and believed that "the traditionists, by insisting on the value of the concrete case as against the tendency to abstract thinking in law have done the greatest service to the law of Islam."¹⁴

Ijma', the third source of Islamic law, says Iqbal, is the 'most important legal notion of Islam.' It consists in the consensus of the *Mujtahids* on a point of law and such a consensus becomes a permanent source of law. This is a process through which new values are established and preserved in Islam. This is the most important avenue of growth and evolution—the vista of progress and development.

Qiyas is the last source of Islamic law and consists in the use of analogical reasoning in legislation. This is the process through which the Islamic principles are applied to local problems or to the changing conditions. Through *Qiyas*, which is another name for *ijtihad*, the growth of Islamic law takes place and the principles are applied to the concrete cases.

Iqbal explained and elucidated these sources of Islamic law and showed that they are so constituted that growth and evolution are guaranteed for all time to come. *Ijma'* and *Qiyas* are two im-

14. Iqbal, *Ibid*, p. 173.

portant instruments of growth and are fully capable of meeting the requirements of genuine change. Iqbal's chief merit lies in the fact that instead of following in the footsteps of the modernists, he thoroughly studied the structure of Islam, imbued himself with its real spirit, and forcefully proved, by a thoughtful discussion over the legal system of Islam, that it was a masterly system which catered to the needs of permanance and change both. Neither was it a closed system, nor subject to atomic relativism. Thus, it was capable of meeting the needs of our age and has the potentialities of transforming a modern society into the Islamic mould.

Is the door of Ijtihad closed?

3. Next comes, automatically, the question of the closing of the door of *Ijtihad*. For, even when the structure of Islam is elastic, if practically the door of future progress and movement has been closed down then the situation won't be any different. Iqbal has dwelt upon this topic at different places. His analysis seems to be as follows:

- (i) He rejects the idea that rigidity came into the world of Islam under the influence of the Turks. He regards this view as shallow.
- (ii) His own opinion was that the door of *Ijtihad* was closed for three reasons, *viz.*, *firstly*, to serve as a check against the disintegrating and confusing influences of the *Mu'tazila*; *secondly*, to meet the sufi challenge to the Muslim society which came in the form of the obscurity of the social vision and the deprivation of the society of its best minds; and, *finally*, the destruction of Baghdad which shook the entire Muslim world and threw it into chaos and confusion. As such the only road to safety was found in strict adherence to the opinion of the authorities of the past. This was an important device to save the Muslim world from further disintegration. And at that critical moment of our history the community did achieve this end by closing the doors of *Ijtihad*. Iqbal

thinks that it was advisable to do so *in that age* for in times of disintegration *Taqlid* is better than *Ijtihad*. In the *Rumuz-i-Bekhudhi* he says:

مضمحل گردد چو تقویم حیات
ملت از تقلید می گیرد ثبات
راه آبا رو که این جمعیت است
معنی تقلید ضبط ملت است

When the structure of life begins to decay,
The Nation takes stability through *Taqlid*.
Go through the way of thy forefathers, for therein
lies strength.

The purpose of *Taqlid* is the maintenance of the Nation.

And again:

اجتهاد اندر زمان انحطاط
قوم را برهم همی پیچید بساط
ز اجتهاد عالمان کم نظر
اقتداء بر رفتگان محفوظ تر

In the time of Decadance *Ijtihad* completes the people's disintegration.

It is safer to follow those who have gone forth
Than the *Ijtihad* of the so-called claimants to
knowledge who are short-sighted.

- (iii) Although Iqbal recognised the utility and the function of *Taqlid*, he thought that the situation has now changed. New problems have arisen which call for new solutions and as such the door of *Ijtihad* must not remain closed. As the door was kept open by God, no one had the right to *permanently* keep it closed. If some of the former doctors of law have upheld this view, Muslims of today are not bound by that "voluntary surrender of intellectual independence."

He therefore, asserted:

“I have tried to explain the causes, which in my opinion, determined this attitude of the Ulema; but since things have changed and the world of Islam is today confronted and affected by new forces set free by the extraordinary development of human thought in all its directions, I see no reason why this attitude should be maintained any longer.”¹⁵

Iqbal is perfectly right in making this observation. The fact is that the situation today is materially different in many respects and due note must be taken of that.

(a) Although the true Islamic Caliphate came to an end by the middle of the first century *Hijra*, during the Ummayyad and the early Abbaside periods, the law of the land was fully Islamic and Islam's teachings were not being tampered with. With the fall of the Abbasides the Muslim state disintegrated and the paramount need of Islamic law, which arises in an Islamic polity, was greatly diminished. This disintegration of the Islamic state sapped the springs of creativity and drifted Muslims into the lap of orthodoxy. Now, Muslims are attaining political independence. Free states are emerging. There is a strong movement in the Muslim world to make these states Islamic and to adopt Islamic law. As such the old attitude must change.

(b) The historical situation is also different. In the past the intellectual and political challenges came like a blizzard and confused the entire scene. Now the situation is such that although Europe has achieved great material progress, its spiritual bankruptcy has become crystal-clear. The Muslim world, on the other hand, is in the grip of a new awakening. This new awakening can be guided only by a new insight into the message of Islam and a realisation of its prospects for the future. Mere parrot-like repetition of that which was taught in the past can be of little avail in this hour of renaissance. Therefore, the gate of *Ijtihad* should be reopened and *Ijtihad* should be exercised to meet the new situations.

15. Iqbal, *Ibid*, p. 168.

Iqbal and Ijtihad

4. This brings us to the problem of *Ijtihad*. Iqbal does not believe in uncontrolled and unbridled exercise of opinion. *Ijtihad* is a legal concept of Islam and it is wrong to think that every independent judgement can fall under it. Here some confusion has been created by those who have torn Iqbal's definition of *Ijtihad* from the general scheme of his ideas and have given it some new fangled meanings. Therefore a little detailed discussion is called for.

Iqbal has defined *Ijtihad* as follows:

“The word literally means to exert. In the terminology of Islamic law it means to exert with a view to form an independent judgement on a legal question.”¹⁶

Now it is strange that some people conclude from this that, according to Iqbal, any and every independent judgement can be *Ijtihad*. Nothing can be farther from truth. Although this definition is not as exact and as comprehensive as a definition should be, it would be unjust and incorrect to think that Iqbal regarded every independent judgement as *Ijtihad*. For, if that is so, every legislature of the world is performing *Ijtihad*, for, what are they doing except forming independent judgements on legal questions? Iqbal believed in independent judgement, but not so independent as to be independent of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*! Iqbal was one of the staunchest critics of this unbridled freedom and we would like to refer to the following points in support of our plea:

(a) Iqbal opposed that freedom of thought which cuts man asunder from Divine Guidance. He valued human reason but knew that it should be used within proper limits; otherwise instead of being a great asset and blessing it might turn into an evil and an instrument of destruction. He says:

آزادی افکار سے ہے ان کی تباہی
 نہ تھے نہیں جو فکر و تدبیر کا سدیقہ
 ہو فکر اگر خام تو آزادی افکار
 انسان کو حیوان بنانے کا طریقہ

16. Iqbal, *Ibid*, p. 148.

In freedom of thought lies their destruction,
 Who do not possess discipline of thought.
 If the mind is immature, then freedom of thought
 Is an instrument for making a beast of a man.

At another place he expresses his evaluation of the unbridled thought of the Modern age as follows:—

پختہ افکار کہاں ڈھونڈنے جائے کوئی
 اس زمانے کی ہوا رکھتی ہے ہر چیز کو خام
 مدرسہ عقل کو آزاد تو کرتا ہے مگر
 چھوڑ جاتا ہے خیالات کو بے ربط و نظام
 مردہ لادینی افکار سے افرنگ میں عشق
 عقل بے ربطی افکار سے مشرق میں غلام

Where to search for mature thought?

The spirit of the age keeps things unripe and uncouth.
 Education liberates the intellect no doubt,
 But it leaves ideas disconnected and un-disciplined.
 In the West 'ishq is moribund because of irreligious thought,
 In the East intellect is in chains because of thought
 indisciplined.

And when a certain section of Muslims, in exercise of this independent judgement, began to twist Islam, Iqbal sarcastically said:

ہے کس کو یہ جرات کہ مسلمان کو ٹوکے
 حریت افکار کی نعمت ہے خدا داد!
 چاہے تو کرے کعبہ کو آتشکدہ پارس
 چاہے تو کرے اس میں فرنگی صنم آباد
 قرآن کو بازبچہ' تاویل بنا کر
 چاہے تو خود اک تازہ شریعت کرے ایجاد

Who has the courage to check the Muslim?

For freedom of thought is a blessing from heaven!
 If he so wishes, he can turn *Ka'ba* into the
 fire-worshipper's synagogue.

Or implant into it idols from the West,
And, making a plaything of the Qu'ran,
Innovate a new *Shari'ah* of his own.

Thus we find that Iqbal was never in favour of that independence of thought which refused to recognise the limits set by God and His Prophet

(b) While explaining his views on *Ijtihad* Iqbal refers to the famous *Hadis-i-Ma'az* which clearly reveals his concept of *Ijtihad*. In this *Hadith* Ma'az bin Jabal said that if he did not find any direct guidance from the Qur'an and Sunnah, then he would *exert to his utmost to form an opinion as to what would be the law of Islam in that case*. This clearly shows that:

- (i) If any explicit guidance is available on an issue in the Qur'an or the *Sunnah*, there is no question of *Ijtihad*;
- (ii) If no explicit guidance is available, then the *faqih* will exert himself to the utmost to find out the implicit guidance; and
- (iii) If nothing explicit or implicit is available in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*, then he will decide the issue in the light of the spirit and the general teachings of Islam, i. e., The Qur'an and *Sunnah*.

That is why the word *Ijtihad* (exerting to the utmost) is used and not merely *ra'y* (opinion). Iqbal clarifies the point at another place as well. While discussing the sources of Islamic law, he uses the word *Qiyas* as synonymous with *Ijtihad* and on the authority of Imam Shafi'i says:

"*Qiyas*, as Shafi'i rightly says, is only another name for *Ijtihad* which, within the limits of the revealed texts, is absolutely free, and its importance as a principle can be seen from the fact that according to most of the doctors, as Qazi Shawkani tells us, it was permitted even in the lifetime of the Holy Prophet."¹⁷

(c) Iqbal did not believe in that kind of free exercise of opinion which totally disregards the traditions of the *millat*. He was very particular on this point and raised it again and again. In *Rumuz-i-*

17. Iqbal, *Ibid*, p. 178.

Bekhudi he captions a chapter as follows:

در بیان این که کمال حیات ملیه این است که ملت مثل فرد احساس
خودی پیدا کند و تولید و تکمیل این احساس از ضبط روایات ملیه
ممکن گردد

“That the perfection of Communal life is attained when the Community, like the individual, develops the sense of Selfhood; and that the propagation and the perfection of this sense is made possible through the perpetuation of National traditions.”

He says:

خود شناس آمد ز یاد سرگذشت	قوم روشن از سواد سرگذشت
باز اندر نیستی گم می شود	سرگذشت او گراز ادش رود
ربط ایام آمده شیرازه بند	نسخه نبود ترا اے هوشمند
سوزنش حفظ روایات کهن	ربط امام است مارا پیرهن
داستانے، قصه، افسانه؟	چیست تاریخ اے ز خود بیگانه
آشنائے کار و مرد ره کند	این ترا از خویشتن آگه کند
جسم ملت را چو اعصاب است این	روح را سرمایہ، تاب است این

The record of the past illuminates
The conscience of a people. The memory
Of past achievements makes it self-aware;
But if that memory fades, and is forgot,
The folk again is lost in nothingness.
Know, then 'tis the connecting thread of days
That sticks up thy life's loose manuscript;
This self-same thread sews us a shirt to wear,
Its needle the remembrance of old yarns.
What is history, O Thou unaware of the self!
A fable? or a legend, a tale?
Nay, 'tis the thing that maketh thee aware
Of thy true self, alert unto the task,
A seasoned traveller; it is the source

Of the soul's ardour, 'tis like the nerves to
The body of the whole community.

And that:

اے پریشان محفل دیرینہ اش
مرد شمع زندگی در سینہ اش
نقش بر دل معنی توحید کن
چاره کار خود از تقلید کن

O thou! whose old concourse is dispersed,
Within whose breast the lamp of life is out,
Engrave on thy heart the truth of *Tawheed*
Solve thy problem by resorting to *Taqlid*.

And that:

مضمحل گردد چو تقویم حیات
ملت از تقلید می گیرد ثبات
راه آبا رو که این جمعیت است
معنی تقلید ضبط ملت است

When the structure of life begins to decay
The Nation attains stability through *Taqlid*.
Go thou the way of thy forefathers for therein
lies strength;

The purpose of *Taqlid* is maintenance of the Nation.

This was the approach of Iqbal to the past. He has discussed it in detail in his *Lectures* where he has expressed the view that:

“Life moves with the weight of its own past on its back, and that in any view of social change the value and function of the forces of conservatism cannot be lost sight of. No people can afford to reject their past entirely; for it is their past that has made their personal identity. And in a society like Islam, the problem of revision of old institutions becomes still more delicate, and the responsibility of the reformer assumes a far more serious aspects.”

How could Iqbal plead for that uncontrolled independence which certain modernists try to put into his mouth?

(d) Iqbal thinks that every Tom, Dick or Harry cannot exercise *Ijtihad* in Islam. It must be exercised by those who have knowledge and whose character can be fully relied upon. In *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi*, while discussing the question of *Ijtihad* and *Taqlid*, he throws light on this problem and says:

ز اجتهاد عالمان کم نظر
 اقتداء بر رفتگان محفوظ تر
 عقل آبايت هوس فرسوده نيست
 کار پاکان از غرض آلوده نيست
 فکر شان ريسد همه باريک تر
 ورع شان از مصطفیٰ نزديک تر

“It is safer to follow those who have gone forth,
 Than the *Ijtihad* of the claimants of knowledge who are
 short-sighted.

Caprice corrupted not the wisdom of thy forefathers,
 Nor was the labour of the pious soiled by personal motives.
 Finer far was the thread of thought their meditation wove,
 Closer to the Prophet's way was their piety.”

In the *Reconstruction* he says:

“It is the duty of the leaders of the world of Islam today to understand the real meaning of what has happened in Europe, and then to move forward with self-control and a clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social policy.”¹⁸

In his quest for safety and protection against modernism he was even prepared to go to the extent of saying as follows:

“I very much appreciate the orthodox Hindus' demand for protection against religious reformers in the new constitution. Indeed, the demand ought to have been first made by

¹⁸ Iqbal, *Ibid.*, p. 163.

the Muslims.”¹⁹

Thus, according to Iqbal, those who are to exercise *Ijtihad* must be endowed with certain qualifications which may be summed up as follows:

- (a) Knowledge of Islam, deep understanding of the ultimate aims of its ideology, institutions and politics.
- (b) Understanding of the modern problems that beset the Muslim world;
- (c) Closeness to the Prophet's way and an understanding of his methods and approach; and
- (d) Reliable moral character so that his decisions may be looked upon with respect.

Now this has been the position of Iqbal and he again and again warned that:

“Our religious and political reformers in their zeal for liberalism may overstep the proper limits of reform in the absence of a check on their youthful fervour.”

What that check should be?—Iqbal was not very definite, but the suggestions he gave now and then show that he wanted to move ahead with deep caution and to organise an academy where he could put together the *'ulama* and the modern educated people. He felt that it was not always possible that all the aforementioned qualities may unite in any one individual. Then, what should be the way out? Iqbal, it seems, wanted to organise a council consisting of *'ulama* and modern educated persons who may, through their corporate efforts, make some original contribution to the reconstruction and the re-codification of the law of Islam.

The problem was so prominent in his mind that in his famous Presidential Address of 1932 he said:

“I suggest the formation of an assembly of *Ulema* which must include Muslim lawyers who have received education in modern jurisprudence. The idea is to protect, expand, and, if necessary, to reinterpret the law of Islam in the light of modern conditions, while keeping close to the spirit em-

19. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* ed. by: 'Shamloo', Al-Manar Academy, Lahore (1948) p. 98.

bodied in its fundamental principles. This body must receive constitutional recognition so that no bill affecting the personal law of Muslims may be put on the legislative anvil before it has passed through the crucible of this Assembly.”²⁰

Iqbal was working on this idea and he thought that the deficiency could be met through consultative *Ijtihad*. (*shooraae Ijtihad*).

The above discussion clearly shows that Iqbal’s above quoted definition of *Ijtihad* does not represent his own ideas in entirety and is not a comprehensive definition. The fact is that it does not fully and completely reflect Iqbal’s concept of *Ijtihad*. A comprehensive definition of *Ijtihad* may be given to elucidate the concept. Allama Aamadi in his renowned work *Al-Ahkam fiusul al-Ahkam*.” says:

“In the terminology of the jurists *Ijtihad* is restricted for that utmost effort which is exerted to form an opinion about any legal matter as to whether it is in consonance with the *Shari’ah*.”

Imam Shatibi, another Muslim jurist, says in *Al-Muwafiqat*:

“*Ijtihad* is that utmost effort which is made to discover the divine commandment (*Ahkam-i-Shari’at*) and to apply the same over newer situations.”

Subhi Mahmasani writes:

“Literally *Ijtihad* means to exert to the utmost, but in the terminology of Islamic law it is used for that effort which is made to discover the law from *dala’il-i-Shara’iya*, i.e., to deduce commandments from the fundamental sources of *Deen*.”

These definitions come from leading Muslim jurists and scholars. But even Western scholars have defined *Ijtihad* in the same way. The *Dictionary of Technical Terms* defines it as under:

“*Idjtihad* means the exerting of one’s self to the utmost degree to attain an object and is used technically for so exerting oneself to form an opinion (*Zann*) in a case (*kadiya*) or as to a rule (*hukm*) of law.”²¹

20. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 60.

21. *Dictionary of Technical Terms*, p. 198. Quoted in *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, Laiden (1953) p. 158.

Hughes' *Dictionary of Islam* defines it as follows:

"*Ijtihad* is the logical deduction on a legal or theological question by a *Mujtahid* or learned and enlightened doctor."²²

Thus we come to the conclusion that although Iqbal's definition of *Ijtihad* is not comprehensive, the over-all approach that he adopted was dynamic and constructive.

Iqbal and Turkey

But before we take up the other point we must make it clear why Iqbal welcomed the liberalism of Turkey?

Our analysis is that Iqbal was eager to see the Muslim world set along the road to emancipation. He welcomed the Turkish experiment for it reflected the stirrings of a new awakening. And as the detailed information about Turkey was lacking, he thought that Kamal Ataturk was continuing the revivalist tradition of Jamal-uddin Afghani and Sa'id Halim Pasha which was not a fact. Turkey did not resort to *Ijtihad*; it, unfortunately, tried to discard Islam.

Iqbal was not looking upon Turkey with full confidence. He was quite sceptical but hoped that a change for the better might occur soon. But this did not happen. And he himself was quite disillusioned.

In the *Reconstruction* he said:

"We heartily welcome the liberal movement in Modern Islam. But it must also be admitted that the appearance of liberal ideas in Islam constitutes also the most critical moment in the history of Islam. Liberalism has a tendency to act as a form of disintegration."

About Zia Gokalp, the Turkish philosopher-poet, he says:

"With regard to the Turkish poet's demand, I am afraid, he does not seem to know much about the family law of Islam. Nor does he seem to understand the economic significance of the Quranic rule of inheritance."²³

In his Rejoinder to Pandit Nehru he says:

"The adoption of the Swiss code with its rule of inherit-

22. Thomas Patrick Hughes, *A Dictionary of Islam*, London, (1935), p. 197.

23. Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 169.

ance is certainly a serious error which has arisen out of the youthful zeal for reform.”²⁴

Similarly about Turkey's law to recite the Qur'an in Turkish he said:

“Personally I regard it as a serious error of judgement.”²⁵

In his later poetical work his disillusionment with Turkey becomes quite manifest. Looking at Turkey's westernisation with grave concern he says:

سمجھ رہے ہیں وہ یورپ کو ہم جوار اپنا
ستارے جن کے نشیمن سے ہیں زیادہ قریب

They deem Europe as their equal and associate
From whose abode stars are much nearer!

In *Javed Nama* he says:

مصطفیٰ را از تجدد می سرود
گفت نقش کہنہ را باید زدود
نو نگردد کعبہ را رخت حیات
گرز افرنگ آیدش لات و منات
ترک را آہنگ نودرچنگ نیست
تازہ اش جز کہنہ افرنگ نیست

And in *Zarb-e-Kalim* he openly declares that:

میری نوا سے گریبان لالہ چاک ہوا
نسیم صبح چمن کی تلاش میں ہے ابھی
نہ مصطفیٰ نہ رضا شاہ میں نمود اسکی
کہ روح شرق بدن کی تلاش میں ہے ابھی

My voice is piercing the heart of the flower,
The gentle breeze is still searching for a garden,
Neither in Mustafa (Kamal), nor in Reza Shah has it mani-
fested,

The spirit of the East is still in search of its abode.

24. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 136.

25. *Ibid*, p. 135.

This was Iqbal's reaction to the Turkish experiment and on the authority of it we are justified in concluding that it would be wrong to say that Iqbal approved of the secularist trends of the Turkish reforms or of their approach of unbridled liberalism which amounted to nothing short of discarding Islam.

Ijma' and its potentialities

5. Iqbal's most potent contribution to the legal thought of Islam is his elucidation of the principle of *Ijma'*. *Ijma'* in the terminology of Islamic law, means the consensus of opinion of the *Mujtahids* and of the *Ummah* on a matter of law. An *Ijtihad* is an individual judgment and it becomes law only after *Ijma'*.

Every student of law is aware of the chasm that has always existed between the ideals of justice and the social realities of life. The fact is that the history of law is a history of shifting emphasis between the ideal and the real. Natural law failed to cater to the changing needs and was twisted like anything and for any purpose. The sociological approach disregarded the question of natural norms and as such inaugurated an era of relativism. Iqbal thought that fundamental malice rests with:

- (i) a lack of eternal values embodying the realities of life,
- (ii) the misjudgement of human reason, which, devoid of Divine Guidance, works in an unrealistic and erroneous way, and
- (iii) the absence of any process through which the ideal is brought into perpetual contact with the real.

Islamic law fulfils all these fundamental needs of a legal order. The Qur'an and *Sunnah* give the eternal values and norms while *Ijma'* is the process through which new norms are created and preserved. The Qur'an and *Sunnah*, being the embodiment of Divine Guidance, are based on the unchanging realities of life and enunciate the basic principles of social existence. They provide the framework into which the principle of *Ijma'* operates. Through it social realities of every age are given recognition and as it commands absolute obedience, it is a unique process to weld the ideal with the real. Iqbal brought to light this fundamental and hitherto unappreciated importance of the principle of *Ijma'*.

He further showed that *Ijma'* is a democratic process and reveals that Islam is basically different from priests'craft. *Ijma'* of a later generation can also change or alter the *Ijma'* of an earlier generation, of course on the basis of legal arguments. (*Dala'il-i-Shar'iyah*).

After the period of the *Khilafat-i-Rashida* the democratic machinery of *Ijma'* could not be re-established and reliance was placed on individual *Ijtihad* alone. This was a great tragedy. But now the institution can be revived and Iqbal thinks that a modern legislative assembly can become an agency for its performance. But he is conscious of certain practical difficulties, viz.,

- (a) The presence of non-Muslims in the modern legislatures; and
- (b) Lack of religious understanding and of the knowledge of Islamic law among the present legislators.

He, therefore, suggests that there should be Muslim legislative Assemblies and:

"The *Ulema* should form a vital part of a Muslim legislative Assembly helping and guiding free discussion on questions of law. The only effective remedy for the possibilities of erroneous interpretations is to reform the present system of legal education in Mohammedan countries, to extend its sphere and to combine it with an intelligent study of modern jurisprudence."²⁶

Thus he not only brought to light the real importance and role of *Ijma'* but also suggested the ways and means through which this principle could be translated into reality in the modern world. This, I think, has been one of his basic contributions to the contemporary Muslim thought.

Iqbal's Legal Philosophy

6. And lastly I may venture to say that in the legal thought of Iqbal we can see the rudiments of a legal philosophy, which, had he lived to formulate and finalise it, would have revolutionised the modern thought, for it was based on the Qur'an and *Sunnah* and would have been an exposition of the Islamic philosophy of law.

26. Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 176.

Law's fundamental concern is the establishment of justice. Although it operates on the current social realities it derives its life and concept from a people's outlook of the cosmos, of man's position in it and of their ideas of social justice. The position of the individual and the nature of his relationship with the society and the world at large determine the norms of law. Iqbal's basic philosophy seems to be that life is a unity and the ultimate ground of life is a rationally directed will which he conceives as ego. He believes that there is a higher law which is based on the realities of existence and has been revealed by the Creator for the guidance of man and society. This higher law, in legal terminology, is the *grundnorm* to which the behaviour of the individual and the rules of the society must conform. And the contemporary confusion of thought and chaos of behaviour is because of the absence of such a *grundnorm*. He says:

“Modern Europe has, no doubt, built idealistic systems on these lines, but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone can bring. This is the reason why pure thought has so little influenced man, while religion has always elevated individuals, and transformed whole societies. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies, whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich. Believe me Europe today is the greatest hinderance in the way of man's ethical advancement. The Muslim, on the other hand, is in possession of these ultimate ideas on the basis of a revelation, which speaking from the inmost depths of life, internalises its own apparent externality.”

This idea of a higher law based on Revelation is the most fundamental element of Iqbal's legal philosophy. This higher law is eternal and provides the possibilities of growth and evolution. The juristic implications of this idea are revolutionary.²⁷ It means:

27. See also, Hamidullah Siddiqui, 'Iqbal's Legal Philosophy' *Progressive Islam* Amsterdam. A pioneer work in this direction.

- **That law has its real sanction in this ultimate and higher law which is objective and realistic. Thus we can avoid the cumbbersome incongruities of the natural law controversy.
- **That the society and state are only political and legal organisations affected for the purpose of the implementation of the higher law and, if they begin to defeat this purpose, they abolish their sanction for obedience.
- **That an International law, regulating and guiding the different legal orders prevailing in different Nation-States, is possible. The difficulties which have been created by the Austinian theory of law are eliminated and the International law of nations, emanating from one *grundnorm* becomes possible.²⁸
- **And that the totalitarian consequences of the Hegelian doctrine of law can be avoided, for, in the case of this law, state is not being obeyed because it is the sovereign but because it is the legal agency for the establishment of the higher law. As such the state will be obeyed only as long as it follows the higher law. This is what is expressed in *Hadith* as 'there is no obedience to the creature if it involves disobedience to the Creator'.

These are some of the aspects of the juristic thought of Iqbal.

Thus we find that Iqbal tried to discover the real meaning and message of Islamic law, to reconstruct the contemporary legal thought, point out the vistas of growth and evolution and to construct a legal philosophy which could act as the philosophic formulation of Islamic Law. This has been a gigantic service to the modern renaissance of Islam.

(April 60)

28. See the writer's article "Law and Philosophy of Law" in *Chiragh-e-Rah*, Islamic Law Number, Vol. I, June 1958, pp 34-51.

IQBAL—A VIEW OF POLITICO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE*

Gilani Kamran

The year 1977 was dedicated to the memory of Iqbal in Pakistan, and a back view of the philosopher-poet's teaching was made in the light of the changed world conditions. In Pakistan, Iqbal's contributions to thought obviously possess a definite context; Iqbal stands for Muslim nationalism and for Islamic internationalism. But the thinking which got consolidated over the year 1977 made a good progress in understanding Iqbal's place in a wider context: in the context of the larger world. Iqbal has, indeed, addressed the Muslims in their twentieth-century historical situation, but there certainly are the areas of his thought which are even more relevant to the common situation of man in the modern world. Thus, politico-cultural perspective which guides and dictates the affairs of practical life of men demands its evaluation also in terms of Iqbal's philosophy.

In his long creative career which covered the crucial thirty-five years of the present century, Iqbal employed poetry as his principal medium of expression; nevertheless, he also communicated in prose on serious subjects which demanded closer study and systematic analysis. He took part in active politics, and was a prominent leader of Muslim political opinion in India. He was perhaps the most important modern Muslim of the subcontinent who had an international worldview, and who looked upon the shifting perspectives of world affairs as the movement of history. He began his career as a poet of subjective experience, but very soon he gave up this mode of writing, and was inclined towards the life of men in their natural setting which brought him face to face with what is called the state of man-in-the-situation. Thus, he became the

*Presented at the Eastern Washington State University, Cheney, Washington, and Duke University, Durham, N.C., in February 1978.

poet of the man-in-the-situation. Colonialism, which was then the system of British imperial administration in India, defined the situation, and the human scene in India appeared in Iqbal's eyes as the scene which demanded his creative and intellectual involvement.

In retrospect, however, two questions appear which had serious impact on Iqbal's poetically sensitive political awareness. And they were: Why has colonialism taken possession of the sub-continent? and how is it possible to live through such a distressing situation? The state of colonialism, of course, meant the suppression and isolation of the history of the people of India, and Iqbal had an acute sense of loss of the collective memory in this context. A large body of his writings, therefore, consisted of transmission of historical memory to his audience, and he soon became a spokesman of past history in a political environment which failed to accommodate such awareness in the subcontinent. His early poems sing of the Indo-Aryan memory, and of the glorious achievements of Muslims in the past and create a mental landscape of history in a geography which was controlled by alien rulers. Thus, as creative act, Iqbal's poetry in its earlier phase achieved one important political objective: it saved the collective memory from extermination in a colonial rule.

Politically, however, India of the British imperial era was sharply divided even in its collective memory. Two different strands of historical awareness ran parallel to each other, and in the absence of any principle of unification and of a united effort the situation could hardly be resolved satisfactorily in favour of the people of India. Iqbal hoped for a conciliation between the divided collective memories of the Hindus and the Muslims of the subcontinent, and he held out the idea of geographical nationalism where the Indian soil appeared as the sacred motherland for the two major communities. He pointed out that communal and ethnic division was mainly the outcome of psychological attitudes, and once these narrow and culturally restricted attitudes were changed and transformed a more rewarding principle of existence would emerge and resolve the inner and outer contradictions of the Indian situation. His poem "The New Temple" invites conflicting

ethnic and religious groups to transcend their myopic visions and to merge into a positive and creative totality.

Iqbal's political thought, in its creative framework, was geographically oriented before he left for Europe in 1905. His idea of nationalism was soil-based, and the identity of the people derived its meaning from the idea of a common homeland. His stay in Europe, however, enabled him to observe the working of geographical nationalism in its materialistic setting, and he found to his great disappointment the clashes among European nations for various materialistic ends. He also found an inner cleavage in the European thinking process, and felt that ordinary reason had elevated materialism to the status of a new deity which demanded unconditional submission and worship from modern man. Though he was fairly appreciative of the achievements of Europe, yet he could hardly incline himself to subscribe to its extreme materialism. Consequently, the rise of materialism in Europe shattered his faith in nationalism in its strict geographic form. He, therefore, naturally looked elsewhere for the fulfilment of his politico-national aspirations. The Muslim world, as a fact of collective geo-historical memory, offered him a subject for serious consideration.

In the history of the Muslim world, Iqbal discovered the principle of unity which was extraterritorial, and supranational, a unity which was not geographical but creative and experiential. It was a unity which was non-spatial. The Muslim world, as a phenomenon of history, appeared to Iqbal as an idea which could transform the condition of man and promised the growth and fulfilment of human life. This awareness changed the entire political perspective, and Iqbal related India to the larger world of Islam for its future orientation. This change of perspective was in fact a change from abstraction to concrete humanism, and from the idea of the indifferent soil to the state of real human beings.

The working of nationalism in Europe had enabled Iqbal to see the weight of numerical majority in a democratic form of government. He realised that the numerical majority, if it so intended, could as well bring about the total effacement of the identities of the minority groups through a democratic process.

In India, he also realised that the Muslims had to face a permanent, unchanging majority of the ethnic group which, for certain historical reasons, could hardly extend any confidence to Muslims in any future form of government in the subcontinent. The idea of numerical majority, unless it was properly educated, caused anxiety and fear, and compelled the minority groups to save and preserve their identity from total effacement, and their humanity from complete liquidation.

Thus, between his European experience and the Indian ethnic and cultural situation, Iqbal moved towards the idea of Islamic community, because it promised regeneration to mankind. This conviction was strengthened in the decade following the end of the First World War in 1918. His lectures on the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (1929) were delivered precisely with the purpose to assess the role of Islam and Islamic community in the changed conditions of modern times. The moral of the lectures, however, was, and it still sounds convincing, that Islamic community in a reconstructed thought-environment can offer hope to mankind. This conclusion formed the basis of Iqbal's Presidential Address to the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930 which pleaded for the establishment of an independent Muslim State in the Indian subcontinent. The State, he observed, would demonstrate the efficacy of the role of Islam as the principle of regeneration in the future world order.

Iqbal's politico-cultural perspective does not consider the human situation as a mad hunt after material ends. Still, it does not mean that Iqbal did not have any sympathy with the materially depressed condition of men and nations. In fact, Iqbal wanted a healthy balance between the material and the spiritual aspects of human life. His politico-cultural view had a strong philosophical basis where political enslavement of nations meant the suppression of the human ego. It also clearly suggested that the idea of political freedom definitely ensures the liberation of the ego from its unrealised state of existence. In a politically handicapped environment the ego remains dormant, and, as such, it exists simply as an inanimate object. Freedom from political overlordship brings it back to life, and opens up innumerable possi-

bilities of its expansion. The expansion, in a creative sense, is the destiny of the human ego which must yield a life-giving expansion in both horizontal and vertical dimensions.

Iqbal's thinking relates politics to philosophy and offers an aim to the man-in-the-situation. The situation, once altered, can hardly stop the ego from its expansion. In his poem addressed to the Russian people, Iqbal, while complimenting them on their success in the creation of a new mode of society, holds out a warning to them in no less strong terms to beware of materialism. He advises them to realise their collective ego in its fullest creative expansion which transcends the matter and approaches the spiritual. The ego, Iqbal points out, integrates the material with the spiritual, and the Divine appears in the human at the point where the horizontal intersects the vertical. Unless the ego operates in this framework the kingdom of God on earth cannot be witnessed by the unfortunate children of Adam.

The idea of expansion of the ego, as a politico-cultural idea, has its basis in the behaviour of the individual. Iqbal points out that only the eternal values of human conduct can provide destination to the wandering human ego. The fragmented human psychology can expose it to another more serious predicament. The human being stands in need of a happy combination of love and reason. The Western heritage must come closer to the heritage of the East and the mind must come closer to the human heart in order to bring about a happy reunion between the complements of the human ego. Without this reunion, the human ego cannot have a second birth. All political philosophies and, indeed, all political movements have hardly any meaning if their destiny is not enriched by the experience of the second birth. In *Jāvid Nāmāh*, Iqbal emphasises this idea, and says :

“It was by way of birth, excellent man,
that you came into this dimensioned world ;
by birth it is possible also to escape,
it is possible to loosen all fetters from oneself ;
but such a birth is not of clay and water—
that is known to the man who has a living heart.
The first birth is by constraint the second by choice ;
the first is hidden in veils, the second is manifest ;

the first happens with weeping, the second with laughter,
for the first is a seeking, the second a finding ;
the first is to dwell and journey amidst creation,
the second is utterly outside all dimensions ;
the first is in need of day and night,
the second—day and night are but its vehicle.
A child is born through the rending of the womb,
a man is born through the reading of the world ;
the call to prayer signalises both kinds of birth.
The first is uttered by the lips, the second of the very soul.
Whenever a watchful soul is born in a body,
this ancient inn, the world, trembles to its foundations.”

In the perspective suggested by Iqbal's politico-cultural thinking the human ego has a definite political and cultural destiny which anticipates its fulfilment in the ever-shifting geo-historical situations of the modern world.

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ISLAMIC UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIAL NATIONALISM IN IQBAL'S THOUGHT

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I

Islamic Universalism and Territorial Nationalism are the two complementary political forces in the present-day Muslim world. Both these trends originated in the Muslim world of today through Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's thinking and interpretation of Islamic teachings and found their most eloquent expression in prose and poetical compositions of Allamah Muhammad Iqbal. It will be opportune to give a very brief survey of Afghani's contributions to modern Muslim thought before an attempt is made to analyse the progress of these two trends in Iqbal's thought.

In the long history of the struggle of the East against Western domination Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's name occupies a unique place.¹ His was one man's will and wit pitted against the brute force of the two mightiest powers of his times, the British Empire and the Czarist Russia. Though Afghani had no support of an army, a State, or even a political organisation, yet through his indomitable courage, indefatigable labour, astute statesmanship, moving eloquence, charismatic leadership and dynamic personality, he became a terror for the chanceries of the West and a hope for the enslaved masses of the East. His programme for their liberation and uplift consisted of three *inter-linked* reformatory measures :

One, enlightenment through educational reforms;

Two, strengthening the national States of the Muslim World through the promotion of nationalist and populist movements; and

Three, the unity of the Muslim world.

1. There is a vast literature on Afghani, his life and works. Abdullah Albert Kudsi Zadeh, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: An Annotated Bibliography*, and his "A Supplementary Bibliography" in *The Muslim World*, LXV/4 (1975), 79-91, are a good guide to this literature. However, Qadi Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghaffar's *Athar-i-Jamal al-Din Afghani* is still a most valuable and balanced biography of Afghani.

Afghani knew that territorial nationalism was the greatest political force of modern times and the most potent weapon in the hands of the downtrodden and enslaved masses of colonial East. So, he became the pioneer of nationalist movements in Muslim East and at the same time exhorted these nationalist forces to join hands against their common enemy, Western Imperialism.

He was the harbinger of Arab nationalism. He inspired 'Arabi Pasha's Egyptian revolt of 1881 and it was under his guidance that Muhammad 'Abduh and Sa'd Zaghlul led the movement for Arab liberation and resurgence. Among his close collaborators for the cause of Arab resurgence were non-Muslim Arab journalists and intellectuals like Adib Ishaq, a Syrian Christian, and Ibn Sanu, an Egyptian Jew.² The nationalist ferment and intellectual renaissance kindled by Afghani at the Azhar University of Cairo had its influence as far as the Malayan peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago. Afghani's disciples inspired the powerful reformist *Muhammadiyah* and *Sarekat Islam* organisations through whose efforts Islam assumed the role of a pre-nationalism in Indonesia.³ A similar pre-nationalist lead was given by Sayyid Shaikh al-Hadi of Malaya who also drew his guidance from the Egyptian disciples of Afghani.⁴

In Iran, he led the successful campaign of 1890-91 against the British monopoly of the sale and export of tobacco, showed the way how the rich economic resources of Muslim East could be used as a weapon for the political and economic emancipation of the people, and, through his powerful support to the Iranian people's struggle for constitutional monarchy (مشروطيت), he became one of the pioneers of Iranian nationalism.⁵ Grateful Iranians claim him to be an Iranian by origin being an Asadabadi. They contend that he assumed Afghani *nisbah* to escape the tyranny of the Qachar despots of Iran. The question is still debated and is, certainly, symbolic of the national

2. C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, pp. 4-17; see also, Rashid Ahmad (Jullundhri), "Pan-Islamism and Pakistan: I, Afghani and Nasser," *Scrutiny*, 1/2 (1975), 29-30.

3. W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, pp. 209-15; also Wilfred C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 48-50 and 75.

4. A selection of al-Hadi's writings has been compiled and translated into English by Mrs Linda Tan and recently published by the Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Kuala Lumpur. Dr Muhammad Zaki wrote in 1965 a doctoral thesis on this subject for the London University.

5. E.G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, has contemporary and the most reliable evidence on Afghani's activities in Iran. One of Afghani's Iranian disciples, Mirza Reza Kirmani, assassinated the Qachar king Nasir al-Din, in 1896, for which Afghani had to suffer.

pride aroused by him.

In Turkey, Sultan Abdul Hamid II conspired to use him and his movement for Muslim unity as tools for the promotion of his own despotic aims, but he tenaciously resisted those attempts and contributed towards giving a nationalist direction to the movement of the Young Turks. At his urging Mehmed Emin Yurdakul composed poems in simplified Turkish using the syllabic meter of folk poetry⁶ and what was still more remarkable, as Professor Bernard Lewis has remarked:

"he adopted a word which, in Turkish usage, had connoted a boorish, ignorant peasant or nomad, and proudly proclaimed himself a Turk—

I am a Turk, my faith and my race are mighty in another place—
We are Turks, with this blood and with this name we live."⁷

He was put under detention by the Ottoman autocrat and, in March 1897, the pioneer of the movement for Muslim unity died in the "guided" prison of the Muslim Caliph who claimed to be the upholder of Pan-Islamism⁸ What an irony of history it was!

But the still greater irony is that the founder of nationalist movements in Muslim countries is said to be hostile to nationalism. This is, in fact, a very subtle propaganda of the Imperialist forces aimed at the weakening of the anti-Imperialist movement among the Muslim masses on two fronts. On the one hand, attempt is thus made to keep the Muslims aloof from the national liberation movements of their countries in the name of Afghani's so-called Pan-Islamism; and, on the other, doubts are created in the minds of the nationalist forces about the motives of the movement for Muslim solidarity. The former attempt delayed the awakening of Muslim masses but it eventually failed and, though the Muslims could not be the vanguard, which Islam expected them to be, yet they did take an active part in the emancipation of the East. The Pakistan Freedom Movement, the Indonesian struggle for *merdeka*, the heroic battles fought by the Algerians against the French colonialists and the long and bitter war that the Arabs have been fighting on many fronts for the liberation of Palestine, are some of the most notable triumphs of the nationalist upsurge in modern world. But we have yet to guard ourselves against the dangers posed by Pan-Islamism to the movement for Muslim

6. Kemal H. Karpat, *The Cambridge History of Islam*, I, 557.

7. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 343.

8. Afghani died in mysterious circumstances and it is suspected that he was poisoned by Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid. Like his origin Afghani's end too remains a debated question.

solidarity. The newly independent Muslim States have won their national sovereignty after many sacrifices. They jealously protect their national identity from foreign interference or encroachment and are sceptical of any reform movement that tends to weaken their national consciousness. Therefore, any move for Muslim solidarity that at the same time does not strengthen the nationalist movements of the Muslim countries would be self-defeating.

We must differentiate between Pan-Islamism and Islamic Universalism. Islam being a universal religion does not have a nationalism of its own. As Iqbal has so well put it, "Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations."⁹ To talk of Muslim Nationalism is to equate Islam with the national religions of the Jews and the Hindus.¹⁰ Islam does not have a Zion or any Aryavarta.¹¹ The whole world is its homeland and not a particular country, for the Blessed Prophet declared: *جعلت لي الأرض مسجداً و طهوراً* [The whole earth is made a mosque for me and pure]¹² For this reason Islamic universalism does not reject; rather, it affirms the nationalist idea; and the territorial nationalism of the Muslim countries and the movement for Muslim solidarity are complementary to each other. On the one hand, Muslim solidarity is the surest guarantee for the safeguard of the territorial integrity of the Muslim countries; and, on the other, it is only a strong, nationally coherent, self-confident and self-reliant Muslim country that can play a meaningful role in promoting Muslim unity. Afghani lived and laid down his life for the achievement of these ideals.

Afghani was a radical. He was not an obscurantist. He visualised

9. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 159.

10. See Gunnar Myrdal's observation in his *Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, I, 306. Myrdal has confined his comparison of Islam and Christianity with Hinduism alone but still more apt would have been their comparison with Judaism. Lenin had to fight a crusade against the Jewish nationalists of the Bund, see his *The Right of Nations to Self-determination*; also, J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*. But the religious nationalism of the Jews in its most aggressive form, Zionism, succeeded in carving out the State of Israel from the British Mandate of Palestine on 14 May 1948. It is amazing how some "Muslim nationalists" present the establishment of Israel nine months after the independence of Pakistan as the strongest argument justifying Pakistan's so-called *raison d'être*. (As if this ancient land with a six-thousand-year-old continuous history of civilisation needs some argument that may account for, or justify, its existence!)

11. For the Hindu *Aryavarta* concept, see this writer's *Pakistani Qawmiyat*, pp. 74-86.

12. Bukhari, *Sahih*, I, 91 and 119.

the resurgent nationalisms of the Muslim countries in the context of the struggle of the East against the colonial exploitation of the West.

Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa (العروة الوثقى), a weekly periodical clandestinely circulated by Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh throughout the Muslim world, was one of the most powerful weapons that they had forged for the anti-Imperialist freedom fight. In its issue dated 15 May 1884, Afghani unequivocally declared :

لا يظن احد من الناس ان جريدتنا هذه بتخصيصها للمسلمين بالذكر احيانا و مداومتها عن حرقهم تقصد الشقاق بينهم و بين من يجاورهم في اوطانهم و يتفق معهم في مصالح بلادهم و يشاركتهم في المتاع من اجيال طويلة فليس هذا من شأننا و لا مما نميل اليه و لا يبيحه ديننا و لا تسمح به شريعتنا و لكن الغرض تعذير الشرقيين عموماً و المسلمين خصوصاً من تطاول الا جانب عليهم و الافساد في بلادهم و قد نخص المسلمين بالخطاب لانهم العنصر الغالب في الاقطار التي غدر بها الاجنبيون و اذلوا اهلها اجمعين و استاثروا بجميع خيراتها -

[In this Journal we have been specifically mentioning Muslims very often and have been fighting to defend their rights, but this must not make anyone believe that we intend to sow enmity between the Muslims and their non-Muslim compatriots who have common territorial interest with them and who have been sharing with them mutual benefits since long millenniums. This does not behove us. It is against our natural disposition. It is also against the tenets of our Faith and is not permitted by our Religious Law. Our aim is to warn the Easterners, in general, and the Muslims, in particular, against becoming victims of the tyranny of the aliens and against letting their lands being corrupted by these foreigners. We do often address the Muslims particularly but only because they are the dominant element in that part of the world where the aliens have spread corruption, subjected the people and destroyed all that was good.]¹³

In the last letter that he wrote from the prison of the Pan-Islamist Caliph, Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid, Afghani said :

خوشم به حبس و خوشم بر اين كشته شدن - محبوسم برائے آزادی نوع -
كشته می شوم برائے زندگی قوم - ولی افسوس می خورم ازین كه، آرزوئی كه،
داشتم كاملاً نائل نه گردیدم و شمشیر شقاوت نه گزاشت كه، عمل بیداری مشرق
را بینم -

13. Husayn Muhiy al-Din al-Hibal, Ed., *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, p. 190.

[I am happy over my internment. I am jubilant over my impending death. I am imprisoned so that humanity may be freed. I am being killed so that nation may live. But I regret that my wishes have not been completely fulfilled. Misfortune did not allow me to see the full process of the awakening of the activism of the East.]¹⁴

Afghani's call for Muslim unity and Asian solidarity did not fall on deaf ears. It took roots, developed and finally emerged as the power of the Third World in which Muslim national States have a prominent place. His soul must have rejoiced at the sight of the Lahore Summit of 1974 when all the Muslim national States joined hands together to remove one of the last bases of Western Imperialism in the East. He regretted that he would not live to see "the process of the awakening of the activism of the East". Better late than never: that process is now in full swing. It reached one of its triumphant moments when the Chairman of the Summit Conference, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, delivered his Presidential Address. The wisdom of Islamic universalism and its relationship with territorial nationalism, on the one hand, and with the solidarity of the Third World, on the other, were incisively perceived and succinctly presented in this historic address. Elucidating the aim and purpose of the Conference he stated:

" . . . it is inherent in our purpose that we promote, rather than subvert, the solidarity of the Third World. This solidarity is based on human and not on ethnic factors. The distinctions of race are anathema to Islam but a kinship of suffering and struggle appeals to a religion which has always battled against oppression and sought to establish justice. . . . It may well be that, in the cause of the Third World, and in humanity's struggle towards a balanced world order, we, the Muslims, are now being called upon to play a central role.

"I must, in this context, refer to a certain ambivalence in our Muslim minds about the role of nationalism in Islam and its compatibility with the establishment of an Islamic community. Let us face it that there has been some uncertainty on this issue. We have several nationalisms among us, Arab and non-Arab, all equally vigorous and vibrant with aspiration. All these nationalisms constitute our responses to the historic situation that we have confronted in our different geographical locations. Nationalism as the motive force of a people's liberation, nationalism as an agent of a people's consolidation, nationalism as a propeller of social and economic progress is a powerful force which we will do nothing to weaken. Furthermore, nationalism is a necessary tributary to the broad stream of human culture. It takes a full understanding of one's own country, of its history and language

14. Qadi Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghaffar, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-97.

and traditions to develop an understanding of other countries, of their inner life and of our relations with them. Islam provides both the spirit and the technique of such a mutuality. Patriotism and loyalty to Islam can thus be fused into a transcendent harmony. As Muslims, we can rise higher than our nationalism, without damaging or destroying it."¹⁵

'Allamah Mubammad Iqbal was a spiritual disciple of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani. He rendered the most notable service towards accelerating the pace of the process "of the awakening of the activism" in the South Asian subcontinent and in welding the two complementary political forces of Islamic universalism and territorial nationalism. The holding of the Islamic Summit at Lahore where he lies buried was a homage to his services paid by the grateful Muslim world.

While Afghani was a man of action, Iqbal was a man of thought. His views on the subject are very complex and we feel that they have suffered through oversimplification at the hands of his hostile critics as well as those of his admirers. In the next few pages an attempt is made to present them unshorn of their complexities.

II

Among all the poetic and prose writings of 'Allamah Muhammad Iqbal the Presidential Address that he delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League held at Allahabad in 1930 stands unique for the profound impact that it made on the destinies of the people of this part of the world. The truth of the prophetic words that he spoke on this occasion is slowly but surely unfolding itself on the pages of history. Take, for instance, the history-making declaration that he made, when he said :

"I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India. . . . The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated State to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area."¹⁶

15. Government of Pakistan, *Report on Islamic Summit, 1974, Pakistan*, pp. 51-52.

16. S.A. Vahid, Ed., *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, pⁿ 170-71.

But Iqbal not only visualised the destined geographical boundaries of the State of his dreams, he also laid down broad guidelines for the future leaders of this State in the same Presidential Address. What he repeatedly emphasised was his wish that the establishment of this new State "will intensify their [i.e. the Muslims'] sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling".¹⁷ And what is most remarkable is the fact that in this respect he asked the leaders of the country that came to be known as Pakistan to follow the example set by the founders of Modern Turkey and of Modern Iran, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah Kabir. He said :

"Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but placid argument that Turkey and Iran and other Muslim countries are progressing on national, i.e., territorial lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population. The minorities there belong, in the language of the Quran, 'to the people of the Book'. There are no social barriers between Muslims and the 'people of the Book'. . . . Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realisation of a final combination of humanity was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran declares: 'O people of the Book! Come, let us join together on the word (Unity of God), that is common to us all.'¹⁸ The wars of Islam and Christianity, and later, European aggression in its various forms, could not allow the infinite meaning of this verse to work itself out in the world of Islam. To-day it is being gradually realised in the countries of Islam in the shape of what is called Muslim Nationalism."¹⁹

17. Ibid., p. 171 ; also p, 183. But compare these statements with the following pronouncement of Iqbal in the second phase of his thought :

"Islam appeared as a protest against idolatry. And what is patriotism but a subtle form of idolatry ; a deification of a material object. The patriotic sons of various nations will bear me out in my calling patriotism a deification of a material object. Islam could not tolerate idolatry in any form. It is our eternal mission to protest against idolatry in all its forms. What was to be demolished by Islam could not be made the very principle of its structure as a political community. The fact that the Prophet prospered and died in a place not his birthplace is perhaps a mystic hint to the same effect" (Javid Iqbal, Ed., *Stray Reflections : A Note-Book of Allama Iqbal* [1910], pp. 26-27).

18. Al-Qur'an, iii. 64. How well our Blessed Master who was the Qur'an personified acted on this divine precept is illustrated by the clauses of the Charter of Medina! For details, see Hamidullah, *Majmu'at al-Wahaiq al-Siyasiyah*, pp. 15-21. Also, this writer's Urdu monograph, *Pakistan Qawmiyat : Jughrafiya'i wa Tarikhi Tajziyah*, pp 174-82.

19. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 190.

No doubt, these words were spoken in the context of the political, social and economic conditions that prevailed in what was in the year 1930 known as British India. Iqbal was delivering the Presidential Address of a political party and for that reason his observations had to be primarily of topical interest. But he was first a poet-philosopher and then a politician-statesman. It is not just a coincidence that among all the Muslim countries only Turkey and Iran—or Persia as it was called at that time—were specifically mentioned by Iqbal, for the leaders of these two brotherly countries, Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah Kabir, were the foremost upholders of the Nationalist ideal in the Islamic world. Iqbal gave a new and profound interpretation to the idea of “what is called Muslim nationalism” by identifying it with the Nationalist movements of Turkey and Iran: “*what is called Muslim Nationalism,*” the italicised words are very meaningful. In the first sentence of the passage under discussion he stated, “national, i.e. territorial lines”. These statements show that Iqbal was not only well aware of the territorial basis of modern nationalism but had also accepted it as an established fact which needed no elaboration.

In one of his last writings while commenting on Leibniz's monadism Iqbal states that according to Leibniz the monad, i.e. the mind of man,

“is a closed window incapable of absorbing external forces. My view is that the monad is essentially assimilative in its nature. Time is a great blessing. While it kills and destroys it also expands and brings out the hidden possibilities of things. The possibility of change is the greatest asset of man in his present surroundings.”²⁰

Change is certainly the greatest asset of Iqbal's thought-processes but is at the same time the greatest liability of his admirers and critics who in the name of consistency would like to seek constancy in his concepts. Iqbal's mind was highly assimilative in its nature and quickly imbibed the impact of his political surroundings. He was very sensitive to the fast moving changes in his milieu. In this constant flux one can discern a broad division of three main phases of Iqbal's thought on the subject under discussion.

First, the Pan-Indian nationalist phase, which ended with his travel to Europe in 1905. This comprises the first part of the *Bang-i-Dara*, and the poems rejected by Iqbal but posthumously collected in different anthologies, like S A. Vahid, *Baqiyat-i-Iqbal*, Muhammad

20. B.A. Dar, Ed., *Letters and Writings of Iqbal*, Iqbal's letter to Mr K.G. Sayyidain dated 21 June 1936, pp. 12-13.

Anwar Harith, *Rakht-i-Safar*, and Ghulam Rasul Mihr, *Sarud-i-Raftah*. The small collection of poems in the second part of the *Bang-i-Dara*, which were composed during Iqbal's stay in Europe, belong to the transitional period between the first and the second phase of his thought: the first portion of this part still reflects the first phase while the second portion presages the second period.

Second, the Pan-Islamist phase, which started sometime during his sojourn in Europe and ended in April 1926, when he successfully contested for the membership of the Punjab Legislative Council and, having faced the realities of the political life, could no longer remain a romantic visionary. The whole of the third part of the *Bang-i-Dara* (1924), the *Asrar-i-Khudi* (1914), the *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi* (1908), the *Payam-i-Mashriq* (1922), and his Urdu and English letters, speeches and statements of the period 1908 to 1926, represent the second phase of his thought.

Third, and the last, which may be termed the Pakistani nationalist phase in which he synthesised his religious pre-nationalism of the second phase with the modern territorial nationalism. The most mature and the last phase of the development of Iqbal's genius was also his most productive one. Most of the works of this period are discussed here.

In the first anthology of his Urdu poems, *Bang-i-Dara*, Iqbal had divided his Urdu poetry in three parts: *one*, from the beginning to the year 1905; *two*, from 1905 to 1908; and, *three*, from 1908 onwards. This was a correct chronological delineation of the growth of his poetical genius up to the year 1924, when the *Bang-i-Dara* was first published. But for the critics of Iqbal time seems to have come to a stop in September 1924: the three phases of Iqbal's poetry as defined above is taken by them as final and they fail to appreciate that the last, most productive and maturest phase of his work started after that date. This anachronism has inevitably led to much confusion, the blame for which is laid at the doors of the poet's Muse by his Western critics like Gibb, Smith, and—the latest in the field—Gordon-Polonskaya. His Pakistani admirers, on the other hand, revel in this confusion, for it provides them ample opportunities for their own tendentiously selective reading and paraphrasing of the Poet. We believe that for a correct and judicious appraisal of Iqbal's thought a sound historical analysis of his works based on a firm chronology is the first prerequisite.

Iqbal's dynamic genius also provided different religious philosophical frameworks for the political ideas of each of the three phases of

his thought. It may also be—perhaps, more validly—argued that the three stages in the development of his religious philosophy led inevitably to those different political attitudes. However, during the period when he preached the political ideology of Pan-Indian territorial nationalism he upheld the *traditional* concept of *wahdat al-wujud* ("Unity of Existence"), but when he repudiated this political standpoint he at the same time rejected Ibn 'Arabi and his sufi doctrine of the Unity of Existence. But in the last phase when he assimilated the political concept of territorial nationalism with Islam, the same process manifested itself in the *modified* form of the Unity of Existence, viz. that of Rumi.²¹

The long passage of his historic Presidential Address which we quoted above shows the subtle way in which the transition from Pan-Islamism to Pakistani Nationalism took place in Iqbal's thinking and the role that contemporary trends in Muslim countries, especially those in Iran and Turkey, played in this process. However, the dialectics of South Asian politics sometime led also to its antithesis especially when the Pakistani nationalist movement faced fierce opposition at the hands of Indian nationalist and Hindu pre-nationalist forces.

Iqbal was himself very conscious of this conflict. Presiding over the Second Session of the All-Parties Muslim Conference held at Lahore in March 1932, he stated :

"To reveal an ideal freed from its temporal limitations is one function; to show the way how ideals can be transformed into living actualities is quite another. If a man is temperamentally fit for the former function his task is comparatively easy, for it involves clean jump over temporal limitations which waylay the practical politician at every step. The man who has got the courage to migrate from the former to the latter function has constantly to take stock of, and often yield to, the force of those very limitations which he has been in the habit of ignoring. Such a man has the misfortune of living in the midst of perpetual mental conflict and can be easily accused of self-contradiction."²²

Iqbal's perceptive genius must be fully aware of the fact that some of the observations made by him at this Conference might not appear

21. This fundamental problem of the study of Iqbal was briefly discussed by this author in his above-mentioned Urdu monograph on *Pakistani Qawmiyat*, pp. 151-77. There is also, in that monograph, a critique of Iqbal's doctrine of *Hijrah* as propounded by him in his poetical writings of the second phase, and which he himself repudiated early in his last phase. See *Zubur-i-'Ajam* (1927) (*Kulliyat-i-Iqbal: Farsi*, p. 487).

22. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 196.

compatible with the fundamental propositions made by him two years back at the epoch-making Twenty-First Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad. But "the time was out of joint"; the long-drawn-out peace parleys between political leaders of the Hindu and Muslim communities had broken down; the Hindu leaders of the Congress, in spite of their loud protestations of having the monopoly of nationalist convictions, preferred to look forward to favours from the British Labour Prime Minister to the making of peace with their Muslim compatriots; and the Communal Award of His Britannic Majesty was eagerly awaited not only by the "communalists" but also by the so-called nationalists of "British India".

The two seemingly conflicting, but really complementary, facets of the last stage of the development of Iqbal's thoughts on nationalism appear to be portrayed in the two short poems of the last collection of his verses, which was posthumously published. On the one hand, in a quatrain he exhorts his *millat* (nation) to follow in the footsteps of the Turkish and Egyptian nationalists and says:

بہ ترکان بستہ در ہا را کشادند بنائے مصریاں محکم نہادند
تو ہم دستے بہ دامن خودی زن کہے او ملک و دیں کس را نہ دادند²³

[Unto the Turks the closed doors were opened ;
The Egyptians got their national foundations strengthened ;
You, too, grasp the skirt of your identity ;
For, a nation without its identity possesses neither Faith nor Fatherland.]

But, at the same time, he enters into a bitter controversy with Mawlana Husayn Ahmad Madani, who headed the premier *madrasah* of the South Asian subcontinent located at Deoband, and opposed the Pakistani movement for national self-determination on the supposedly nationalistic ground.²⁴ Iqbal poetically summed up this polemic in a short satirical poem entitled "Husayn Ahmad," which had been put towards the end of the *Armaghan-i-Hijaz* by its compilers. It reads as follows:

23. *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal : Farsi*, compiled by Dr Javid Iqbal (henceforth, *Kulliyat : Farsi*), p. 950. Iqbal's Persian and Urdu anthologies have been collected in two handy volumes by his son, Dr Javid Iqbal ; all references to his poetical works in this essay are to these volumes.

24. Z.H. Faruqi's well-documented monograph, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, has only partly—and rather partially—succeeded in unravelling the complexities and anomalies of South Asian politics and their impact on the Muslim divines (*'ulama*).

عجم هنوز نداند رموز دین ورنہ
 ز دیوبند حسین احمدؒ این چہ بوالعجبی است
 سرود بر سر منبر کہ ملت از وطن است
 چہ بے خبر ز مقامِ مجددؐ عربی است
 بمصطفیٰؐ برساں خویش را کہ دین ہماہ اوست
 اگر بہ او نرسیدی تمام بولہبی است²⁵

[The 'Ajam has not yet mastered the secrets of the Faith, otherwise
 We would not have seen the strange spectacle of (the *madrakah* of) Deoband
 producing a Husayn Ahmad.
 He sermonised from the top of the pulpit that it is the territory that makes a
 nation;
 How ignorant he is of the standpoint of Muhammad of Arabia!
 You must reach out to Muhammad, the Chosen One, for he personifies
 the Religion;
 If you do not reach out to him, you follow the Father of the Flame]

There was no contradiction in Iqbal's own thought, but certainly there was much confusion in the political situation of South Asia on the eve of the promulgation of the Government of India Act, 1935, on account of the conflicting aims and ambitions of the contending parties. In his famous Allahabad Presidential Address which contains the leitmotiv of the last phase of his political thought he unequivocally based his demand for the formation of "autonomous States" on the universally accepted postulates of nationhood, that is, "the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests".²⁶ His viewpoint on the question of nationhood was thus radically different from that of the "Iqbalist" theo-bureaucrats and their publicists. In the same history-making address he re-affirmed his essentially non-communal, secular and nationalist approach towards the vital question of the electorates when he declared:

"The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates if provinces are demarcated so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity."²⁷

25. *Kulliyat: Urdu*, p. 691. This controversial quatrain which is in Persian appears to be inadvertently misplaced in the collection of Urdu poetical works.

'Ajam=the non-Arab world. In Iqbal's poetry it signified the foreign accretions to the tenets and practices of pristine Islam.

Abu Lahab="the Father of the Flame," the title of 'Utbah 'Abd al-'Uzza, a step-brother of the Blessed Prophet's father, and a bitter enemy of Islam.

26. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 173.

27. Ibid., pp. 174-75.

In the controversy that he had with Jawaharlal Nehru during the years 1934-36 on the Ahmadiyah question, he again elucidated what he considered to be "the attitude of Islam towards nationalist ideals". "Nationalism," he stated, "in the sense of love of one's country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of the Muslim's faith." He further explained:

"In Turkey, Iran, Egypt and other Muslim countries it will never become a problem. In these countries Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority and their minorities, i.e., Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, according to the law of Islam, are either 'People of the Book' or 'like the People of the Book' with whom the law of Islam allows free social relations including matrimonial alliances. It becomes a problem for Muslims only in countries where they happen to be in a minority, and nationalism demands their complete self-effacement. In majority countries Islam accommodates nationalism; for there Islam and nationalism are practically identical; in minority countries it is justified in seeking self-determination as a cultural unit. In either case, it is thoroughly consistent with itself."²⁸

Commenting on the above-quoted passage of his father's writings, Justice Dr Javid Iqbal made the following judicious remarks:

"If Iqbal had lived to see the establishment of Pakistan (the realisation in a concrete form of his abstract and nebulous political ideal) it is certain that he would have developed into yet another phase, and laid the foundations of what may be termed 'Pakistani nationalism'. But he died at a stage when Indian Islam was still struggling to gain independence from the British and, at the same time, emancipation from the Hindus. Those were the times when supporting the cause of territorial nationalism or patriotism in the Indian subcontinent meant the submergence of the Muslims into the majority community and their extinction as a distinct political entity. Iqbal, therefore, took pains in providing a religio-philosophical justification for the rejection of territorial nationalism and patriotism, although he approved of the growth of territorial nationalism and patriotism in the countries of the Middle East."²⁹

With all deference to the illustrious son of the 'Allamah, we would like to submit that by December 1928 when Iqbal delivered his lecture on "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam" at Madras he had definitely forsaken the pan-Islamist views of the second phase of his thought as is evident from the passages of that lecture that we

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 287-88.

29. Dr. Javid Iqbal, Ed., *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. xxi-xxii.

have quoted in this essay elsewhere.³⁰ Two years later when he presided over the Twenty-First Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad, the Pakistani phase of his thought had reached its culminating point. Now he not only "approved of the growth of territorial nationalism and patriotism in the countries of the Middle East" as claimed by Dr Javid Iqbal, but also pleaded for the creation of autonomous States in the South Asian subcontinent based on the universally accepted ingredients of nationhood for, he argued that, such a measure would deepen "the patriotic feeling" of the Indian Muslims.³¹ It is remarkable that at a time when the ascendancy of the revanchist Hindu Nationalism and the introduction of religion into politics by Mahatma Gandhi³² had paved the way for the religious problem to monopolise the political scene of the subcontinent, the 'Allamah was not at all oblivious of the socio-economic and geo-historical *raison d'être* of the liberation of Pakistan. In the Pakistan Address to which we are repeatedly referring he made it clear that

"Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim States will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such States."³³

He further emphasised, as we have partly quoted earlier, that

"in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous States based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India."³⁴

In the same Address he had earlier argued that

"India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia."³⁵

30. See *infra*, p. 62 and note 66.

31. See *supra*, p. 46 and note 17.

32. There are very respected Pakistani historians who propound the thesis of Muslim separatism in India and Dr Abdul Hamid is one of them; his scholarly work under this very title was published in 1967 by the Oxford University Press. But there is another side of the picture as well which was presented by the Quaid-i-Azam in the Presidential Address that he delivered at the Delhi, April 1943, Session of the Muslim League; *vide*, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, I, 495-505.

33. S.A. Vahid, Ed., *op. cit.*, p. 172.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

To illustrate how the broader geo-historical, cultural and economic, and not the narrow "communal," considerations dominated Iqbal's mind, we would like to quote extensively from that portion of his Pakistan Address in which he put forward the case for the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency. He stated:

"I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilization the Royal Commissioners find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Mas'udi noticed this kinship long ago when he said: 'Sind is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam.' The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt: 'Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia.' With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back towards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis of India, I think it unwise to keep her attached to a presidency which, though friendly today, is likely to become a rival at no distant period."³⁶

In his *magnum opus* which was dedicated to the child who grew up into Justice Dr Javid Iqbal and was composed soon after the Pakistan Address he welded the two complementary political forces of the present-day Muslim world, i.e. Islamic universalism and territorial nationalism, not in the context of the Middle East but in that of the South Asian subcontinent. To project his ideals of Islamic universalism he chose to depict an impressionistic—and not at all a historically factual and photographic—portrait of Jamal al-Din Afghani. It was a happy choice of Iqbal, for, as we have shown in the first part of this essay, Afghani's movement for Muslim solidarity was entirely based on forceful nationalistic impulses. It is significant that Iqbal has put in Afghani's mouth such sentiments as

لردِ مغرب آن سراپا مکر و فن اہل دین را داد تعلیم و وطن
او بفکرِ مرکز و تو در نفاق بگزر از شام و فلسطین و عراق³⁷

36. Ibid., p. 186.

37. *Kulliyat: Farsi*, p. 650; Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad, Tr., *Pilgrimage of Eternity, Versified English Translation of Iqbal's Javid Namah* (henceforth *Pilgrimage*), pp. 50-51.

[The Western lords, in their deceit, have taught
The cult of nation-worship, have thus lured
The faithful from their creed. A centre they
Themselves do seek, while riven ye remain :
Pray now bypass this Syria, Palestine, Iraq.]

The above lines seem to demonstrate that Iqbal was against those parochial, provincialist movements which served the interests of "the Western lords" and weakened the anti-Imperialist forces, as the particularist nationalism of "Syria, Palestine and Iraq" has been a great hindrance in the march of the resurgent Arab nationalism. It is also significant that Iqbal had foreseen that trend of Europeanism which culminated in the formation of the European Economic Community based on the Gaullist ideal of the preservation of national sovereignty and he wanted the Muslim national States to emulate it and defeat the machinations of "the deceitful Western lords" (اردی مغرب آن سراپا مکر و فن) by their own weapons. While establishing the larger framework of Islamic universalism, Iqbal's Muse transcends all earthly bounds, for

"The word of God doth not depend on time
Or place or nations; no, it far transcends
The words of even those who utter it.
It is above, apart; it needs no land,
No Rum or Syria, for its home."³⁸

ذکر حق از امتان آمد غنی از زمان و از مکان آمد غنی
ذکر حق از ذکرِ هر ذاکر جدا است احتیاجِ روم و شام او را کجاست

But Iqbal's Muse was not like the skylark of Shelley, a "scorner of the ground," but was "the daring warbler" of whom Wordsworth sang:

"While the wings aspire, are heart and eye
Both with thy nest upon the dewy ground
The nest which thou canst drop into at will,
Those quivering wings composed, that music still!"

Coming back to its "nest" Iqbal's skylark passes through the "firmament of Saturn" where were "the condemned spirits of those who were treacherous to their nation and whom Hell refused to accept."

". . . Of them
There are two evil ones who for their flesh
All stifled a nation's soul. They are a shame

38. *Pilgrimage*, p. 75; *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 680.

To fatherland, to faith, to all mankind,
From Deccan Sadiq, Ja'far from Bengal!"³⁹

اندرونِ او . دو طاغوتِ کهن روحِ قومے گشته از بهرِ دو تن
جعفر از بنگال و صادق از دکن ننگِ آدم ، ننگِ دین ، ننگِ وطن

Iqbal here introduces us to "the Spirit of India," "a noble hourie"
"Eternity beamed from her brow, her eyes
Did sparkle with the wine of endless bliss."⁴⁰

در جبینش نار و نورِ لا یزال در دو چشمِ او سرورِ لا یزال

"The Wail of the Soul of India"⁴¹ reminds us of the "Plaint of Pain" and "Portrait of Pain") of the first phase of Iqbal's thought.⁴² "Beyond the firmaments" we meet Ghani, the minstrel of Kashmir. Here the patriotic soul of Iqbal soars high above the petty politics of the Hindu and the Muslim "Nationalisms". He sings in praise of the Nehru family—the father and the son:

بند را این ذوقِ آزادی که داد؟ صید را سودائے صیادی که داد؟
آن برهمن زادگانِ زنده دل! لاله! احمر ز روئے شان خجل!
تیز بین و پخته کار و سخت کوش از نگاهِ شان قرنگ اندر خروش
اصل شان از خاک دامن گیرِ ماست مطلع این اختران کشمیر ماست⁴³

[Who gave to Ind desire of liberty?
Who taught the prey to hunt? They were those sons
Of Brahmins, with alive and vibrant hearts,
Whose faces put the tulip and the rose
To shame. Mature at work and diligent
And keen of eye, their very glance commoves
The West. Their origin is this our soil,
Our catching earth; in Kashmir's sky, these stars
Arose.]

What a tragic irony it is that the selfsame Nehru family is denying Kashmir's yearning for liberty! But the true understanding of Iqbal's message will one day—and sooner rather than later—remove the cruel anomalies of the recent politics of "this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people."⁴⁴ We can hear voices

39. *Pilgrimage*, pp. 131-32; *Kulliyat : Farsi*, pp. 729-30.

40. *Pilgrimage*, p. 133; *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 731.

41. *Kulliyat : Farsi*, pp. 732-35; *Pilgrimage*, pp. 133-37.

42. *Kulliyat : Urdu*, pp. 42 and 68-76.

43. *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 753; *Pilgrimage*, p. 154.

44. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 168.

coming from the future—and not a distant future, *In-sha' Allah*:

“... Shouldst thou think that our dust contains
Not e'en a single spark, inside thyself
Look thou awhile. Whence all this fire thou hast?
Whence came this breath of spring? 'Tis from the wind
That lends our hills their fragrance and their hue.”⁴⁵

خاکِ ما را بے شرر دانی اگر بر درونِ خود یکے بکشا نظر
این همه سوزے کہ داری از کجاست؟ این دمِ بادِ بہاری از کجاست؟
این ہماں باد است کز تاثیرِ او کوہسارِ ما بگیرد رنگ و بوا

Iqbal once again gives vent to his intense patriotic fervour when he meets “the martyred king,” Sultan Tipu:

باز گو از ہند و از ہندوستان آن کہ با کاش نیرزد بوستان
آن کہ اندر مسجدش ہنگامہ سرد آن کہ اندر دیر او آتش قسرد
آن کہ دل از بہرِ او خون کردہ ایم آن کہ یادش را بجاں پروردہ ایم
از غمِ ما کن غمِ او را قیاس آہ ازاں معشوق عاشق ناشناس⁴⁶

[Tell me of India, with whose blades of grass
E'en gardens cannot match. Tell me of her,
Dead is the passion in whose mosques and quenched
Whose temples' fire. I gave my blood for her,
I nursed her image in my memory,
From my grief canst thou guess her grief; alas!
For the beloved who forgot her love.]

In the answer that is given to “the martyred king” by “Living Stream” (زندہ رود)—an apt epithet for the poet himself—there is a large-hearted recognition of the liberating role of the Civil Disobedience Movement launched by the Congress:

ہندیاں منکر ز قانونِ فرنگ در نگیرد سحر و افسونِ فرنگ
روح را بارِ گراں آئینِ غیر گرچہ آید ز آماں آئینِ غیر⁴⁷

[The people of this land defy the law
The West has giv'n to them; they spurn its charms.
A burden on the soul is alien law
A sorrow e'en though it be heaven-sent.]

But almost at the same moment the politician in Iqbal was reacting strongly *against* the very same Civil Disobedience Movement. In his

45. *Pilgrimage*, p. 154; *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 753.

46. *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 768; *Pilgrimage*, p. 170.

47. *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 769; *Pilgrimage*, p. 170.

Presidential Address to the Second Session of the All-Parties Muslim Conference held at Lahore on 21 March 1932, to which we have already referred above, he stated :

“The Congress leaders fear that the British Government in their provisional settlement of the communal problem may concede to the minorities what they demand. They have, therefore, started the present campaign to bolster up a claim which has no foundation in fact, to defeat a pact which, they fear, may find a place in the coming constitution, and to force Government to settle the matter of minorities with the Congress alone. The Congress resolution in pursuance of which the civil disobedience campaign was launched made it perfectly clear that since Government had refused to regard Mahatma Gandhi as the sole representative of the country, the Congress decided on civil disobedience. How can then a minority join a campaign which is directed as much against itself as against the Government?”⁴⁸

Truly it is dangerous to be honest to one's convictions and at the same time to the dialectics of historical forces ! But Iqbal was a brave man. He, with the disarming candour that was one of the most prominent characteristics of his character, confessed “the misfortune of living in the midst of perpetual mental conflict.”⁴⁹ In *Javid Namah* the “Living Stream” took the longer historical view that the Civil Disobedience Movement of the Congress was an anti-Imperialist move and was, therefore, bound to hasten Pakistan's liberation despite the Congress leaders' own narrow communalist motivation. But in his Presidential Address Iqbal had to take the immediate political view and condemn Congress communalism.

Symbolic of Iqbal's journey from Pan-Islamism to Pakistani Nationalism is the replacement of Aurangzib by his arch-enemy, the poet-warrior-patriot Khushhal Khan Khattak, in the niche of the poet's heroes. The “Living Stream” of *Javid Namah* sings:

خوش سرود آن شاعرِ افغان شناس آن کہ بیند باز گوید بے ہراس
 آن حکیمِ ملتِ افغانیاں آن طبیبِ علمتِ افغانیاں
 راز قومے دید و بے باکانہ گفت حرفِ حق با شوخی رندانه گفت⁵⁰

[. . . The poet who the Afghans knew,
 Who uttered fearlessly what he beheld,
 The wise man of the Afghan nation,
 Their doctor who could physic all their ills,
 He saw a people's secret, ventured forth
 To tell the hidden truth in dauntless words.]

48. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., pp. 203-04.

49. Ibid., 196.

50. *Kulliyat : Parsi*, p. 765 ; *Pilgrimage*, p. 166.

Iqbal found in Khushhal Khan a kindred soul and fell in love with him. Quite early in the third—and the last—phase of his thought, in May 1928, he wrote an article on “Khushhal Khan Khattack (The Afghan Warrior-Poet)” for the *Islamic Culture* of Hyderabad-Deccan, in which he *inter alia* stated:

“His was a versatile mind and he wrote on various subjects, such as poetry, philosophy, ethics, medicine and his own autobiography which is unfortunately lost. Throughout his poetry, the major portion of which was written in India, and during his struggles with the Mughals, breathes the spirit of early Arabian poetry. We find in it the same love of freedom and war, the same criticism of life.”⁵¹

Among the specimens that Iqbal gives of Khushhal's poetry to show his “passionate patriotism, his aspirations, and the keenness of his observation of man” are included the following lines—albeit apologetically:

“Still Aurangzeb's malevolence hath not a whit diminished
Though the curse of his father it before drew down.
For this reason, also, no one can place dependence on him;
He is malignant and perfidious; a breaker of his word.”⁵²

Certainly it is a far cry from the Pan-Islamist phase of *Rumuz-i-Bekhuri* (1918) when Iqbal sang an eulogy of “*Shahanshah* Alamgir, May Allah's mercy be upon him,” for he was

درمیانِ کارزارِ کفر و دین ترکشِ ما را خدنگِ آخرین⁵³

[He the last arrow in our quiver left
In the affray of Faith with unbelief.]

Iqbal's admiration for Khushhal's “passionate patriotism” remained undiminished throughout his Pakistani nationalist phase. In the *Bal-i-Jibril* (1935) we find a short and sadly sweet poem “The Last Will of Khushhal Khan” (خوشحال خان کی وصیت) in which Iqbal sang of the Warrior-Poet's testament that he must be buried in that “hallowed spot which was not polluted by the dust raised by the hoofs of the horses of the Mughul hordes.”⁵⁴ In the *Darb-i-Kalim* (1936) Khushhal gets a unique place in the heroes' gallery built by Iqbal: he is etherealised as *Mihrab Gul Afghan*. The ideas and impressions that Iqbal

51. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 129.

52. Ibid., p. 130. Cf. an incisive study of “Khushhal Khan and Aurangzeb” in Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, pp. 221-46.

53. *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 98; Arthur J. Arberry, *The Mysteries of Selflessness*, p. 17.

54. *Kulliyat : Urdu*, p. 446.

received through a deep study of the selections of Khushhal's poems literally translated by Raverty into English were rendered by him in that beautiful collection of poems which are entitled محراب گل افغان کے افکار ("Thoughts of Mihrab Gul Afghan").⁵⁵

Iqbal's own patriotic passion continued to express itself throughout the last phase of his thought in such outpourings as اشکے چند اشکے بر افتراق ہندیاں ("A Few Tears on the Dissensions of the Indians") in *Pas Chi Bayad Kard* (1936)⁵⁶ and شعاع امید ("A Ray of Hope") in *Darb-i-Kalim* (1936),⁵⁷ till he himself felt that he was relapsing into the old days of his Pan-Indian Nationalism when he vainly tried to build "a new Temple".⁵⁸ In a quatrain included in the posthumously published anthology of his last poems, *Armaghan-i-Hijaz*, he sings in "The Presence of God, the Truth" (بہ حضور حق):

چہ گویم قصہٴ دین و وطن را کہ نتوان فاش گفتن این سخن را
مریخ از من کہ از بے مہری تو بنا کردم بہاں دیر کہن را⁵⁹

[How may I say to Thee the story of Faith versus Fatherland?
For I cannot speak out the bare truth about this episode.
Don't Thou be angry with me, if because of Thy indifference to me
I built up the same old Temple.]

How pathetic is the pain that the poet felt over his mental conflict! He was tortured by the dilemma faced by the Muslims in the subcontinent. The solution that he proposed seemed very remote at that time. Pan-Indian nationalism which he had very rightly rejected at the time when he entered the Pan-Islamist phase was not the answer to the call of the country which every conscientious human being receives in his lifetime. But, maybe, he had to live with it till his dream of "the creation of autonomous states based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests"—my repetition may please be condoned—was fulfilled. He placed his acute problem before his spiritual mentor, the *Pir* of Ruma, and the answer that he received is as follows:

قلب پہلو می زند با زر بشب انتظار روز می دارد ذہب⁶⁰

[In the darkness of night the base coins and the golden ones get mixed up;
Let the day dawn for the glittering gold!]

He was sure that the Dawn will come and

55. Ibid., pp. 164-80.

56. *Kulliyat : Farsi*, pp. 829-30.

57. *Kulliyat : Urdu*, pp. 569-71.

58. Ibid., p. 88; V.G. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal*, p. 8 ("A New Altar").

59. *Kulliyat : Farsi*, p. 892.

60. *Kulliyat : Urdu*, p. 428.

کریں گے اہلِ نظر تازہ بستیاں آباد مری نگاہ نہیں سوئے کوفہ و بغداد⁶¹

[The people-with-vision will build a new Homeland ;
I do not look up to the Kufah and Baghdad of yester-years !]

The Day of Deliverance dawned, but its herald had then left for his Eternal Home.

A new Homeland was built, but it is still waiting for its "people-with-vision" (اہلِ نظر) to make it prosper. They are still looking towards "the Kufah and Baghdad" of yester-years, oblivious of their own Karachi and Islamabad.

"National, i.e. territorial, lines" of Iqbal's thinking in the final phase of his political philosophy are also evident in the stand that he took *vis-a-vis* Pan Islamism.

In September 1931, on the eve of his departure for London to attend the Second Round Table Conference, Iqbal gave an interview to *The Bombay Chronicle* in which he was asked to propound his views on what the questioner termed as "Pan-Islamism". Iqbal, in the first instance, deprecated the use of this term as according to him it "was invented after the fashion of the expression 'Yellow Peril,' in order to justify European aggression in Islamic countries."⁶² Then, supporting Afghani's movement for Muslim solidarity he explained that Afghani's was "purely a defensive measure" and that "he actually advised Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey to unite against the aggression of Europe". Iqbal concluded his views on the subject by declaring that :

"Islam does not recognize caste or race or colour. In fact Islam is the only outlook on life which has already solved the colour question, at least in the Muslim world, a question which modern European civilization, with all its achievements in science and philosophy, has not been able to solve. Pan-Islamism, thus interpreted, was taught by the Prophet and will live for ever. In this sense Pan-Islamism is only Pan-Humanism. In this sense every Muslim is a Pan-Islamist and ought to be so."⁶³

Two years after this interview Sir Fazl-i-Husain made certain observations regarding the so-called Pan-Islamic movement on which Iqbal issued the following press statement :

"Sir Fazl-i-Husain is perfectly correct when he says that political Pan-Islamism never existed. It has existed, if at all, only in the imagination of those who invented the phrase or possibly as a diplomatic weapon in the hands of Sultan Abdul Hamid Khan of Turkey.

61. Ibid., p. 362.

62. B.A. Dar, Ed., op. cit., p. 55.

63. Ibid., p. 56.

Even Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, whose name is closely associated with what is called Pan-Islamic movement, never dreamed of a unification of Muslims into a political State.

"It is significant that in no Islamic language—Arabic, Persian or Turkish does there exist a phrase corresponding to Pan-Islamism."⁶⁴

Further elaborating this theme he advised the Indian Muslims that they "should sink in their own deeper self like other Muslim nations of Asia, in order to gather up their scattered sources of life and, according to Sir Fazl's advice, stand on their own legs".⁶⁵

"Every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self" was a favourite topic of Iqbal in the third and last phase of his thought, viz. of Pakistani Nationalism. He has expounded it philosophically in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, as follows:

" . . . For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity of free independent units where racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration."⁶⁶

But Allah is not the god of a Chosen *Ummah*. He is the Lord of the worlds (رب العالمين). His Blessed Messenger is Mercy for the worlds (رحمة للعالمين). His Book is the guidance for the worlds (هدى للعالمين). Islamic universalism must, therefore, be a prelude to what Iqbal so happily phrased "Pan-Humanism". Conversely, the "noble ideal" in the words of Iqbal's Pakistan Address of 1930 must be "a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them".⁶⁷

In short, Iqbal's political philosophy with all its complexities, phases of development and shifts of emphasis can be described by three concentric circles: *first*, the circle of territorial nationalism; *second*, that of Muslim unity; and, *third*, the one encompassing the whole of oppressed humanity. In the message for the New Year's Day of 1928 that he gave to the All-India Radio from his death-bed, he pleaded for "the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality,

64. A.R. Tariq, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, pp. 207-08.

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Reconstruction*, p. 159.

67. S.A. Vahid, Ed., *op. cit.*, p. 170.

colour or language". There is a cry of anguish in his broadcast message for the suffering humanity of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), China, Palestine and Spain. He lamented :

" . . . Engines of destruction created by science are wiping out the great landmarks of man's cultural achievements. The governments which are not themselves engaged in this drama of fire and blood are sucking the blood of the weaker peoples economically. It is as if the day of doom had come upon the earth, in which each looks after the safety of his own skin, and in which no voice of human sympathy or fellowship is audible.

"The world's thinkers are stricken dumb. Is this going to be the end of all the progress and evolution of civilization, they ask, that men should destroy one another in mutual hatred and make human habitation impossible on this earth? Remember, man can be maintained on this earth only by honouring mankind, and this world will remain a battle-ground of ferocious beasts of prey unless and until the educational forces of the whole world are directed to inculcating in man respect for mankind."⁶⁸

حرفِ بد را بر لب آوردن خطاست کافر و مومن همه خلقِ خداست
آدمیتِ احدی را تـرامـ آدمی با خـپـر شو از مقامِ آدمی⁶⁹

[It is evil to speak ill of others,
For Muslims and non-Muslims all are the creatures of God ;
To be human is to have respect for all mankind :
So, be thou aware of the station of Man !]

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Mohammed Maruf

IQBAL ON DEMOCRACY

Iqbal was basically a democrat. He was not only a theoretical politician, but he also practically participated in the politics of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. In 1926, he stood for election and was chosen to the Punjab Legislative Council. As Dr L.S. May writes, Iqbal was "an active member of this Council, speaking often on land revenue and taxation, demanding greater justice in land assessment and even land revenue deductions in hardship cases."¹ In his speech of 10 March 1927, he pleaded the case for compulsory primary education,² and in his speech of 5 May 1927 on the 1927-28 Budget he advocated for better sanitation conditions in villages as well as for medical aid to India's women.³ He started his political career as a member of the National Liberal League but later on joined the All-India Muslim League. When the Muslim League was split in 1928, Iqbal became Secretary of the Shafī' branch, from which position he later resigned. Iqbal was actively involved in the political broiling of the subcontinent and, in many important respects, he rather moulded the destiny of Muslim India which was later to become Pakistan. Thus, Iqbal lived a full political life as a democrat. In *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, he ushers in the democratic era in these strong words :

سلطانی جمہور کا آتا ہے زمانہ
جو نقش کہن تم کو نظر آئے مٹا دو⁴

and links it, somehow, with the destiny of the teeming millions of India. He is opposed to all forms of feudal lordism, kingship,

1. Dr L.S. May, *Iqbal : His Life and Times*, p. 169.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. P. 110

despotism, etc., and pleads that the people should be the captains of their own destinies.

To Iqbal, the form of government is a very important determining factor of human destiny and life. He disagrees with Alexander Pope who held: "Let fools fight for the forms of government," and says, "To my mind government, whatever its form, is one of the determining forces of a people's character. Loss of political power is equally ruinous to a nation's character."⁵ History bears out his opinion because we find that people under dictatorial or despotic rules are generally submissive and meekish. Again, one of the reasons for the moral deprivation of Muslims was their loss of power in the subcontinent. Iqbal endorses the democratic system on the ground that it gives the individual a maximum of freedom and a fairplay to his potentialities and capabilities. Democratic rule has its impact on scientific thought also. As Iqbal says: "The growing spirit of individualism in politics is not without its influence on contemporary scientific thought. Modern thought regards the universe a democracy of living atoms."⁶ Thus, the government determines the character as well as the thought of a people; it has its inroad into the philosophical and scientific ideas of a nation. He goes on to add that a democratic system exerts a healthier influence on the thinking and conduct of a people. But "what is democracy to Iqbal"?

Democracy is primarily a science or a methodology rather than an ideology or a philosophy, and this is how Iqbal seems to treat of it. It is a way to ensure and confirm a certain ideology through common suffrage. Iqbal subjects democracy as a methodology to searching criticism. To start with, it is a methodology and should be treated as such. But as used in the West, this methodology is quantitative. Iqbal expresses this fact in the following verse:

جمہوریت اک طرزِ حکومت ہے کہ جس میں
بندوں کو گنا کرتے ہیں تو لا نہیں کرتے⁷

5. Dr. Javid Iqbal, Ed., [Iqbal's] *Stray Reflections*, p. 14.

6. *Ibid*, p. 41.

7. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm*, p. 150.

In this method no discrimination is made on the basis of education, talent, mental calibre, and individual potentialities. It fails to differentiate between a fidel and an infidel, a Muslim and a non-believer; that is why Iqbal compares it to an unsheathed sword. He says in *Gulshan-i Rāz Jadīd* :

زمن ده اہلِ مغرب را پیامی کہ جمہور است تیغِ بے نیامی
 چہ شمشیری کہ جان ہامی ستاند تمیزِ مسلم و کافر نداند
 نہ ماند در غلافِ خود زمانی برد جان خود و جانِ جہانی⁸

It overlooks the important individual differences which modern psychology accentuates. A quantitative democratic system is prone to ignore these very important differences. The basic principle of this democracy is the utilitarian rule of justice: "Everyone to count for one, and nobody for more than one"⁹ —the absolute principle of justice which is hardly just. Iqbal refers to the same quantitative approach to democracy when he says :

گریز از طورِ جمہوری غلامِ پختہ کاری شو
 کہ از مغزِ دو صد خر فکرِ انسانی نمی آید¹⁰

Here Iqbal beautifully brings home the implicit fallacy of composition ingrained in the quantitative approach and urges that thinking of two hundred asses will not make one human brain. It was this argument which disillusioned Iqbal with the Western concept of democracy.

Again, democracy being a methodology, it will endorse any ideology which gets a common suffrage, irrespective of its moral import or its worth as an ideology. It is a method, as said before, and can be used to introduce or perpetuate any ideology for which it is being used. This method is responsible for a motley variety of governments in the world, right from kingship and dictatorship to people's government; it perpetuates capitalism

8. Pp. 167-68.

9. The utilitarian principle of justice or Equity as enunciated by H. Sidgwick.

10. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 135.

with as much force and justification in one country as socialism in another. Where it is fostering kingship in Britain and a presidential form of government in the U S A., it is endorsing dictatorship, the Russians claim. The capitalists, who have their leadership in America today, have the pretensions that only capitalism is democratic because it does not interfere with individual rights; the socialists, divided into two *blocs*, assert that socialism and democracy are indivisible.¹¹ In the name of democracy, history tells us, thousands of atrocities have been committed in the world. In the hands of infidels, this method perpetuates infidelity, and has failed to mitigate the miseries and black spots of the world. In *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, Iqbal reports the Satan as saying :

جمہور کے ابلیس ہیں اربابِ سیاست
باقی نہیں اب میری ضرورت تہِ افلاک¹²

Again, Iqbal condemns democracy which is divorced from religion or belief. The European democracy is pestered with this ill. Iqbal says :

مری نگاہ میں ہے یہ سیاستِ لادین
کنیزِ اہرمن و دونِ نہاد و مردہ ضمیر
ہوئی ہے ترکِ کلیسا سے حاکمی آزاد
فرنگیوں کی سیاست ہے دیوے بے زنجیر¹³

The European democracy is not only irreligious and faithless, it is also wrought by the capitalists for their own sinister designs. He says :

تری حریف ہے یا رب سیاستِ افرنک
مگر ہیں اس کے پجاری فقط امیر و رئیس!¹⁴

As said before, democracy can be equally efficaciously used to ensure supremacy of a ruling class or a community. In one of the

11. Article by N. Podgorny, "Socialism: Theory and Practice," June 1977.

12. P. 162.

13. *Darb-i Kalim*, pp. 152-53.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 142.

verses Iqbal reports Satan saying :

ہم نے خود شاہی کو پہنایا ہے جمہوری لباس
جب ذرا آدم ہوا ہے خود شناس و خود نگر¹⁵

Thus, democracy is also used to camouflage the same old kingship and despotism. It is subservient to the perpetuation of same old system by sugar-coating it, and democracy provides the requisite sugar-coating. When Iqbal was disillusioned at this outer garb of democracy, he was forced to reject it in so far as it retained the racial and status preferences. He says :

شریکِ حکمِ غلاموں کو کر نہیں سکتے
خریدتے ہیں فقط ان کا جوہر ادراک!¹⁶

It is sometimes not good for a community to have a democratic approach. It may be very useful to a majority, but it will always keep a minority suppressed and wretched. This is also another use of democracy. It was in view of such a situation in the subcontinent that in 1886 Sayyid Ahmad Khan urged that "if the democratic principle was introduced in India, the Muslims would find themselves completely at the mercy of the Hindu majority."¹⁷ Democracy is not advisable if it is manipulated to suppress a minority, because it is, in itself, the handmaid of majority, irrespective of their views and the moral value of those views. If the case between the early Muslims and the non-believers of Mecca were decided by a common suffrage rather than in the battlefield of Badr, Islam would have been buried there and then. Iqbal very rightly says that democracy, being a methodology, is in itself neither good nor bad; it is the use to which we put it that decides its value, and which is again relative. He says :

خیر ہے سلطانی* جمہور کا غوغا کہ شر؟
تو جہاں کے تازہ فتنوں سے نہیں ہے باخبر!¹⁸

15. *Armaghān-i Hijāz* (Urdu), p. 7.

16. *Darb-i Kalīm*, p. 139.

17. Dr L.S. May, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

18. *Armaghān-i Hijāz* (Urdu), p. 7.

It is not the rule of democracy, but the wicked designs of the present world which are pertinent, because democracy in itself is amoral like any other method. It is a sword, as Iqbal said, which knows cutting only, and not whom it cuts—a fidel or an infidel, a socialist or a capitalist, the *bourgeois* or the proletarian. But its forms in vogue, as we find in the West, are very malicious and devised to serve some sinister designs of the Western world. Again, talking of the ills of democracy in the West, Iqbal writes: "Democracy has a tendency to foster the spirit of legality. This is not in itself bad; but unfortunately it tends to displace the purely moral standpoint and to make the illegal and the wrong identical in meaning."¹⁹ This tendency we have witnessed in the West, which has become more and more legal-minded, but has left the moral standpoint far behind. Democracy is among those potent reasons which have been responsible for the gradual consignment of morality to the grave. Keeping in view all these ills of the Western democracy, Iqbal epitomises his polemic thus :

تو نے کیا دیکھا نہیں ، مغرب کا جمہوری نظام ؟
چہرہ روشن ، اندروں چنگیز سے تاریک تر !²⁰

Iqbal analyses his discussion on Western democracy in the following words : "The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich."²¹ He points out that the uses of imperial ambitions in Europe indicate that the Westerners are tired of democracy. This reaction against democracy in England and France has not only purely historical causes, but also deeper psychological causes.²²

But where to get democracy free from all these ills ? What is the proper use of this methodology ? To Iqbal, unless man has a right notion of life and is imbued with love and fraternity,

19. Javid Iqbal, Ed., op. cit., p. 120.

20. *Armaghān-i Hijāz* (Urdu), p. 8.

21. *The Reconstruction*, p. 179.

22. Pp. 121-22.

democracy cannot be but oppressive and demonic. Democracy, free of all these ills, is possible only in a society which knows no apartheid, no racial or caste discrimination, no feudal relationship between master and slave, no hatred of one against the other. Only Islam has envisaged such a polity in which Mahmud (signifying the master) and Ayāz (signifying the slave) stand in the same ranks. Dr K.A. Hakim delineates Iqbal's notion of democracy thus:

“Islam imbibes constituents of the best possible democracy and, according to Iqbal, they need to be embedded in specific institutions. It was Islam that gave the lesson of equality of rights and practised it, included the concept of a republic among its basic teachings, taught that government should be run by a Council or *mushāwarat*. An ordinary subject could summon the *Amīr al-Mū'minīn* to the court as a respondent. Islam declared the freedom of conscience; gave the concept of a welfare state, the duty whereof was not only to run administration, but also to provide for the basic needs of the people; dispelled the colour and race differences. Everybody was at liberty to choose his own avocation and way of life. Islam played the pioneer in teaching that wealth should not concentrate in a few hands.”²³

Islam at the moment is beset by narrow-mindedness and obscurantism, but

“if it is freed from this narrow-minded and obscurant approach of the mullā, if the Muslims take to developing their spiritual potentialities rather than paying heed to the superficial form, they can offer the world such a kind of democracy that the political systems of England and America will feel shy and small.”²⁴

This system will not be a quantitative approach, like counting of heads; it will be a qualitative assessment of the participants and the principle of equity ensuing upon it shall be: “Everyone according to his deserts, rather works”—in short, *Musāwāt-i Muḥammadī*.

As against the Western democracy, which I have described as quantitative in approach, the Islamic democracy delineated in

23. Dr K.A. Hakim, *Fikr-i Iqbāl*, pp. 287-88.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 288-89.

the above paragraph, I describe as "spiritual democracy" with a qualitative approach. This is possible only in a society consisting of developed egos, practising Islamic or "Muhammedan" equality. Such a society Iqbal calls the Kingdom of God on earth. In a letter to R.A. Nicholson he briefly, but clearly, describes what he means by the Kingdom of God. He writes :

"The Kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth."²⁵

Thus, "Kingdom of God" and "spiritual" democracy mean the selfsame thing, according to Iqbal. The establishment of such a democracy necessitates enforcement of the Islamic Law, which is useful only after the *Ijtihād* or necessary reorientation of that Law to the demands and requirements of the time has been effected. What is worth noting, Iqbal believes that *Ijtihād* or reorientation in law can well be effected through democratic process. In the words of Iqbal :

"The republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam."²⁶

Iqbal, in agreement with Turkey, believes that "the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly."²⁷

In his discussion of *Ijmā'*, as a source of *Ijtihād*, Iqbal recommends that, in view of the present needs, the power of *Ijtihād* can best be vested in a Muslim legislative assembly rather than in a single representative individual. He says :

"The transfer of the power of *Ijtihad* from individual representative of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form *Ijma* can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs. In this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our legal system, and give it an evolutionary out-

25. A.J. Arberry (Eng. tr.), *Javid Namah*, Intro., p. 11.

26. *The Reconstruction*, p. 157.

27. *Ibid.*

look."²⁸

He, however, suggests that

"The Ulema should form a vital part of Muslim legislative assembly helping and guiding free discussion on questions relating to law."²⁹

Iqbal concludes his chapter on "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam" (*Ijtihād*) in the following suggestion:

"Let the Muslim of to-day appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purposes of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam."³⁰

The spiritual democracy, unlike European democracies, did not emerge from any economic considerations. In 1916, Iqbal said:

"The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity; it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character."³¹

Had it grown out of the extension of economic opportunities, it would have been no less quantitative in its approach than the European democracy. The very basis for such a type of democracy was laid down by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) in his famous address of the Dhill-Hijjah (7 March 632). He said:

"The aristocracy of old time is trampled under my feet. The Arab has no superiority over the non-Arab. And a non-Arab has no superiority over the Arab. All are children of Adam, and Adam was made of the dust of the earth."³²

The fundamental basis of Islamic democracy is *Tawhīd*. As Iqbal expresses:

28. Ibid., p. 174.

29. Ibid., p. 176.

30. Ibid., p. 180.

31. Dr. R.A. Nicholson, *Secrets of the Self*, Intro., p. xxix, n.

32. Quoted in Dr. H.H. Bilgrami, *Glimpses of Iqbal's Mind and Thought*, p. 94.

“Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle [of *Tawhīd*] a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, and not to thrones.”³³

Again, Iqbal’s concept of democracy, as rightly said by Dr H.H. Bilgrami, is not limited to any particular geographical, racial or linguistic boundaries. Iqbal urges, while talking of Islam:

“As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects blood-relationship as a basis of human unity.”³⁴

And this stress on the worth of individual is the very basis of democracy.

(April 77)

33. *The Reconstruction*, p. 147.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY OF IQBAL

Dr Khawaja Amjad Saeed

Iqbal—The Anti-Imperialist. Iqbal, the great thinker of Islam, was the first economist of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to raise his voice against the exploitation of Muslims by domestic and foreign classes controlling the means of production. It was not an easy task to open one's mouth on such matters in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century against foreign imperialists who held Muslims responsible for the War of Independence (1857), and clamped censorship and other restrictions on speeches and writings. Yet Iqbal picked up courage to expose the designs of the alien rulers working under the cloak of "Imperial Liberalism" even when he was only a student at the Government College, Lahore, and used to recite his poetry in the annual gatherings of the Anjuman Himāyat-i Islām. In the beginning he composed his verses in the traditional low key but gradually he changed his tune until his thunders rocked the British Empire and finally ripped open the Imperial Crown glittering with the Koh-i Nūr snatched from the Muslim Emperors of India.

First Urdu Publication on Economics. Iqbal started his career in 1899 as a teacher of history and philosophy at the Lahore Oriental College. It was in 1903 that he wrote a book on Economics in Urdu: *'Ilm al-Iqtisād*. That was the time when the classics of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Ricardo, Alfred Marshall and Taussig were taught all over Europe. But in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent even teachers and scholars had only a hazy idea of this subject. In fact, except for three Universities, it was not yet introduced at the University level anywhere in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. But the talented poet not only studied this subject, he also familiarised it to the Urdu-knowing public.

This publication established Iqbal as the first Muslim economist of the subcontinent. In the absence of a technical

dictionary from English into Urdu it was no easy to write or translate a book on Economics. Yet credit goes to Iqbal that he, not only introduced the subject in as simple a language as possible, but also, for the first time in the history of Urdu literature, rendered economic terms and terminologies into Urdu which served as a beacon light for the next generation of writers on Economics.

Poverty Affects Human Soul. This compilation of Iqbal is remarkable also in another way. He has included thought-provoking suggestions and marginal notes at various places which bespeak of his ingenuity and inquisitive mind. He has written an introduction which, in later years, proved a landmark in the political history of the subcontinent. He underscored the relations between economic activity and human psychology and raised the question of the effect that a man would have on his body and mind if he is unable to meet both ends meet. And then he himself provided the answer saying that poverty affects human soul very deeply. "The mirror of soul is tarnished," he wrote, "and man is reduced to nonentity both morally and socially". Iqbal felt deeply at the poverty of people in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in the post-1857 war period. "Is poverty indispensable in the present-day world economic order? Is it not possible that the heart-rending bewailings of the poor in the streets of India are silenced for ever? Is it not possible that the heart-moving and pathetic scenes of poverty are effaced from the world map for ever?"

Iqbal continued his contemplation on questions he had raised in his treatise on Economics as far back as 1903, and found the answer in 1930 when he delivered his famous address at the Allahabad session of the All-India Muslim League. At that time the poverty of India and especially of Muslims had touched the rock bottom as a result of the British policy of Imperial Preferences to shift the burden of the world economic crisis (i.e. Great Depression) of 1929-30 to the colonies. India had to resort to largescale cut in public expenditure. The most to suffer were Muslim employees, labourers and business men who were already living on margin.

Economic Genesis of Pakistan Movement. Since the Muslims had been driven to this plight by the exploitative manoeuvres and discriminatory attitudes of the domestic and the foreign rulers, the only way out, Iqbal proposed in his Allahabad address, was

that the Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent should be separated from the main subcontinent. Muslims and Hindus are two separate nations and could not live together, he pointed out. An excerpt from his Allahabad Address is given below:

"I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."¹

These words of Iqbal created a flutter in the circles of vested interests, but the Muslim nation found a powerful leader in the person of Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah who made a great political issue of this reasonable proposal and, after seventeen years of relentless struggle, Pakistan was achieved. Iqbal, too, did not sit idle. He pursued the idea vigorously and continued fighting for the economic cause of Muslims till his demise in 1938. A few months before his death when negotiations were still going on between Quaid-i Azam and the British Government, he expressed his views emphatically on the subject and said that the only solution lay in the establishment of a separate homeland for Muslims. On 28 May 1937 he wrote:

"The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come."²

This realisation came to the Muslim masses through Quaid-i Azam who waged the twin battle against the Hindu bourgeois and British imperialism and, in the end, succeeded in creating Pakistan where the Muslims are free to tackle with their problems in any manner they like.

It was Iqbal who issued a clarion call for the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and it was this call which initiated the long, arduous,

1. Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Ed., *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1977), p. 10.

2. Iqbal wrote thirteen letters to Mr M.A. Jinnah (four in 1936 and Nine in 1937). The extract is from his letter dated 28 May 1937. See *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1974), p. 17.

and historic struggle for the achievement of Pakistan. His verses, speeches and letters stand testimony to the fact that it was he who first hit upon the two-nation theory which led logically to the idea of two separate homelands.

It may be observed here that Iqbal had not yet clearly proposed a separate and independent State for Muslims. In the beginning he formulated the two-nation theory and later proposed sovereign Muslim States in the Muslim majority areas as the only definite goal of the long, persistent and glorious struggle for independence. It was emphatically stated by him between May 1936 and November 1937 in his correspondence with the Quaid-i-Azam.

In his Allahabad Address Iqbal stated :

“The character of a Muslim State can be judged from what the *Times of India* pointed out sometime ago in a leader on the Indian Banking Enquiry Committee. ‘In ancient India,’ the paper points out: ‘the State framed laws regulating the rates of interest; but in Muslim times, although Islam clearly forbids the realisation of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim States imposed no restrictions on such rates’, I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its laws, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.”³

Iqbal provided a framework for an individual and for the Muslim national identity through his philosophical doctrine of *Khudi* which he expressed in his captivating poetry.

Historical Addresses of Iqbal. Iqbal delivered three speeches⁴ on Budget in the Punjab Legislative Council of those days. He also delivered a speech on the resolution regarding application of the principle of assessment of income tax to the assessment of land revenue of 23 February 1928 in the Punjab Legislative Council.

His two historical Presidential Addresses of Allahabad⁵ and

3. Sherwani, Ed., op. cit., p. 11.

4. 1927-28 Budget, 5 March 1927; 1929-30 Budget, 4 March 1929; 1930-31 Budget, 7 March 1930. For relevant Budget speeches, see *ibid.*, pp. 44-45, 59-61 and 62-65, respectively.

5. Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Session of the Muslim League at Allahabad on 29 December 1930.

Lahore⁶ are of significant importance and give the outlines of the strategy for his economic thinking.

Islamic Law Should be Further Developed in the Light of Modern Ideas. Islam is the basic ideology of Pakistan. This was clearly stated by Iqbal in his letter of 28 May 1937 to Quaid-i Azam:

“Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody.”⁷

Iqbal visualised early the enforcement of Islamic Economic System as a solution to the economic problems of Muslims. An excerpt from his above-mentioned letter is given below in this context:

“But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India.”⁸

The economic plight of Muslims prominently figured in his mind and he was desperately keen to find a solution to this problem. He attributed the following factors responsible for the poor economic conditions of Muslims: (1) Hindu money-lenders; (2) Capitalism; (3) Foreign rule.

Disagreeing with the atheistic socialism of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as a solution to the economic ills of Muslims, he firmly believed in the Islamic Economic Order as a panacea for their problems.

New International Economic Order. Iqbal was conscious of the exploitation which the rich Western nations forced upon the poor and underdeveloped Eastern countries of the world. He seems to have foreseen a new international economic order which is being hotly debated and discussed today in international forums.

Iqbal thought that the policy of capturing new colonies and markets was at the root of the sharpening antagonism among Western countries. His sense of justice was outraged by the

6. Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on 21 March 1932. See *ibid.*, pp. 26-43.

7. *Letter of Iqbal to Jinnah*, p. 18.

8. *Ibid.*

colonial system which permitted developed nations to subjugate the less developed ones. Condemnation of the exploitative nature of Western civilisation frequently appears in his poetry during this period. In 1936 he wrote :

امتے بر امتے دیگر چرد دانہ این می کارد ، آن حاصل کرد
از ضعیفان ناں ربودن حکمت است از تنِ شان جاں ربودن حکمت است
شیوہ تہذیبِ نو آدم دری است پردہٴ آدم دری سوداگری است⁹

[One nation pastures on the other,
One sows the grain which another harvests,
Philosophy teaches that bread is to be pilfered from the
hand of the weak,
And his soul rent from his body,
Extortion of one's fellowmen is the law of the new civilisation,
And it conceals itself behind the veil of commerce.]

He strongly stood as a valiant champion of the economic emancipation of Muslims as is testified by the following excerpts from one of his speeches made at Lahore :

"I am opposed to nationalism as it is understood in Europe, not because, if it is allowed to develop at India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims. I am opposed to it because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity."¹⁰

"The people of Asia are bound to rise against the acquisitive economy which the West has developed and imposed on the nations of the East. Asia cannot comprehend modern Western capitalism with its undisciplined individualism."¹¹

The following well-known verse from his poetry indicates the frame of his mind about his feelings towards the exploitative attitude of the West :

دیارِ مغرب کے رہنے والو خدا کی بستی دکان نہیں ہے
کھرا جسے تم سمجھ رہے ہو وہ اب زرِ کم عیار ہو گا¹²

[O, Residents of the West ! God's earth is not a shop ;
The gold you think to be genuine will now prove to be debased.]

9. *Pas Chih Bāyad Kard Ay Aquām-i Sharq* / *Kulliyāt*, p. 30/826.

10. Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Session of All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore on 21 March 1932. See Sherwani, Ed., op. cit., p. 28.

11. Ibid., p. 39.

12. *Bāng-i Darā* / *Kulliyāt*, p. 141.

Austerity. Developing countries are all caught up in the crisis of underdevelopment in the face of vast unlimited resources and in the face of steadily rising curve of needs and ambitions. Caught in this paradox, one important strategy for them is to adopt austerity as a guiding inflexible rule to allow resources to go into economic construction. Iqbal was a great champion of this cause and recommended it time and again. Examine the following statement :

“[My] Father was not very fond of European clothes. He always advised me to wear our national dress. Similarly he disapproved of expensive material for clothes, and rebuked me if I spent money unnecessarily.”¹³

Socio-Economic Changes. Iqbal believed that socio-economic changes were necessary for the establishment of social justice. At the same time he qualified the implementation of these changes dependent on the moral perfection of man, in which Islam must have a deciding role.¹⁴

“What they call Commerce is a game of dice :
For one, profit, for millions swooping death.
Their science, philosophy, scholarship, government
Preach man's equality but drink man's blood.”¹⁵

Socio-Cultural and Economic Strategy. The five-point plan which Iqbal proposed in his Presidential Address on 21 March 1932 at Lahore is summarised below :

- (1) The Muslims should join one all-embracing political organisation with provincial and district branches all over the country.
- (2) To raise a national fund of Rs. 50 lac for setting up a Muslim political organisation.
- (3) Formulation of Youth Leagues and well-equipped volunteer corps throughout the country under the control and guidance of the central organisation.

13. Chapter 3 : “Iqbal My Father,” by Javaid Iqbal, in Hafeez Malik, Ed., *Iqbal—Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan* (Studies in Oriental Culture, Number Seven—Iqbal, New York : Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 61.

14. Chapter 5 : “Ideology of Muslim Nationalism” by L.R. Gordon Polonskaya (a prominent Soviet Ideologist), in Hafeez Malik, Ed., op. cit., p. 121.

15. V. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal* (Bombay: Longmans, 1955), pp. 42-43.

- (4) Creation of male and female cultural institutes in all the big towns of British India,
- (5) Creation of "an assembly of ulema" including also Muslim lawyers well versed in modern jurisprudence.

Iqbal Wanted Land Reforms. During Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms era, all the three Legislative Councils were dominated by the feudal class whose basic aim was to protect and promote their vested interests in the country.

Iqbal stood for the oppressed class of peasants and advocated land reforms. It will be a befitting tribute to the memory of Iqbal if we develop an equitable system of agriculture in which the cause of peasants is well looked after for ensuring social justice for the peasants and for making a major break-through in boosting agricultural production.

The memory is still fresh in our mind when "in the Nili Bar Colony the Government had decided to sell three and a quarter lakh acres of land to big land-owners. Iqbal [justifiably] proposed that half of this land should be reserved for peasants."¹⁶

Iqbal came to realise that in a just polity, land as a means of production should be owned by the society for the benefit of all. "*al-Ardu Lillāh*" ("The Earth is God's"), a poem in *Bāl-i Jibrīl* succinctly sums up the idea of ownership of land :

دہ خدایا ! یہ زمیں تیری نہیں، میری نہیں !
تیرے آبا کی نہیں، تیری نہیں، میری نہیں !¹⁷

[Landlord, this earth is not thine, is not thine
Nor yet thy fathers; no, not thine, nor mine.]

On 23 February 1928, he made a thought-provoking speech on land revenue. He maintained that the charging of land revenue on the theory of State-ownership of land was wrong in principle, and in this connection he said :

"Let me tell the honourable representatives for Simla that the first European author to refute this theory was the Frenchman Perron in the year 1777. Later in 1830 Briggs made a very extensive inquiry as to the law and practice in India and relating to the theory of State-ownership of land. He gave in his book an accurate description of the laws of Manu, of Muslim law, and the practices prevailing in the various parts of India—Bengal,

16. Syed Abdul Wahid, *Studies in Iqbal* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976), p. 263.

17. *Bāl-i Jibrīl/Kulliyāt*, p. 119/411. Eng. trans. by Kiernan, op. cit., p. 45.

Malwa, the Punjab, etc., and arrives at the conclusion that in no period in the history of India the State ever claimed the proprietorship of land. In the times of Lord Curzon, this theory was put forward, but the Taxation Committee's report which was published sometime ago has come to a very clear finding that this theory had no basis at all.

"... However, we have to see, in the first place, how far the present system of assessment is just. Workable it is and sanctioned by a very old tradition; but we have first to see whether it has justice on its side or not, My submission is that it is not at all just. The injustice of it is perfectly clear. If a man happens to be a landowner, big or small does not matter, he has to pay land revenue. But if a man earns from sources other than land less than two thousand rupees a year, you don't tax him at all. That is where injustice comes in."¹⁸

"... we do not apply the principle of progression in the case of land revenue whereas we apply that principle in the case of Incom-tax."¹⁹

"Whether a man holds two kanals of land or 200 kanals of land, he is liable to pay the revenue. In the case of income-tax the principle of ability or the principle of progression is applied—that is to say, there is a graduated scale and some people do not pay income-tax at all."²⁰

Rural Development. The development of rural areas is at the heart and crux of the economic development of a country. It does not mean merely agricultural growth, but it also calls for improving the economic and social conditions of the rural population by raising their incomes and providing them with necessary amenities like good houses, paved streets, water supply and sewerage, health services, education, roads, power, communication, etc.

On 5 March 1927, while speaking on the 1927-28 Budget in the Punjab Legislative Council, he wanted allocation of more provision "for rural sanitation as well as for medical relief for women"²¹

Excerpts from another speech are quoted below :

"Thirdly, I suggest the formation of youth leagues and well-equipped volunteer corps throughout the country under the control and guidance of the central organisation. They must specially devote themselves to social service, customs reform, commercial organisation of the community and economic propa-

18. Sherwani, Ed., op. cit., pp. 65-56.

19. Ibid., p. 45. Speech on the Budget 1927-28 delivered in the Punjab Legislative Council on 5 March 1927.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

ganda in towns and villages, specially in the Punjab where enormous indebtedness of Muslim agriculturists cannot be allowed to wait for the drastic remedies provided by agrarian upheavals. Things appear to have reached the breaking point as in China in 1925 when peasant leagues came into being in that country. The Simon Report admits that the peasant pays a 'substantial portion of his means to the State. The State, no doubt, gives him in return peace and security, trade and communication. But the net result of these blessings has been only a kind of scientific exactitude in taxation, destruction of village economy by machine-made goods and the commercialisation of crops which makes the peasant almost always fall a prey to money-lenders and commercial agents. This is a very serious matter especially in the Punjab. I want the proposed youth leagues to specialise in propaganda work in this connection, and thus to help the peasantry in escaping from its present bondage. The future of Islam in India largely depends, in my opinion, on the freedom of Muslim peasants in the Punjab. Let then the fire of youth mingle with the fire of faith in order to enhance the glow of life and to create a new world of actions for our future generations.'²²

Industrial Development. The cause of industrial development was very dear to the heart of Iqbal. He considered the development of industries essential for mitigating the curse of unemployment. On many international platforms there is a talk of indigenous technology which is being wrongly associated with Mahatma Gandhi. The historical fact is that Iqbal was the author of this concept. Examine this excerpt from his speech :

'We spend practically nothing on industry. And as I have said before and as many other speakers have pointed out, industrial development alone can save us from the curse of unemployment. There is a good future for weaving industry and for shoe-making industry in this province and if we encourage these industries, I think we shall be able to save the province from unemployment, provided we protect these industries against Cawnpore and Ahmedabad.'²³

The modern struggle, Iqbal believed, was conditioned by trade and industry. "Among the Asian Nations, the Japanese were the first to comprehend the secret of revolution. They dedicated themselves to industrialising their national economy. Today, they are recognised as one of the industrially advanced nations of the world. They had achieved this distinction because of their highly industrialised economy and not because of the contribu-

22. *Ibid.*, p. 41.23. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

tions of any national philosopher, poet or litterateur."²⁴

Manual Worker Glorified. His advice was unequivocal: Muslims must take to industry and craftsmanship. "In my eyes," declared Iqbal, "the hands of a carpenter, rough and coarse due to the constant use of the saw, are far more attractive and useful compared to the soft and delicate hands of a scholar, which never carry more than the weight of a pen."

High Cost of Administration. On 7 March 1930, discussing the Budget for 1930-31, he said:

"The problem of unemployment is becoming more and more acute every day. Trade is at a low ebb. You can easily imagine what the financial future of the province is likely to be. I am inclined to think that the present position is due not so much to stationary revenues as to the present system of administration which necessitates high salaries in the matter of which the people of this province have no say."²⁵

Inheritance Tax. Iqbal proposed inheritance tax for those who would inherit property of the value of twenty to thirty thousand rupees. He described it as "death duties". Quickly Mian Fazl-i Hussain, the Unionist chief, retorted: "Living duties would be more appropriate". Not to be outwitted by the remark, Iqbal said: "It is the living who would have to pay."

Conclusion. It is time now that we made an intensive research on the economic philosophy of Iqbal and, in the process, not only learn from his great ideas but also implement them to ensure acceleration of the pace of economic development in such a manner as to ensure prosperity of the people of Pakistan and for establishing a New National Economic Order in which social justice is not given lip-service alone but is also implemented in letter and spirit. Only then we can succeed in emancipating the cause and lot of our rural and urban poor whose interest was supreme in the great poet's mind all the time.

(October, 82)

24. Chapter 4; "The Man of Thought and the Man of Action," in Hafeez Malik, Ed., op. cit., p. 74.

25. Sherwani, Ed., op. cit., p. 64.



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| Mohammad Iqbal: Introduction to the Secret of the self. | N.I. Pragarina |
| Iqbal's Pantheism. | Robert Whittemore |
| Iqbal: A Reformer of Islamic Philosophy. | R. Haree |
| Iqbal as a Poet and Philosopher. | Edward McCarthy; |
| Satan in Iqbal's Philosophical and Poetical Works. | A. Baussani
Tr. by R.A. Butler. |
| Problem of Ethics in Mohammad Iqbal's Philosophy. | M.T. Stepanyants |
| Iqbal as a Seer. | Mumtaz Hasan |
| The Key point in Iqbal's Educational Philosophy: | Muzaffar Hussain |

In memory of my teacher A. A. Starikov

MUHAMMAD IQBAL : INTRODUCTION TO *THE SECRETS OF THE SELF*

Note by the translator

Long ago Muhammad Iqbal's poetry crossed the boundaries of his motherland and now one can say that it belongs to mankind as a whole along with many masterpieces by other prominent men of culture of international repute.

Iqbal's poetry is well-known in the Soviet Union and it is dear to the peoples of my country because of its humanism and strong belief in the unlimited potentials of a human being. Iqbal's love for freedom and his passionate desire to see his people prosperous and happy are also revered by Soviet readers.

His poems, translated from Urdu and Persian, into the various languages of the Soviet Union, are widely published in Moscow, Tashkent and Dushanbe. If one takes into account the fact that the USSR is a country of complete literacy, and that the usual circulation of any book is not less than several thousand copies, one cannot but draw the conclusion that *Bang-i-Dara*, *Payam-i-Mashriq*, *Zarb-i-Kalim*, *Bal-i-Jibril* are no less popular in the Soviet Union than in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, and the Persian and Arabic speaking world.

There are also eleven original research works on Iqbal's poetry and philosophy written by Soviet scholars and it gives me pleasure to present one of these works to the Pakistani public. The article "Muhammad Iqbal : Introduction to the *Secrets of the Self*" by N. Prigarina is the first work on Iqbal by a Soviet scholar to be translated from Russian and published in Pakistan. I am sure that it will not be the last.

It is necessary to mention here that this translation has become possible due only to the energetic efforts of Mr. B.A. Dar, Director, Iqbal Academy, Karachi, who has been instrumental in establishing contacts between Soviet and Pakistani scholars engaged in research on Iqbal's heritage.

I fail to find words suitable to express my deepest gratitude to Mrs. Alys Faiz and Lt. Col. K.A. Rashid whose kind help and guidance were of great value when I worked on this translation.

I must confess that I am not a professional translator and readers, therefore, may be indulgent if in the translation they meet some errors.

Edward K. Kolbenev
Deputy Cultural Secretary
USSR Embassy, Pakistan

This article deals with some features of Muhammad Iqbal's lyrics of his early years in Persian, namely the Introduction to his poem *Asrar-i-Khudi*. The poem was first published in 1915, though some extracts of it had been recited by the poet at the session of Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam

in Lahore in 1914. It was Iqbal's first work published in Persian. Before this he had written his poems in Urdu and by that time was well-known in the literary circles of India.

As far as the genre of the Introduction is concerned it occupies a particular place in the poem. The lyric fragments can be read in all sixteen chapters of the poem which differ in their content but the poem as a whole should be considered as an epic work of a philosophical and didactic nature. Being an account of religious and philosophical doctrine it has some genre features of a sermon or treatise.

The genre of the philosophical and didactic poem and the accounts of religious and philosophical doctrine in a poetic form was a widespread phenomenon of classical literature in Persian.¹ Jalaluddin Rumi, the author of the philosophical and ethic code in six volumes, *Masnawi-i-Ma'nawi*,² was Iqbal's favourite poet.

As to the philosophical subjects of the poem *The Secrets of the Self*, analogies from the classical Persian Literature would not help much. Its subjects were created by a new age and seem to be the answer to "the social demand" of the Indian Society of Iqbal's period. Hence it is clear that his contemporaries highly appreciated the poem, for they found in it the substantiation and development of the ideas of the value of a human personality, an appeal to an inner perfection and an active creative work.³

The problem of personality and the question of the perfect man, connected with it, emerged and developed in Iqbal's work as the reflection of those changes which took place in India in the beginning of the twentieth century. It was not incidental that Iqbal was the first who introduced a new term, *Khudi* (*Khud*, خود, self).⁴

Considering the individuality of a human being as a result of the development of God's individuality, Iqbal speaks about the stages a

1. See M. Zand, *Six Centuries of Glory*, Moscow, 1964, p. 180 (Russian)

2. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

3. Muhammad Ali, *My life, a fragment. An Autobiographical Sketch*. (Lahore, 1964), p. 167; R. Nicholson, *An introduction to Muhammad Iqbal's The Secrets of the Self* (London, 1920).

4. M. Sharif asserts that *Khudi* in the works of 1908-1920 is the dynamic centre of desires, efforts, actions and it is moved in its development by Time. The entire inner life of a human being and the whole world that surrounds him were created by this *Khudi*. See M. M. Sharif, "Iqbal's Concept of God" in *Iqbal as a Thinker* (Lahore, 1944), p. 111. Later on the poet uses the term in a double sense: the individuality of a human being and an individual in his relations with society, God and religion. See Houben, "The Individual in Democracy and Iqbal's Conception of *Khudi*" in *Crescent and Green* (London 1955), p. 152.

human being goes through to obtain the features of "God's vice-gerent on earth". The poet assigns to religion, poetry and philosophy considerable importance; he is inclined to explain the decay in the countries of the Muslim East as the consequence of the oblivion of original "pure" Islam, by the dissemination of pantheistic philosophy and its reflection in literature. According to Iqbal it was equal to advocating of slavish obedience and indifference towards the tasks presented to a human being by life.

Now to speak in more detail on Iqbal's attitude towards pantheism and pantheistic sufism on the one hand and on the idea of returning to "pure" Islam on the other neither pantheism nor early Islam is spoken about in the "Introduction" chosen for the analysis; nevertheless it would be difficult to understand some features of Iqbal's lyric without understanding what part these problems played in Iqbal's outlook when he wrote his poem.

The Secrets of the Self marks the beginning of a new stage in Iqbal's creative work and is connected with the turning point of his outlook which took place after the poet's return from Europe where he had gone to complete his education.

The period when he worked on his thesis¹ for which he obtained his Ph.D., the years spent in Europe were fruitful and influenced his entire life. During that period (1905-1908) Iqbal studied western philosophy and established contacts with European scholars. However, he could not but notice the true face of Europe going speedily towards war. Since then the constant theme of all Iqbal's poems on the West became the theme of the immorality of sciences and technology which so easily could be used against a human being. After coming back from Europe the poems Iqbal wrote appeared to be prophetic—he compared pre-war Europe to a nest built on the points of bayonets, and its militarism, with preparations for suicide.

As a thinker and a man to whom the fortunes of his mother land were dear, Iqbal with all his heart and soul was prepared to accept any state system which would make the people happy and ensure the most favourable conditions for the flourishing of the human personality. But he did not find it in Europe, and in search of such a system which would bring about the equality of all people, as Iqbal wrote in a letter to one of his friends, he turned his face towards Islam. Being a deeply religious man, Iqbal could not accept Marxism because of its atheism, although

1. M. Iqbal. *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (London, 1908). Iqbal speaks in this work "with tremendous sympathy to sufism". See A. Krimsky, *The History of Persia, her Literature and Darvish Theosophy*, II (Moscow, 1912), p. 111 (published in Russian).

he once said that Islam was *Bolshevism plus God*.

This turning to religion was not surprising, for, before Iqbal, in Muslim India any attempt to present any new idea on the social life, on man and his attitude towards society, etc. was, in fact, within the limits of Islam. In the first instance it can be explained by the very strong influence of feudalism and feudal institutions upon the social thought of the country as well as by the fact that Islam had maintained the whole complex of lawful social and political functions.¹

And the idea of the revival of Islam also had a well-grounded and sound tradition in the Muslim community of India.² The work on his Ph.D. thesis provided Iqbal with the facts corroborating the view about the change in the originally monotheistic nature of Islam. As a consequence of the further spread of this religion and the development of its later mystic interpretations, sufism of a pantheistic nature (*Vahdat al-Vujud*) sprung up and rapidly spread all over the Muslim world.

For Iqbal to raise his voice against pantheism meant the rejection of the enormous heritage of the classical literature in which the pantheistic disposition has its poetical interpretation. While Iqbal, the philosopher, broke through his aesthetic feelings and was even able to denounce Hafiz whom he considered as an advocate of philosophy of renunciation, Iqbal, the poet, failed to free himself from the fascination of Hafiz's poetry.

The pantheistic concept of "unity of reality", in short, is contained in the thesis: the entire reality is God. The cognition of Truth is described in a given order. The highest stage of it is *Fana*, non-existence, ecstasy of self denial, self-dissolution, spontaneous (direct) contact with the divine. Pantheistic sufis attach great importance to the ecstatic unity with God. R. Nicholson writes, "So far as *Vali* or saint is considered as a type of a perfect man among the people it should be taken into account that the essence of Muslim sanctity, as the institution of prophesy, is none other than the divine illumination, instantaneous vision and understanding of the things that are invisible and unknown, when the veil of common sense suddenly lifts and an intellectual ['I'] disappears in the stunning grandeur of the sole true light. An ecstatic feeling of unity with God shapes *Vali*. This is the end of Path, *Tariqa*."³ So long as Truth is obtained in the state of ecstasy, complete self denial,

1. A. Massaux, *Islam* (Moscow, 1961), p. 93.

2. L. Gordon-Polonsykaya writes about it in details as well as about trends connected with Islam (reformism, modernism, pan-islamism) in his work *Muslim Trends in the Social Thought of India and Pakistan* (Moscow 1963). Later on, Iqbal advocated not only for return to original Islam but for re-construction of its principles in the light of changed conditions of life.

3. R.A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 78.

dissolution and disappearing in the uniformity are required from those who want to obtain it. This is pantheistic sufism (universe=God).

In the beginning of his literary and philosophical career Iqbal was inclined towards pantheism and by the time he completed *The Secrets of the Self* he became its violent enemy. He considered Plato whose ideas transformed in the later teaching of Plotin, influenced the philosophy of sufism, as an ascetic, as the pastor of obedient rams and as the deadly enemy of a life of activity. A separate chapter of *The Secrets of the Self* is devoted to the criticism of Plato's theses. As the sufi doctrine of "unity of reality", as it is known, adopted a great deal from the philosophy of neo-Platonism, Iqbal directly connected "the decay" of the Muslim society with the dissemination and the very existence of this doctrine.

The culmination of the doctrine, viz., the teaching on *Fana fi-l Haq* (non-existence in God) is unacceptable to Iqbal. As a matter of fact this point is the beginning of the break with *Vahdat al-Vujud* because the non-recognition of this point is equal to the non-recognition of the doctrine as a whole.

Envisaged by this doctrine the comprehension of Truth through the annihilation of human personality in God (according to R. Nicholson, connection in the absence of any connection) was to Iqbal equal to the loss of this personality for society, to the annihilation of the unique human individuality for which the poet himself was ready to give up "the whole universe with all its stars":¹

آفتاب و ماه و انجم می توان دادن ز دست
در بهائے آن کف خاکے که دارائے دل است

The sun, and the moon, and the stars I can give up :
For this handful of dust endowed with heart.

The return to the original Islam and the banishment of pantheism, according to Iqbal, would have also established such relations between man and God when God would have remained the ideal, the Supreme individual and the amalgamation of man with God would have meant the discharge by man of his terrestrial duties of God's vicegerent on earth (read : the master of terrestrial matters), e.g. the active creative work, the perfection of inner life, the acquiring of the features of God-deal, etc.

Iqbal denied the state of ecstasy as a method of cognition of Truth through the denial of somebody's individuality. According to him, the moment of cognition of Truth is the highest creative act, the mobilization of all human being's strength. It demands complete exposition of

1. Muhammad Iqbal, *Zuboor-i-Ajam*, p. 153.

human personality and by no means is it his dissolution in God.¹ He glorifies such inner enthusiasm inspired by the contiguity with Truth which makes the blaze of Truth itself more vivid and gives the light to its essence.

Jalalud-din Rumi, the greatest poet-mystic of the thirteenth century, was the only one from the whole galaxy of the poets who wrote in Persian in the middle ages who professed such "dialectical monotheism". According to him a searcher for Truth is separated from Truth forever. And Iqbal was one of the first thinkers who drew attention to this distinction between Rumi and other mystics. His spiritual proximity to Rumi could be also explained by this fact. It is because of the same reason Rumi became Vergil of a new Dante, his spiritual leader and preceptor in the celestial journey (*Jawid-Nama*). Rumi is one of the most favourite heroes of Iqbal. As a sage and an old man, a "connoisseur of secrets," he also appeared in the introduction to Iqbal's first philosophic poem.

As an epigraph to the whole poem Iqbal takes the verses by Rumi from his most popular ghazal :

دی شیخ با چراغ همی گشت گرد شهر کز دام و دد ملوالم و انسانم آرزوست
 زین همراهان مست عناصر دلم گرفت شیر خدا و رستم دستانم آرزوست
 گفتم که یافت می نشود چسته ایم ما گفت آنکه یافت می نشود آنم آرزوست
 Yesterday the shaikh with a lamp wandered around the city
 [Speaking] I am tired of beasts of prey ;
 I want a human being.
 I am sick of these weak companions ;
 I want God's Lion (i.e. Ali) and Rustam of Dastan.
 Said [I] : "He cannot be found. We have tried to find."
 Said : "I want him who cannot be found".

This ghazal is very dear to Iqbal, and it is not accidental that he quoted it more extensively in his other poem *Jawid Nama*. Two lines from another Poet, Naziri Nishapuri (seventeenth century), are taken as an epigraph to the introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*

ایست در خشک و تریشه من کوتاهی چوب هر نخل که منبر نشود دار کنم
 There is no dearth in my forest of dry and green shrubs.
 Out of each tree, if mimbar doesn't come out, I'll make the
 gallows.

While the epigraph from Rumi defines the conception of the poet as a whole, human being's search, the lines from Naziri go well with the mood of "Introduction".

1. M. M. Sharif, *Iqbal's Concept of God*, A. Bausani, "Gulshan-i-Raz-i gadid di Muhammad Iqbal" in *Annali di Istituto universitario orientale* (Napoli, 1958), Vol. VIII, 6.

Sincere, full of emotion, confused to a certain extent in the beginning, the Introduction is a narration of passion, the great passion of a human being who has become aware of his prophetic gift, who has discovered, as it seems to him, the secret of life and "eternal mirth". Perhaps, that is why Iqbal likes Naziri's passion for building *mimbars*—rostrums for sermons. He himself wants to come to the people with his own sermon. It is a stormy monologue from which the reader comes to know about the formations of a poet prophet. At the same time the new, unprecedented awareness of his prophetic gift is a deeply personal event for the poet, and he brings us into his inner world, opens it before us in his confession.

In short, the content of the Introduction is as follows. The poet's night is full of thoughts about human beings. The thoughts are sorrowful. But the poet has a powerful weapon—words. They have been put to the test by a mystic gardener of life: the striking sword has grown up out of the line planted in the soil, and then the poet has found confidence in the enigmatic strength that was planted in his soul.

In Iqbal's poetry Zurwan, the jinn of time and space, and God possess the same strength which makes it possible to penetrate into the essence of things, to comprehend their potentialities and their future.

The poet speaks about himself as about the Sun which has not yet been born. He considers the whole universe around him as a potential possibility of the universe. This Sun has not learnt the order and the customs of the firmament. It has not driven the stars of the night away from the sky; its rays have not yet been painted in red henna at the moment of its appearance. It is as if this Sun that shows its first rays from the horizon in the vibrant false dawn is afraid of its appearance. The poet is filled with an inner tremble: he fears to put his thoughts and feelings on trial before the people, for he is afraid of not being understood:

سبزه ناروئیده زیب گلشنم گل به شاخ اندر نهان در دامنم
بسکه عود فطرتم نادر نواست هم نشین از نغمه ام نا آشناست

The flowers that have not grown, are the decoration of my garden,
The flower [dreaming] inside the twig, is [hidden] under my flap.

[Although] the tunes of the lute of my nature are rare,

He who is sitting next to me does not know my melodies.

Why does it happen? Only because of the fact that our poet is a new Sun? No, his epoch can also be blamed, the epoch which will fail to appreciate the charm of Joseph Beautiful if an old legend is revived—the legend about the prophet who "was sold at the market for miserable price,

for a few dirhems ; they did not value him much.¹

عصر من داننده اسرار نیست یوسف من بهر این بازار ایست
نا امیدم ز یاران قدیم طور من سوزد که می آید کلیم

Our age is not a connoisseur of secrets.

My Joseph is not for this market.

I despair of my old friends.

Sinai is on fire : Is Moses ascending to it ?

According to the legend, Moses — "collocutor of Allah" — was on his way in solitude to obtain commandments. The fire which caught the Sinai mountain blocked his companions' way.

The poet finds himself in the same loneliness. His companions, his collocutors, do not feel sacred emotions, their apathy is expressed through the image of the silent Red Sea — a symbol of storms in Persian poetry. The poet compares their souls with the Red Sea — soundless like the modest dew that leaped on the cold leaf of the grass.²

But in the poet's soul every dew drop is like the roaring ocean caught by the storm :

قلزم یاران چو شبنم بے خروش شبنم من مثل یم طوفان بدوش

The Sea of my friends is soundless like dew.

My dew is like the ocean with typhoon on its shoulder.

But the solitude does not frighten the poet, for the recognition does not always come during the lifetime. It will not make the poet to retreat. He brings his word to the people :

اے بسا شاعر کہ بعد از مرگ زاد چشم خود بر بست و چشم ما کشاد
رخت ناز از نیستی بیرون کشید چون گل از خاک مزار خود رسید

Oh, many poets were born after their deaths.

They closed their eyelids and opened our eyes.

The wretched belongings of their non-existence were taken out,³

[They] sprouted up like a flower from the ashes of their graves.

The poet cannot keep silent. One theme is vividly heard in the Introduction. Later on Iqbal was to develop it in his subsequent works in Persian—it is associated with the role the poet allots to any manifestation of life. It is the theme of anxiety. If one cannot do anything more,

1. The Quran (xii. 20) translated by Sablukov, Kazan (1907).

2. The explanation of Moses' experience at the Mount Sinai as given by the author is not correct. Similarly it is wrong to translate *Qulzam* as Red Sea; *Qulzam* here signifies any sea. (Ed.)

3. The correct translation, as done by Nicholson, would be :

And journeyed again from nothingness. (Ed.)

the poet says, he should cry, for the scream is the evidence of non-quietness, the burning of desires, the proof that a human being is still alive, but doesn't keep silent. The poet exclaims in the Introduction :

عاشقم فریاد ایمان من است شور حشر از پیش خیزان من است

Oh, my beloved !, the howl is my faith.

The turmoil of the Day of Trial is because of me.¹

A new poet and prophet emerges in the world like a powerful melody filling the entire world. It is immeasurably bigger than a thin string from which it has come. As if it is like the Indian Ocean which cannot be restricted within the tight banks of an ordinary streamlet. The poet is like a spring cloud from the vivifying rain of which one bud turns into a whole garden.

The enormous strength has emerged in the poet's soul because he has come to know "the secrets of life". He also appeals to others to obtain the knowledge of the secret :

سحر عیش جاودان خواهی بیا هم زمین هم آسمان خواهی بیا
پیر گردون با من این اسرار گفت از ندیمان رازها لتوان نہفت

If you want to obtain the secret of eternal mirth, do come.

If you want to get the sky, to get the earth, do come.

The heaven disclosed this secret to me.

We cannot conceal the secrets from our friends.

And then there is a traditional appeal to a wine-distributor. But the poet does not ask for the wine of oblivion which takes the person away from troubles and burdens of life; he needs the life-giving moisture— "moist flame" that turns a beggar into a king from a fairy tale. He wants the wine which brightens up the thought and makes the sight keen.

As in other parts of the "Introduction" and the poem itself here are subtle polemics against Hafiz, the Persian poet of the fourteenth century.

In the first edition of the poem, Hafiz was called leader of tipplers whose bowls are filled with the sweet bane of oblivion. In subsequent editions Iqbal omitted the name of Hafiz but retained his attacks on the poet whose poems "take away from us passion of life."²

The wine-distributor has given to the poet such wine that makes him again and again glorify a noble old man—"master of the sealed book of secret love"—Rumi. Rumi's image and the impact of his poetry are similar to the flame of a candle which attacks the moth. The strength of

1. The correct translation, as done by Nicholson would be :

But I am a lover : loud crying is my faith :

The clamour of Judgement Day is one of my minions. (Ed.)

2. *Asrar-e-Khudi*, p. 39.

his feelings breathes life into dead clay, which a human being is moulded from. It has given birth to the inspiration of the lyric hero. Rumi's appearance before the inner sight of the poet is the culminative point of the "Introduction".

The poet has been gravely disappointed by the incomprehension of the people around him, by their deafness and indifference. The description of the state of despair seems to implement the task of colours — creation of contrast between the bottomless gloom of man's weakness and prophetic lucidity of Rumi who appears before the poet in dreams :

شب دل من مائل فریاد بود خامشی از یاریم آباد بود
شکوه آشوب غم دوران بدم از تهی پیمانگی نالان بدم
این قدر نظاره ام بے تاب شد بال و پر بشکست و آخر خواب شد

At night my heart was inclined to sob,
The calm of the night was filled with my groanings,
I was the embodiment of sorrow of centuries,
I mourned over the emptiness of [my] bowl,
And everything before my eyes was so utterly dark
That my wings were broken and [I] fell asleep at last.

The guiding star which Rumi lit up for the poet is Love. In the shape of poetical images Rumi's monologue contains the wisdom which Iqbal advocates henceforth. Rumi demands that the poet should kindle in his heart such love as would lead him to Truth without meditation and hesitation, without retreating before the requirements of reason. The obstinate brain, the eyes burdening the feelings with observations on which reason builds its proof, should not be a hindrance.

شیشه بر سر دیده بر نشتر بزن

Break the glass against the head,
Strike the eyes against a lancet.¹

And the main thing, Rumi says, is to shout at the top of your voice after speaking of your feelings. How long will you keep silent like an unopened flower? The words by Rumi which show his attitude towards Love and Reason, two outstanding features of a human being, seem to be the recurring, constant theme of Iqbal's poetry :

گفت اے دیوانہ! ارباب عشق جرعه گیر از شراب ناب عشق
سنگ شو آئینہ! اندیشہ را بر سر بازار بشکن شیشه را

1. This line has something in common with the well-known quatrain by Baba Tahir, the last bait of which is as follow :

بسازم خنجرے نوکش از فولاد ز لم بر دیده تا دل گردد آزاد

[I] shall make a dagger—Damascus steel edge.

[I] will strike it on my eyes to set my heart free.

Said : "Oh, mad man who is in love,
Take a sip of pure wine of love.

Become a stone for the mirror of reasoning (fear),

[Take the courage] to break the glass in the sight of everybody !"

Setting off Love and Reason is the traditional theme of Persian lyrics in general, and of Rumi's poetry in particular.

This theme has been elaborated by Iqbal in his other works in Persian. For instance, in his book *Payam-i-Mashriq* (the Message of the East), *Zabur-i-Ajam* (the Persian Psalms) and others, and the theme of the West emerges very often along with it. According to Iqbal the West is the embodiment of odd and immoral reason. But it is very important to keep in mind that Iqbal's Love does not have anything in common with gross sensuality. Love is the aspiration, creative activities and eternal pulsation of life, and it is as if because of the words of Rumi, the poet has achieved a second birth, revived his spirit and at last explains to the reader what "the secret of existence" is :

چون نوا از تار خود برخواستم جنتے از بہر گوش آراستم
برگرفتم پردہ از راز خردی وا نمودم سر اعجاز خودی

Like a melody I went up from my strings,
Created paradise for the ears ;
I tore the veil from the secret of *Khudi*,
Showed the secret of the creation of *Khudi*.

The ecstatic affection for Rumi, the wisdom of his admonitions, gave a new birth to the poet. It is reflected even in his verses which are now devoid of the nervous impetuosity that was peculiar to them in the beginning :

بود نقش ہستیم انگارہ* ناقبولے نا کسے نا کارہ*
عشق سوهان زد مرا آدم شدم عالم کیف و کم عالم شدم
حرکت اعصاب گردون دیدہ ام دررگ مہ گردش خون دیدہ ام
بہر انسان چشم من شبہا گریست تا در بدم پردہ* اسرار زیست

The drawing of my existence was a mere deaf,
Wretched, worthless, incomplete.
Love polished me, I have become a human being,
I have learned of the world in its qualities and quantities,
I have seen the movements of the nerves of the firmament,
I have seen the blood current in the veins of the moon.
Nights I spent bemoaning for Man
Until I tear the veils off the secret of existence.

"Introduction" ends with the explanations of the causes which made the poet change his mother tongue, Urdu, and turn to Persian. It

must be mentioned that the Persian language was known to the educated Indian Muslims because it was a compulsory part of school education, along with Arabic.

ہندیم از پارسی بیگانه ام ماہ نو باشم تہی پیمانہ ام
حسن انداز بیان از من مجو خوانسار و اصفہان از من مجو
گرچہ ہندی در عذوبت شکر است طرز گفتار دری شیرین تر است
فکر من از جلوہ اش مسجور گشت خامہ من شاخ نخل طور گشت
پارسی از رفعت اندیشہ ام در خورد با فطرت اندیشہ ام

I am an Indian, I am alien to the Persian language,

I am a new moon and my bowl is empty.

Don't look for the beauty of style from me.

Don't look for Khansar and Isfahan.

Although Hindi is as sweet as sugar,

The way of exposition in Persian is sweeter ;

My thought is bewitched with its brilliancy,

My pen has become a branch of the tree on Sinai mountain.

Persian, because of the high stream of my thoughts

Went very well with the essence of my thoughts.

This explanation, however, does not seem to be comprehensive. Of course, the sincerity of this explanation is beyond all doubts—"the way of exposition in Persian is sweeter". Farsi Dari is the language of the richest literature of the world. It is the language of Rumi—the favourite poet and spiritual preceptor. But there is also no doubt the desire to share the idea of the formation of personality with all the peoples of the near and middle East who at that time suffered the shocking consequences of the feudal servitude and the colonial domination of the Western powers in one way or another. Iqbal meant the countries where Persian was a literary language or the language of literary tradition (for example, in Turkey). It was however after a number of years that Iqbal's creative works were understood in Iran in this particular way.¹

Having turned towards the Persian language, Iqbal continued the tradition of literature in Persian that had already existed in India. This literature had existed for many a century and had produced such masters of poetry as Amir Khosrow Dehlevi, Makhi, Bedil who belong to the entire Persian-speaking world. Apparently, Iqbal happened to be its last brilliant representative.

The poetics of the classical literature in Persian and that of Indo-Persian literature greatly influenced Urdu poetry. Changing from one language to the other (it is a very frequent phenomenon of the literature

in Urdu), the poet continues to remain in the world of habitual images, means of expression and style. Thus he is able not to change his creative manner.

Iqbal's works in Persian continue the traditions of both literatures (the classical Persian as well as the Indo-Persian) and it can be seen particularly in the assimilation of stylistic devices elaborated in those literatures. While using the formal means and devices accumulated by those literatures, Iqbal, however, inevitably finds himself under the influence of the features connected with their content. One can judge it even by the extract which is being analyzed here.

It is well-known that almost all the Persian and Indian poets who can be considered as most talented ones, paid a tribute of respect to Sufi mysticism. A great number of traditional settled images of poetry in Persian continue to live on in literature not only due to all the literary reminiscences connected with them, but due to the religious and mystic tradition which secured them.¹

The broad range of vocabulary, for example, such words as *Ishq* (Love) *Mai* (Wine), *Saki* (Wine-Distributor or to be exact, a sort of a toast-master of regales, the life of the party); some images (for instance, the passion of the moth for the candle, the yearning of a drop for the ocean, etc.) had a more or less settled mystic interpretation.

The tangible mystic undercurrent of Iqbal's poetry in Persian is closely connected with this tradition. Some research workers taking this fact as the ground state that Iqbal was one of the greatest mystics of our time.² In his later philosophical works and statements Iqbal resolutely rejected the mystic method of cognition but in his poetry the mystic undercurrent was almost always to be seen to more or less extent. The thing is most likely not merely because of the influence of the forms and tradition mentioned above but also due to the inner inclination of the poet towards poetic mysticism, due to the so called particular mood of the poet's soul.³

1. On the religious and mystic tradition in the usage of the vocabulary, see Louis Massigon, *Essai sur les origines technique de la mystique musulmane*, Paris, 1922.

2. Said Nafisi, "Mysticism in Iqbal's poetry," in *Iqbal Review*, Vol I No. 1, April, 1960.

3. "Was the philosophy of Iqbal merely a variety of mysticism and was he himself a mystic? By no means, if what is meant by "mystic" is a person who rejects the value of reason and the scientific data. Iqbal believes that some aspects of substance can be expressed only through the language of the poetic metaphor". See R. Whittemore, "Iqbal's Panentheism" in *Review of Metaphysics*. New Haven, 1956, Vol. 9, No. 4.

"Once Iqbal called himself a combination of contradictions. His natural inclination towards mysticism and his hostile attitude towards it (his words are obvious proof of it) are a good illustration for this combination. He inherited his mystic mood from his father and felt the subconscious bent for mysticism in his early years", points out Sheikh Abdul Qadir, a friend of the poet. See Sheikh Abdul Qadir, "The poet and mystic" in *The Pakistan Times*, April, 21, 1950

Any how, we meet in the "introduction" the image of *Saki* (Wine-Distributor), and his mystic. Wine of love. The poet is caught with the mystic ecstasy. (We have already mentioned that Iqbal's interpretation of this state differs from the interpretation of it in the spirit of *Vahdat al-Vujud*). And finally, one can see the strong influence of Sufi poetry on the images of Iqbal's poems. For example, we can meet very often the conception of the substance of a human being as a handful of dust, as a lump of clay, etc. And the poet likes this conception and tries to play it up.¹ Hence we find in his works a great number of poetic and symbolic images, in complete accordance with the Sufi traditions: clay—divine mystic potter—pitcher, vessel for wine. When the pitcher made out of a lump of clay, is filled with wine, the vessel finds the soul, a handful of dust becomes a human being who is now caught forever with the fire of dissatisfaction.

Therefore, when Rumi appears to our hero with the words of parting, he says to him:

فاش گو اسرار پیر مے فروش موج می شو کسوت مینا بیوش

Reveal the secrets of the o'd wine-seller,

Become the wave of wine, let the vessel (become your) cloth.

The meaning of this metaphor is: Become a human being. There are some other images of Sufi lyrics in the "Introduction". It is significant that Iqbal is indifferent to the Sufi images which are being interpreted, as a rule, in the spirit of the pantheistic Sufism, but he does not change the habitual link between Divine Beloved and Lover. In his works of the later period, particularly in *Payam-i-Mashriq* (The Message of the East), the habitual poetic images were transformed by the poet in accordance with his views on the man-God relationship. And mere mentioning of those images is enough to produce a whole series of particular associations of ideas. In his later works the poet stressed the initiative of Lover, though according to the tradition (by the way, it also relates to the early mystic tradition of Dhunnun), only the sign given by the Beloved can give courage to the Lover.

According to Iqbal the dew itself flies to the Sun in a state of "blissful oblivion" without waiting for its call. The moth hovers round the candle to burn a new light in its own soul, the drop in the ocean is proud of its destiny to become a pearl. It does not accept this destiny as an award for its own insignificance if it is compared with the ocean. (Compare Saadi's *Bustan*, chapter 4, parable on "A drop and the ocean") Those

1. In accordance with the mystic interpretation of the Quranic legend on the creation of men. See V. A. Zhukovsky. *Man and the Cognition of the Persian Mystics*, St. Petersburg, 1895 (published in Russian).

images have not been yet changed and are used in accordance with the tradition. But in this work, it is interesting to note, the image of the atom has already been elaborated—the image of the insignificant, of a speck of dust which is attracted by the Sun-Lover. In the beginning there is some sort of acquaintance with the exposition of the image: the poet speaks about himself as if he is a tiny speck of light, an atom which can bear hundreds of downs.

ذره ام مهر منیر آن من است صد سحر اندر گریبان من است

I am an atom, I am related to the Sun,
Hundreds of dawns are hidden inside me.

While reading Rumi, the poet again begins to feel the power of attraction for the Sun-Love. A tiny mute speck of dust feels a fresh surge of energy and is ready to undertake a journey :

ذره از خاک بیا بان رخت بست تا شعاع آفتاب آرد بدست

The atom has bid farewell to the dust of deserts,
In order to obtain the brilliance of the Sun.

There the purpose of the journey of a speck of dust is very significant. There is not a striving for the return to the beginning of all beginnings and to its origin (neoPlatonism, pantheistic Sufism) but it is an attempt to obtain the features of the Sun-Ideal.

Almost at the very end of the Introduction we again meet theme of the atom.—But this time it is like a mass scene completing the theme of the formation of the poet-prophet who had passed through the state of ecstasy of the mystic love:

ذره کشت و آفتاب انبار کرد خرمن از صد رومی و عطار کرد

Have sown an atom, have filled the granary with the Sun.
Out of hundreds of Rumis and Attars have built havest.

Undoubtedly, such apotheosis of Atom (ذره) is the apotheosis of personality which managed to utilize its abilities.

There is one more theme in the Introduction which is not directly connected with the one being analysed above. It is the theme of music. Almost twenty verses of the Introduction out of one hundred are connected with musical images. The lines about music intersperse the Introduction without visible system and they are born by the sensation of the contrast between the deaf silence of the night and inner alarm tearing at the heart of the poet. And the poet seems "to listen" better than "to see" in this deaf silence of the night—that is why he is so sensitive to the sounding of the night. The frequent usage by him of the musical and "acoustic" terms, images, comparisons creates the additional effect—the night comes to life, and sounds in various voices for the reader.

The images of music, the creation of musical associations grow into the music of the verses themselves. Even the silence turns into something material, a sort of "anti-sound".

خامشی از یاریم آباد بود

The silence of the night filled with my groanings,

In spite of visibly unsystematic nature of musical, or as we have called them, "acoustic" images, they play their specific organizing part in the Introduction. They permeate the entire text like gigantic *Tanasub* (the name of method to put in a verse in one row the words with conjugated semantics).

In *The Secrets of the Self* and in its lyric, the Introduction in particular, the poet displayed an outstanding command of writing technique in the Persian language. His Persian sounds graceful and natural. The Introduction creates great interest, for many features of Iqbal's lyrics in Persian had been based on it. Those features were developed later on in his lyric collections: *The Message of the East*, *The Persian Psalms* and *The Gift of Hejaz*.

The literary merits of Iqbal's poetry in Persian create no doubts and have been recognized not only by his country-men but by the entire Persian speaking world and by the admirers of Iqbal's poetry in other countries.

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IQBAL'S PANENTHEISM

Robert Whitemore

I

EXAMINE Western philosophy from an Islamic standpoint and one characteristic of it is inescapable: from Thales to Wittgenstein Western thought has been for the most part invariably insular, insufferably parochial. European and American thinkers, in so many ways so diverse, have been from the time of their Greek forebears virtually as one in their provincial assurance that such ontological, cosmological and theological speculation as is worthy of their notice is a product of their Western culture.

The philosophy of Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) affords a notable case in point. In the world of modern Muslim thought he stands alone. His *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*¹ aspires to a place akin to that occupied by al-Ghazali's *Ihya Ulum al-Din* ("Revivification of the Religious Sciences"). His philosophical poetry is regarded by many Muslim scholars as a worthy postscript to the *Diwan* and *Mathnavi* of Jalaluddin Rumi. In his Pakistani homeland, and throughout the world of Islam, he is accorded a respect verging at times on reverence. And yet you will seek in vain through the pages of most modern European and American philosophy for a mention of his name.² He is unknown even to the compilers of philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias.

Were Iqbal's philosophy purely Islamic in background and interest, such lack of notice might be expected. But such is not the case. Through years of study and travel in England and on the Continent Iqbal became thoroughly conversant with and steeped in the West and its culture. A student of McTaggart and James Ward at Cambridge (1905-1908), a Ph.D. from Munich, he encompassed the range of European thought from Plato to Bergson, rejecting much in the former, absorbing much from the latter. Nietzsche has left his mark upon him, as have Wundt, Lotze and William James. But this is not to imply that Iqbal is merely another Asiatic turned Western eclectic. For Ghazali and Rumi also have been his teachers, the Prophet and the Qur'an his constant source of inspiration. It is this fusion of patterns of philosophical and religious thought foreign to

1. London, 1934.

2. One prominent exception is Hartshorne & Reese's *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 294-97.

each other that constitutes Iqbal's "Reconstruction" an achievement possessing a philosophical importance far transcending the world of Islam. Iqbal, in fact, has added yet another dimension to that cosmo-theological point of view associated in the West with such names as Whitehead, Berdyaev, Montague, Hartshorne and William James. In the measure of his contribution to this point of view lies the enduring philosophical significance of his thought.

II

AT the heart of Iqbal's philosophy³ lies the existentialist conviction that Reality is ultimately inexpressible purely in terms of reason and science. This is not to deny the import of these latter. Whatever view of man, universe and God we ultimately arrive at, it must, Iqbal thinks, be one in which the data of science are accounted for, one in which the demands of reason for coherence are met. Yet below and above the level of science and reason there is that which man knows simply because he feels it and intuits it. There is, to use Bradley's terms, the intra-relational as well as the supra-relational. There is prehension which is not yet apprehension; there is feeling. The real is the rational—and then some.

Is Iqbal's philosophy, then, no more than a species of mysticism? By no means, if by "mystic" you understand one who renounces the use of reason and the materials of science. Iqbal is no more a mystic, and no less, than Hegel, Bradley, Whitehead or Berdyaev, because he, like they, finds some facets of this universe expressible only in the language of metaphor or poetry. Like these (Western) thinkers he too finds Reality in some respects surd, of a character that can neither be explained nor explained away. If one wishes an example, one has, Iqbal would argue, merely to look within to that finite centre of experience denominated by the words "self" or "soul." Psychiatrist, behaviourist, mystic, all have fallen short in the attempt to explain this, so far, inexplicable. Yet for every man his "self" is the fundamental fact of the universe.⁴ With it alone does any philosophy properly begin, and the philosophy of Iqbal is

3. By "Iqbal's philosophy" I mean, unless otherwise indicated, that point of view expressed in the philosophical poems of his later years, *The Secrets of the Self* (Asrar-i Khudi), tr. Reynold A. Nicholson (London, 1920); *The Complaint and the Answer* (Shikwah and Jawab-i Shikwah), tr. Altaf Husain (Lahore, 1954), and his major prose work *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. The limitation is necessary since, as with most thinkers, Iqbal's philosophy encompasses a development from the aesthetic pantheism characteristic of his early poetry, and his *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (London, 1908) to the personalistic panentheism of those later writings whose viewpoint it is here our concern to elucidate and analyse. For a brief account of Iqbal's early position, see M. M. Sharif, "Iqbal's Conception of God," in *Iqbal as a Thinker* (Lahore, 1944), pp. 107-12.

4. "To my mind, this inexplicable finite centre of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe. All life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life" (*The Secrets of the Self*, pp. xvi-xvii).

no exception: ". . . my perception of things that confront me is superficial and external; but my perception of my own self is internal, intimate, and profound. It follows, therefore, that conscious experience is that privileged case of existence in which we are in absolute contact with Reality and an analysis of this privileged case is likely to throw a flood of light on the ultimate meaning of existence."⁵

What, then, is this "self" we begin with? It is not, Iqbal thinks, a *thing*, material in nature, describable in terms of the morphology of a stuff. It is not a Scholastic soul-substance. Nor, on the other hand, can it be conceived as a mere succession of psychic states, a stream of consciousness.⁶ It is rather something which, while doing justice to both Permanent and Passing, makes neither character to be an epiphenomenon of the other.⁷ It is, in a word, *ego*.

This is not to imply that "ego" is to be regarded as something over and above what it experiences, for "inner experience is the ego at work."⁸ The very essence of egohood is directive purpose,⁹ creative movement,¹⁰ action. "Thus my real personality is not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, and held together by the unity of a directive purpose. My whole reality lies in my directive attitude. You cannot perceive me like a thing in space, or

5. *Reconstruction*, p. 44.

6. "Consciousness," as Iqbal sees it, "is something single, presupposed in all mental life, and not bits of consciousness, mutually reporting to one another" (*ibid.*, pp. 96-97).

7. The Fichtean overtones of this conception of "self" are most obvious in Iqbal's poetry, as, for instance, these lines (187-96) from *Secrets of the Self*:

The form of existence is an effect of the Self,
 Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the Self,
 When the Self awoke to consciousness,
 It revealed the universe of Thought,
 A hundred worlds are hidden in its essence:
 Self-affirmation brings Not-self to light.
 By the Self the seed of opposition is sown in the world:
 It imagines itself to be other than itself.
 It makes from itself the forms of others,
 In order to multiply the pleasure of strife.

8. *Reconstruction*, p. 97. Also "The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as a directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience" (*ibid.*).

9. "Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands" (*ibid.*, p. 52).

10. "On the analogy of our conscious experience, then, the universe is a free creative movement. But how can we conceive a movement independent of a concrete thing that moves? The answer is that the notion of a 'thing' is derivative. We can derive 'things' from movement; we cannot derive movement from immobile things" (*ibid.*, p. 48).

a set of experiences in temporal order; you must interpret, understand, and appreciate me in my judgements, in my will-attitudes, aims, and aspirations."¹¹ Here will and intellect, mind and ego, coincide, for mind (or thought) is ego viewed as "a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded, thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end."¹²

What we call Nature is but ego as event and act. That this is so becomes clear when we look at this conception of self (ego, mind) in the light of the traditional mind-body problem. Iqbal finds the solution of Spinoza and Descartes equally inadequate:

Parallelism and interaction are both unsatisfactory. . . . We have seen that the body is not a thing situated in an absolute void; it is a system of events or acts. The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts. This does not obliterate the distinction of soul and body; it only brings them closer to each other. . . . The body is accumulated action or habit of the soul; and as such undetachable from it. It is a permanent element of consciousness which, in view of this permanent element, appears from the outside as something stable. What then is matter? A colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of co-ordination.¹³

In Iqbal's universe there is no such thing as "a purely physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality, elementally incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind."¹⁴ As in Whitehead, so also in Iqbal, philosophy of nature becomes a philosophy of organism, becomes panpsychic evolution in which nature is to be "understood as a living, ever-growing organism whose growth has no final external limits."¹⁵ As

11. Ibid., p. 98.

12. Ibid., p. 30.

13. Ibid., p. 100. Cf. also: "physical organism—that colony of sub-egos through which a profounder Ego constantly acts on me, and thus permits me to build up a systematic unity of experience. Are then the soul and its organism two things in the sense of Descartes, independent of each other, though somehow mysteriously united? I am inclined to think that the hypothesis of matter as an independent existence is perfectly gratuitous" (ibid., p. 98).

14. Ibid., p. 101. Cf. also: "The truth, however, is that matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we called the external world; it is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting. . . . The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. . . . There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit" (ibid., p. 147).

15. Ibid., p. 54. It is, however, important to note that the inspiration for Iqbal's panpsychism is not any thinker of the West but rather the famed Persian mystic, Rumi. Iqbal acknowledges as much in his *Reconstruction*, quoting at length and with obvious approval from Rumi's *Mathnavi*. See especially pp. 115 ff.

in Whitehead, so also in Iqbal, nature so understood is not simply blind, purposeless life-force. As unity, as ego in action, it is through and through teleological, but not in the sense of a fixed plan.

The world process, or the movement of the universe in time, is certainly devoid of purpose, if by purpose we mean a foreseen end—a far-off fixed destination to which the whole creation moves. To endow the world process with purpose in this sense is to rob it of its originality and its creative character. . . . It is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character, and brings itself to some sort of a present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past. To my mind nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a preconceived plan. As I have already pointed out, the universe, according to the Quran, is liable to increase. It is a growing universe and not an already completed product which left the hand of its maker ages ago, and is now lying stretched in space as a dead mass of matter to which time does nothing, and consequently is nothing.¹⁶

Are we, therefore, to conceive the universe as lacking deity? By no means. "The movement of life, as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of its various stages. Without this synthesis it will cease to be organic growth. It is determined by ends, and the presence of ends means that it is permeated by intelligence."¹⁷ At the level of cosmic unity this intelligence must be conceived as Ultimate Self,¹⁸ Divine Ego. Immanent in nature,¹⁹ the source of the emergent, it is, in the words of the Qur'an, "the first and the last, the visible and the invisible." What we call Nature is but a fleeting moment in its life.²⁰ To know Nature is to have knowledge of its behaviour.²¹ As character is to the human self, so is Nature to this Divine Self. "In the picturesque phrase of the Quran, it [Nature] is the habit of Allah."²²

Reality is, therefore, essentially spirit. But, of course, there are degrees of spirit. . . . I have conceived the Ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must add now that from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed. The creative energy of the Ultimate Ego, in whom deed and thought are identical, functions as ego-unities. The world, in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am.' Every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man.²³

16. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

18. ". . . the ultimate Reality is a rationally directed creative life. To interpret this life as an ego is not to fashion God after the image of man. It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organizing principle of unity" (*ibid.*, p. 58).

19. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

The cosmological problem here is, of course, the relation of finite ego to Ultimate Ego, psyche to Omnipsyche. In Iqbal's words, "The real question which we are called upon to answer is this: Does the universe confront God as His 'other', with space intervening between Him and it?"²⁴ Iqbal's answer is an unqualified "No." "The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him."²⁵ "The universe . . . is not an 'other' existing *per se* in opposition to God. It is only when we look at the act of creation as a specific event in the life-history of God that the universe appears as an independent 'other'. From the standpoint of the all-inclusive Ego there is no 'other'. In Him thought and deed, the act of knowing and the act of creating, are identical."²⁶

The scientific justification for such a view Iqbal finds to lie implicit in the theory of relativity itself. "We cannot," he remarks in his essay "The Self in the Light of Relativity":

construe ever-present externality to mean the total independence or absoluteness of what appears as external to the self. Such an interpretation would contradict the very principle which discloses its relativity. If, then, in view of the principle of relativity, the object confronting the subject is really relative, *there must be some self to whom it ceases to exist as a confronting 'other'*. This self must be non-spatial, non-temporal—Absolute, to whom what is external must cease to exist as external. . . . To the Absolute Self, then, the Universe is not a reality confronting Him as His 'other'; it is only a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite life. Einstein is quite right in saying that the Universe is finite but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase . . . of God's extensively infinite consciousness and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite. The Qur'anic way of expressing the same truth is that the Universe is liable to increase.²⁷

This is to say that God Himself is liable to growth. "The future certainly pre-exists in the organic whole of God's creative life, but it exists as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines."²⁸

Is God then imperfect? If "perfection" precluded growth the answer would have to be "Yes." But "perfection" need not be so conceived. Change in the sense of a movement from an imperfect to a relatively perfect state is not, Iqbal argues,²⁹ the only possible form of life. The

24. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

27. In Bashir Ahmad Dar, *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy* (Lahore, 1944), pp. 397-98.

28. *Reconstruction*, p. 75. Cf. also: "We are gradually travelling from chaos to cosmos and are helpers in this achievement" (*Secrets of the Self*, p. xvii); "The universe is not a completed act; it is still in the course of formation. There can be no complete truth about the universe, for the universe has not yet become 'whole'" (*ibid.*, p. xviii).

29. *Reconstruction*, p. 57.

Creative Self at any moment of His existence possesses the totality of the achievement of the universe, hence is properly denominated "perfect." If creation is continuous, the future open, the universe growing, then the perfect, surpasser of all others in that it includes within itself all Being and value, may and must surpass itself.³⁰

Is God then infinite? If by "infinity" you mean boundless immensity in space, immeasurable stretch of serial time, Iqbal's answer is "No."

God cannot be conceived as infinite in the sense of spatial infinity. In matters of spiritual valuation mere immensity counts for nothing. . . . Space and time are possibilities of the Ego, only partially realized in the shape of our mathematical space and time. Beyond Him and apart from His creative activity, there is neither time nor space to close Him off in reference to other egos. The Ultimate Ego is, therefore, neither in the sense of spatial infinity nor finite in the sense of the space-bound human ego whose body closes him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word, God's infinity is intensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series.³¹

It is not that series because for Iqbal, as for Bergson, time is not serial passage but pure duration,³² "an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but is moving along with, and operating in, the present."³³ Is God then in time? Rather it is that time like space, like change, like Nature itself, is a function of the character of God. For God as Ultimate (Absolute) Ego is, as we have seen, the whole of Reality.

He is not so situated as to take a perspective view of an alien universe: consequently, the phases of His life are wholly determined from within. Change, therefore, in the sense of a movement from an imperfect to a relatively perfect state, or vice versa, is obviously inapplicable to His life. A deeper insight into our conscious experience shows that beneath the appearance of serial duration there is true duration. The Ultimate Ego exists in pure duration wherein change ceases to be a succession of

30. The logic of this viewpoint has been most extensively and persuasively argued by Charles Hartshorne in his *Man's Vision of God* and in his essay, "The Logic of Panentheism," in *Philosophers Speak of God* (see especially pp. 506-08).

31. *Reconstruction*, p. 61. Cf. also: "True infinity does not mean infinite extension which cannot be conceived without embracing all available finite extensions. Its nature consists in intensity and not extensity; and the moment we fix our gaze on intensity, we begin to see that the finite ego must be *distinct*, though not *isolated*, from the Infinite" (ibid., p. 112).

32. "Personally, I am inclined to think that time is an essential element in Reality. But real time is not serial time to which the distinction of past, present, and future is essential; it is pure duration, i.e. change without succession. . . . Serial time is pure duration pulverized by thought—a kind of device by which Reality exposes its ceaseless creative activity to quantitative measurement. It is in this sense that the Quran says: 'And of Him is the change of the night and of the day'" (ibid., pp. 55-56).

33. Ibid., p. 47.

varying attitudes, and reveals its true character as continuous creation. . . . To the Creative Self change cannot mean imperfection. The perfection of the creative self consists, not in a mechanistically conceived immobility. . . . It consists in the vaster basis of His creative activity and the infinite scope of His creative vision. God's life is self-revelation, not the pursuit of an ideal to be reached. The 'not-yet' of man does mean pursuit and may mean failure; the 'not-yet' of God means un-failing realization of the infinite creative possibilities of His being which retains its wholeness throughout the entire process.³⁴

From the standpoint of pure reason it might appear that we have here to do with merely one more species of pantheism. Indeed, Iqbal himself admits pantheism to be the inevitable outcome of a purely intellectual view of life.³⁵ Yet if Iqbal's God is at all identifiable with the Qur'anic Allah—and such Iqbal intends Him to be—the conception unfolded above cannot possibly be pantheistic. How then is the "inevitable outcome" to be avoided? The answer to this question is at once an answer to the question as to how we come to *know* God.³⁶ As Iqbal sees it the sole possible answer to this latter is that we *know* God by intuition,³⁷ which is to be conceived not as a faculty of knowledge qualitatively distinct from reason or perception,³⁸ rather as a quality implicit in cognition at every level. Thus while intuition is feeling, this is not to imply that it is purely subjective, for as Bradley and Whitehead have shown, feeling itself reveals cognitive content. To see that this is so we have, Iqbal suggests, merely to reflect on the character of our knowledge of our own self. And as it is at the level of the finite self so is it at all levels. Man rises in intuition from the discovery of self to the awareness of life as centralising ego,³⁸ rises finally to the intuitive experience of God as universal, unifying, telic power. For Iqbal as for Ibn Arabi, "God is a percept; the world is a concept"³⁹; for Iqbal as for Bergson, Bradley and Whitehead, the Ultimate is known because

34. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

36. "Scholastic Philosophy has put forward three arguments for the existence of God. These arguments, known as the Cosmological, the Teleological, and the Ontological, embody a real movement of thought in its quest after the Absolute. But regarded as logical proofs, I am afraid they are open to serious criticism and further betray a rather superficial interpretation of experience" (*ibid.*, p. 27). The reason for their failure is, from Iqbal's point of view, "that they look upon 'thought' as an agency working on things from without. This view of thought gives us a mere mechanism in the one case, and creates an unbridgeable gulf between the ideal and the real in the other" (*ibid.*, p. 29). It is precisely because this gulf between ideal and real cannot be admitted that all scholastic forms of argumentation for God must involve an element of speciousness.

37. For a detailed account of Iqbal's conception of intuition, see Ishrat Hasan Enver, *The Metaphysics of Iqbal* (Lahore, 1944), pp. 19 ff.

38. *Reconstruction*, p. 58. Cf. also: "The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction" (*ibid.*, p. 140).

39. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

felt, believed because intuited. Strictly speaking, the experience which leads to this *gnosis* is not a conceptually manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in a net of logical categories.⁴⁰ Whitehead calls it "transmutation." For Bradley it is what we mean in speaking of the transformation involved in the passage from the relational to the supra-relational level of experience. Whatever it is named, it is, none the less, that quality of experience which leads the self beyond the intellectual with its inevitable pantheism to complete itself in the possession of that attitude which, for Iqbal, is religion.⁴¹ To come to the realisation of the meaning and significance of this religious level of experience is, Iqbal thinks, to see for once and all the inadequacy of pantheism as a theological description.

We have seen that for Iqbal the relation of finite to Infinite Ego is one in which "true infinite does not exclude the finite," but rather "embraces the finite without effacing its finitude," and in so doing "explains and justifies its being"⁴²—which is to say that "the world in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am'."⁴³ Expressed either way, it is clear that Iqbal does not intend that the Infinite be regarded merely as an abstract totality of finites. In both forms the notion of a unity transcending its parts is plainly implied. In short, Iqbal's conception is not pantheism but panentheism, understanding by this latter "the doctrine that the world is not identical with God (pantheism), nor separate from God (deism), but in God (theism), who in His divine nature transcends it."⁴⁴

To confirm this we have but to look to the central position occupied in Iqbal's thought by the notion of the individual. At no point in his philosophy does Iqbal describe the Absolute in terms of featureless

40. Ibid.

41. Religion is defined by Iqbal as "a deliberate enterprise to seize the ultimate principle of value and thereby to reintegrate the forces of one's own personality" (ibid., pp. 178-79). So defined, religion "in its higher manifestations is neither dogma, nor priesthood, nor ritual" (ibid. p. 178). "Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man" (ibid., p. 2). "The ultimate aim of the religious life [is] the reconstruction of the finite ego by bringing him into contact with an eternal life-process, and thus giving him a metaphysical status of which we can have only a partial understanding in the half-choking atmosphere of our present environment" (ibid., p. 183).

42. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

43. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

44. *Funk and Wagnall's Unabridged Standard Dictionary*. Panentheism as here defined differs from theism in that it either (1) leaves open the question as to whether God is to be conceived as personal (the theistic viewpoint), or as non-personal, or a-personal, or it (2) leaves open the definition of "Person," assuming that God is defined as such.

totality.⁴⁵ God is always "Ultimate Ego," "Creative Self," "Omnipsyche." As regards the character of the finite, the description is throughout in terms of selves or egos. The reference is always plural. Even in his doctrine of transformation (transmutation) Iqbal is at pains to stress his conviction that the individual is neither in time nor eternity lost in God. "The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it."⁴⁶

Because individuality is plural, this doctrine cannot be pantheistic; because outside of God there is no individual, there is nothing, deism is meaningless. It is theistic to the degree that individuality connotes personality. It is panentheistic because according to it God as individual, while not other than that universe which is His physical being, is more than the sum of egos and sub-egos of which this universe is composed. To those who have followed the exposition thus far, this concern to establish Iqbal's view as panentheism may seem to border on labouring the obvious. Yet such labouring is necessary if only for the reason that at least one interpreter of Iqbal's thought has seen fit to deny that Iqbal's view is panentheism because "Either the Ultimate Ego holds the finite egos in His Imagination; or He holds them in His Being. The first alternative is panentheistic. Iqbal would not hold it; it is not justified by the facts of our experience of our own self. The human ego, if regarded as a creation of the imagination of God only, would be lifeless and no more than imaginary."⁴⁷ If this is what panentheism really means then we must, I think, admit the soundness of the argument. But with all due respect to the author, it would appear that he has here badly misconceived the meaning of the term. However variously it be defined, panentheism has never meant *merely* the holding of the finite in God's imagination. At least no panentheist of philosophical stature has ever so maintained. Of course, to hold that God (before creation) possesses that finite in His imagination which, after creation, He holds also

45. Commenting on the view espoused by Farnell in his Gifford Lectures on the attributes of God, Iqbal remarks that "It may, however, be said that the history of religious thought discloses various ways of escape from an individualistic conception of the ultimate Reality which is conceived as some vague, vast, and pervasive cosmic element, such as light. This is the view that Farnell has taken. . . . I agree that the history of religion reveals modes of thought that tend towards pantheism; but I venture to think that in so far as the Quranic identification of God with light is concerned Farnell's view is incorrect. . . . Personally, I think the description of God as light, in the revealed literature of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, must now be interpreted differently. . . . The metaphor of light as applied to God, therefore, must, in view of modern knowledge, be taken to suggest the Absoluteness of God and not His Omnipresence which easily lends itself to pantheistic interpretation" (*Reconstruction*, pp. 60-61).

46. *Ibid.*, p. 187; cf. also pp. 91, 94.

47. Ishrat Hasan Enver, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

in His being, is orthodox doctrine for any theist who maintains the dogma of creation *ex nihilo*. But Iqbal does not seem to accept this dogma,⁴⁸ and to define panentheism as the holding of the finite in God's being appears to be no more than an alternative manner of expressing the definition we have already adopted.⁴⁹ If such be so, then Enver's summary of Iqbal's conception of the relation of God and the universe expresses precisely that view we have all along been concerned to delineate, i.e.

we must hold that the Ultimate Ego holds the finite egos in His own Being without obliterating their existence. The Ultimate Reality must be regarded as of the nature of the self. But further this self does not lie apart from the universe, as if separated by a space lying between Him and ourselves. The Ultimate Self, therefore, is not transcendent, as is conceived by the anthropomorphic theists. He is immanent, for He comprehends and encompasses the whole universe. But he is not immanent in the sense of the pantheists of the traditional type, because He is a personal and not an impersonal reality. . . . He is in short immanent and transcendent both, and yet neither the one nor the other. Both immanence and transcendence are true of the Ultimate Reality. But Iqbal emphasizes the transcendence of the Ultimate Ego rather than His immanence.⁵⁰

III

To unite in one motion the Absolute of cosmology with the Person of monotheism is, as James Ward has remarked, *the* problem for twentieth-century philosophers. By and large they have shirked it—some, like Hegel, Bradley and Alexander, by emphasising the Absolute to the virtual exclusion of the Person; others, such as the Scholastics and the Christian Existentialists, by exalting the Person to a degree beyond which philosophers committed to a coherently reasoned approach could give assent. A small group—Berdyayev, Whitehead, Hartshorne, are names which come to mind—have met the problem head on. To this last group must now be added the name of Iqbal.

In a sense, the task that Iqbal has set himself is even more difficult than that attempted by these last named thinkers, for Iqbal has sought to accomplish not merely the personalisation of the Absolute, but to do so in such manner as to render his conception true in character and

48. The reservation is necessary, because while Iqbal holds to a doctrine of "continuous creation" (*Reconstruction*, pp. 47-49, 97-98), which he claims is essentially Islamic (*ibid.*, p. 131), it is doubtful whether Islamic orthodoxy, which accepts creation *ex nihilo*, would find the two doctrines compatible. On this point it may well be that Iqbal has reconstructed Islamic religious thought somewhat more extensively than the original architects would care to acknowledge.

49. See above, p. 72.

50. Enver, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

spirit to the teaching of the Qur'an. Because Islam, like Christianity, has for far too many centuries been dominated by a dogmatic scholasticism, this is an undertaking of somewhat greater difficulty than it need have been. Hence, for Iqbal, as for many philosophers and theologians of the West, any revivification of religion must begin with the recognition that the scholastic outlook, far from constituting a divinely sanctioned truth, is rather a philosophical straitjacket of which religion must be divested if it is to live. Applied to Islam this means a panentheistic reinterpretation of the teaching of the Qur'an, and throughout his work Iqbal is concerned to show that this teaching is not simply harmonious with his "reconstruction" but actually requires it. This, he thinks, becomes clear when we stop to consider the nature and character of the Person envisaged by the Qur'an in juxtaposition with the view of God which has been set forth above.

Now that Ultimate Ego must be Person is evident from the implications of Iqbal's cosmological scheme itself. If the universe is so constituted as to consist in an infinity of sub-egos unified into egos, in turn unified into an all-inclusive ego, then it makes no sense to speak of this last as simply an all-pervasive life-force, for life, taking as it does the form of ego, implies individuality by this very act, and this is so whether we have regard to ego as finite or as all-inclusive infinity. If God is Ego, Self, God is Person.

So much might one admit. But the heart of the matter remains to be resolved since it is not at all self-evident that Iqbal's idea of "Person" and that of the Qur'an are one and the same. For while scholars, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, seem to be more or less agreed that Allah is to be thought of as operatively immanent and concrete in this world, both Sunnite orthodoxy and the language of the Qur'an itself describe a creator God and celestial and terrestrial hierarchy which, taken literally, seems a far remove from Iqbal's Creative Self in process. Is the Qur'an then to be taken literally? Iqbal would say no, for as it is in Christianity, so here also, the presupposition of the possibility of any reconciliation between Scripture and philosophy is the recognition that Scripture need not, indeed cannot, be understood in all its parts in literalist or fundamentalist terms. Of course, the final word regarding the propriety or orthodoxy of any non-literalist interpretation is most properly left to the Qur'anic theologians. We only note here Iqbal's claim that Allah and Ultimate Ego are to be understood as one and the same.

The religious warrant for such an assertion is to be found by considering the Islamic notion of Creation. As noted above,⁵¹ Iqbal takes

51. See above, p. 67.

this notion to mean not that single act with which the past began but rather a continuous and continuing process in time. And for support he cites that hadith in which the Prophet has declared, "Do not vilify time, for time is God."⁵² That such a reinterpretation of Creation is of immense importance for religion is obvious. For if Creation be conceived as the continuous unfolding and fulfilment by God in time of the unlimited possibilities open for His realisation rather than, as orthodoxy has it, the making of a finished product outstretched in space, confronting God as His "other," then such specifically religious doctrines as immortality and resurrection, evil and destiny, take on a new and reasonable character, the classic problems of relating God to the universe and creation to evolution admit at last of explanation free from paradox.

Consider immortality. If creation is continuing progress, God and the universe in the making, then immortality cannot be man's by inalienable right guaranteed by his faith. It cannot be a static condition to be achieved and enjoyed in an eternity of restful glory. On the contrary, as Iqbal never wearies of pointing out, "It is the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution, or disciplines him for a future career. The principle of the ego-sustaining deed is respect for the ego in myself as well as in others. Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it. . . . The ego must continue to struggle until he is able to gather himself up, and win his resurrection."⁵³ It is important to note that this "struggle" is not one which culminates with death: ". . . death, if present action has sufficiently fortified the ego against the shock that physical dissolution brings, is only a kind of passage to what the Quran describes as 'Barzakh' . . . a state of consciousness characterized by a change in the ego's attitude towards time and space."⁵⁴ Just what this "state" or "change" consists in can hardly be precisely defined. However, as Iqbal interprets it, it is not to be regarded as merely a passive state of expectation. Rather it is "a state in which the ego catches a glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality, and prepares himself for adjustment to these aspects. . . . The resurrection, therefore, is not an external event. It is the consummation of a life-process within the ego."⁵⁵ In sum, that ego is worthy of immortality which preserves itself even in the face of death, and passing through death to "Barzakh," in "Barzakh" still maintains its tension in the face of Judgment. Notice that there is here no question of an "original sin" inhibiting man's attainment of the goal. On Iqbal's view there is no need for "Grace."

52. *Reconstruction*, p. 10.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-14.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

Sin or evil, as Iqbal sees it, is not something which hangs over mankind as a curse which only God in His infinite mercy can lift. Rather is it a challenge—to be met and mastered by each acting in his own way. Had we known not evil, we could not, he thinks, recognise good; if evil did not present itself as a factor to be overcome, ego would not have opportunity to achieve the individuality demanded for it. Iqbal's viewpoint, both as regards evil and immortality, inevitably calls to mind the meliorism of William James,⁵⁶ as indeed Iqbal apparently intends that it should, for he adapts James's language to the conviction of Islam when he remarks *apropos* of evil and immortality that "The teaching of the Quran, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognizes a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil."⁵⁷

Withal, we must not allow the melioristic character of Iqbal's re-interpretation of these doctrines to obscure the fact that his work is, from first to last, the work of a *Muslim*.⁵⁸ At every point he is at pains to indicate his conviction that his teaching is in all respects harmonious with the spirit and teaching of the Qur'an. He speaks and writes always from a standpoint *within* Islam. Thus, if in the sequel we find his reconstruction to be a philosophic importance transcending the world of Islam, we must remember that in one sense at least it is in spite of his standpoint rather than because of it.

IV

THAT God (whatever its nature) is One, that this universe is animated (for better or worse) by purpose, and that it has a character and value, that this value is evidenced by the testimony of God to man in Scripture—in these convictions Islam and the religions of the West find common ground. To ascribe, therefore, an extra-Islamic significance to Iqbal's thought is to claim that his viewpoint contributes in important measure to the clarification and understanding of these common convictions, not only as regards their harmonisation with secular knowledge as well.

Does it, in fact, do this? The conception of God as Absolute Ego, whatever its offence to the religious sensibilities of the orthodox, achieves

56. It is obvious that Iqbal here has in mind Chapter 5 of James's *Pragmatism*.

57. *Reconstruction*, p. 77.

58. This is most apparent in his poetry, as, for instance, these lines from *Jawab-i Shikwah* (p. 36):

To my Muhammad be but true,
And thou hast conquered me;
The world is naught; thou shalt command
My Pen of Destiny.

this much: it gives concrete meaning and plausibility to man's cherished belief that God is love. The conception of purpose as the realisation by Self of value and character, however dubious in the eyes of materialists, achieves this much: it explains the relatedness of all things to God, and of God to all things, in such manner as to avoid the insoluble theological paradoxes inherent in the scholastic conception of God as simple, immutable, non-reflexive perfection.

Yet to say that Iqbal has given new plausible meaning to old paradoxical doctrine is but to state half the case. For in showing that nature and spirit are not alien to one another, and hence that it is not necessary for the man of religion to say no to his environment, he has pointed the way to a solution of the perennial conflict between science, philosophy and religion, a solution whose key is the recognition that "The scientific and religious processes are in a sense parallel to each other. Both are really descriptions of the same world with this difference only that in the scientific process the ego's standpoint is necessarily exclusive, whereas in the religious process the ego integrates its competing tendencies and develops a single inclusive attitude resulting in a kind of synthetic transfiguration of his experiences."⁵⁹ Applied to philosophy, this is to say that, "While sitting in judgement on religion, philosophy cannot give religion an inferior place among its data. Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man. . . . Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring from the same root and complement each other."⁶⁰ The measure of Iqbal's contribution to Western thought is, in large part, his success in showing that the proper understanding of meaning and relation of religion, philosophy and science will be attained only when men come to realise that each is only a perspective, but a perspective for the lack of which Reality would be the less.

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59. *Reconstruction*, p. 185.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

IQBAL : A REFORMER OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY*

R. Harre

It is often suggested that the Islamic resurgence of recent years is a purely political movement. This is certainly not true of events in Pakistan. In that country's independence and in its progressive governmental philosophy can be seen one of the very few cases in history of the translation into reality of a philosophic theory of the state and life of man. The suggestion for a separate State for Indian Muslims came in the first instance from the philosopher Iqbal. Further, much of the political character that the new State now exhibits can be traced to the philosophic theories which Iqbal developed, and which were circulated by him both in Urdu and Persian poetry, and in the more conventional medium of English prose.

To understand the kind of revolution Iqbal brought about, as well as to appreciate his quite daring originality, the conceptual scheme which he recommended must be seen against the background of the intellectual history of Islam. The conventional Muslim account of man has, from the earliest times, been of a Cartesian orthodoxy, and parallel to this account there has been a similar account of the world as consisting of both physical and spiritual elements. In the early days of Islam both kinds of elements were accounted equally real and equally worthy of investigation. Muhammad himself instructed his followers in the great benefits they would derive from the study of nature. However, some five hundred years after the Prophet's death a marked change came over Islamic philosophy and religious practice. While it had formerly been an act of piety to study by the appropriate techniques either the physical or the spiritual world, it became, under the influence of a group of mystics called Sufis, proper to study only the spiritual. The explanation of this revolution need not detain us, but its effect was pervasive; the intellectual freedom and activity that had characterised the first five centuries of Muslim civilization rapidly disappeared. It required nearly a thousand years for a counter revolution to develop

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within this tradition, for Iqbal was the first Muslim philosopher wholly to oppose this orthodoxy.

His opposition is quite fundamental, and hangs, not upon piecemeal revision of the traditional conceptual scheme but on the recommendation of one compounded partly of elements from the early centuries of Islamic culture, and partly of elements derived from an evolutionary view of the world, owing much to Bergson and Whitehead. The result is a new view and a novel interpretation of Quranic doctrines what Iqbal called his "reconstructions" that is wholly at variance with Sufi tradition.

Iqbal's reconstructions are based upon three main principles which he believes to be interconnected. They are :

1. There are three fundamentally different kinds of things we can study: inanimate matter, living organisms and minds. The attempts that have been made to study these three kinds of things (these three areas of experience) have given rise to three groups of sciences, the physical, the biological and the psychological. It is important to understand that Iqbal regarded psychology as one science among a group of mind studies, others being, for example, theology and the striving for mystical experience. The total picture of the world that we derive from all three groups of sciences is what Iqbal calls religion.

2. It is proper for an individual to be active. Blind obedience to that fate which is taken to be the will of God cannot offer any theoretical grounds for immortality, nor is the belief in predestination, which is supposed to justify the acceptance of *Qismat*, supported by experience in any of the three realms.

3. All these three kinds of things we can study are changing from what they were into something else. The world, the animate creation and God are each changing. Muhammad was the last prophet, not because he gave a final description of the three realms of experience, but because he recommended a method of enquiry that enables a day-to-day record of the change to be kept.

The metaphysical background is supplied by a theory of time. It is a principle for Iqbal that there are three main levels of experience, each with its appropriate group of science, but of these sciences only physics has provided us with a theory of time. The most developed form of the theory Iqbal takes to be that advocated by Whitehead, for whom "Nature is not a static fact in an adynamic void but a structure of events possessing the character of continuous creative flow, which thought cuts up into isolated immobilites out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time." This, however satisfying as a physical explanation of a certain kind of temporal experience, cannot be taken as a complete philosophic theory, for it concerns only one of

the three "regions of Reality." Iqbal says, "Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory. It does not pass, events do not happen (on this theory), we simply meet them." No mathematical theory which treats time as another dimension of space will do as an explanation either, for this takes away the essential element of change which is the central feature of our experience of time. For a complete theory we must turn to the other levels of experience, since if physical explanations will not do for time as experienced in other ways, perhaps from them we may derive an explanation for the character of physical time.

A theory satisfying to the three realms is provided by Iqbal by the exploitation of an analogy between the relation of perception to physical reality and the relation of the third realm to perception. Iqbal argues that there must be two selves going to make up each individual. These he calls the efficient and the appreciative self, for there is an inner as well as an outer experience, and so there must be an inner something to be experienced. The efficient self is that which concerns itself with, and which is itself partially formed by, the physical world. We know quite well that the time of the physical world is serial time and the succession of impressions is what the efficient self apprehends. This self Iqbal likens to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. The other self, the appreciative self, is available only to keep introspection, and when we do find it, by, for example, religious exercises, we find ourselves in "appreciative time," a "changeless now." This, of course, cannot be described by us consciously since to do so we would be required to use categories applicable only to serial time. In our ordinary experience of ourselves the efficient self is dominant and breaks up this changeless now into a series of nows; and these, so Iqbal says, are the instants of linear time. It is in various analogies with this process that Iqbal finds the "typical movement of life." Analogies drawn are: God to his creation; from a confused to a clear perception of reality; from "knowledge-as-a-whole" to the abstractions of the physical and other sciences.

Having made this analysis Iqbal then makes another conceptual recommendation of great importance. We are to regard, he says, the appreciative self and its analogues as creative. We do not, for example, find things, we make them. "What we call things are events in the continuity of nature which thought spatializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for the purposes of actions." Not only do we make things, but in political and ethical action, among other things, Iqbal believes that we also make our ends. He regards this view as a consequence of

the two kinds of experience, the inner and the outer. The result of our inner experience is the grasping of a continual succession of goals and purposes which give significance to everything that happens. The past and the future are carried into every event. There is no final cause, for this would involve the loss of that spontaneity that Iqbal regards as one of the facts about our lives that are indubitably given.

Now what holds the efficient and appreciative selves together into an individual? Iqbal answers this by invoking a Bergsonian term "duration," by which he means that all events which come one after another in serial time are held in a kind of suspension. Only out of such a suspension, Iqbal argues, can creation take place. There is no time logically prior to this background self. However, this vague exposition is not Iqbal's last word on "duration," for in discussing the nature of God he provides an explanation of the queer notion of suspension. Both Iqbal's religious theory and his ethical principles are developed within the conceptual scheme that I have just sketched.

Let us now see how Iqbal put this metaphysics to work. It must be remembered that Iqbal's main purpose as a philosopher was practical, he aimed at the reformation of the character of a culture and his method was the philosophic reconstruction of the fundamental tenets of Islam. This practical purpose showed itself in a reconstructed theology and reformed ethics.

Iqbal's theology begins with the proposition that God must be capable of change. This is not "change in the serial sense where change is marked by one state giving way to another but in the appreciative sense. This means that when, in our perception of him, God is serialized, he appears to change, the many aspects which are held in intimate, contemporary suspension in him appreciatively are serialized by our understanding into a changing, evolving Godhead and his Creation." It follows from this doctrine that God can be both continuously creative and yet remain the same. When we understand him and the universe in a serialized procession of states, the source of these states is the suspension in God of everything that has been, is and will be looked at by our efficient selves. God is creative, but perceived by the deep experience of our appreciative selves he is complete and together, existing, as it were, all at once. From this theology follows an altogether new explanation of the traditional Islamic doctrine of the finality of the prophethood.

Prophets appear in history, one following another, each contributing but a deep appreciative understanding to our serialized knowledge of God and the Universe. Iqbal talks of this process, the paradigm

of all mystical experience, as the "supercharged ego" bringing back knowledge from God. Now since both God, in his aspect as the serialized Universe, and Man as his efficient self are changing, it is quite unreasonable to believe that any revelation which occurred at a given point in the serialized succession of states that is history, is a final revelation of the character of God which is wholly appreciative, and which can only be understood serial-wise at the end of time, that is never. Muhammad was the last prophet, not because he brought the final revelation of truth, but because he brought the method of free, personal enquiry which made further revelations unnecessary. Each man has the way clear for him now, if he wishes, to experience God and understand the world for himself. The search for understanding is keyed to our metaphysical explanation of ourselves as having through the two selves, efficient and appreciative, an entrance to both worlds of knowledge, without and within. It was the mistake, Iqbal believes, of the Sufis to concentrate upon the exploration within, and it is the mistake of the Franks, the people of the technocratic cultures, to concentrate upon the exploration without. The acceptance of true Islam, Muhammad's Islam, commits a man to both kinds of exploration if he would understand the whole world. From being a creature upon which knowledge is imposed man has evolved into a creature who demands knowledge for himself. Since both God and Man have changed, is it surprising that relations have changed too?

This is the broad metaphysical picture that Iqbal sketches. Within the details we will find his moral theory. The question which leads to the statement of a moral theory, is: how can the free creative appreciative egos of men exist within the free creative appreciative Ego of God? How can both be free? Iqbal answers as follows.

"The truth is that the whole theological controversy relating to predestination is due to pure speculation with no eye on the spontaneity of life, which is a fact of actual experience. No doubt the emergence of ego endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation of the freedom of the all inclusive Ego. But this limitation is not externally imposed. It is born out of God's creative freedom, whereby he has chosen finite egos to be participants of his life, power and freedom." But perhaps this freedom is an illusion of the serializing self. Iqbal argues that we could not exist as individuals if we did not, in some sense, act contrary to the world. He says, "The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego . . . it is present in the areas of mutual invasion, as a directive energy, and is

formed and disciplined by its own experience. It is open to man as thus conceived to belong to the meaning of the universe and become immortal." In this way Iqbal exorcises that strict determinism that had provided such an important element in Islamic moral and political theory as the doctrine of *Qismat*. A person comes into being only through individual striving and creative activity. The causistical consequence of the rejection of *Qismat*, the fixed destiny, in favour of *Taqdir*, the personal creation of destiny, is the claim Iqbal makes, that a man is good only by striving according to those ends which by inward meditation or empirical investigation he makes for himself. Only in this sense must men work out their destiny.

The causistry is reinforced by a corresponding theory of immortality. It was mentioned above that Iqbal believed life to centre in the tension between mind and environment, a tension which holds an individual together and makes the centre to which his individuality can refer. A person is self-sustained, in individuality, just so far as he resists absorption in nature. Death then becomes the test for the power of self-maintenance in man. "Personal immortality," says Iqbal, "is not ours by right, it is to be achieved by personal effort." Paradoxically one creates oneself at the same time and by the same process as one serializes the creation of God, the world of nature. In particular the study of the science would not be inimical to immortality on this view, but a positive assistance.

In describing this metaphysical system, my intention has been purely expository and not critical. Internal criticism of the system could no doubt be made to seem fatal to it, but would be based upon a misunderstanding of a metaphysical system's purpose and character. External criticism would require a judgement on a way of life for which it is inappropriate to ask in less than a full scale's study. My purpose in this article is to make clear what a man, whom many now follow, thought about his religion for holding the opinion he did. If these reasons and opinions have no intrinsic interest, then the metaphysician has failed altogether in his recommendations for a reformed conceptual scheme. This suggests the kind of judgement which it would be appropriate to make.

Iqbal proposed a counter-revolution within the Islamic tradition. Though the spur for his reconstructions came from study of Kant and Whitehead, he seems as one might expect to have gained some of his most characteristic attitudes and opinions from philosophers deviating little from Islamic tradition. For example, Iqbal provides an explanation of the Divine suspension of states in non-temporal duration, re-

solving the paradox by a distinction between intensive and extensive infinity. A never ending extensive infinity of states can be generated by some extensively limited but intensively infinite process, as an infinite series can be generated from a short formula. This distinction of kinds of infinities is made a great deal of by the thirteenth century Persian mystic Rumi, for whom Iqbal often professed admiration as the great practitioner of enlightenment by inward exploration. Again, he takes from the tradition, and especially from Rumi, the classical notion of expressing a moral theory in a description of the perfect man. Iqbal's perfect man shows in his character the philosopher's rejection of the doctrine of *Qismat*. Salvation through the dissolution of self is to be replaced as a moral ideal by salvation through the assertion of self. It should be clear from the character of Iqbal's metaphysics that this assertion is not like the assertion recommended by existentialists. It is assertion of self, not by the doing of something simple for the sake of action, but a complicated and difficult process of scientific enlightenment, mystical experience and finally rational action towards those ends to which the two ways of knowledge lead us.

Finally I should like to make it clear that nowhere in Iqbal's work do we find a connected, strictly argued philosophic system. Iqbal is not a philosopher in the sense in which this term was understood in the European academic tradition. He aimed quite self-consciously to inculcate an attitude and not to argue a case. With this attitude to metaphysics we would, in our post-Wittgenstein world, agree. However, Iqbal does aim to convince, and his system is intended to be intellectually acceptable; it is not intended to be a soft philosophy. Nevertheless, I believe that we must ask of such systems not "Is it true or acceptable?" but "could I live by it?"

(October 69)

IQBAL AS A POET AND PHILOSOPHER*

Edward McCarthy

In our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms.

—Thomas Mann.

Even as I depart from this world,
Everyone will be saying 'I knew him.'
But the truth is that none knew this traveller,

What he said, unto whome he said; or whence he came. Iqbal
We know him better now. And not only his own people know
him but the whole world. Recognition of Muhammad Iqbal's
genius was slow in the West, and this was for a very simple reason.
Modern European poetry is almost entirely divorced from action—
the last great poet of affirmation was probably Milton—and the
European mind is naturally suspicious of the kind of poetry that
carries a message. Muhammad Iqbal's work is nothing but a message
and hence its lack of impact on the West until very recently.

What was not realized by the West was the essential unity of
Iqbal's poetic vision; for in this poet, thought and poetry were fused
as these had very rarely been done before, and as such it is not possible
to discuss the poetry without a knowledge of his thought. It is
also difficult to fully understand the thought without an appreciation
of the poetry; as both are complementary. In the ultimate analysis
poetry, thought and action are all merged into one. It is this oneness
of the poetry of Iqbal that I would like to discuss here.

Iqbal begins and ends with the belief in *Tauhid*—the oneness of
God—as expressed in the Holy Qur'an. From this all Man's potentialities
spring and return to it in the end. Man is spiritual, his ultimate
aim is spiritual. But in Islam the search for spiritual reality is
not something contradictory to the world of matter—on the contrary,
since we live in the world our destiny can be worked out only

*A prize was awarded to the writer of this article by the Pakistan Embassy, Khartoum. —Editor.

in and through the world. Here lies the great difference between Islam and Christianity, for whereas Islam fosters a spirit of unworldliness through the visible world, Christianity rejects reality in favour of the ideal. Europe, it might be said, was both created and permanently spoiled by Christianity. Very early in his career, Iqbal realized this, and incidentally, in realizing it, and the individualism that had resulted from it, foresaw the First World War—

A nest built on a slender bough cannot last.

The Greeks too, because of their one-sidedness, were rejected by him. He even went so far as to criticize the early Muslim thinkers for reading the Qur'an in the light of the Greek thought, for the Qur'an is basically anti-classical and sees even in the humble bee a recipient of divine inspiration, whilst Plato despised sense-perception to such an extent that he rejected the real world altogether. The ideal of Islam is 'to appropriate the real with a view eventually to absorbing it, to convert it into itself and to illuminate its whole being.'

But Iqbal, following Ghazzali, does not limit knowledge to strivings of intellect alone; he stresses that inner intuition which the heart achieves and which in the words of Rumi 'finds its food in the rays of the sun.' Here again he is close to the Qur'an, which stresses the value of all modes of knowing. But with knowledge in and for itself Iqbal was not content—he even criticized such knowledge as well as the modern educational system which encourages it.

Thou and thy books are never apart;

Thou readest but thou dost not see.

For him knowledge was useless if it did not further the ideal of 'self' or '*Khudi*'.

The concept of *Khudi*, as developed in the major philosophical poem, *Asrar-i-Khudi* (1915), is basic to Iqbal. It is a concept very close—some might say dangerously close—to Nietzsche's concept of the Superman. But Iqbal, possibly in reaction to the Sufi ideal of passive contemplation, was thinking in terms of the dynamic individual in society long before he studied Nietzsche, and there is one great difference between the two ideals: Iqbal's concept of selfhood was both religious and democratic, while Nietzsche's concept was aristocratic and in a universe where 'God is dead.' Iqbal summed up his idea in these words:

Loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature."

The great poet, scanning the mass of phenomena, finds eventually his own heart. Iqbal, like Dante, and in our own time, Eliot, finds in his own heart love, and finds love at the heart of the universe. For Love

Paints 'the tulip petals 'hue;
Love robbed thee of thyself and gave thee tears;
Love brought me ever closer to my soul.

This all-pervading love, knowledge, and Iqbal's concept of *Khudi*, are all inextricably mixed. Knowledge is a progression beginning with sense-perception (*'Ilm*), and ending with the knowledge of the heart which is the knowledge of ultimate reality, i.e., Love (*'Ishq*). Harmony between these two forms of knowledge, a constant synthesis of *'Ilm* and *'Ishq*, are the basis of *Khudi*. The major part of Iqbal's poetry is an attempt at achieving this harmony, and it is precisely here that his thought is clearest and his poetry greatest:

Bring back the cup and soul-reviving wine,
Let me rise again to my spire of glory.
Though lingered in my flask a drain of freedom's wine,
This too the pious elder dubbed forbidden joy.
No lion-heart now rides, fearless to the truth,
None now remains but slaves of creeds and sects.
Who has dared to uplift the *foulful* sword of love?
The hand of knowledge grasps an empty sheath.
If in the breast a heart illumined beats, then warmth of words
will breathe the fire of life,
But if no light there be, then words are forever dead.
But not my night from the moon-gleams' light,
In thy cup is the full bright moon, O Saqi.

Iqbal could hardly be content with *Khudi* in and for itself. Certainly man's individuality must be developed, for only by the completion of the personality can we hope to achieve that awareness of reality which Iqbal believed to be man's ultimate goal on earth, that awareness of what Eliot has called the 'still point of the turning world.' But man is a social being; we must be ourselves but we must also live together. After the completion of the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, Iqbal addressed himself to the problem of the individual within the

community. This resulted in his second major philosophical poem, *Rumuz-i-Bekhudī* (1918), in which he argues that the only hope for the future is a return to the past, to seek what is vital and for all time in the teaching of the Qur'an. This is a difficult poem by any standards, but the difficulty is in proportion to the theme itself. What kind of society is best suited to the twofold human problem of individuality within the community? Iqbal argues that by clearing away the dross of the ages, the hard core of Islam as set out in the Qur'an could be discovered again, that the Qur'an which is the only religious book whose teaching was aimed at all society, contained the answer to the problems confronting the twentieth century. As an individual should always be in 'a state of tension', so also a society should be ever striving because the highest development of self meant equality, freedom and solidarity. In this way a State should also try to translate these principles according to space-time forces. The State should aim above all, at the completion of the individual and in achieving this it would also achieve its own highest goal. There is only one means to this end, and that is the right action.

Here we reach that point in Iqbal's thought which has, to a great extent, prevented his genius from being recognized until very recently in the West. For a European a poem has its own end; Iqbal had no time for such a belief—for him art was an attempt to grasp the deepest realities of human existence, and since these could be grasped only through action, and particularly that kind of action which widened our frontiers not only from a purely earthly point of view but also with an eye on the complexity of life behind it, therefore art should not be an end in itself but an attempt to produce useful action—or at least a state of mind conducive to this. This is the crux of the problem. Fifty years ago, for all this great qualities as a poet, Iqbal would have been dismissed as an 'impure' artist, but today in Europe, with the realization growing ever stronger that the artist cannot stand aloof from the great social problems of his time, there is a lot to be learned from Iqbal (as he himself remarked), firstly because he managed to write great poetry while remaining always (or nearly always) close to his people, secondly that through his poetry he managed to create 'the consciousness of his reality'.

Apart from the above mentioned philosophical works, Iqbal wrote other other major works like the *Bal-i-Jibril* in Urdu,

regarded by many as his greatest work and the *Javid Namah*, in Persian, a kind of Divine Comedy of the East, in which Iqbal ascends through different stages to heaven, guided by Rumi, as Dante was guided by Virgil. The main theme of the poem is that both the East and the West have been wrong in their attitude to reality:

The East saw God but failed to see the world of matter,
The West got embroiled in the world and neglected God.

But it was not this poem or the two philosophical poems that made Iqbal a popular poet so much as his poems in Urdu, which often put forward the same ideas but with greater simplicity and conciseness. These poems were directed to an audience close at hand, and in them—and especially in the poems of *Bal-i-Jibril* and *Zarb-i-Kalim* there is, it seems to me, an immediacy that is often lacking in the greater works:

Hear my complaint and feel, or do not feel, with me:
He does not come to beg redress whose soul walks free;
Vast skies, and frozen winds, and man's one pinch of dust:
What urged Thee to create?—kindness or cruelty?
The garden breeze has shattered the rose's petalled tent,
Is this your bounteous spring, your fair wind's ministry.

and a lyricism that the theme of the greater poems could not permit:

The tulip's lantern
In desert bare
Is fanned to brightness
By spring air.

But Iqbal was a many-sided genius, and there are no poetic forms which he did not attempt successfully.

Many visionaries have dreamed of action—to Iqbal alone, so far as I know, was it granted to realize his life's dream. The whole basis of his work was Faith:

Faith in essence is a burning search,
Whose beginning is respect, whose end is love.
The rose is honoured for its grace and charm,
And a man is worthless if he has not these.

Faith in his vision of a meaningful universe:

Each thing in essence is the same, be it light or dust;
The sun's blood will flow if the atom's heart be rent;

Firm faith, a constant striving and world conquering love,
These are men's weapons on the battlefield of life.
Faith in man is continuously pushing him forward.
On rides the moon to its peak of glory,
But there is no halting place for man's endeavour.

Here is not the place for a discussion on politics, though no essay on Iqbal would be complete without at least a reference to Iqbal's crowning achievement—the conception of Pakistan. Great poets contain in themselves the unformulated aspirations of their time and people. Iqbal went a step further and actually formulated the aspirations of the Muslims of the then undivided India, and did so by translating his thoughts logically into action. He saw that Islam was 'a state conceived as a contractual organism... animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature... but as a spiritual being understood in terms of human social mechanism.' To quote from him:

"Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has its place in the moral life of man. Yet what really matters is a man's faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the feelings which in my eyes are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated."

Iqbal's conception of Pakistan, far from being the result of narrow nationalism, which some have thought it to be, mainly because they failed to understand Iqbal's motives, was noble, on the part of a great poet and thinker, who all his life advocated action, whose whole life was an attempt to revive the lost purity of Islam, and in doing so to remake his people, whose one aim was, after all, very human:

This, my God! is my desire,
Let all men have my vision.

(October 61)

SATAN IN
IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHICAL AND POETICAL WORKS

A. Bausani

Translated into English

by

*R. A. Butler**

E. Hardy, a Sanskritist and historian of religions, wrote in the first issue of *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* whose founder he was: "The religions of the civilized peoples are also the very frame of the science of religions."¹ More than half a century of extremely fruitful research in the field of the "Primitive" religions have of course modified the views of the scholars in religious science a good deal. Nonetheless I do not think it unfit to quote Hardy's above statement as a methodological excuse, should I say, for the present study. By examining an element of the religious thought of a modern thinker and artist of Pakistan, I indeed intend to trace those lines of his philosophical and poetical construction that lead us back into older and deeper zones. Perhaps this way offers a greater chance for security : for to proceed from what is known and liable to experimentation towards what is less known and more difficult to experiment, proves, of course, much easier than the opposite way.

The special shape which Muhammad Iqbal has given to Satan's figure, has prompted a few articles from Pakistani writers, whereas to my knowledge no European author has written anything on Iqbal's Satan. The most substantial of the articles from Pakistanis, as far as I can see, are : Abdur Rahman Tariq, "Iqbal kā tasawwur-i Iblis", in *Jahān-Iqbāl*, Lahore 1947, pp 399-420 (in Urdu) ; Bashir Ahmad Dār, "The Idea of Satan in Iqbal and Milton", in *Iqbal*, Bazm-i Iqbāl, Lahore, Vol. I, July 1952, N. 1. pp. 83-108 (in English) ; Tāj Muhammad Khayāl, "Iqbal's Conception of Satan" in Vol. II (July 1953, pp 1-17) of the same Journal (in English). Statements from the above authors will, when quoted, correspond to the following abbreviations : Tāriq, Dār, Khayāl.

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Mention must also be made of A. Aḥmad Surūr's study on the Iqbalian Satan, "Iqbāl aur Iblīs", in *Na'e aur purāne charāgh*, Delhi 1946, pp. 31-62. The same volume contains also other studies on Iqbal. Surūr's article also contains interesting remarks about other Urdu poets who wrote poetry on Satan.

In what follows I am going to present in chronological order, the full translation of those basic texts (some of them have not been translated, so far, into European languages) of Iqbal's work that are significant of his conception of Satan, excluding only: (a) the passages in English prose from the *Lectures*², which can be understood also by reader un-acquainted with Oriental languages, and (b) single verses or groups of verses which do not present any consistent context. They will be quoted as foot-notes or in some other place in the course of the article.³

(A) From *Payām i Mashriq* (1923, in Persian) :

Taskhīr i fitrat (The Conquest of Nature, p. 97-101)

(a) *Birth of Adam*

Love vociferated: Lo! a fervid adorer is born;
Beauty shuddered: Lo! a percipient is born.
Nature plunged into consternation that
From the dust of a powerless world,
A self-maker, self-demolisher, self-regulator is born.
Out went a news from the sky to the Eternal Abode;
Beware, ye veiled-ones! a veil-ripper is born.
Desire—unaware of itself, in the sanctum of life,
Opened the eyes, and yet another world was born.
Quoth Life: "I sweltered in the dust all my life,
Until (at last) a gate hath appeared in this Olden Vault."

(b) *Refusal of Satan*

I'm not (like) the naive Light-Being⁴, that
I prostrate before Adam;
By origin, he's dust, by descent I'm Azar.
From my ardour sweltereth blood in the veins of universe;
In my run, I'm a gale, in my rattle, I'm thunder.
I'm the liaison for Atoms (of Matter), I'm the code for
Elements⁵,

I'm fire and (yet) I grant harmony—
 I'm (indeed) the fire of the Alchemist.
 My own structure do I break into pieces ;
 Until from the dust of old, I bring forth a new form.
 Owing to my stream, the wave of sky deigneth no rest ;
 I'm the painter of the world, I'm the lustre of the gem.
 The embodiment of star is from Thee, the movement
 Of the star from me ;
 I'm the Soul in the World, I'm the occult life.
 Thou imparteth life to the body, I grant rebellion to Life ;
 Thou robbest the calm, I guide with ardour.
 I've not begged for prostrations from the lowly-ones ;
 I'm wrathful even with't the Hell, I'm just,
 Even with't the Doomsday.
 Adam—of earthy descent, mean and infantile,
 Born in your lap, groweth old in my embrace.

(c) *Temptation of Adam*

Life (full) of suffering and conspiracies is better
 Than everlasting repose ;
 A ring-dove becometh a Falcon through fretful
 Struggle under the Net.
 Nothing art thou capable of except prostrations of humility :
 Rise like the tall cypress-tree, O thou (who art)
 Slow-paced in action.
Kauthar and *Tasnim* take away from thee the pleasure of action,
 Extract thou mirror-like wine from the grape-vine.⁶
 Good and Evil is but the offspring of the imagination
 Of thy God ;
 Get thou the taste for action, step boldly ahead,
 Seek thy Objective.
 Rise that I show thee a new World ;
 Open the World-descrying eye, stroll around for a prying view.
 Thou art an insignificant drop, be thou a sparkling gem ;
 Get thee going from atop thy sky, take the place in the Ocean.
 Thou art a shining sword, ravish thee thy soul of a whole world ;
 Show thou thine own quality, come out of thy shield.

Open thine Eagle-wings, spill the blood of doves;
It meaneth death for the Hawk to live in ill-repute.
Thou dost not know it yet . . . The desire dies when it is united to
the Goal.
Eternal life is nothing else than to live in ever inflamed passion.⁷

(d) *Adam coming out of Paradise sayeth:*

What a pleasure is it to devote entire life
To infatuation and harmonization;
To melt the heart of the mount, the plain and the desert awhile.
From the cage to open a door to the openness of a garden;
To traverse the path of sky, to confide with the Stars.
With raptures latent, with submissions manifest;
To throw a cognizant glance towards the threshold of the
beloved.
Sometimes seeing nothing but One in a bed of tulips;
Sometimes distinguishing a prickly thorn from the rose.
I'm all an unsatiated rapture, I'm the agony of desire;
I surrender conviction to doubt since I'm a martyr of inquisi-
tiveness.

(e) *The Morn of Doomsday (Adam in the presence of the Creator)*

O Thee! From Thy sun the star of Soul seeketh light;
From my heart Thou hast lit up the lamp of the benighted World.
My skills created an ocean with (just) a single channel of water;
My adze bringeth forth milk from the liver of the hard rock.
Venus is my prisoner, Moon is my worshipper;
My versatile intelligence hath sway over the Universe.
I go deep down the Earth, I rise high onto the sky;
The atom and the shining moon are captives of my magic.
Although his spell led me astray from the righteous path,
Overlook Thou my mistake, accept the excuse of my sin.
The World doth not yield unless we conjure up his spell;
Except for the lasso of will-power the Universe
Doth not become subjugated.
That from the hot sigh this stony image becometh pliant;
The wearing of his Sacred-Thread (zunnar)⁸ became unavoidable
for me.

Intelligence bringeth into net the wily nature⁹;
The flame-born Ahriman doth prostration unto dust!

(B) From *Jāvēdnāma* (1932, in Persian)

(1) *Ahriman tests Zoroaster*

Because of thee, all my creations wail,
To January thou hast my April turned.
Thou mad'st me reprobate; thy paintings all
Are coloured with my blood. Thy shining hand¹⁰
Doth spell my death and thy Sinaic light
Props and perpetuates thy God of men.
The dupes alone can trust the word of God,
Who goes His way save the misguided ones!
He proffers rosy poison for a drink,
His presents are the saw, the worms, the cross.
Save prayer no refuge did Noah have
And prayer that availed him naught!¹¹ Now dwell
In caves, in angel's company, and quit
The town, turn with a glance the earth to gold,
And scorch the sky with songs.¹² In mountains like
A Moses wander burnt by radiant sights . . .
But prophethood abjure, whose priestly breed
Are Mullahs. Lowly company perverts
A man, to ashes turns his nature's fire
Let saintliness suffice thee; for to love
A headache is what prophethood entails.
Arise and gather back thy scattered threads,
And live alone, renounce all multitudes.¹³

(2) *The Song of Baal*

Man could behold no God beyond the sky
Although this blue veil he did tear,
What dwells within his heart save fleeting thoughts
Like waves that rise and disappear?
The tangible alone gives his soul bliss,
Old days, O Hope! will now return;
Live long, O West! thou of the East aware,
Out of our graves hast made us turn.

Our age has come, O ancient gods, our age!
The Unitarians' gathering's broken now,
With hearts untouched by thrill divine,
Their company's hushed, forsaken are their cups,
They who once quaffed but Gabriel's wine.
Torn from the Lord, bound to the fatherland,
Thus have the free their freedom sold;
The Haram's keeper wears the denier's thread—
Whose glory on him takes its hold.
Our age has come, O, ancient gods, our age!
The blissful days have to the world returned.
No faith, but race and state shall glow;
No fear have we now of Muhammad's lamp,
At which a hundred Bu Lahabs blow.
Although the sound 'no god save God' still comes,
The mouth 'll be mum if sealed 's the soul;
Charm of the West gives Satan life anew,
God's brilliant day in gloom doth roll.
Our age has come, O ancient gods, our age!
Men free from cords of faith are our men,
So snap the cords, cut them away;
We gave a prayer devotionless to them,
Till hard it is for them to pray.
They thrill enough now get from music gay,
What bliss is there in prayer?
Much more than for the Lord intangible,
For idols visible they care.¹⁴
Our age has come, O ancient gods, our age!

(3) *Satan's apparition in the firmament of Jupiter*

Living Stream : He who regarded himself much above
The rank of man (=Satan); his flagon nor his jar
Contains e'en dregs. Our dust doth fly in skies,
Where lies the fire of that impoverished one?
Hāllāj : Say little of that leader of all souls
With unfulfilment anguished; sore athirst,
His primeval cut is filled with blood. We are
But ignorant; he knows reality
And nothingness. His old revolt has taught

To us this secret that the fallen know
 Delight of rising and that from the pain
 Of less flows forth the joy of more. To burn
 In his fire is to love; without his flame,
 No burning be. He is antecedent
 In service and in love ; therefore unschooled
 Man in his mysteries remains. Tear off
 The cloak of orthodoxy that constrains;
 And from him learn the unity of God.¹⁵

.....
 But in a while the world went dark, all space
 To bounds of spaceless regions somber turned.
 And out of this pervading night did flash
 A flame, from which appeared an aged man,
 He was attired in black and smoke around
 His person coiled. The sage of Rum informed,
 "He leads all those with separation sore,
 He is all fire and holds a cup of gore.
 An ancient one who seldom smiles, speaks less,
 Has eyes that pierce the flesh and search the heart.
 A drunkard and a theologian both,
 Philosopher as well, at once he is;
 Dressed as an anchorite, and diligent
 Like priests in prayer busy. Union's bliss
 Is foreign to his stuff, so he forsakes
 Eternal beauty, chooses to live like
 An eremite, but since it is so hard
 To tear away oneself from beauty, he
 Cannot but spurn obeisance too.¹⁶ Do look
 And realise his spiritual throes,
 Watch how he doth travail, how he endures.
 Immersed he is still in the blazing war
 'Twixt good and evil, and though he has seen
 A hundred prophets, yet he dares deny."
 His anguish seared my soul. A silent sigh
 In endless woe, I saw escape his lips.
 He arched a glance at me and thus addressed,
 "Who always dwells in action more than me?
 It is such toil that for one Sabbath I
 Have not been free. I have no seraphin

Nor slaves, unaided by apostles is
My message sent.¹⁷ I have tradition brought
Nor testament—though what a mortal blow
To those seep in faith's lore! None snaps the thread
Of faith as sharply as they do, none leaves
Like them the Ka'ba but a heap of bricks.¹⁸
And my faith is not founded in the way
They know, because in it there is no sect.¹⁹
I left prostration off, and wrought a tune
Out of the clash of good and bad. But I
Am no denier of God, be not deceived
By my exterior; see my inner self.
I would be mean of intellect if I
Denied the Lord, since in his Presence once
I stood. When I deny I but affirm
And what I say is better than what I
Withhold. To share man's misery I for him
Accept the wrath and fury of the Lord,
I let flames shoot out from my field and make
Man reach volition from fatality.²⁰
My evil I display that thou mayest swoop
On it or isolate thyself as thou
Mayest will. O man, release me from my flame
And straighten up my knotted task. O thou
Who in my noose art caught and giv'st me leave
To sin, live with the mettle of a man within
This world. If thou compassion feelest for me
Remain a stranger to myself, my sweet
And bitter disregard, no sombre make
My scroll. Pursuers in the world exist
On preys: till thou allow thyself to be
A sport, all arrows I do point on thee.
Who soars need feel no fall; the hunter too
Can be frustrated by a watchful prey."
"Transcend thy cult of isolation now,"
I said to him, "Divorce is in my eyes
The worst of things"²¹. "Disunion's day is filled
With rapture," he replied, "its ache and throb
And quiver do compose life's music sweet.
Of union I shall breathe not even a word,

For fusion if I seek, nor I survive
 Nor He remains." Thus talk of union made
 Him look distraught and strange, and anguish new
 Assailed his heart, he fumbled in his fumes,
 In which he in a while dissolved himself,
 And from these winding vapours rose a wail;
 How happy is the soul that feels its smart.

(4) *The Wail of Satan*

O lord of good and bad, man's company
 And commerce has degraded me. Not once
 My bidding dares he to defy; his self
 He realises not. And never feels
 His dust the thrill of disobedience;
 Unlit as it is by the ego's spark.
 The victim himself to the hunter says,
 "Entrap me"; from his pliancy I seek
 Refuge. Release me from this chase, recall
 My fealty of but yesterday. O woe
 To me whose sinewy heart he has turned soft
 And frail. His nature is effeminate
 And feeble his resolve, he lacks the strength
 To stand a single stroke of mine. A man
 Endowed with vision would have suited me,
 A riper rival I deserve. Reclaim
 From me this game of chaff and dust, for planks
 And impish play suit not an aged one.
 This Adam's son is just a heap of hay,
 Whom my one spark can all consume. If thy
 World had but straw why didst thou light a lake
 Of fire in me? Thou dost confront with glass
 The one who could e'en mountains melt. Now for
 The pilling torture of these victories
 I claim to be requited. Lead my way
 That I may find a man of God, who dare
 Resist my might, and who will twist and turn
 My neck, whose single glance will make my flesh
 To creep, and who will say to me "Be gone",
 Who will not weigh me by two oats. O God!²²
 Confront me with a single faithful man,

May I perchance gain bliss in my defeat!²³

(C) From *Bāl-i Jibrīl* (1935 in Urdu)

(1) *Dialogue between Gabriel and Satan* (pp. 192 ff.)

Gabriel : Comrade of ancient days! How fares the world of sight and sound?

Satan : In fire and rage and grief and pain and hope and longing drowned.

Gabriel : No hour goes by in Paradise but your name is spoken there; Is it not possible that rent robe be mended that you wear?

Satan : Ah, Gabriel! You have never guessed my mystery; alas Maddened for ever I left upon Heaven's floor my broken glass.

Impossible, oh! impossible I would dwell here again;
Silent, how silent all this realm—no palace, no loud lanel
I whose despair is the fire by which the universe is stirred,
What should I do—all hope renounce, or hope yet in
God's word?²⁴

Gabriel : Your mutiny has put our high estate in Heaven to shame;
In the Creator's eye what credit now can angels claim?

Satan : But in man's pinch of dust my daring spirit has breathed ambition,
The warp and woof of mind and reason are woven of my sedition.

The deeps of good and ill you only see from land's far verge:
Which of us is it, you or I, that dares the tempest's scourge?
Your ministers and prophets are pale shades: the storms I teem
Roll down ocean by ocean, river by river, stream by stream!
Ask of this God, when next you stand alone within His sight;
Whose blood is it has painted Man's long history so bright?
In the heart of the Almighty like a pricking thorn I lie;
You only cry for ever (Allāh hū)²⁵ oh God, oh God most high!

(2) *Satan's Petition* (p. 215)

To the Lord of the universe the Devil said:
A firebrand Adam grows, that pinch of dust
Meagre-souled, plump of flesh, in fine clothes Trussed,

Brain ripe and subtle, heart not far from dead.
 What the East's sacred law made men abjure,
 The casuist of the west pronounces pure;
 Knowest Thou not, the girls of Paradise see
 And mourn their gardens turning wilderness?
 For fiends its rulers serve the populace:
 Beneath the heavens is no more need of me.²⁶

(D) From *Zarb-i Kalīm* (1937, in Urdu)

(1) *Fate* (pp. 42 ff.)

Satan : Oh God, Creator! I did not hate your Adam.
 That captive of Far-and-Near and swift-and-Slow;
 And what presumption could refuse to You
 Obedience ? If I would not kneel to him,
 The cause was your own fore-ordaining will.

God : When did that mystery dawn on you? before,
 Or after your sedition ?

Satan : After, oh brightness
 Whence all the glory of all beings flows.

God : (to His angels): See what a grovelling nature taught him this
 Fine theorem! His not kneeling, he pretends,
 Belonged to My fore-ordinance; gives his freedom
 Necessity's base title; wretch! his own
 Consuming fire he calls a wretch of smoke.²⁷

(2) *Satan's Order to his Political Offspring* (p. 148)

Enmesh in politics the Brahmin—from
 Their ancient altars the twice-born expel!
 The man who famine-racked still fears no death
 Mahomed's spirit from his breast expel!
 With Frankish daydreams fill Arabia's brain
 Islam from Yemen and Hejaz expel!
 The Afghan reveres religion: take this cure
 His teachers from their mountain-glens expel!
 Tear from the true-believers their traditions
 From Khutan's meadows the musk-deer expel!
 Iqbal's breath fans the poppy into flame
 Such minstrel from the flower-garden expel!²⁸

(E) From *Armughān-i-Hijāz* (1938)

(1) *Satan Earthy and Satan Fiery* (in Persian, pp. 180 fl.)²⁹

Corruption of the modern age is manifest ;
The Sky is ashamed of its ugliness.
Shouldst thou develop a taste for Vision,
Two hundred satans are at thy beck and call.
On every side are robbers of the eye and the ear;
They are vehemently active in pillaging the heart.
Invaluable sin (is available) for just a farthing!
B'cause these merchants are (such) cheap-sellers.
O what a devil! his gait is chiastic;
He blindeth thine eyes through sorcery.
I rank him as an impotent Devil,
Since he catcheth a weak prey like thee.
O what a poisonous drink is it in his cup;
It extracteth the soul while the body is unaware.
Thou see'st but the noose of the net visible;
Not the net that's within his seed.
Eversince Man hath fallen from his position,
To the extent of firmness he has a scope.
The sin too becometh tasteless and cold,
If thy Iblis is of earthy origin.
Don't be thou a prey to the Satans of this age;
Their flirtation is suitable for the degenerate alone.
To the virtuous ones, that Iblis is welcome;
Who hath viewed God and is a master of his art.
The rival of his blow is the Perfect Man;
For he is descended from fire and hath a lofty position (*illā*).³⁰
Neither is every earthy-being worthy of his lasso;
For a weaker prey is prohibited unto him.
E'en though 'tis far afield from the comprehension
Of the abject ones;
But this point must surely be told:
"With these new-born Satans doth not contend,
The sinner who hath a nature proud."

(2) *Say unto Iblis* (in Persian, pp. 177 fl.)

Say unto Iblis a message from me;

How long (your) sweltering underneath a net.
 To me this earthy abode doth not appeal,
 Since its morn is not with't the prelude of an eve.
 Until they raked the World out of Nothingness,
 Its inner self was cold and with't (any) commotion.
 With't our Soul, when was there any fervour?
 They created thee from our fire.³¹
 Separation brightened the vision of Eagerness;
 Separation surred the pursuant urge of Eagerness.
 I know not the state of your circumstance;
 To me this (admixture of) water and earth made
 Aware of myself.
 They drove thee from their Porte;
 They named thee wretched-one and infidel and transgressor.
 I'm fretful right from the morn of Eternity;
 Owing to that thorn which they planted within the heart.
 Thou knowest my right and my wrong;
 The seed doth not grow from my bad tilth;
 Thou didst not prostrate and out of compassion ;
 Thou art owning countless sins on my part.³²
 Come, let's play the backgammon (*nard*)³³ in a regal manner,
 (Let's) melt the World all around (us).
 With the spell of (our) skill, from its (mere) grass-leaves,
 (Let's) fashion out a Paradise this side of the Sky.

(3) *Satan's Parliament* (written 1936 in Urdu, p. 213 fl.)

Satan

The elements weave their ancient dance. Behold
 This wild world, dust and ashes of the hopes
 Of Heaven's exalted dwellers! That Creator
 Whose 'Let there be' made all things, today stands
 Ready to annihilate them. I it was
 Who drew in Europe's brain the fantasy
 Of empire, I who snapped the spell of mosque,
 Of church, of temple; I who taught the homeless
 That all is ruled by Fate, and filled their guardians
 With capitalism's hot frenzy. Who shall quench
 The devouring blaze in him whose paroxysm
 The fires that rage in Satan's soul have fed,

Or bow the crest of that time-weathered palm
Whose branches I have watered into greatness!

First Counsellor

Firm, beyond doubt, is the sovereignty of Hell.
Through it the nations have grown rotten-ripe
In slavishness: wretches whose destiny is
From age to age to kneel, whose nature craves
A prostrate worship, no prayer uttered erect (*qiyām*)³⁴
In whom no high desire can come to birth,
Or born must perish, or grow misshapenly.
From our unceasing labour this wonder blooms:
Priesthood and sainthood now are servile props
For alien dominion. Opium such as theirs
Was medicinable to Asia; had we needed,
The sophist's art lay ready, no less potent
Than droning psalm. And what if pilgrim zeal
Still shout for Mecca and the Kaaba?—blunt
Is grown the sheathless scimitar of Islam!
To whose despair stands witness that new-fangled
Canon: anathema, the Muslim who
In this age draws his sword in holy war³⁵!

Second Counsellor

The many-headed beats bellows for power ;
Is this our bane, or boon? You have not learned
What new-hatched mischief are about the earth.

First Counsellor

I have learned; but my scrutiny of the world
Assures me of no danger in what is only
A fig-leaf hung to lust of empire.
Was it not we, who dressed autocracy
In democratic costume? The true power
And purpose of dominion lie elsewhere,
And do not stand or fall by the existence
Of Prince or Sultan. Whether parliaments
Of nations meet, or Majesty holds court,
Whoever casts his eye on another's field
Is tyrant born. Have you not seen in the West
Those Demos—governments with rosy faces

And all within blacker than Chengiz' soul?³⁶

Third Counsellor

While tyranny's spirit lives on no fear should come
To trouble us! But what answer shall we give
To that accursed creature, that vile Jew,
That Prophet of no Sinai, that Messiah
Without a Cross—no messenger of God,
Yet in his claps a Book?³⁷ How shall I tell you
How many a veil those godless eyes have shrivelled,
Heralding to the nations east and west
Their day of reckoning? What dire pestilence
Could outgo this! the slaves have cut the ropes
That held their lord's pavilions.

Fourth Counsellor

In the halls
Of mighty Rome behold the antidote.
We have revealed once more the dream of Caesar
To Caesar's offspring, whose strong arms enfold
The Italian sea and make its tumbling waves
Now soar like the pine, now like the rebeck sob!³⁸

Third Counsellor

He!—when he casts the future, I do not trust him;
He has stripped Europe's statecraft all too naked.

Fifth Counsellor (to Satan)

Oh you whose fiery breath fills up the sails
Of the world! You when it pleased you, brought to light
All mysteries; in your furnace earth and water
Became a planet panting with hot life.
We, once Heaven's simpletons,³⁹ with you for teacher
Have come to knowledge; and no deeper skill
Than yours in Adam's nature has He whom men,
Poor innocents! magnify as their Preserver—
Whilst they on high whose only thought was prayer
And sanctification and the rosary
May hang their heads in everlasting shame,

Mean beside you. But though you have for vowed
Disciples all the shamans of the West,
Their wits lose credit with me. That rebel Jew,
That spirit of Mazdak come again! Not long,
And every mantle will be rent to shreds
And tatters by his fury. The desert crow
Begins to plume itself among the hawks
And eagles: dizzily the face of the world
Goes altering! what we blindly thought a handful
Of blind dust has blown whirling over the vast
Of the skies, and we see trembling, so deep sticks
The terror of to-morrow's revolution,
Mountain and meadow and the bubbling spring;
Oh Master; on the brink of chaos lies
This earth whose sole reliance is your sceptre.

Satan (to his counsellors)

Earth, sun and moon, celestial spheres, all realms
Of matter, lie in the hollow of my hand.
Let me once fever the blood of Europe's races,
And East and West shall see with their own eyes
A drama played out! With one incantation
I know how to drive mad their pillars of State
And princes of the Church. Tell the wise fool
Who thinks our civilization fragile like
A glassblower's workshop, to destroy its cup
And flagon if he can! When nature's hand
Has rent the seam, no needleworking logic
Of communism will put the stitches back.
I be afraid of socialists?--street-bawlers,
Ragged things, tortured brains, tormented souls!
No, if there is one monster in my path
It lurks within that people in whose ashes
Still glow the embers of an infinite hope.
Even yet, scattered among them, steadfast ones
Come forth who make lustration of their hearts
With contrite tears in the pure hour of dawn;
And he to whom the anatomy of the age
Shows clear knows well, the canker of to-morrow
Is not your communism: it is Islam.

I know its congregation is the Law's
 Upholder now no more; the Muslim runs
 With all the rest, makes capitalism his creed;
 I know that in this dark night of the East
 No shining hand that Moses raised to Pharaoh
 Hides under his priest's sleeve. Yet none the less
 The importunities of the hour conceal
 One peril, that somewhere the Prophet's faded path
 Be rediscovered. A hundred times beware,
 Beware, that Prophet's ordinance, that keeps safe
 The honour of women, that forges men and tries them,
 That bears a death-warrant to every shape
 Of servitude, admits no Dragon Thrones,
 Knows neither emperor nor roadside beggar.
 It cleanses wealth of every foulness, making
 The rich no more than stewards of their riches;
 What mightier revolution could there be
 In thought or deed than it proclaims—earth's soil
 Belongs to no earth-monarch, but to God?⁴⁰
 And well for us if those enactments still
 Lie buried smugly out of sight and mind!
 Felicity it is, that the Believer
 Himself has lost all faith. Long may he halt
 Entangled in the maze of divinity
 And glozing comment on the sacred Word!
 May daybreak never invade the obscure night
 Of that God-meditating folk whose creed
 Might burst the spells of all the finite world!
 Whether the Son of Mary perished once,
 Or knew no death: whether the Attributes
 Of God from God are separate or are God's
 True essence: whether 'He who is to come'
 Betokens the Messiah of Nazareth or
 Some new Reformer clothed with Christ's own vesture:
 Whether the words of Scripture are late-born
 Or from eternity, and which answer holds
 Salvation for the chosen People—let⁴¹
 These theologians' graven images
 Content the Muslim of this country!
 Keep him a stranger to the realm of action,

That on the chessboard of existence all
His pieces may be forfeit. Good, if he
Lie down in slavery till the day of doom,
Relinquishing to others what he calls
A transient globe, and hugging such belief,
Such minstrelsy, as serve to keep his eyes
Well bandaged from the theatre of life.
For yet with every breath I dread that people's
Awakening, whose religion's true behest
Is to hold watch and reckoning over all
The universe.⁴² Keep its wits bemused with dawn
Potations of its dregs of thought and prayer;
And tighten round its soul the monkish bonds!

To the above texts considerations from the *Lectures* (pp. 81-88) on the myth of the Fall and Sin must be added. They are of great importance for a better understanding of Iqbal's idea of Satan. He affirms that (1) unlike the Biblical story of the Fall (which is linked with pre-monotheistic conceptions⁴³ and is also found in Babylonia, etc.), the Qur'an makes no mention of the serpent (phallic motive) nor of the rip (also a pre-monotheistic symbol motive); (2) Adam ate from the fruit either of the tree of good and evil, or of the tree of life; (3) whereas the Old Testament curses the earth for Adam's act of disobedience, the Qur'an declares it to be the 'dwelling place' of man and a source of profit⁴⁴ to him, for the possession of which he ought to be grateful to God. Man is not "a stranger on this earth". Paradise (*jannat*) means a primitive state in which man "is practically unrelated to his environment and consequently does not feel the sting of human wants, the birth of which alone marks the beginning of human culture." Thus, far from being "fall" and "nostalgia for an initial paradise", Iqbal asserts clearly, "the fall does not mean any moral depravity; it is man's transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the dream of nature with a throb of personal causality in one's own being . . ." Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice, and could therefore, according to the Qur'anic narration, easily be forgiven. In this interpretation of Iqbal, every remaining link between the legend of the Fall and pagan myths of nature—whose "deeper" meaning has been revalued by certain modern psychologists⁴⁵ is resolutely cut off, to the advantage of an interpretation radically

"futurist", anti-pagan and optimistic: no nostalgia for an "eternal return"⁴⁶ to the past, but joy in thrusting oneself forward into the creation of new realities that lies in the future and are entirely different from those of the past. "That God has taken this risk shows his immense faith in man." Satan's act (whose purpose, Iqbal says, is to arouse doubts in man's mind, and one could add, quite fruitful doubts) is therefore in a certain sense an excellent deed. Then returning to somewhat more orthodox view of things, Iqbal adds that God had forbidden Adam to taste from the fruit of the tree, which Iqbal, (quoting Madame Blavatsky), considers the symbol of occult knowledge, "because his finitude as a self, his sense-equipment, and his intellectual faculties were, on the whole, attuned to a different type of knowledge," i.e., the type gained by slowly accumulated observation. Adam yielded to Satan's whispering, not because he was elementally wicked, but because of his being "hasty" (*ājul*)⁴⁷, a characteristic which the Qur'an attributes to man's nature. The only way to avoid this intuitive occult knowledge for which he was not fitted, and by which he would have lost the balance of his faculties, was of course to place him in an environment in which he could exist only by an extremely hard method of trial and experience. Satan thus is the one who induces man to seek an unsuitable and dangerous "short cut to knowledge", depriving him of the joy of growth by experience for which alone the latter is suited. But for Iqbal who emphasizes the fact that, according to the Qur'an, Adam ate from the Tree of Life⁴⁸, Adam's temptation and alleged fall have yet another meaning: they signify the desire for eternity which man can only satisfy through the sexual act of multiplication which pre-supposes sex-differentiation. Yet the emergence and multiplication of individualities, each fixing its gaze on the revelation of its own possibilities and seeking its own dominion, inevitably brings in its wake the awful struggle of the ages. The Qur'an's "Descend ye as enemies of one another"⁴⁹, rather than to mean a proper punishment for wickedness, is actually a logical consequence of man's choice of eternal life (which for him is only possible as an eternity by multiplication), and painful struggle is the means to "harden" and purify man's self. Of all this, to say it once more, Satan is the author.

These texts are basic for any understanding of Iqbal's Satan. Before proceeding to a closer examination of this interesting figure, it will be good to give an outline of its main features.

Even a rapid reading of the above presented texts permits the follow-

ing considerations:

(1) Satan appears under two (seemingly irreconcilable) aspects: on the one hand Satan is essentially man's enemy⁵⁰, the one who induces him into sheepish attitudes, into slavery, into a rough sort of mystical gnosis (all these concepts are for Iqbal closely connected); on the other hand, he is substantially man's friend; the one who gives him taste for action, for growth and for risk; the Satan who supports and eulogizes the idea that separation, i.e., living as a human person 'in contact with', but 'detached from' the objective world and from God himself, is a superior and more beautiful way than 'union' which is undifferentiated, sterile and emasculating.

(2) Satan has above all one enemy: it is the *prophetic* conception of life which considers the prophet superior to the saint, law superior to theology, social institution superior to mysticism.

(3) Unlike the "European" Satan (in fact Christian, even as regards his modern, rather morbid forms), Iqbal's Satan has nothing to do with the concepts of "death", "flesh", or even, partly, of "sin" which are usually associated with him. The Iqbalian hierarchy of values (fairly different from that customary to the Western Christian) has at its top the personal creative action opening on the future, for which death, flesh and even sin can be constructive elements, and at its bottom has the servile quiet, and docile return to the Principle, to the undifferentiated, even though the one who is at work, be an ascetic and what certain people call a saint.

(4) In the old controversy between the fire and the Earth which Satan provoked himself by his refusal to bow down before Adam, Iqbal seem to hold that in the end the Earth, in order to be worshipped by the Fire, needs purification and transformation through the very Fire. There exists however dust-coloured Satans (*khākī*) as well. They are not worthy of a man who has been purified by the fire of a worthier and mightier Satan.

(5) Satan represents the strength of logic, of intellect, of systematic doubt as against love (*'ishq*). To this aspect of Satan relates also his being "the first predestinationist."

Let us now examine the above mentioned points in more detail, trying to trace the threads that link such conceptions of Iqbal with his sources in Islam and the West. Beginning with point 1): Satan's bivalent character is more or less clearly found in many religious traditions. It is well known that the Rosicrucian tradition, nowadays revived e.g. by Steiner, distinguishes two demoniac powers, Ahriman and Lucifer, being a "materializing" power comparable, to a certain extent, with

Iqbal's *iblis-i-khākī*, and the latter being a dissolving force by which any material substance is made to go up in subtle intellectualism.⁵¹ But is there in the Islamic tradition any such bivalent notion of the Satanic? The *ḥadīth* on Satan are for the most part extremely plain; one could hardly see there any possible source of Iqbal's conception. Nearly all Islamic Satans are *khākī*, even if in theory they are created of fire.⁵²

The main sources of Iqbal's Satan, as regards his bivalent nature as well as in many other respects, are principally two: Rūmī and Milton. There exists on Milton's Satan a good many well-founded studies which Zwi Werblowski⁵³ has recently summarized and discussed in an interesting thesis. But I know of no specific study on the Satan of Rūmī. It will therefore be necessary to speak of him at some length by way of *excursus*.

Satan's sinful error takes on various aspects in Rūmī: pride, envy, dry reasoning,—the whole worsened by Satan's *excuse* in the very words of the Qur'an *bi-mā aghwaytanī* ("because Thou, O Lord, hast sent me astray") which sets about a dangerous and sinful fatalism (cf. Iqb. D.1.) in front of Adam's submissive *rabbanā zalamnā*⁵⁴ (I, 1488 fl.; IV, 1389 fl.; V, 3077 fl.; VI, 405). Both, Adam and Iblīs, know equally well that in a certain way God is the sovereign author of every thing, but whereas Iblīs gets enraged with God and makes him responsible for his "slip", Adam, even though he is basically of the same mind as Satan, tries always to excuse his master and, as a good servant, to give the fault to himself alone.⁵⁵ Iblīs' sin is to have placed himself exclusively at God's point of view, the absolute *tauḥīd*,—at the side of the Fire, forgetting earthly humility, neglecting to look at things as they are from below. Thence the great importance given in Islam to the Earth (Adam), from the point of view of the *Earth* (See below).

Envy is another aspect of Satan's sin: his "*ana khayr*" ("I am better" I, 3216; I, 429) is Satan's malady. God's order is the *cause* of Satan's sin. Before that order he had been for 10,000 years a saint and perfectly pious angel. In the same way, the sun is the cause of the stench of dung. At night, dung does not smell (I, 3283 fl.). Satan's sin expresses itself by way of logical reasoning: he is the father of *qiyās*. He indeed reasons thus (I, 3397-98): "Fire is, no doubt, superior to earth: now I am of fire whereas he is of filthy earth: let us therefore judge from the comparison between the secondary and the primary: he is of the darkness whereas I am of radiant light." God's answer to this argument is: "No, on the contrary, *there will be no comparisons any more that count* (Cor. XXIII, 10); devotion and piety alone will be the *miḥrāb* directing

towards pre-eminence." That means that God's plan is always unforeseeable: "The son of Abū Jahl became a true believer, the son of Noah⁵⁶ was among those who went astray" (ibid., 3402). And elsewhere (II, 1620) Rūmī still says further that God in his sovereign power can lift Adam, against all law of nature, from the earth to beyond the skies, and keep down the fire of *Iblīs* even beneath the earth.⁵⁷ Satan, replete with logic and thus leaning towards pantheistic and anti-personalist views, is incapable of seeing beyond Adam's *form* (clay) which he compares with his own fire, that more real *substance* which is the sovereign act of God's personal will which creates and moulds every form without any necessity. With a precipitate and shallow conclusion (III, 2299 fl.; IV, 1616; IV, 1709) he stops the search. He has only one eye (IV, 1616), sees only one half of the reality, sees *q̄in*, but not *dīn*,⁵⁸ sees clay and earth, but not the act of the creative will which is beneath. *Iblīs* therefore means reason against love (*ishq*), love being something more, something different from "sentiment", "a faculty" I should say, "with which the personal action of the ever new God, *badi 'us-samāwāti wa'l-arḍi*, (and therefore lovable as a person, and adorably unforeseeable—as the ever new one) is perceived beyond the rigid rationality of the laws of nature." In the *Mathnawī* this contrast is pointed out repeatedly (e.g., IV, 1389 fl.), and in an interesting passage (I, 3283) the emaciated face and cyanotic (*kabūdī*) complexion of the rational philosopher who sneers at Satan as a rude superstition, means to Rūmī the incarnation of Satan himself. Doubt and perplexity, which characterize philosophy as against faith, are inspired by Satan. But Rūmī's theism, in as far as Satan himself is concerned, does not even give him the satisfaction of radical, absolute rebellion. In an interesting passage (I, 3893 fl.) Adam mocks⁵⁹ at Satan's shameful damnation. Immediately God interprets Adam's malicious joy as a falling back into the realm of the "given", of the "natural", of the "accepted": Adam is not even for an instant allowed to accept as a natural phenomenon what in fact is a positive act of divine will. At once a Voice rises (V, 3897): "God would be able to disgrace 100 Adams and to convert 100 Satans to the purest Islam." From this point of view, although there is always scope for an exception and Satan still could become a cherubim again (IV, 3496), his being Satan does not go against God's will, but is part of his personal providence (II, 2120). "If *Iblīs* worshipped Adam, Adam would no longer have been Adam, he would have been another." Satan, it is said in explicit words, depends directly on one of the attributes of God's power: that of *mudill* (V, 953). One could

go as far as to say that in this manner a Satanic element is indirectly introduced into God himself (see below). The dialectic between Satan and Adam (rather than between Satan and God, also in Islam), between Pharaoh and Moses, between Evil and Good,—the evacuation of evil taken as absolute, runs like a shining thread through the whole *Mathnavī*. We have given an account of this elsewhere.⁶⁰

But in spite of Rūmī's deep sense of the dialectic between Good and Evil, God and Satan, as it vibrates through the *Mathnavī*, the great mystic of Balkh would alone scarcely have sufficed to inspire Iqbal's image of Satan. It is true that in some places Rūmī's Satan may appear to be a superior being, (as e.g. in the beautiful dialogue with Mu'āwīya)⁶¹, and still more, some of Satan's earthly incarnations, as e.g. Pharaoh, may seem full of glorious power, but Iqbal's Satan would certainly be unthinkable without the undisputable influence of Milton who in his turn stood under a strong influence from pre-Christian Prometheus. The bivalent nature of the Miltonian Satan—closely resembling that of Iqbal's *Iblīs*—has very deep roots. I fully agree with Werblowski (op. cit., p. XIV) when he asserts that "while originally the Hebrew culture (and in the case of Iqbal the Islamic culture too), being based on the experience of a vocation, of an election on the part of God, could easily assert itself as willed by God, in its post-exilic developments it underwent more and more the influence of pagan thought, i.e. Greek and Persian. This led naturally to a complete dissociation of spheres: good and evil, God and anti-God, power, i.e. activity and inactivity and suffering, heaven and earth, spirit and matter, grace and nature, Kingdom of God and of the World. As a consequence, Satan becomes the holy exponent of power in this sublunar universe after the Fall and is thus the prototype of man's cultural striving." Iqbal would have perfectly subscribed to Werblowski's statement that "the sense of trespass and sin inherent in the dynamism of human life which, to our modern consciousness, is typically Christian, is in fact essentially Greek." To this, other considerations could be added which are only partly developed by Werblowski (Milton was substantially Christian) and which offer a special interest for the understanding of the dualism of Iqbal's Satan. In a pantheistic-antipersonalist conception, the Evil par excellence is the *principium individualionis* i.e. the getting off from the undifferentiated unity of the happy world of the "origins".⁶² On the contrary, that which for such a culture is Satanic, for the monotheistic religions which Islam represents in the most radical manner, is the most distinctive characteristic of the Divine. Here, as in

Hebraic thinking, what is considered as good is precisely the future and the origins, i.e. the deepening of the conscious distinction, the emergence from the undifferentiated. God is personal and the principle of personification. He himself, through Vocation and Covenant, instigates action. Thus action is not hybris, but *imitatio Dei*. Satan's speech: *eritis sicut dii* etc. is in fact divine, not satanic (besides, is it not said, in the Gospel as well as in the Old Testament: "be saints as God himself is saintly?"⁶³). The fact that in the legend of the Fall similar words are put into Satan's mouth, is the best proof that such a legend reflects strata of pre-monotheistic religiosity preserved in the traditions of the Old Testament and the Qur'an. Satan in Iqbal's poem (A, 1) is in reality God himself, God shown as the instigator of action, as the voice. In a radically theistic-personalist culture the truly evil Satan is the one who insinuates returned and undifferentiated quiet,⁶⁴ the Satan of "vile nature" of the poems D 1, 2, E 3, 1. Thus the dualism of Iqbal's *Iblīs* (which Khayāl perceives clearly, but cannot explain historically) on the one hand through Milton, and on the other through the Islamic tradition, in particular Rūmī, traces back historically to the inextricable mixture,—also in the tradition of the great prophetic religions,—of premonotheistic legends on Satan (doing works worthy of God or of a Prophet)⁶⁵ and the new divine dignity arising from the individuation (where Satan becomes for man a giver of "opium"). Instead, an aspect truly satanic of the theistic type of Satan is his being instigator of magics (*Hārūt and Mārūt*, cf. the Qur'an II, 102) understood as a pseudo-action. This action is satanic because it has its roots down in the depth of an impulse originally pre-monotheistic and not in a call from above.⁶⁶

It is not by chance that the Qur'an and its earliest commentators lay not so much stress on Satan's pride as rather on his *disobedience* towards God's order. The real Satan's sin lies therefore not in the hybris of Action, but in his intent to operate apart from collaboration with God, in a sterile autonomy (magics). It counts among Iqbal's great merits that in his reconstruction of an absolute prophetic theism he has perhaps unconsciously singled out the most genuine element from among the Scripture traditions of the prophetic religions (interpreting them with not a little freedom), and that he has finally put a little bit of Satan also into God (cf. e.g. verse "I am in God's heart like a thorn" of C1) giving thus a poetical form to a theory which some modern authors have formulated in scientific prose.⁶⁷

Sooner or later the wayfarer on the path of religion feels the need for

a criterion of the Satanic and the Divine which at times take on shapes of an extreme resemblance.⁶⁸ In prophetic theism this criterion is the *obedience to the prophet*. From obedience spring those values which for such a religious *Weltanschauung* are supreme: the deepening of the believer's distinct consciousness as a person, and deepening of his personal integrating contact with God. Such an obedience already viewed by Rūmī (cf. my above cited articles) with an acute psychological and religious insight as the only way of salvation from the danger of satanic pride and, metaphorically speaking, from the danger of relapsing into the "mothers" (the *ummahāt* of Islam), i.e. the undifferentiated. The existence of a prophet bars radically the road to the undifferentiated and an undifferentiating *unio mystica* with God, to the *unio* understood as "eternal return". It is therefore the prophet, and his office as a prophet, that are Satan's worst enemy. On this point Iqbal improves the theory of Rūmī who perhaps was not aware of the social and institutional value of the *nubuwwa* (prophethood) which he, as can be seen from various passages, seems to have brought very near, if not altogether confused, with the *wilāya* (sainthood). Instead, the two terms (*nubuwwa* and *wilāya*) are given by Iqbal as explicitly opposed in B 1 which is a piece of great importance for his idea of Satan. There Satan (Ahriman) specifies with great care those religious concepts which Iqbal considers as poles apart from one another:

(1) The concept of covenant (*mithāq*) and that of union (*wiṣāl*). The former concept is a characteristic element of the prophetic religions and in a certain sense Satan replaces it by the *wiṣāl* of mysticism. The *mithāq* is unthinkable without having a strong sense of the person of God. The very sense of it is a barrier against any possible undifferentiated mixture of the human with the divine. These two beings that enter into "covenant" with each other, are clearly distinct and gain in a certain sense equal dignity and value;

(2) *bar murād-as rāh raftan*: "going" i.e. acting "according to His will". The action of the believer as a soldier in God's service, is not individualistic and magical and so is in absolute opposition to that of the "true" Satanic;

(3) sociality. Satan like eremitic monachism, meditation dissociated from social action, the getting off from the earth as the earth, so to speak, is made to fade into the state of the philosopher's stone (از نگاہے) ⁶⁹ کیمیا کن خاک را. This absence of sociality in the satanic comes out plainly in Zoroaster's protest against Ahriman's words:

جلوہ حق چشم من تنها نخواست
حسن را بے انجمن دیدن خطاست

Khalvat as well as *jalvat* are both necessary for a complete religious life, but *khalvat āghāz-ast ū jalvat intihā-st*. "How beautiful, to walk in the caravan on the road of God, to pulsate like the soul through the veins of the world!" It is however useless to quote the innumerable passages from the theists whose involuntary religious inspiration is substantially pre-monotheistic and for whom the satanic is in the *mass*, in world, flesh and earth.⁷⁰

(4) The concept that places *nubuwwa* higher than *wilāya*. The prophet is the one who, having reached heaven (Iqbal in no way denies the mystical experience of the prophet: cf. *Lect.*, pp. 23, 125), does not disdain to descend to earth again, to take up social work, to found nations and communities, to give laws, to guide the beings—the individuals by now fully emerging from the matrice—towards a divine aim becoming steadily higher and more conscious, an aim for the future. The saint is the one who aspires to reabsorption in God (خیز و در کاشانه وحدت نشین: Ahriman gives as advice to Zoroaster), who undergoes the sweet appeal of the primeval nest (an appeal which for Iqbal's radical theism is deeply satanic) rather than dedicate himself, as God's helper, to the building of quite different nests, to the conquering of quite different positions.⁷¹ And finally, let us come to still another characteristic of Iqbal's and of the Islamic Satan: his being not correlated, or at least not essentially correlated, with concepts such as "flesh" and "death" which in Christianity⁷² and in other prophetic religions⁷³ are almost naturally connected with Satan.

On the contrary it is precisely man's flesh that the Islamic Satan hates: according to a curious, but interesting tradition (from Talmudic sources), Iblīs himself, as God's secretary and on his order (when he was still an angel) is supposed to have kneaded Adam's body. This body, it is said, remained flabby and lifeless for 40 days. Iblīs then used to come prying about him, "to enter noisily through his mouth, to get out from his behind and to make fun of him in front of the Angels, saying: 'Don't be afraid of this fellow: he is hollow (*aghwaf*), while God is full (*ṣamad*, solid, complete).⁷⁴ Death too, not only as a part of God-willed natural order, has nothing satanic about it, neither for Islam nor for Iqbal. On the contrary Iqbal, inquiring deeper into concepts which are fundamentally Islamic, makes of it a thing of supreme goodness, a source of values. The death of a martyr is divine and glorious, the death of the (spiritually) weak, abject, useless and annihilating.⁷⁵ However death has in itself nothing demonic nor is it related to any idea of sin. Death is the inevitable consecration of that Iqbalian principle in which—contrary to all

types of mysticism—"liberation from finitude is not the highest state of human bliss" (*Lect.* p. 117). It is good to die because being fully "achieved", determined as a personal being, and thus having the power of speaking with God, is better than being infinite, i.e., deprived of individual consciousness and become de-personalized. If there is anybody, it is precisely Satan who is *divine* (A 1 c, B 3), he who invites to *firāq* which is linked with the concept of death. Continuous negation, *sūkh̄tan-e nā-tamām* (A 1 d) on the part of this Satan is an indispensable basic element of the Iqbalian theistic philosophy and figures clearly as good in the hierarchy of values.

In a certain sense even sin itself is not satanic. In one of his Iqbal studies, Fr. Courtois wonders how Iqbal would solve the problem of evil. His answer is that he does not solve it at all.⁷⁶ This may be said, but only if the contrast between good and evil is viewed as a contrast between heaven and earth, God and World. This however is not Iqbal's dualism, nor is it his hierarchy of values. If ever there is a contrast in Iqbal's thought, it is between Personal and Indistinct, Powerful and Weak, Heaven and Earth seen together as God's creation and Primordial Chaos, prophetically organised religious Society and individualistic anarchy and monarchism. From this point of view also sin can be good, and source of good:

از گناه بنده صاحب جنون کائنات نازه آید برون⁷⁷

Besides, Satan's disregard for the flesh is narrowly linked with his unsocial character. Basically he is like the member of a great religious community, who thinks he has understood the idea of the Superior better than others and knows better what ought to be done; for in his heart he despises the companions who are less intelligent than he is (i.e., the other angels, cf. A 1 b). In turn the Superior, even though he agrees with Satan in a certain sense (as Iqbal somehow admits in E 2), is obliged by his unintelligent inferiors to follow much more *terre à terre* ways and methods in the providential work of his *khalq* and *amr*: this is why he creates Adam out of flabby flesh ("filthy clay"). The way a true religious being ought to follow, would have been the one actually leading to social asceticism, i.e., to the admission that historically and with regard to the actual level of reality of the First Creation, the best possible way was that shown by God, namely to become a fool with the fool, i.e., to understand the requirements of the earth and the flesh⁷⁸, to understand (see A 1) that man's way of redemption passes through the flesh (cf. especially the last verse of the above mentioned poem).

In comparison Satan is also enemy of the earth. He belongs to the "race of fire". In Islam the controversy between Earth and Fire is fairly old and offers considerable historical and religious interest. Already in the days of the *zandaqa* and *shu'ūbiyya*, some gave glory to the Fire above the Earth, supporting Iblīs in his act of negation. On the other hand it seems that the Semitic world (or rather the world of the monotheistic and prophetic religions) have given preference to the earth over the fire. Professor Mo'in, a Persian scholar of remarkable worth, thus writes on the fire in an excursus of his most valuable study on the influences of Mazdeism in Persian literature⁷⁹: "After Islam had spread in Iran and the fire-temples were destroyed, the Fire little by little forfeited the respect and veneration it enjoyed among the Persians, although the enlightened intelligentsia of Iran and the partisans of ancient culture especially the *shu'ūbiyya* and the protagonists of national awakening, always strove in various ways to kindle again the flame of national sentiment and to preserve a sense of veneration for the fire. In one of his *qaṣīda* Bashshar ben Burd⁸⁰ gives preference to the Fire (holy to the Persians) over the Earth (which, instead, is venerated by the Muslims as it served to build the Islamic *Ka'ba*. God also used it to knead Adam's body) and declared Iblīs (made of Fire) higher than Adam (made of Earth):

Earth is dark and Fire shining
 And Fire was worshipped ever since it existed.⁸¹
 Satan is better than your father Adam:
 Wake up, you throng of wicked!
 Satan is of fire and Adam of mud
 And the Earth will never rise to the loftiness of the Fire!

In his *Shāhnāma*, Firdausī also calls fire which represents divine splendour, 'the *qibla* of the Persians', and earth and stone 'the *qibla* of the Arabs.'⁸²

Elsewhere Firdausī considers Fire as the first element of creation, from which the earth came forth (the elements appear in this order: warm-dry-cold-humid). This attitude of Firdausī contrasts with Asadī's⁸⁴ curiously energetic plea in favour of the Earth (which implies that the controversy must have been rather lively). At the beginning of the *Garshāsp-nāma* (ed. Yaghma, Tehran, p. 7 ff.) Asadī displays a wealth of arguments on the relative excellence of the elements. In brief they come to this: it seems evident to the poet that as instruments and forms

created by God, all four basic elements are worthy of praise, but whoever takes guidance from sound reason (*khīrad*) must admit that the most praiseworthy is the Earth. God's grace takes its way from heaven, but the earth is the gate to which the way leads; it is in the shade of the earth upon the sun that the sky's innumerable stars are seen shining; on earth all great men and prophets have lived where they brought their Sacred Books and delivered their message; the earth is like a loving mother, its vegetation are her breasts; the earth is man's place of repose, God's house (the *kā'ba*) itself is made of earth. It is also the *qibla* of the angels since they were ordered by God to worship Adam made of earth. It is from the mines of the earth that man raises the precious stones; the earth is the animals' refuge. It harbours the living and the dead. In patience it endures every burden. It is the place which, in the act of canonical bowing, man touches with his head. The stars themselves, while turning round the earth, offer it worship; and it is the place where the other three elements are found. It is not greedy and lets nothing perish: deposit one seed only in its bosom and it will give you back a thousand; it is like a horn of plenty; it is Muhammad's *qibla* (the *Ka'ba*) from which one's gaze should never be turned. What does it matter if the sorcerer is attracted by the Fire? Iblis was made from fire, and Adam from earth. This alone would be sufficient proof that the one is superior to the other.⁸⁴

It is interesting to compare these arguments in favour of the earth with those given (on the basis of traditions of various ages) by the author of the curious little book (which we have already cited) *Ākām al-marjān fī al-kām al-jān* (pp. 158 ff.). His claim is that Satan, however distinguished and sagacious a logician he may be held by certain people, nevertheless failed from a rational point of view, when he spoke the famous *khālaqtanī min nār*, etc., because for 15 reasons of "sound logic" the earth is superior to the fire. The reasons are as follows: (1) unlike the earth, fire by nature dissolves and destroys all it touches; (2) the nature of fire is thinness, mobility, acuteness while the nature of earth is peace and quiet; (3) from the earth, Providence takes the food (*arzāq*) of animals and men, their ornaments, their tools, their houses: nothing of all this is found in the fire; (4) earth is needed for life, but not fire which can be done without; (5) any food entrusted to the earth is given back twofold and more whereas fire destroys it; (6) fire is not *qā'im bi-nafsi-hā*, needs a place where it can burn, but the earth needs no support (*hāmil*); (7) the satanic flames flash up here and there just as the winds blow, while Adam's earth is solid. The wind hardly moves it from

its position and then returns to the Lord who "chose it and relented towards it" (Qur. XX. 122); (8) the *hawā*-⁸⁵ which was blowing on the Adamic earth, was accidental and soon dropped whereas the earth was solid (*razāna*) from the beginning (*aṣlī*). The substance of Iblis was the opposite: each one returned to what he was at the origin, Adam to good, Satan to evil; (9) the fire, even if it is good for something, always harbours evil whereas the earth harbours good and blessings; (10) in the sacred Scriptures (the Qur'ān) God often speaks of the earth, and invites one to meditate upon its usefulness, etc. On the contrary he mentions fire only when he wants to speak of punishment, terror and torture; (11) in the Qur'ān God explicitly gives his blessing to the earth; (12) it is on the earth that God has erected his temples (*buyūt*), in particular the *Ka'ba*. This alone would suffice to establish its superiority over the fire; (13) God has placed on the earth such a variety of products, jewels, animals, etc. as he has not placed in the fire; (14) fire behaves as the *servant* of all things that are on earth; (15) the Accursed One has only seen the exterior form (cf. Rūmī, *op. cit.*) of the clay, but not its end (*nihāya*). Thus even on the absurd assumption that Fire was better than Earth, it would not follow that what is *created* from fire is better than clay, for God can create from everything. He can create from inferior matter a better thing than that created from superior matter. What therefore is of importance, is to consider the *kamāl an-nihāya*, not the *naqṣ al-mādda*. But Satan's realization has not gone thus far.

Taking altogether, this last argument is the essential one. One could scarcely express more clearly, more synthetically, what makes the essential difference between the creationist mentality of Islam and that of any other pre-monotheistic religion. The true value resides not in the original matter, but in the creative intention of the personal God. The hierarchy of values is not one given by nature, but results from creation, in view of an end. In Iqbal who certainly must know this controversy between fire and earth, the fire appears as nobler than the earth almost "by nature" (A 1 e, C 2, E 1, E 2 etc.) and the superiority of the earth over it appears clearly as paradoxical (cf. A 1 e). The fire even seems to be the proper characteristic of that Satan whom previously we have called the Divine Satan, whereas "satans of dust" is the name given to the degrading satans, the counsellors of non-resistance, the "true satans" of theism (cf. E 1). The complete man who has reached the stage of the *illā* is also of "fiery extraction" (ibid.). The contradiction which develops between the images of the dual Satan, the one Active (Divine) and the other Passive (Satanic) seems to find a solution in the important final verse of *Taskhīr-i fitrat*, inadequately interpreted by Khayal. "The flame-born Ahriman doth pro-

stration unto dust"! It must be read in the light of *Jāvēdnāma* (B 3): "When I deny I but affirm and what I say is better than what I withhold . . . O man, release me from my flame and straighten up my knotted task." The fire has given to the earth a special "translucency", its external denial was needed for a "redemption of the earth."⁸⁶ We are here in a dialectic of images which perhaps cannot be understood without remembering the ancient Mazdaic tradition in which the earth itself is divided into its archangelic image (*zām*) and its reality as brute matter (*zamīk*). To put it in Mazdaic terms, Adam, as regards his outer appearance, is created from *zamīk*, but hidden in his *zamīk* there is that *zām* which will be his "body of resurrection" once it has become transparent and *mēnōk* under the action of a purifying energy which is (the) *x'arena* i.e., fire. Once again: Iqbal's philosophizing imagery takes us back, through very thin, but historically easily discernible threads, to that Mazdaic religiosity which has so much influenced Islam in all its forms, orthodox and heterodox.⁸⁷ For Iqbal, at any rate, any superiority proves erroneous, be it that of the earth or that of the fire. He substantially agrees with the above quoted booklet of as-Shiblī and considers the true superiority to belong to the *act* of God whom fire and earth serve as his instruments. Besides Adam and Satan are dialectically brought still closer in a beautiful verse of Iqbal's *Armagan* (E 2):

بغیر از جان ما سوزے کجا بود ترا از آتش ما آفریدند

With't our Soul, when was there any fervour?
They created thee from our fire.⁸⁸

In the same short poem Satan takes on the garment "of the one who carries man's sin" garbing himself thus as a redeemer (see note there). The final quatrain exalts that constructive civilisation based on logic and technique which Iqbal seems only to deplore when he sees the Europeans build it up.⁸⁹

Iqbal's (passive) Satan is thus also pro-European, but only in this sense that he takes advantage of Europe in order to lull the Orient and especially Islam to sleep.

It is no wonder that Iqbal connects the Europeanizing, narcotic Satan with the intellect.⁹⁰ But this has not to be taken in the extremist Christian sense of a Chestov. To understand Iqbal's anti-intellectualism one must remember, I believe, this important statement from the *Lectures* (p. 58): "The result of an intellectual view of life is necessarily panthe-

istic"; it is therefore a Satanic result; it tends to dissolve the individualities in an abstract undifferentiated Cosmos. The divine Satan, instead, represents *judā'ī*, *firāq* (separation), he therefore is anti-pantheist par excellence, and therefore still a master in *'ishq* (love). (In Jāv., B 3, Ḥallāj calls him "more advanced than we in the art of love"). This love is unthinkable without the separation of the two lovers and their autonomous individuality. *'Ishq* as an insight that sees—beyond the *masnū'*—God's personal *sun*⁹¹ rather than the abstract *essence* of things, does not lead to pantheism, but to parsonalism. The Iqbalian *'ishq* is thus *amor* in the sense of a super-intellect, not in the sense of an infra-intellect. It is the *'ishq*-less, purely logical Satan who is the first advocate of predestination (D 1). Fatalism, absolute Logic and pantheism are for Iqbal to some extent equivalent.⁹²

Our description of Satan's image in the poetical and philosophical work of Iqbal leads us to try also an approach to the "problem of evil" which in the *Lect.* (p. 76) Iqbal rightly calls the "crux of theism". I would add that it is "the crux of theism" not only in the well known meaning of (*Lect.* 76): "How is it then possible to reconcile the goodness and omnipotence of God with the immense volume of evil in His creation?" but also in a deeper sense which Iqbal often skims over in his work without giving a definite expression, even though he points quite clearly to the problem's solution,—the consequences of which perhaps frighten him. I mean to say that once it is granted that God is personal, or even, as Iqbal declares explicitly, "limited" (*Lect.* 79/80) precisely because he is *living*, it is unavoidable to suppose in him an element of what we call "evil". That this is not merely the outcome of a mental exercise, the abstract logical consequence of the theistic position, but arises as a historical certitude from the very texts of the great monotheistic religions, has been set forth with brilliancy in Miss Schärf's interesting study on *Die Gestalt des Satans im Alten Testament*.⁹² Her principal conclusion is that the genuine God of the Old Testament, with his attributes of power and bounty, undergoes a process of dissociation in the course of which he finally loses the attributes of power which, at a certain period at least, were felt as derogatory to divinity, etc. This dissociation culminates particularly in the New Testament where a part of what God was before, is detached from him, and where the Devil who in the Old Testament enjoyed a very relative autonomy and was not more than one of God's servants, become what the psychologists call an "autonomous complex" and reigns as "the Prince of this world". In the same process God be-

comes a loving Father to such a degree that in the average *pietas* of the Christian commoners his image takes on "the features of a kindly grandmother rather than those of a father."⁹⁴ Besides, already the Old Testament contains a few texts where the beginning of the split can be seen with great clarity: it suffices to compare e.g. II Sam. XXIV, 1: "Again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he incited David against them, saying: Go, number Israel and Judah!" with the later account of the same event in Chron, XXI, 1: "Satan stood up against Israel, and incited David to number Israel."⁹⁵

In comparison, Islam, as is well known, has maintained a remarkable fidelity to the ancient concept of God as also 'powerful'. An interesting episode related by Browne⁹⁶ shows how in the sphere of Islam God's bivalent nature (powerful and bounteous) is also consciously felt as a more adequate notion than is the case in other religions, where, as in Christianity, stress is merely laid on God's bounty. A sharp mind (and particularly an advocate of such an absolute theism) as Iqbal's was, could of course not remain unaware of how this amounted, from a human point of view, to the negation of a good and of an evil, both abstract and absolute, and to the insertion of the thorn of evil into the very heart of the Living God. That Iqbal was conscious of all this, i.e. that a certain type of Satan represented the demonic element in God, is quite clear from this verse of his short poem *Pas che bāyad kard ai aqwām-i sharq*; especially if such a verse is compared with those in which Iqbal makes Satan the representative of the *lā* against the *illā*⁹⁷.

نکتہ میگویم از مردانِ حال امتان را لا جلال الا جلال

If Satan is the representative of the *lā*⁹⁸, he is, as a consequence, also representing the attributes of *jalāl* (power, force, etc.) in God, i.e. that "Dāmonische in Jahwe" which has been studied so many times in Europe.⁹⁹

Nor could evil be more clearly attributed to God than as Iqbal does in the following verse :

روز حساب جب مرا پیش ہو دفترِ عمل
آپ بھی شرمسار ہو مجھ کو بھی شرمسار کر¹⁰⁰

But for various reasons it is Iqbal as a *poet* who reaches these penetrating insights which seem to be withheld from him as a thinker (e.g. *Lect.* p. 80: "no doubt wrong-doing is confined to man only"). Against the

Manichean solution of the problem of evil through dualism, or that of Hinduism through renunciation (escaping from world-evil-māyā), or that of Christianity through moralism (original sin), Iqbal chooses a solution which he himself calls "meliorism" (*Lect.* p. 81) and which is based on the concept of the perfectibility of the universe of *Dasein*, of the non-finiteness of creation (cf. Qur. XXXV, 1), of the "growing universe". In one of his poems, man, in a dialogue with God, says: "Hundreds of worlds are bursting into bloom from the fields of our thought, and you have made only *one* world, a world stained with desire and blood! Lay now the new foundations of a more serious world, for we have grown serious now: what then is this amazing gallery of days and nights, of present, past and future"?¹⁰¹ And in *Bāl* God accepts the criticisms of the Angels (and of Lenin! "Oh Eternal Painter! your work is still unfinished"!) and issues orders for the completion of his first creation. In *Armaghān* (p. 22) man, in a beautiful dialogue¹⁰² with God, addresses thus the Creator: "Now make this world eternal (Satanic temptation!). Don't you see how magnificently we who were born from earth, have adorned this globe of dust?" In reality, Iqbal says, there exists, already prepared in the heart of this world, another world, God's recent work (*ibid.*, 72): "In this world there is a paradise in full bloom, and the tears we shed are like pearls of dew hanging at its branches. But still it is motionless and without life,—waiting for an Adam"!

Iqbal's most intimate thought on the problem of evil in the world could perhaps be summed up in this way: "The world as it is, certainly contains evil, plenty of it, and, to speak frankly, this is also God's fault. To deny this to him would almost give offence to His power. But he is not because of this an evil God, the wicked Demiurge of the Manicheans. Good and evil are such in relation to man: the present world is a *first exercise* in God's creation. As he is a living God, he has other worlds in preparation in his creative consciousness, worlds ever more beautiful and mighty, in the achievement of a plan which to us on the whole remains unknown. Thorns and roses both help to give perfection to the ever growing tree of the cosmos which divine impulse drives forward. On looking back with a longing for returns, one sees the evil as well as the good, and one blames God for it, the youthful God of the first creation. It is when looking forward that one catches a glimpse of the ever more beautiful splendours of God's evolving plan":

برون از شاخ بینی خار و گل را درونِ او نه گل پیدا نه خار است¹⁰³

Summing up what precedes, it can be said that in Iqbal's Satan there

is a confluence—if not in his philosophy, at least in his poetry—of the following elements:

(1) the Greek element of "Prometheus",¹⁰⁴ of action and "technique" as "hybris", seen through the filter of Milton's work which Iqbal knew well;

(2) the ancient Hebrew and the genuine Islamic element of Satan as God's instrument and intendant, which Iqbal drew from his traditional Islamic education;

(3) the Christian and gnostic element of Satan as the positively evil power, which comes from ancient Iran. Iqbal took it from those elements that are found in Milton, and also from readings he made of New Testament and Zoroastrian texts (we already mentioned his knowledge of the Avesta and of the main tenets of Mazdaism);

(4) a personal development of Iqbal of the concept that in the Hebraic-Islamic God there is an element of what Christianity calls "satanic". This concept is also implicitly found with authors of the Islamic mystical tradition, (cf. certain passages from Ghazālī, Rūmī and others), but it could not have taken on sufficiently explicit and "modern" forms in Iqbal's consciousness without the influence of the post-Kantian idealism (especially Fichte)¹⁰⁵ which he had studied in Europe;

(5) a further Pragmatic-political development, typically Iqbalian, of Satan as "opium of the people"¹⁰⁶, which is logically deducible as the true opponent of the Complete God (Power+Love, Satan+God) of the Biblical and Islamic theism. This development on the one hand feeds on anti-European and anti-mystical polemical motive, and on the other springs from profound meditations on the metaphysical consequences of the Islamic God as personal. To these meditations the writings of certain irrational Protestant theologians which Iqbal had read in Europe, must also have added their contribution.¹⁰⁷

To have attempted an elucidation of these elements by showing their historical connections and their fusion in the interesting metaphysical and poetical world of a modern Islamic personality belonging to two cultures,—one of the few who have studied and remarkably well penetrated European thought—seems not to be purposeless, even from a practical point of view: it indeed endeavours to serve a wider and deeper exploration of those areas between various *Weltanschauungen* which in our dwindling world are growing every day more varied and frequent.

Foot Notes

1. E. Hardy, in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, vol. I, 1898, p. 41 (cit. in Schmidt, *Manuale di Storia Comparata delle Religioni*, ed. ital. 1938, p. 126).

2. I quote as *Lect.* in what follows, the reprint made in Pakistan of the second Oxford edition of 1934: *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore 1951. As is known, the first Lahore edition is of 1930. *Note of the translator.* The translations reproduced here are taken from V. G. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal*, London 1955 and from Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad, *Pilgrimage of Eternity* (Jāvid Nāma), Lahore 1961. The translation of A) (Payām-i Mashriq) and of (E 1 and E 2) (Armugān-i Hijāz) is due to the kindness of Mr. Mahmud Ahmad, advocate, Lahore.

3. The titles of the works will be abridged as follows. *Payām, Jāv, Bāl, Darb, Armaghan.* Dates between brackets refer to their first Lahore edition. They of course also contain short poems which were written a little earlier. *Armaghan* was published posthumously. It contains verses in both Urdu and Persian. The language of the other works will be given between brackets. The meaning of the various titles is: "The Message of the East", "The Book of Jāved" (Poema Celeste), "The Wing of Gabriel", "The Rod of Moses", "The Gift of Hijāz".

4. The "Light-Beings" are the angels. On the epithet 'naive' see foot-note 39. The episode refers to well-known Quranic passages as VII, 12; XXXVIII, 76, etc.

5. *Ummahāt* (Mothers). The term comes in this sense from Goethe (cf. the well known passage in *Faust II*, v. 6173 to 6306) whom Iqbal held in great admiration.

6. The 'Mirror' that shows the secrets of the world is a well known "archetypal" image in various religious traditions. It is interesting to find it here connected with Satan: it symbolizes intuitive knowledge outside time. It springs from the "Gaal" motive of the half-mythic Persian king Khusrau or Jamshīd of whom it is said in Firdausi's *Shāhnāma*:

. . . thence Kai Khusrau took up the cup and gazed.
He saw the seven climes reflected there,
And every act and presage of high heaven,
Their fashion, cast, and scope, made manifest.
From Aries to Pisces he beheld
All mirrored in it—Saturn, Jupiter,
Mars, Leo, Sol and Luna, Mercury,
And Venus. In that cup the wizard-king (afsūngar)
Was wont to see futurity . . .

(ed. Beroukhim, Tehran, vol. IV, p. 1099, translated by A. G. and E. Warner, vol. III, p. 318, London, 1908).

In the Persian lyrico-mystical tradition followed by Iqbal this type of Cup-Mirror is in its turn connected with *wine*. In this context the idea of the anacreontic cup in the Western mysticomagical tradition should not be forgotten. (See the interesting material collected by Jung in *Psychology and Alchemy*.) Apropos of Satan who in Iqbal's poetry offers such an esoteric cup to Adam, the connection between the chalice and the horn (of the moon) as brought out by Jung, is also of great interest, especially in consideration of the fact that certain Islamic traditions about Satan speak of "Satan's horn" which rises from the East. They also say that the sun "rises and sets between the two horns of Satan" (cf. *Ākām al-Marjūnn*, pp. 187 ff. quoted in foot-note 52).

7. This anti-panteistic and anti-mystical idea that dialogue in separation is better than in-differentiation in union, occupies a central place in Iqbal's philosophy. In his short poem *Gulshan-i rūz-i Jadid*, e.g., which is an interesting and relatively little

known *Javāb* (not translated so far into European languages) to *Shabistri's Gulshan-i rāz*, Iqbal makes the archangel Gabriel speak thus to God: "I renounce eternal union, now that I see the pleasure that is in complaints and sighs, allow me to share Man's proud imperfection, give me the ardour of Adam" (p. 206 of the Lahore edition, 1929).

How this idea is to be justified, will be seen more clearly in the course of the article.

8. The *zānnār* is the well known *kosti*, the wound ritual cincture of the Zoroastrians, which under Islamic rule became the distinctive mark of the protected non-Muslims (*ḍimmī*). In the tradition of the Persian lyrical mysticism the *zānnār* symbolizes heresy, non-Islamic belief, but at the same time (it was made of the significant number of *seventy two* threads of white wool etc.) it alludes to more esoteric, profound meanings.

9. Akin to this beautiful short poem are, as regards the similarity of concepts, two other poems found in *Bāl*: "The Angels take leave of Adam quitting Paradise" (p. 117) and "The Spirit of the Earth bids welcome to Adam" (pp. 178-179). The former re-affirms that Adam's *restlessness* as a consequence of his vivifying contact with Satan is good and productive ("One does not understand whether you are of earth or of mercury; it is said that you are of earth, but star, the moon-light are also part of your nature!"; in the latter poem, the Earth (*The Spirit of the Earth*, see also foot-note 86) foresees the supreme dignity of man grown sovereign after "the cruel torment of the days of separation" ("Yes, Fate will understand the silent winking of your eyes; from far the stars of sky will see you . . . The sparking of your sighs will rise to the Firmament!")

10. *Yad-i bayḍā*, "the white hand", is a Qur'anic term referring to Moses' famous miracle. "And thrust thy hand within thine armpit, it will come forth white without hurt" (Qur. XX, 22). Iqbal uses the term very often as an ideogram of "prophetic power", as a symbol of *nubuwwa*.

11. Refers to Noah's unsuccessful prayers for saving his impious son (not mentioned in the Bible) from destruction in the deluge (cf. Qur. XI. 36-49) Satan here refers to the presumed uselessness of prophetic humility in front of the eremitic pride of the Saint.

12. This satanic hint at the "overcoming and nullifying of the *earth*" will be explained more clearly further on.

13. This description of Zoroaster's temptation by Ahriman is, from the point of view of the concepts, the most important of four parallel images of prophecy as opposed to anti-prophecy in *Jāv*. The "temptation" of Ahriman trying to deter Zoroaster from his prophetic vocation is already found in the Avesta (*Vendidad*, XIX, 1 fl.) which Iqbal must have known through some translation, since in substance there is similarity of concept. (See F. Muller's translation, "Zarathustra's Versuchung" in *WZKM*, III, 1889, p. 20 fl.). The other images are those of Buddha: Gautama is confronted with the Dancer; of Christ: the evils of the European civilisation, worse than Judas' deeds themselves, are put in front of Jesus ("What I did with His humanity, says Judas, His followers have done with His divinity!"; and of Muhammad: the antiprophetic temptation is symbolized, in the pagan Abū Jahl's complaint, by the aristocratic and racialist mentality of the pre-Islamic paganism. *Jāv*, pp. 48-60).

14. In this song of Baal the element that appears satanic to Iqbal lies in the return to ancestry, in the nostalgia for the eternal return, which to Iqbal's mind had been revived by the studies of European scholars on the most ancient civilisations.

Concepts such as the return to the pre-monotheistic origins, the *monarchy*, the racialist *aristocracy*, the nationalistic *patriotism* and even the plastic idolatry of *art* as pure beauty, are here brought under one unique satanic denominator.

15. i.e. Satan, when refusing to prostrate himself before Adam, appears as the absolute protagonist of *tauhīd*. It is not by chance that the idea is put into the mouth of Hallāj; it was wide spread among Islamic mystical circles. Cf. Masignon's and Nicholson's works quoted in foot-note 27.

16. What Iqbal wants to say here, not without a remarkable sense of psychological and religious intuition, is that the first step on the way to Satan is the giving up of the "institutions" (*sujūd* is here the symbol of the canonical prayer). On the primeval ground of the tragedy between God, Adam and Satan, the prostration before Adam was tantamount to the ritual and institutional obligation, i.e. to the material (earth-Adam) side of religion, the one Satan could not understand. See *passim*, in the whole course of the article, and compare with the defence of the institution in the significant verses I, 2624 fl. of Rūmi's *Mathnavī*.

17. See the same concept in B 1.

18. The fact that the Ka'ba is made of earth (bricks), is precisely the main argument used by the supporters of the earth against the fire in their interesting controversy between earth and fire. This verse seems to me a confirmation of the contrast between the two.

19. This is a paraphrase of a fairly wellknown *ḥadīth*.

20. It means that basically Satan acted out of affection for Adam. He wanted to rid him of God's constrictive *jabr* and make him free, i.e. the apparent hatred shown to Adam in his refusal to bow before him, was hiding affection for him. The idea of Satan as the "bearer of Adam's sins" is also found in E 2. See foot-note 32.

21. It is the well known juridical *ḥadīth*: *abjaḍu 'l-ashyā' 'indī 'l-ḥalāq*, here in metaphysical adaptation.

22. The oversight occurred in my translation *Poema Celeste*, p. 123, should be thus corrected. Which was the scarcely specified forbidden tree of Paradise, has been much discussed between Islamic exegets: the more common opinion, which then became a *leit-motiv* in the Persian lyrical and mystical poetry and which is given here, is that it was a corn plant. Cf. Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr al-Qur.*, II, 35, vol. I, p. 178. He quotes also the other opinions, among the one holding to grapes, or, more rarely, to the fig-tree. The apple-tree is entirely missing. The traditions quoted by Ṭabarī attribute the corn plant version clearly to the Hebrews (*ahl at-tūrāt*). In primitive cultures the end of the golden age is also connected with corn or grains (cf. Pettazzoni, *Miti e Leggende*, Turin 1948, I, p. 314), and it might be that the introduction of agriculture was felt as a decadence when compared with the "uncivilized" state of beatitude enjoyed by nomads, hunters or fruit-gatherers. On the beginning of agriculture as connected with a sexual act see the material collected by M. Eliads, *Traite d'histoire des religions*, Paris, 1959, p. 286 fl.

23. In the same poem, in principle the most ambitious of Iqbal, the author asks (pp. 185-186) why Satan was created, and gets from the saint *Shāh-i Hamadān* the altogether Fichtean answer that Satan serves as a stimulus for man's fight: from fighting evil man grows strong and hardens himself in a sane manner.

24. Refers to Qur. XXXIX, 53: Despair not of the mercy of Allah. Satan retorts that if creative and productive action springs from anguish and despair unsatisfied with quiet ecstasy, then it would be better to say: "despair"! In this whole dialogue one cannot but recognise Iqbal's great sympathy with Satan, and the ex-

tremely positive role which he assigns to him.

25. "He is God" a very common *dhikr*-sentence in use in the mystical fraternities against which Iqbal had a heart-felt antipathy, at least at this phase of his thought.

26. This is only one of Iqbal's numerous and often unjust attacks against democracy and in general against the European civilization, understandable only in consideration of the fact that Iqbal had above all been acquainted with the "imperialistic" and colonial aspects of this civilization. For more evidence see examples in *Bâl*, p. 222, where the freedom of thought is called a "satanic invention", and p. 210 where the cinema is deprecated not only as being "not an art, but impiety and magic" [sic!]; in *Payâm* where he condemns the League of Nations (p. 233) and looks with distrust at the invention of the airplane (p. 162: "before worrying about the sky it would be better to settle the organisation of this earth!"); democracy is aspersed with over-simplified criticism (p. 158: "from the sum of two hundred asses never a man will come out!"); Europe is "the centre of assassination devices" (pp. 146-147) etc. Khayal, in order to explain the contradiction between such sweeping statements and the activist philosophy of Iqbal, maintains that they are only one-sided, and he tries to justify them in principle. To me it seems more natural to take them simply for a biased view, psychologically understandable; it leads him to condemn Europe for the same conquests which he would have hailed if they had come from the Islamic sphere. (In *Lect.*, p. 7, he even claims them to be originally Islamic).

27. Iqbal himself adds in a foot-note: "taken from Ibn 'Arabî". He probably refers to *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. with comm. of 'Abdur-Razzāq Kāshānī), Cairo 1321 H., p. 166. (From Ibn 'Arabî also Rūmī has probably taken similar considerations in *Mathnavī*, I, 1488 ff. and other passages quoted below). On the same concept see also Hallāj, *Kitābu 'l-Tawāsīn*, ed. Massignon, Paris 1913, pp. 41 ff., 87 ff. L. Massignon, *La Passion d'al-Hallāj*, Paris 1922, pp. 712, 934 ff. R. A. Nicholson, *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*, Cambridge 1923, pp. 31 ff. Satan accuses God of having deceived him by using Adam as a bait and pretext also in a passage of the great mystic Sanā'ī (d. 1141).

28. It is to be noted how Iqbal in his anti-European feelings goes as far as to defend the *mullāhs* (for whom he had usually no soft corner, especially not for Afghan *mullāhs* of the day), when wrongly or rightly he saw English manoeuvres in the efforts made to "chase" them. As is known (cf. *Islam and Ahmadism*, Lahore 1936), Iqbal also made English underhand dealings responsible for the rise of the Ahmadiyya sect. He maintained (cf. *Rumūz-i Bē-khudī*, Lahore 1948, 3rd ed., pp. 143 ff., translated by Arberry, London 1953, p. 40) that in periods of decadence *taqlīd* is better than theological free-thinking.

29. On the mythico-religious relationship between Fire and Earth see below pp. 49 ff.

30. Taken from the *shahāda: lā ilahā 'illā allah*. The necessary *lā* stage is that of negation. For Iqbal it is (cf. Khayal, p. 9) positively satanic. It has to be transcended into the *illā* stage, i.e., the affirmation of God, of the true God of the classical monotheism. Iqbal often uses this antithesis, e.g. when speaking of the communists (*Jāv.*, p. 88): they have reached the *lā* stage, and rightly so —, but now they have to rise to the *illā*, etc.

31. In Iqbal's thinking there often emerge immanentistic lines of thought: remains of his Hegel studies under his master, the Neo-Hegelian McTaggart. This

passage is one example. It falls little in line with transcendent theism. A yet clearer example is found in the last verse of the beautiful poetry quoted in my *The concept of Time in Iqbal's religious philosophy*, pp. 171-172. See also foot-note 4 on p. 168 of the same.

32. This idea, which is most remarkable in this context, has a very ancient origin. The bivalent character of Satan—Logos is present in the Talmud (see interesting examples in A. Frank-Duquesne, "Reflexions sur Satan en marge de la Tradition judeo-chretienne" (p. 251) in *Satan, Etudes Carmelitaines*, 1948. The idea that Satan is the brother of the *Logos* is also found in the *Divinae Institutiones* of Lactantius (II, 9). The relevant passage has recently been made accessible to the Italian public by Papini in his recent and much discussed book *Il Diavolo*, (Florence, 1953).

It is also known that certain Gnostic sects attributed to Satan a role of redeemer, precisely in the meaning that he gives man freedom and impels him to action. Here, however, the sentence seems to come out of a simpler concept: Satan, assuming the role of *tempter*, takes on the responsibility for man's sins (cf. Qur. XXXVIII, 83-84; VII, 16-17).

33. *Nard* corresponds to the well known trick-track game. Iqbal suggests that Satan should run the risk of taking this world "as it is, as a juvenile creation of God" while at the same time he creates a better one, a paradise on earth. This is according to Iqbalean doctrine, exactly what God wants from man (cf. *Jāv.*, p. 225: "whoever has no creative power, God says to the poet, is an atheist and a blasphemer . . . Be glowing with passion, be creator, embrace, as we Ourselves do, all horizons of the Cosmos", etc. Once more, Satan, as the instigator of action, comes to be identical with the Qur'anic God. These beautiful, even though at first sight rather unassuming, verses belong to the most significant elements for an understanding of Iqbal's "satanism".

34. The *qiyām* is one of the phases of the Islamic canonical prayer (*ṣalāt*), exactly the *statio*. The order established by Satan is therefore the cowardly prostration before the tyrants. To be noted is the contrast—also verbal—between Satan who is such because he does not want to prostrate himself (the Satan whom we will call the Satan Divine) and the one who impresses on men a faint-hearted taste for prostration before the "monarchs". By the way it may be noticed that for Iqbal are imbued with *monarchic* spirit, in spite of contrary appearances, not only the properly speaking monarchy, but also democracy and Communist socialism. Theocracy alone is for him truly democratic (cf. *Khayal*, p. 12).

35. Iqbal did not share the pacifist tendency of certain Muslim modernists as regards the holy war. He thought it to be absolutely justified in certain cases which he practically identified with the insurrection movement against authorities illegal from the religious points of view: see his interesting comment on Qur. IV, 59 in *Jāv.*; p. 192 where the Qur'anic *minkum* is understood as "those of you who are in authority", therefore not the colonial rulers who are not of you.

36. These are precisely the political friends of the "true" Satan: hereditary monarchy which means tyranny of the one by right of birth; indistinct liberal democracy which means tyranny of capitalists by right of wealth; and (more clearly specified below in *i*) and in other passages of Iqbal's work, cf. also *Jāv.*, pp. 69-70; communism which means the tyranny of abstract material interests. All this together is "monarchy".

37. Refers to Marx. "No messenger of God, Yet in his claps a Book" is an

expression dating from before Iqbal and applied to certain famous Muslims, in particular to Maulānā Jalāl ud-Dīn Rūmī.

38. Means another possible danger threatening Satan's "sheepish" order: Iqbal identifies here this danger with Fascism and Mussolini. In view of the events which occurred after the last war this piece is interesting. But even fascism for which Iqbal had some sympathy, is in his view insufficient to awake the world from satanic sleep: the true danger for Satan is the prophetic and theocratic community of Islam. (See below)

39. There exists a well known *ḥadīth* quoted by Ghazālī (*Iḥyā'*, IV, 322), reading thus: *aktharu ahl 'l-jannati al-bulh* "Most of the dwellers in paradise will be the fool", which of course means the poor in spirit, etc.

40. "Earth's soil belongs to God" is a *ḥadīth* (based on the Qur'anic passages) often quoted by Iqbal. For more commentary see *Jāy.*, pp. 80 ff.

41. With this criticism of speculative theology, or at least of certain loquacious features of it, Iqbal combined a remarkable respect for the *shari'a*, even though giving it an interpretation that had little in common with one spread by the manuals of the *faqīh*. In addition to two of the best known problems of the Islamic speculative theology (the question of the identity of the divine attributes, *ṣifāt*, with the divine nature, *ḡāt*, and that of created or uncreated character of the Qur'an) we find here also two problems listed which were of a special interest in the Sub-continent of Iqbal's days, taking into account the development which the *Aḥmadiyya* movement had taken there. (Cf. Iqbal's severe criticism in the already mentioned *Islam and Ahmadism*.) As is known, this movement, contrary to the Islamic orthodoxy, maintains that Jesus has really died and that in the coming *Mahdī* one ought not to see Jesus himself, but a Renovator embodying Jesus' qualities (on the teachings of the *Aḥmadiyya*, see the summary given in Pareja-Bausani Hertling, *Islamologia*, Rome 1951, pp. 588-590). According to Iqbal these discussions were apt to deter the Indian Muslims from their more concrete task, namely that of fighting the oppressors and re-establishing true Islamic theocracy.

In an article which says much more and also much less than its title announces "The Persian Conception of Artistic Unity in Poetry," in *BSOS*, XIV, 2 (1952), p. 242, Wickens gives as a characteristic of Islam that it absorbs theology into law, and he maintains that this phenomenon has not yet been explained by the orientalists. Thus far I agree with him, but I am not convinced by the explanation he proposes and which is exactly contrary to what e.g. Iqbal affirms in his whole work regarding the rejuvenation of Islam: "The God we meet in Muslim Theology is central and timeless (?), not only himself unchanged (?) but changing nothing else since the beginning of Time. Such theology has thus virtually never concerned itself with the very stuff of its Christian counterpart: those vital subtle questions of Person, Nature, Hypostasis and so on . . ." The Qur'an, (and not only the Qur'an as interpreted by Iqbal) seems to me fully in contradiction with these assertion of Wickens (cf. Qur., L, 15; LV, 29; XXXV, 1; XXIX, 19, etc.).

The reason for giving precedence to the *shari'a* over theology in Islam seems to me to lie rather in the impossibility to reason about God because of his being to an extreme degree "personal", immobile and arbitrary. It is possible to reason about an *Ens*, a *Motor Immobilis*, but not about a personal being. But since this personal being has a certain plan for mankind, since through the Prophet it gives origin to States and attaches a special importance to *this* earth, the only thing in which man, with regard to God, can take interest, is to keep ready to march at his orders. In

general, it is the very much other-worldly oriented religions which give special importance to theological disquisitions (Christianity, Manichaenism, gnosis, etc.).

42. *Ihtisāb-i kā' ināt* i.e. being *muhtasib*, spiritual "police inspector" of the inner world. This relates to a tradition.

43. Since the term "pre-monotheistic" is used several times in the course of this article, it may be useful to say more precisely that by means of this term I intend to make a clear differentiation between the monotheistic religions in the strict sense and all other types of religion. Monotheistic religions in the strict sense are fastened upon the conscious negation of the ancestral gods, which is the work of some great founder personality (the prophet). He feels himself called upon by the unique God to carry his Message,—a Phenomenon which, as Pettazzoni (*Saggi di Storia delle Religioni e di Mitologia*, Roma 1945, p. 7) has noted, is extremely rare, or even almost unique in the religious history of mankind, if one considers that Christianity as well as Islam are derived from Hebraic monotheism. The prefix *pre* of *premonotheistic* has a very broad value since premonotheistic religions also subsist naturally in today's world.

44. Iqbal's deductions and distinctions between the two Qur'anic episodes of the fall (compare VII, 11-27 with XX, 115-123), however interesting they are from the point of view of his theology, do not in all respects seem acceptable from the point of view of a textual criticism of the Qur'an. Nothing indeed impels us to think that the indetermined "tree" of the first Qur'anic account is the Tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil as distinct from the Tree of life clearly specified in the second account. It would rather seem that in the Qur'an the two trees are fused into one, the Tree of Life which would be—contrary to the account of Genesis—the one whose fruit Adam ate.

45. It is interesting to note how little the monotheistic *Weltanschauung* (Biblical and Qur'anic) appeals to the heart of modern man in comparison with the remarkable favour enjoyed by recent rejuvenation of myths and magic etc. To point out only one example we may refer to Mircea Eliade's beautiful *Le Mythe de l'Éternel Retour*, Paris 1949. Although on pp. 154 ff. he shows with perfect clarity that the Jewish monotheistic prophetic religiosity is the first real *novelty*, i.e. the destruction of the traditional cyclical mentality, and although on pp. 236-237 he recognizes that faith of the monotheistic type, "une philosophie de la liberté qui n'exclut pas Dieu", is the only system capable of overcoming "the horizon of archetypes and recurrence" fully and without danger, his whole book nonetheless breathes an air of nostalgia for that world of archetypes and the lost ontological paradise and manifests a heartfelt antipathy against the history-conscious type of thinking. (See in particular pp. 218 ff.). Since it touches our concern closely, we take the freedom to rectify his interpretation of Qur. XXIX, 20 (not IV, 4 as erroneously quoted by him): "Allah est celui qui effectue la Création, donc il la repete" (?). He thus attributes a conception of the "eternal return" (cyclical) type also to the Qur'an, whereas the sentence, when translated exactly ("... see how He originated creation, then bringeth forth the later (second) growth"), proves just the contrary, i.e. what Iqbal calls the "anti-classical" and futuristic conception of the "monotheistic" mentality.

46. How deeply the nostalgia for the "eternal return" is rooted also in the minds of those who have been brought up on lines of a religion as strictly monotheistic as Islam, appear from the statement—unjustified in my view—of one of Iqbal's learned followers, M. D. Siddiqi. It is found in a thoughtful though lengthy article of his: "Iqbal's Concept of Evolution" (in *Iqbal*, vol. II, 1954, P. 27): "He seems to

believe that the world process is the self-realisation of an *original unity broken up* into its components."

47. The term refers to Qur'ān XVII, 11.

48. See foot-note 44.

49. Qur. VII, 24. But also Satan's traditional enmity with man assumes for Iqbal's a positive value in the Fichtean sense. In another passage he says e.g.: "To be true the enemy is also your friend, his existence gives an active brightness to your Enterprise. He who is conversant with the degrees of the self, considers it a grace of God to have a powerful enemy." And again: "Refuse living in a faded world which has a God without having a Satan".

50. Satan is, in Islam as well as in the Jewish religion, essentially the *enemy of man*, of Adam, not the enemy of *God*. Also Rūmī opposes Adam to Iblis, just as Abraham is opposed to Nimrod and Moses is opposed to Pharaoh. The New Testament with its conception of the two kingdoms, God and world, gives to Satan a far greater importance, under the manifest impact of Persian and gnostic influence. On this point see the interesting considerations of A. Frank Du Quesne, *op. cit.*, p. 208 and 290. They seem however somehow biased by his desire to vindicate by all means absolute originality of Christianity.

51. Besides, there is also in the iconography a great difference between certain representations showing Satan as a horrible heavy monster, and others where the fallen angel appears in a posture of a noble self-restraint (cf. E. Kirschbaum, "L. Angelo Rosso e l. Angelo Turchino" in *Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana*, XVII (1940), pp. 209-227.

Besides, the oldest roots of this bivalent character can be historically traced back to the so-called primitive cultures. On the one hand, there is the serpent-Dragon (symbolizing the primordial chaos, abyss) to which we briefly refer in foot-note 62, and on the other hand, the well known figure which appears—and this is particularly interesting for us here—especially in the myths about the creation, the "countercreator" like the Coyote in the myths of hunters and gatherers of California (see some passages in Pettazzoni, *Miti e Legend*, vol. III, Turin 1963, pp. 89 ff. and also the brief study of D. Šatolli, T. Tentori, *Miti e legende sulla creazione dei primitivi nordamericani*, Rome 1941, pp. 28-32.) In a cosmogonic myth of the Algonkian tribe (Lenape) it is spoken of (quoted in Schmidt, *Ursprung der Gottesidee*, II, pp. 417-419) either as a counter-creator who among other misfortunes brought death into the world, or as a thick snake causing a great flood. I do not think that it is possible to identify the two beings, as Henninger does ("L'adversaire du Dieu bon chez les primitifs", in *Satan, Etudes Carmelit*, Paris, 1948, p. 111). On the contrary, they represent very strikingly two different aspects of the "Satanic" also as regards its evolution in history. Also in other myths (cf. that of the Maidu quoted in Šatolli-Tentori, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-32) "Coyote" and the serpent are quite distinct from each other.

To make myself clear: it is somewhat the same as the difference between the ambivalent Germanic Loki (see F. Stanton Cawley, "The Figure of Loki in Germanic Mythology" in *Harvard Theol. Review*, XXXII, 1939, pp. 309-326) and the dragon, the serpent of Midgardhr, the former being lively and "faber", true Iqbalian *iblis nirī*, the latter dull and "material" like an *Iblīs khākī*.

As regards the "counter-creator" (sometimes also *assistant* creator), Pettazzoni thinks him to be a creator belonging to a different mythology. He is supposed to have been supplanted amongst the vicissitudes of history and successive strata of

peoples etc. (Cf. "Mythes des origines et mythes de la creation", in *Proceedings of the 7th Congress for the History of Religion 1950*, Amsterdam 1951, pp. 67 ff.).

52. The reading of the chapters related to Satan in Bukhārī's and Muslim's collections of traditions, or in other texts as *Ākām al-marjān* (quoted below), can at best yield some interesting starting points for historical and religious comparison with post-biblical Judaic sources, or serve as an amusing pastime because of the stories contained in such collections. In the main, Satan appears there—as also in the Hebraic texts—as God's instrument with only a very relative autonomy. However, for a fuller historical understanding of Iqbal's Satan one must bear in mind not only the considerations of the mystics of which we have given examples here and there, but also the interesting chapter on "temptations" in al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā'* (Cairo edition of 1312 H. part III, pp. 20 ff.): It reads there e.g. (p. 21) that God, as the Qur'an says, created all things by pairs. So the devil is the angel's counterpart. A little further he explains the well known tradition: "The heart of the believer is between the two fingers of God" affirming without hesitation that Satan is one of the two fingers. (He therefore is an *aspect of God*, he is *musahhar* to God like all other creation!) Apropos of the famous tradition: "The Prophet said: No one of you is without a Demon. They asked him: You also? Yes, I too, but God has assisted me against him. He has become Muslim and does not command but what is good", the great theologian shrewdly explains its meaning so that the passions (*shahawāt*) are not evil in themselves. In the case of the man of God, on the contrary, they become themselves stimuli of good. Al-Ghazālī (with whom Iqbal felt perfectly in line, cf. foot-note 42) showed in his whole work a vivid sense of the superiority of moral action over speculative theology. Of this the following closing passage of the great Teacher of Tūs (op. cit. p. 23) gives a testimony: "The servant of God must always be bent on chasing (*daf'*) the Enemy from his soul, rather than on wondering what the Enemy's origin, genealogy and dwelling-place might be. He ought above all to ask what sort of weapons the Enemy uses; so as to keep them more effectively away from his soul: they are the passions (*hawā*) and the lustful pleasures (*shahawāt*). This suffices for him who is wise."

In his most useful review *Notes on Islam* Fr. Courtois S. J. has started publishing instalments of a well informed and objective study on "The Islamic Conception of the Devil" (first instalment on pp. 2 to 12, vol. VII, No. 1, March 1954). But on p. 2 only a hint is given to a passage in Iqbal's *Lect.* and it remains entirely unnoticed that the figure of Iblis assumes a far greater importance in the author's poetical work in Urdu and Persian.

53. Z. Werblowsky, *Lucifer and Prometheus, a Study of Milton's Satan* (Thesis of the Faculty of Arts, Geneva), London 1952.

54. The sentence which forms the *radif* of a most beautiful *ghazal* in Rūmī's *Diwān* (cf. V. von Rosenzweig, *Auswahl aus den Diwanen des Mawlānā Dschelāleddīn Rūmī*, Wien 1838, pp. 18-21) is a quotation from Qur. VII, 23 (*rabbanā zālamnā ānfusanā*, "Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves . . .").

55. This important concept arises still more clearly from an anecdote cited in a foot-note by Nicholson (Commentary on the First and Second Books, p. 109, v. 1493), and taken from a Commentary on the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* of Ibn 'Arabī: "A certain mystic in conversation with God said: 'O my God, You have decreed that sin should be, You have willed it, You have created it in my soul!' Then a voice answered him: 'This is precisely what is held by those who believe in My unity (*tauḥīd*),—here therefore Satan defends the absolute *tauḥīd* from yet another angle),

but what is it that those who profess to be my servants, should say?' The mystic answered: 'It was my fault; it is I who committed sin, who did wrong!' 'And I,—the Voice continued answering—I have pardoned, I have shown mercy!'

56. Cf. Foot-note II.

57. This concept of God as transcendent and arbitrary, above nature and above its law, is often found in Rūmī's *Mathnavī*; in this same episode one meets with a verse which is properly speaking a declaration of explicit anti-pantheism; God says: "*chār tab'ū 'ellat-e ūlā na-y-am, dar taṣarruf dā- 'imā man bāqī-y-am*".

On the problem of pantheism in Rūmī see Nicholson's already quoted work *Idea of Personality in Sufism* and also "Theism and Pantheism in Rūmī," an article of mine in *Pakistan Quarterly* (Karachi), III, 4 (1954), pp. 36-41; 60-62.

58. The verse reads (IV, 1617): *did ʔin-i Adam ū dīnīsh na-dīd; in Jahān did ān jahān-bīnīsh na-dīd*. Nicholson translates: "He saw the clay of Adam but did not see his obedience to God: he saw in him this world but did not see that (spirit) which beholds yonder world." If one compares this passage with those quoted a little earlier where Satan's failure is not to perceive God's active decision,—and with fragment on the controversy between earth and fire, quoted on p. 41, foot-note 15, where Satan sees only the *naqsh al-mādda* and not the *kamāl an-nihāya*—and if in addition one considers the parallelism of the second *miṣra'* of this same verse (where *ʔin* corresponds to *jahān*, and *dīn* to *jahān-bīnīsh*, the translucent perception of the material world which is proper to God and to the transcendent beings, the *fravashī*, to put it in terms of Mazdaism), then a—to my view—better interpretation and translation of *dīn* in the present passage comes spontaneously to one's mind. It means "the more real and profound personality of Adam", in a certain sense his *fravashī* personality, that of the "true" Adam, not directly dependent on the earth, but on the finality of God's creative act. Besides, Corbin (op. cit. in foot-note 70, on p. 143 and *passim*) has shown how the conception of the Mazdaic *daēna* is found present in certain Islamic circles. In the same study, the problem of *daēna* is also given a semantic solution which sounds a little more acceptable than the one proposed by Duchesne-Guillemin in *Ormazd et Ahriman*, Paris 1953, p. 67.

59. This forms a curious contrast with Luther's injunction to laugh at Satan *quia est superbus spiritus et non potest ferre contemptum sui* (Werblowsky, op. cit., p. XI).

On the prohibition of laughter in certain situations reported by myths and fables see the interesting study of Propp in *Uchenye Zapiski Gos. Leningradskogo Universiteta*, Kl. Filolog. N., III, 1939. The hero, when penetrating into the throat of the dragon (Satan) which he should kill, may not laugh, otherwise he is defeated.

60. Cf. A. Bausani, 'Aspetti del misticismo islamico' *Ricerche Religiose*, vol. XX, 1949, pp. 1 ff.; and of the same, "Il pensiero religioso di Maulāna Gialālād-Dīn Rūmī" in *O. M.*, XXXIII, 1953, pp. 180 ff.

61. Summary in the above quoted article on Rūmī, p. 187.

62. Mysticism of all times is full of this motif. In the myth the serpent-dragon motif e.g. (which generally symbolizes the primordial chaos, the abyss of the waters, the un-differentiated One) has developed, as Propp has shown (*Le radici storiche dei racconti di fate*, Ital. edit., Turin 1949, pp. 343-446), from an initial stage of "useful serpent" whose stomach is believed to give magical abilities to the one who dwells in it, into a stage of "evil serpent" which is "the fruit of a higher civilisation". The good serpent is still very much alive in the Chinese civilisation (dragon), but remains of the good serpent motif exist even in the Bible (cf. John III, 14-15

where Jesus refers to Num. XXI, 8-9). One may also remember the famous gnostic sect of the Ophites.

63. Cf. Lk VI, 36; Mt V, 48; Lev. XIX, 2.

64. Also in the Christian tradition has Satan the aspect of the one who spreads "confusion" who "obnubilates". Cf. the terms employed in I Tim., III, 6; VI, 4; II Tim., III, 4; they are all derived from *typhos*, smoke, steam. So also the *mat-aiotes* of II Peter. II, 18; Rom. VIII, 20 (but "the work of him who so subjected it" in this passage means for many exegets *God*); Eph. IV, 17 seems to refer to the idle metaphysical disorder which Satan tries to create. Frank-Duquesne (*op. cit.* p. 238) cites also a curious passage from Jeremiah on the effect of the Fall as a return to the indetermined. In Frank-Duquesne's learned and interesting study any distinction between the two aspects of Satan is however missing. For this reason his criticism (pp. 303 fl.) of the doctrine of Satan as "aspect of God" (of the personal God) appears only partly justifiable.

This aspect of Satan as Chaos explains why in the Islamic tradition he is also connected with the water (abyss, *tehom*, chaotic primordial waters). There exists more than one *hadīth* collected in *Shūblī*, *op. cit.* pp. 164 fl., 175-176) according to which "Iblīs' throne is on the sea", or Solomon, riding an *'ifrit* in search for Iblīs, finds him on *bisāf* on the sea. Whence it is not by chance that in the Christian apocalypse *the sea will be abolished* at the end of times (Apoc. XXI, 1). In Is. XXVII, 1, God will "kill the serpent which lives in the sea".

65. See e.g. E 2) and foot-note 32. According to Saint-Victor (*Les deux Masques*, III, ed. 1883, p. 342) Prometheus is the *permanent prophet*.

Going back beyond Milton and his immediate sources, one should recall, as regards the role of Satan as initiator of "technique", the many legends of genii or devils working under-ground: cf. the dwarfs of the Northern mythology. G. Agricola, in *De animantibus subterraneis*; Hephaestus (a pagan god, whence a demon), identified e.g. by Vossius (*De Origine et Progressu Idolatriae*, 1688 cit. in Max Muller *Clips from a German Workshop*, IV, p. 203) with Tubalcain etc. etc.

Agricola's page on the under-ground devils is so interesting that I reproduce it from an old translation into Italian of the dialogue *Il Bermanno* by M. Tramezzino (in Vinegia, MDL, fol. 430 v.; the little book contains the translation of G. Agricola's main works).

Bermanno: "Joking apart, in some mines certain kinds of Demons happen to be found: some of them do not cause any harm to the miners, but they go roaming around the wells and, without doing anything special, seem to exert themselves much in hard work, now digging the vein together with the others, now emptying the buckets from the material they have dug, now operating the lift, or teasing and vexing the workers. This happens specially in wells from which much silver is being raised, or where there is hope of finding much of it. Some others of the Demons are very tiresome and cause harm, as was the case (which is well known to many) of one who a few years ago harassed so much a mine of Anneberg called the Crown of Roses that he murdered no less than twelve miners. Whence that well had to be given up, although it contained a lot of silver.

Ancone: Psello, among the six kinds of demons he lists, mentions the one which is usually found in the mines, and he says, if I am not mistaken, this is the worst of all, being garbed in the thickest stuff that can be found. (On earth, as being "heavier" stuff than fire, see below).

Bermanno: As I said, some of them are so wicked that the miners flee from

them as from a deadly pestilence: some others, on the contrary, are so pleasant that the miners not only do not mind meeting them often and listening to their difficulties, but they even desire for them and take them for people bringing good luck".

66. The magical aspect of Satan (of the "true" Satan) is parallel and connected with his traditional aspect as "liar", as creator of vampires and of confusion, as Golem and as *homunculus* using from below the proteiform and abstract cosmical energy which is quite different from the *fiat* of the divine Creator. Rūmī has in his *Mathnavī* (III, 1191 fl.) a few master-pieces—true witnesses to his deep psychological experience—on the difference between "magic" and "creation", between Prophet and Magician, between "true" and "false miracle", a distinction over which only those do smile who are wanting in real religious experience. One may also remember his verse *kar sadā'i ke to-rā bālā kashīd, ān sadā mī-dān k'az bālā rasīd*. The sure proof that an inspiration comes from God and not from Satan, is that it has an elevating practical effect; it never depresses.

67. I refer to works as e.g. that of P. Volz, *Das Dämonische in Jahwe*, 1924; R. Scharf, *Die Gestalt des Satans im Alten Testament*, in Jung, *Symbolik des Geistes*, 1948. Frank-Duquesne is however perfectly right in noting (*op. cit.*, pp. 303-305) that the idea which recent writers have given a scientific formulation, is not at all new, and he quotes many interesting precedents (forgetting however the rather important *Marriage of Heaven and Hell* by Blake.)

68. The question of the dangerous resemblance between Divine and Diabolic, and that of the practical means for discriminating between them has occupied all mystics and religious minds. Rūmī's solution (cf. the above quoted articles) consists in the humble veneration for the Prophet-Saint, the Visible Master who preserves man from falling back into the undifferentiated Satanic; for Ghazālī (*Ihyā'*, III, p. 24) the "doors of the devils" are numerous whereas "the door of the angels" is only one and is mostly mistaken for those of the devils. The instrument that serves as a criterion, is the *Book of God* (the revealed prophetic Scripture and its Laws) and the heart (*qalb*) enlightened by piety (*taqwā*).

69. Cf. H. Corbin, *Terre celeste et corps de resurrection d'après quelques traditions iraniennes*, in *Eranos*, XXII (1953), pp. 97-194.

70. It may suffice to think of certain aspects of the Christian tradition more or less strongly imbibing gnosticism. It is interesting that some people, like the individualistic Kierkegaard, who are considered as forerunners of the rebirth of the orthodox biblicism, under-went deep gnostic influences, as Martin Buber has shown among other things in *Dialogisches Leben*, Zurich 1947. On the "Demonic" in Kierkegaard see E. Paci, "Ironia, Demoniaco ed Eros in Kierkegaard", in *Archivio di Filosofia*, Roma 1953 (II). To the ferocious tirades of Kierkegaard against the mass Iqbal replies with the well known *ḥadīth*: "Satan is with him who is alone, but the hand of God is upon the Community."

71. According to Iqbal (see one of his Urdu verses quoted in *The Concept of Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 177) the classical call for "giving up the world" to the Quranic believer must mean that he ought to thrust himself forward towards new worlds and to conquer them actively. It is in this sense that he paraphrases the famous tradition that there is no monachism in Islam. Monachism in Islam means "holy war".

72. It may suffice to quote Paul's letter to the Romans. The whole classical Christian theology with its ideological link between sin-death-flesh-redemption is unintelligible for the convinced Muslim not so much for reasons of possible incon-

sistencies he would be able to discover from the point of view of logic (this is only the outside of certain polemics), but because instinctively he feels it to be too anthropomorphic; too great seems to him the importance attached to the sin of a poor man. Such importance appears prejudicial to the absolute liberty of God's will which the Muslim wants to safeguard at any cost.

73. The dragon-serpent briefly discussed in foot-note 62 is generally connected with the realm of the dead.

Interesting in this respect is a Japanese myth (Kojiki, XXXVIII, 115) which says that in order not to die man should have married a horribly ugly woman. But he refused, and as a result men are "like flowers" and like flowers they die. Death is the wages one pays for doing or not doing something *ugly* (cf. "the wages of sin is death" of Paul).

One may also consult the material on the origin of Death given in the article 'Fall (Ethnic)' in *ERE*, V, p. 706 ff.

74. Cf. Badr ad-Din Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh ash-Shibli (d. 769 H.), *Ākām al-marjān fī ahkām al-jānn*, Cairo 1326 H., p. 197. On the meaning of the important term *ṣmad* (Qur. CXII, 2) which here with all evidence means "solid" "compact", see other opinions as given in Rosenthal, *Some Minor Problems in the Qur'ān*, New York 1953 (Reprint from the Joshua Starr Memorial Volume).

75. On the redeeming death of the Brave in Iqbal see Bausani, *The Concept of Time*, op. cit., pp. 173-177.

76. Couttois, op. cit., pp. 343, 345. Any trace of a tragical "Dostojevskian" vision of evil and of the "Satanic" is indeed absent from Iqbal as well as from Islam as a whole. (I refer to visions as Stavrogin's confession in *Besy* and that of Hippolyt in the *Idiot*).

77. "The sin of an ecstatic soul begets a younger universe". These words are laid in *Jāv.* into the mouth of the heretic heroine, *Tāhira* in the firmament of Jupiter (*Jāv.*, p. 144).

78. Christianity goes still further in this direction, teaching the incarnation even of God himself. This conception is repugnant to Islām because of central affirmation of God's absolute freedom of will, which in the case of incarnation would be subjected to necessity. See Muhammad Mo'in, *Mazdayasnā va ta'āree an dar ulabiyāt-e fārsi*, Tehran, 1326 solar (1948), (pp. 36, 623, XX). In my view this is one of the best achievements of the young generation of Persian scholars. Conducted with European scientific method and richly provided with analytical indices and registers of names etc., it would be worth while a translation or a broad summary in languages that can also be read by non-Iranologists. Prof. Corbin who rightly points out its remarkable value, has given of it a summary in French by way of an introduction of about 30 pages. The passage here translated is from pp. 408 ff.

80. The well known "free-thinker" and devoted panegyrist of caliph al-Mahdī, executed in 783-784 A.C. on the charge of heresy.

81. Interesting idea that the monotheistic *Weltanschauung* is a "novelty", something stranger and intrusive that breaks into a "tradition".

82. Mo'in, op. cit., p. 40, where the Persian text of Firdausi is given and mention made of a similar contrast in the *Shūhnāma*, but now with regard to Christians.

83. It is the younger Asadi ('Alī Asadī) who completed his poem *Garshāsp-Nāma* in 1016 A. C. and also composed the well known dictionary *Lughat i Fārs*. He should not be mistaken for Abū-Naṣr Aḥmad Asadi, his father and master of

Firdaust. (Cf. Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, vol. II, pp. 272 ff.)

84. Further on in this poem (pp. 134-139) Asadī puts into the mouth of a Brahmin in discussion with Garshāsp an account of the creation of the world which begins with heat and fire, and then, almost as an apology, he states another theory, that of the "Greek philosophers" which is nearer to the Islamic concept and in which at least the air is better than the fire.

85. Cf. the demon as *exusia tu aeros* in the Christian gnosis. In the esoteric doctrines the air represents and symbolizes the "lower level of the mind". The double meaning of the Arabic root *hawā* and *hawā'* ("passion" and "air") suggests this assimilation.

86. On these aspects of the "earth" see the fascinating and learned considerations that form the core of Corbin's precious article (quoted above). In one of his interesting poems, the Turkish mystical poet Yunus Emre (I want to thank my friend Prof. A. Bombaci for having brought it to my knowledge) says this on the subject of the "earth":

"... No clouds do ever darken the light of my Moon,
Never does its fulness disappear;
From the earth its light is poured on the sky.
On the earth have I discovered my Moon, why should I seek in the sky...?
On the earth I must prostrate my face,
From the earth is mercy showering on me!"

(Text in Yunus Emre, ed. by A. Golpinanli 2289)

The supremacy of the earth takes here the meaning of the Saint, the Spiritual Guide rising from the earth and exercising his mission on the earth. (The "Moon" by Rūmī is called 'Alī.)

87. Duchesne-Guillemin in his already cited *Ormazd et Ahriman* seems to exaggerate in his attempt to minimize the importance of the Iranian influence on the Greek as well as the Hebraic, Christian and Islamic culture. Even though a proper discussion is here out of place, let us nonetheless note that apart from the *Hārūt* and *Mārūt* legend (but its identification by Dumézil with *Harvatāt* and *Amrtāt* is far from being approved unanimously by the Islamicists) and the two other points of detail quoted on p. 150, the Islamic tradition and the Qur'ān itself seem to have taken something more from Mazdaism. (The very pre-historic covenant between God and future men, and the "choice" they take (see Qur. VII, 172) seem clearly to derive from the well known "choice" of the *fravashi* spoken of in *Bundahishn*, II, 10-11).

81. See foot-note 31. On the other hand one can quote a verse of Iqbal in which man takes on a particularly striking attitude of "praiseworthy rebellion" after the manner of Iblis:

I am servant, if it true, and seek for no other pleasure (*rizā*) than Yours,
And I go no other Way than the one ordered by you,
But if you should enjoin this ignorant man:
'Say that an ass is a horse of purest race', I never would obey!

(*Armaghan*, p. 10)

89. See foot-note 26 and 28. It should however be borne in mind that Iqbal's way of arguing in the passage where he condemns "freedom of thought" can also be of value: "not every heart," he says, "is the seat of an Angel Gabriel; not every thought is fit for hunting the Bird of Paradise." In other words, the world gets its light

only from thoughts coming from God, centred in God, not from the indiscriminate confusion of selfish thoughts of this or that. Once again, Iqbal stands for a theoretic-prophetic conception (not "monarchic and dictatorial") against the vague humanism of those who are separated from the Source; the motivation of his anti-liberal criticism is therefore deeply religious, not political.

90. In a letter to Saiyidain, quoted in his *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy*, Lahore 1945 (IV ed.), p. 136, he even declares explicitly: "the intellect is satanic".

91. Cf. Rūmī, *Mahnavī*, III, 1360 ff.

92. Of Iqbal's ideas about fatalism and freedom of will, see my *Concept of Time*, pp. 170-173. Besides, the Islamic tradition has it also that Satan was the first to use *qiyās* in the famous sentence *khalāqtanī min nār* etc. He is therefore the first "logician". (Cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, s. v. *Kiyās* and Shibli, *op. cit.*, p. 174).

93. *Op. cit.* in foot-note 67.

94. The witty point is of Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the best noted Protestant theologians with a fairly orthodox outlook (cit. in Werblowsky, *op. cit.*, p. 74).

95. One may add still this curious fact noted by Frank-Duquesne (*op. cit.* p. 251): *sar hā-'olām* which in the Talmud (Yebhamoth 16 B) is "the Angel of Yahwe" of Ex. XXIII, 20 and which is identified by Philo with the Logos, is on the contrary Satan in the Christian tradition (cf. II Cor., IV. 4; John XII, 31), and in the reported passage of St. Paul even "the God of this world".

It is of interest that in a tradition reported by Shibli (*op. cit.*, p. 214) Jesus is looking at Iblis and says: "this is the *arkūn* of the world" etc. Perhaps the Greek term is here kept for the sake of this lesser clarity so as not to hurt the Islamic conscience by attributing such vast power to Satan.

96. In *A Year amongst the Persians*, Cambridge 1927, p. 144, the discussion between Browne and some Bābīs runs thus: "They seemed—writes Browne—to have no conception of Absolute Good or Absolute Truth: to them Good was merely what God chose to ordain, and Truth what he chose to reveal, so that they could not understand how anyone could attempt to test the truth of a religion by an abstract ethical or moral standard. God's attributes, according to their belief, were twofold—"Attributes of Grace" (*Ṣifāt-i Jamāl* or *Lūf*), and "Attributes of Wrath" (*Ṣifāt-i Jalāl* or *Qahr*): both were equally divine and in some dispensations (as the Christian and Bābī) the former, in some (as the Mosaic and the Muhammedan) the latter predominated."

97. See foot-note 30. The short poem has a casual and political character and has not been translated into European languages.

98. See foot-note 30.

99. See foot-note 67.

100. "On the Day of the last Accounts, when the book of my deeds will be opened before me, disgrace me, God, yea, but disgrace also Thyself!"

101. Translated in my article: "Sette poesie inedite di Muhammad Iqbāl". in *Il Punto nelle Lettere e nelle Arti*, Rome, II, 3, 1953, p. 18. In a brilliant essay in novel form on Noah (in *Montaggio*, II, 3-4, 1954) M. Brelich has poetically developed his excellent intuition of the value of what collaboration between God and man in absolute theism means. His sentence: "Noah remained dear to the Lord, because he suggested to him ideas as to how ably to modify the original plan without destroying it" (p. 63) sounds like an echo to Iqbalean passages as this: "If your heart is bleeding for a Destiny, then ask God to order for your another one" (*Jāv.*, p. 101

of the translation) and others like this,

102. The "dialogue" with God is not only a theoretical principle repeatedly asserted by Iqbal but is very often also used by him as a literary genre.

103. "Thorns and roses can be seen upon the branch, but on its inside there is neither rose nor thorn!"

104. A noteworthy recent interpretation of the Promethean myth is found in Kerényi, *Miti e Misteri* (Ital. ed.), Turin 1950, pp. 179-262.

105. In a yet unpublished doctoral thesis of the Roman Antonianum on Iqbal's philosophy, the Pakistani Franciscan Father Augustin Fernandes has tried to point out a few immanent Fichtean aspects of Iqbal's philosophy which are usually neglected by the Muslim scholars. In order to establish the exact role of these immanent elements which are (as shown by me in *Concept of Time*, foot-note 4 on p. 168) in a striking contrast with Iqbal's theism—which in my view appears far more characteristic—it would be necessary to study thoroughly the God-World relationship in his "poetical" works.

106. It is of interest to notice that Plato, whom with some over-simplification, Iqbal makes the great master of the mystical world, in *Asrar* (pp. 34 fl.) is declared head and guide of the "sheep" and opium of the nations etc. He therefore is substantially "satanic". Considering that Plato has also recently been called "the philosopher of the primitive mentality" (cf. M. Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 64), it is undeniable that the intuition of Iqbal, whose aversion in particular towards that type of mentality has been exposed above, is psychologically correct—leaving its historical exactitude out of consideration.

107. Cf. Courtois, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

October 68)

PROBLEMS OF ETHICS IN MOHAMMAD IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY

M. T. Stepanyants

The tendency to the personal interpretation of the relation between God and man eliminating any ecclesiastic or secular meditation, the tendency which is so much typical for the Reformation explains the attention of the religious reformers to pantheism or mysticism.

Pantheism, which unites God and the world, sometimes identifying them, allows to interpret this unity both ways: as dissolution of nature in God or, just opposite, of God in nature. In the latter case, pantheism contains the elements of naturalistic philosophy. In XVI-XVII centuries these very elements of pantheism made it the most important mythological foundation of the majority of natural-philosophic theories in West Europe (Kampanella, Bruno etc.)

In Islam too mysticism or sufism sometimes served as a form for naturalistic conceptions.

Sufism looks at the prayer as a way to personal contact with God. Muslim mystics believe that it is possible by merging in God not only to contact with Him but even to comprehend the Absolute Truth. The achievement of "fana" is considered to be the aim of "tarikah". "Tarikat" stipulates the elimination of human will, the acknowledgement of personal insignificance, the belief in God as the only real being. Iqbal justly considered that mysticism "suppresses personal initiative" and that is why "... the decadents in all ages tried to seek shelter behind self-mysticism and nihilism". "Having lost the vitality to grapple with the temporal"—Iqbal said,—“these prophets of decay apply themselves to the quest of a supposed eternal, and gradually complete the spiritual impoverishment and physical degeneration of their society by evolving a seemingly charming ideal of life which reduces the healthy and powerful to death”.¹

Being critical to mysticism Iqbal at the same time borrowed quite a lot from sufi philosophers and used a number of sufi terms and notions. The sufi doctrine "wahdat-al-wujud" which expresses the pantheistic idea of the unity of God and nature was interpreted by

1. See S. A. Vahid. *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, (Lahore, 1964), pp. 101—102.

M. Iqbal in the spirit different from that one of the traditional Islamic mysticism. Sufism laid the emphasis on the distinction of "zahir" and "batin" (Appearance and Reality) where God is Reality and nature is appearance. Accordingly, this world and the human beings are the appearance of the Reality-God. This point of view logically leads to the total ignoring of world problems as temporal, not important, and to the understanding of the role of man as a passive conductor of God's will. The unity, the melting of individual ego in Cosmic ego, Iqbal understood not as the refusal of man from his own ego but rather as participation in the creative activity of Supreme Being.

In his time M. Iqbal by his own way developed the ideas which had been early expressed by "non-orthodox" sufis like Mansur Hallaj and Abdul Qadir Beidil. The name of Hallaj to whom belongs the famous exclamation: "Anal-Haq", which brought him to death, was a number of times mentioned in Iqbal's poems.

Iqbal even called himself "the second Mansur".

A. H. Kamali who acknowledges "departure" of Iqbal "from the traditions of emotionalism and idealism, which reduce human existence to a phenomenal shape in the development of the absolute", considers that this departure was due to the fact that "the radical elements of Beidil's thought came to full bloom in Iqbal's philosophy of self".¹ In contrast to the traditional sufi symbolics, which compare the relation between God and man as that one of ocean and waves, river and bubbles, Beidil used in his poetry metaphors which radically modified the concept of man. "Just like a pearl, which though hardened in the bosom of a river, is thrown ashore I am thrown out, because I could not be absorbed, melted, or dissolved"². Beidil looked at man as "the pinnacle of creation, the shaper and the maker, the knower and the doer".³

Mohammed Iqbal continued this line of thinking and developed it in a comprehensive concept of "khudi", in which man was regarded as a creator, as a partner of God and Maker. In his poem "Mahawarah Ma-Bayen Khuda wa Insan" ("God's Conversation with Man"), man speaks to his maker as an equal:

1. A. H. Kamali, *The Heritage of Islamic Thought*,—in *Iqbal, Post-Philosopher of Pakistan*, N. Y. London, 1971, p. 223.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

3. *Ibid.*

"You made the night, and I the lamp,
And you the clay and I the cup;
You - desert, mountain-peak, and vale;
I - flower-bed, park and orchard; I
Who grind a mirror out of stone,
Who brew from poison honey-drink".

Individual "ego" strives to come closer to the divine "Ego". But Iqbal understood this striving not as a dissolution on account of man's refusal from own "khudi", but just opposite, as his self-affirmation. "The ultimate of the ego", Iqbal wrote, "is not to see something, but to be something... The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it".¹

Approaching to God or to Ideal, was regarded by the poet rather as a vital than an intellectual act. He considered it a vital act which "deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and re-made by continuous action."²

M. Iqbal in his concept of "ego" tried by his own way to synthesize the ideas of Muslim and European philosophy. His concept of "ego" has much in common with some of the ideas of Fichte. Iqbal was particularly attracted by Fichte's immanent philosophy regarding object and subject in their indissolubility. Like Fichte, the Muslim poet-philosopher affirmed the unity of object and subject, being and thought, non-ego and ego. "It is possible to take thought not as a principle which organizes and integrates its material from the outside, but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded, thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of the being."³ The real world of "non-ego" is the expression of the creative activity of "ego". Thus the world of objects is not something different from our "self", it is some part of us. "The world is nothing but the manifestation of ours,"—said Iqbal,—"for without us there would be no scenes of lights and sound".⁴

Iqbal believed that affirming by this way the unity of object and subject, he solved the problem of free will and found the golden

1. M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 198.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

4. M. Iqbal, *The Secrets of the Self*, (Lahore, 1961), p. 16.

middle way between absolute determinism and voluntarism. But it seems he has failed to solve the problem. One of the weakest points of this dualistic system is: how "non-ego" appears out of "ego". In Fichte's view the theoretical reason cannot give the answer to this question. This can be done only by practical or moral reason, according to which this "creation" is an act of free will. M. Iqbal also considered that ordinary thought cannot appreciate this unity, the essence of which is the creative activity of self.

In "Asrar-i Khudi" Iqbal says:

"It [the Self] makes from itself the forms of others,

.....
—.....

Subject, object, means and causes—

All these are forms which it assumes for the purpose of action."¹

In Iqbal's view "In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation."

This identification of contemplation with creation reminds Henri Bergson's theses that "the act of cognition coincides with the act which creates reality" and that "the difference between *who* cognizes and *what* is cognized disappears". In his lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, M. Iqbal a number of times referred to Bergson's ideas, particularly while interpreting intuition as the highest form of intellect and also when considering the problem of time and space. However, the Muslim poet-philosopher did not accept a number of Bergson's notions, which contradicted the spirit and social trend of his own world outlook. Being a mouthpiece of anti-colonial social forces of his society M. Iqbal propagated creative activity and struggle. Bergson's ideas about aimless wave impulses, which are chaotic and non-regulated, lead to the conclusion that it was useless to oppose this play of blind forces. The pessimism of the social conclusions out of Bergson's philosophical premises could not be accepted by Iqbal. Opposing Bergson the Muslim philosopher stated: "Reality is not blind vital impulse wholly unilluminated by idea. Its nature is through and through teleological".³

1. Ref. B. A. Dar, *Inspiration from the West*, in "*Iqbal, Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan*", p. 193.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

3. M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 53.

M. Iqbal realized vulnerability of his position as affirmation of "teleological" character of nature leads to negation of free will. "The world"—Iqbal recognized,—“regarded as a process of realizing a pre-ordained goal is not a world of free, responsible agents. It is only a stage on which puppets are made to move by a kind of pull from behind”.¹

Thus Iqbal did not want to accept voluntarism which liberates from responsibility, leads to pessimism and desires to step away from participation in this life. He also rejected supernaturalistic determinism of orthodox Muslim philosophy which did not recognize free will. Iqbal made an attempt to solve the antinomy of freedom and necessity, God's will and man's free will. Development of the world, the acts of men are not aimless, they are submitted to the teleological purpose. But this purpose is not understood statically, as a predetermined plan of development. "The notion of purpose cannot be understood except in reference to the future".² There is no rigid aim system, in every period of life, people mould and develop themselves according to the spirit of new ideals. Teleological purpose is understood by Iqbal in the sense that "... there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands".³

The Muslim reformer recognized that if "ego" selfdevelops, it is able to will and act, then freedom and omnipotence of God are doubtful. How man's free will can be reconciled with God's omnipotence? In Iqbal's view God Himself limits His power. This limitation "is born out of His own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power, and freedom".⁴ By giving freedom to man God takes risk, for "the freedom to choose good involves also the freedom to choose what is the opposite of good".² God takes this risk because He believes in man and man is to justify this faith.

Iqbal followed the sufi teaching on good and evil. The Quran says, "Whatever good visits thee, it is of God; whatever evil visits

1. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

thee is of thyself" (4:81). In contradiction to this, the medieval sufists (Abdul Karim al-Jilli and others) said that both the good and the evil of the universe came from God. In their opinion, evil was a necessary objective condition for the realisation of good. Just as the bird must overcome the resistance of the air to fly, so man can only be good by overcoming evil, and, therefore, he has no right to complain about the existence of the latter.

In adopting this sufist principle, Iqbal modified it somewhat. The pessimism and passivity of the medieval mystics had no place in the philosophy of one who spoke for the middle class at a time when it was rousing itself to political action. His affinities were much more with the romanticism and dynamism of 17th and 18th-century European philosophy. Himself a poet, his understanding of Western philosophical thought was drawn mostly from literature and poetry. We would even say that his dialectical ideas on good and evil were to a great extent inspired by the works of Goethe and Milton.

Iqbal explained his ideas by interpreting the Biblical legend of man's fall from grace and expulsion from the Garden of Eden (cf. the Quran, 7, 10-24) as a manifestation of "free choice", a view entirely out of keeping with religious tradition. "Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice," he said.¹ Furthermore, if good was the result of free choice, one might say that evil created good. Iqbal's Iblis-Satan-like Goethe's Mephistopheles was part of the eternal force that always desired evil but worked only good. Without it life would have no dynamism, and deathly passiveness would triumph in the universe. The figure of Satan in one of his poems, like in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, is more attractive than that of God, because it symbolises the spirit of creativity. Addressing the Lord, Iblis says:

Thou hast created the starry spheres : I cause them to move

I am the life of all in the World, the life latent in everything.

Thou givest life to the body : I infuse warmth into life.

Thou showest the way to peaceful rest : I lead towards restless strife !

The man of earthly origin, foolish and short-sighted,

Is born in Thy lap, but attaineth maturity in mine.²

The revolutionary spirit of Iqbal's conception suited the mood of the radical intelligentsia at that time of active struggle against

1. M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 85.

2. S. A. Vahid, *Iqbal, His Art and Thought*, p. 112.

colonialism. Its admission of the objective character of evil impressed the intellectuals. It enabled them to account for all social troubles not by any subjective causes, but by the real live evil, which was colonialism and feudalism.

In insisting on such a close relation between the two ethical categories, even on their mutual interchangeability, Iqbal was stressing the necessity and propriety of taking action against the established social order, which had degenerated into an evil. Disobedience, protest, even violence, all acts condemned by the prevailing morality, were held up as virtues to those engaged in the anti-colonial struggle.

According to Iqbal, there are three stages in the development of the ego. These three stages remind the sufi "tarikah" as well as Nietzsche's ideas of the development of superman. However, they are not the same. Opposite to sufis Iqbal saw the purpose of the development of ego not in "fana" — self-negation, but in self-affirmation, in transformation into the perfect man — "Insan-i kamil", who fulfils the divine will, who is a divine vicegerent. Iqbal's views differ from Nietzsche. For the latter, the superman is a man who does not follow any moral norms. For Iqbal, "the perfect man" is a strong personality, who uses his will and energy not for his own desire for power, but for the sake of fulfilment of the divine will. "Insan-i kamil" is supposed to be able to overcome the vices of the society and to act according to the moral norms ordered by God.

Iqbal undoubtedly felt the influence of Nietzsche, but was not one of his followers. His interest in the German philosopher sprang from a desire to create a Muslim philosophy of action that would suit the aims of the national-liberation movement. He was attracted by Nietzsche's ideal of a superman, a man of will, capable of heroic living. He was impressed with his rejection of Christian asceticism, which condemns man to slavish passivity, for he himself strongly denounced the asceticism preached by the Muslim mystics. He borrowed some of Nietzsche's imagery, for instance the allusions to diamond and coal as symbols of firmness and lack of will.

But while he admired the vision and literary gifts of the German philosopher, Iqbal rejected the basic premises of his philosophy. In his opinion, despite his "vision of the divine", thanks to which he might have become a prophet, Nietzsche never became one because, firstly, he relied entirely on his own faculties without seeking "external guidance in his spiritual life", and, secondly, because he entrusted the

realisation of his philosophical principles only to the elite, whom he contrasted to the common "herd". This atheism and cynical aristocratism made Nietzscheism unacceptable to Iqbal, whose philosophy was inspired by belief in an indivisible bond between man and God, man and society.

(April 73)

IQBAL AS A SEER*

Mumtaz Hasan

IQBAL symbolises the renaissance of Islam in the twentieth century, a regeneration of its intellectual movement and the spirit of its culture. His life forms an interesting study for us from more than one point of view. In the first place, he represents a process of mental and spiritual development starting from modern nationalism, but moving away from it as its incompatibility with the broad human outlook of Islam unfolded itself to him, and as he studied the political and cultural limitations of modern nationalism at close quarters in Europe and in the sub-continent. This process of development is, in certain respects, shared by the other two leaders of the Pakistan movement, Syed Ahmad Khan and Jinnah, both of whom started with the idea of Indian nationalism but had to renounce it later in the light of experience.

Secondly, Iqbal defined and identified the fundamental values of Islam in the context of modern thought. Where does Islam stand in the currents and cross-currents of modern scientific and philosophical concepts? How do we find our bearings in these new surroundings and what path are we to take to reach our goal? What part can Islam play in the modern world with its national and racial strife and its social, economic and cultural antagonisms? These were some of the important questions that presented themselves to Iqbal, on which he spent a lifetime of study. For him, Islam was not a mere device for Muslims to adjust themselves to the changing conditions around them; it was a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical and racial limitations and for fashioning a new world out of the old. It had its own course to pursue in the future as in the past. Iqbal believed that "Islam is itself destiny and will not suffer a destiny."

Iqbal's contribution towards the education of the Muslim consciousness in our times is vast and versatile. He was an outstanding scholar of Arabic and Persian and knew Sanskrit. He also knew German. In English, he has a style of his own—a clear, concise, compact style. He was acknowledged as an outstanding Islamist by the world of scholarship, and a number of European scholars and Orientalists were in correspondence with him on matters of academic and historical interest. His

*Text of a speech delivered on the occasion of the presentation ceremony of *Iqbal in Pictures*, compiled by Fakir Syed Wahiduddin, to the Museums Association of Pakistan. Reproduced with permission.

poetic genius found spontaneous expression in his philosophical poems, *Asrar-i Khudi* and *Rumuz-i Bekhudi—The Secrets of the Self and The Mysteries of Selflessness*—which convey, in words of rare beauty, the vital meaning and message of Islam. Above all, he focussed his attention on the political conflict and intellectual crisis of the world of the early twentieth century and, in that context, made a serious study of the social and cultural foundations of Islam and of the principle of movement inherent in its structure. In his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, he put forward an ordered philosophy and pointed the way to the revitalisation of Muslim society. He has written some of the greatest poetry ever produced in Urdu or Persian, or, indeed, in any of the other languages we know. As a Muslim, he regarded humanity as one and was deeply interested in all aspects of human activity. He reached out in all directions to gather knowledge and inspiration and has conveyed it to us in lines of immortal beauty. Iqbal for us is the gateway to world culture. His work gives us a view of the whole panorama of human civilisation and, as we read him, we find ourselves on terms of intimacy with the great minds of all ages, with whom he encourages us to agree or disagree. His broad and unbiased attitude towards all systems of thought and belief, and his universal outlook on cultures and civilisations make him undoubtedly one of the great humanists of all time.

Above all, Iqbal is the father of the Pakistan idea. He dreamt the great dream, although he did not live to see it come true. Or was it a vision that he saw, a vision of the shape of things to come, the kind of vision that comes only to the seeing eye? For Iqbal was a seer. Just as Nietzsche foretold the rise of Russia in the twentieth century and Tennyson, the development of civil aviation and of aerial warfare and the United Nations, Iqbal had foreseen the establishment of Pakistan. As early as 1909, he had, in a letter to Ghulam Qadir Farrukh of Amritsar, rejected the idea of the so-called Hindu-Muslim unity, which he described as romantic but impracticable. In his Presidential Address to the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on the 29th of December, 1930, he stated clearly that "self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State" appeared to him to be "the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."¹ Subsequently, he included Bengal in his scheme, and reaffirmed his idea in a letter to Jinnah in 1937.²

Iqbal's demand for a consolidated Muslim State was met by bitter

1. Shamloo (ed.), *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1948, p. 12.

2. Letter dated 21 June 1937 in *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1956, p. 24.

criticism some of which was aimed at him personally. He defended his views and stuck to them without entering into any personal controversy, which he never did any time in his life. It may be interesting to recall that when Iqbal was facing these acrimonious criticisms, there was no one in the sub-continent at the time to share his idea, or the blame for it, even though a number of claimants have sprung up later.

Speaking of the 1930 Address, I am reminded of a personal anecdote. When Iqbal returned to Lahore from Allahabad I went to see him. I was still a student at college and felt greatly perturbed at his reference to self-government for the new Muslim State "within the British Empire." "Why did you say that, sir," said I; "why must our Muslim State remain within the British Empire?" His first response was a smile. "You will notice," said he, "that I have said 'self-government within or without the British Empire.' You are worried about 'within,' but there are so many others who have told me they are worried about 'without.'" "But why did you have to say that at all, sir?" I insisted. "Because," said he, "while I see the establishment of a Muslim State as inevitable in the process of history, I cannot see clearly, at least at present, whether it will be within or without the British Empire." I had to keep quiet. Here was a man who was utterly loyal to his vision, who told you what he saw clearly, and what he did not.

Iqbal not only foresaw Pakistan, but also the difficulties it was going to have to face from the beginning of its career. He saw the conflict and the bloodshed that was coming, and he also saw where it would mainly take place. In 1936, in a letter to Maulvi Abdul Haq of the Anjuman-i Tarraqi-i Urdu he wrote:

”مسلمانوں کو اپنے تحفظ کے لیے جو لڑائیاں لڑنی پڑیں گی ان کا میدان پنجاب ہوگا۔ پنجابیوں کو اس میں بڑی بڑی دقتیں پیش آئیں گی کیونکہ اسلامی زمانے میں یہاں کے مسلمانوں کی مناسب تربیت نہیں کی گئی۔ مگر اس کا کیا علاج کہ آئندہ رزمگاہ یہی سر زمین معلوم ہوتی ہے۔“³

[The battles that the Muslims will have to fight for their self-preservation will have the Punjab as their battlefield. In this the Punjabi Muslims will have to face considerable difficulties, for during the days of Muslim rule they were not educated properly in their responsibilities. This, however, cannot be helped, for it is quite clear that this is the land where the fighting will be.]

This amazing prophecy found its initial fulfilment in the mass killings and migration of population in 1947 at the time of Independence.

3. *Iqbal Nama*, Vol. II, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1959, p. 79.

It has been more than fulfilled in the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict. Whether or not the prophecy has exhausted itself, we do not know.

Earlier in 1912, he had said :

آنکھ جو کچھ دیکھتی ہے لب پہ آ سکتا نہیں
محو حیرت ہوں کہ دنیا کیا سے کیا ہو جائے گی⁴

[The lips dare not disclose what the eye doth see;
I am amazed at the way the world is going to change.]

He has not given us any details of what he saw, but in the very next verse he has told us which way he saw the world would go :

شب گریزاں ہوگی آخر جلوہ خورشید سے
یہ چمن معمور ہوگا نغمہ توحید سے⁵

[The darkness of night will flee before the light of the morning
sun ;

This Garden will be filled with the song of the glory of God.]

A few years later he had his greatest vision :

آنچه بود است و نباید زمین خواهد رفت
آنچه بالیست و بنود است ہاں خواهد بود

[What should not be shall cease to be—all that ever was.
What hath not been but ought to be, the same shall come to pass.]

Iqbal similarly had a clear vision of the Kashmir struggle. Before there was any sign of agitation in Kashmir, he saw the gathering storm on the horizon. In a poem, "The Message of the East" written in Nishat Bagh in Kashmir, which is included in the *Payam-i Mashriq*, he referred to the plight of the common Kashmiri :

بریشم قبا خواجہ از محنت او نصیب تنش جامہ تارتاری⁶

[While his master wears the silken robe woven by his labour,
He himself is condemned to be in tatters.]

Iqbal goes on to call on the cup-bearer to arouse the Kashmiri's courage and inspire him to action :

سرت گردم اے ساقی ماہ سیاہ بیار از نیاگان ما یادگاری
ازان جرعه برفشان بر کسیری کہ خاکسترش آفریند شراری⁷

[O moon-faced Saqi! may I be thy sacrifice!
Bring me the heady wine of our ancestors.]

4. *Bang-i Dara*, p. 215.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 216.

6. *Payam-i Mashriq*, p. 314.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

And sprinkle some of it on the Kashmiri,
That sparks of fire may arise from his humble dust!]

Some time after this poem was written, the Kashmir agitation began. To Iqbal's own surprise, it started with a labour revolt in the silk factory to which he had referred.

Iqbal's own family came from Kashmir and he was devoted to the welfare of the downtrodden people of that land, that beautiful land which the East India Company sold away to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a mere seventy-five lacs of rupees. Early in his career, Iqbal was for years Secretary of the Kashmiri Association. He was conscious of his Kashmir origin. In a couplet which sums up his whole personality he says:

تم گلے ز خیابان جنت کشمیر دل از حریم حجاز و نوا ز شیراز است⁸

[I am a rose from the Paradise of Kashmir,
My heart comes from the sacred land of the Hijaz, and my voice
from Shiraz.]

When he recalled the East India Company's deal over Kashmir, he could not help exclaiming:

دھقان و کشت و بجوی و خیابان فروختند
قومی فروختند و چہ ارزان فروختند⁹

[Fields, streams and gardens, and peasants too, they sold away,
They sold away a whole people and how cheaply did they sell!]

When he thought of the misfortunes of the people of Kashmir, the unlimited potentialities they possessed and the tyranny that warped and destroyed their lives, he felt infinitely sad:

آج وہ کشمیر ہے محکوم و مجبور و فقیر
کل جسے اہل نظر کہتے تھے ایران صغیر
سینہ افلاک سے آٹھتی ہے آہ سوزناک
مرد حق ہوتا ہے جب مرعوب سلطان و امیر
کہ رہا ہے داستان بیدردی ایام کی
کوہ کے دامن میں وہ غم خانہ دھقان پیر
آہ یہ قوم نجیب و چرب دست و تر دماغ
ہے کہاں روز مکافات اے خدائے دیر گیر¹⁰

8. Ibid., p. 214.

9. Javid Namah, p. 189.

10. Armaghan-i Hijaz, pp. 258-59.

[That Kashmir which till yesterday the discerning ones called "Little Iran,"
Is destitute and helpless and bound in utter subjugation to-day.
A sigh of grief goes up from the bosom of the Heavens themselves,
When the simple and honest man is browbeaten by kings and
princelings,
Behold the old peasant's house of woe at the foot of the hill;
It tells the story of the ruthlessness of the times.
Alas! for this people, so noble, artistic and full of invention!
[Where is Thy Judgment Day, O God! O Thou who art so slow
to punish!]

But Iqbal has faith that Kashmir will not die :

چس خاک کے خمیر میں ہو آتش چنار
ممکن نہیں کہ سرد ہو وہ خاک ارجمند

[That honoured land which has the Chinar's fire in the essence
of its being,
Never will that land grow cold and lifeless.]

"What about the future?" asks Iqbal. The answer is given in the *Javid Namah*—"The Book of Eternity"—and is conveyed by Syed Ali Hamdani, the great saint of Kashmir, whose spirit meets Iqbal in the transcendental regions beyond the Heavens :

در نگاهش جان چو باد ارزان شود پیش او زندان او لرزان شود
تیشہ او خارہ را برمی درد تا نصیب خود زگیتی می برد¹¹

[When he (the Kashmiri) comes to hold his life cheap as the wind.
The very walls of his prison-house will shake before him;
Then his axe will split granite asunder
And he will grab his rightful share from Destiny itself !]

Here, as everywhere else, Iqbal leaves us with a message of hope.
To-day Iqbal and Pakistan are synonymous. It is significant that the recent Indian attack on Pakistan was concentrated mainly on two cities, Sialkot and Lahore, the former being the birthplace of Iqbal, and the latter the city where he lived and died. It is no less significant that during this war the people of Pakistan turned instinctively to Iqbal for inspiration and sustenance. The battle that Pakistan has had to fight for its survival has brought to the fore the whole background of its existence. Before Independence, when the Muslims were struggling for Pakistan, a number of European and American voices were heard against the Pakistan movement. The British Government were officially opposed to it and it was a refreshing exception to find a man like Beverly Nichols

11. *Javid Namah*, p. 191.

supporting it. Since Independence, the same kind of attitude has persisted even in well-informed and well-meaning quarters. The argument is that most of the Muslims in the sub-continent are local converts and are of the same race as the non-Muslims. The outsiders have been comparatively few, and form no more than a fraction of the total Muslim population. Thus, the race being largely the same, why should there be two countries instead of one? I have always found it difficult to understand this argument, particularly when it emanates from European and American quarters. Let us take the Europe of to-day. According to the experts, there is a basic racial unity in the European sub-continent. "The racial characteristic of the Europe of today," says Professor Dixon of Harvard, "is the dominance of the Alpine and Palae-Alpine types. Except for portions of Southern Scandinavia, the Western Baltic lands and shores of the North Sea, the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Southern Italy, together with small areas in West Central France and South-Eastern Russia, the whole continent is dominated by brachycephalic types, which are themselves central, whereas the dolichocephalic types are mainly marginal." Let us add to this the fact that the civilisation and culture of Europe as a whole has a Graeco-Roman foundation. There is also a common background of historical experience in the shape of the Roman Empire, the spread of Christianity, the Crusades, the Renaissance and the Reformation. The development of the Fine Arts also has an all-European basis. For example, even now the Russian ballet and the Russian theatre, in spite of their Communist environment, are a part of European culture. So are Goethe, Shakespeare, Dante, Voltaire, Victor Hugo, Ibsen, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Pasternak and even Sholokov. So too are the musicians, men like Beethoven, Mozart and Leopardi; the artists, such as Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Rubens and Titian; the philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, Kant, Rousseau, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson; and the scientists, like Newton, Einstein, Max Planck, Madame Curie, Pavlov and Heisenberg. The Europeans have the same classics, the same Greek and Latin sources of inspiration, the same scientific outlook, the same way of living and the same approach to the basic problems of life. And yet there are more than twenty countries in Europe, which are most of the time uneasy in each other's company. Similarly, in South America, we have practically the same race and yet there are so many different countries in the area with their own political ambitions and aspirations. Even in the United States, which is pre-eminently a melting-pot of nationalities, where populations have migrated from all parts of Europe and the rest of the world and where a new world outlook is developing, there are still a number of different cultural groups which

are likely to continue for some time before they are assimilated into the American system.

The explanation for the existing multiplicity and diversity of States in the Western world may partly lie in the existence of separate linguistic groups (we may even say perhaps, in this context, that American English is different from English English, Canadian French from French French, and Swiss German from German German) even though there are, on the other hand, also some conspicuously multi-lingual States like Canada, Switzerland and the U.S.S.R. The more important reason seems to be the geographical divisions introduced by mountains and rivers and the impact of historical accident on the group consciousness of various units of population which now receive inspiration mainly from the highly emotional idea of "the glory of the Fatherland" and their military and economic superiority over other national groups which helps them to establish political hegemony over them.

We have seen how, in spite of a large measure of racial and cultural unity, the Western world is divided into so many independent States whose friendliness towards each other cannot always be taken for granted. Is there anything very strange, then, in the existence of two independent States in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent? Let us look into the matter a little more closely.

In the first place, is it a fact, let us ask, that Pakistan and India are racially of the same stock? Let us also ask whether the sub-continent is inhabited by one race. I am afraid that answer to both questions is in the negative. Even as far back as the Indus Valley civilisation, the answer was in the negative. The human remains discovered during the excavations at Mohenjodaro, as Sewell and Guha tell us in *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilisation*, edited by Sir John Marshall, disclose the existence of at least four racial types, the Proto-Austroloid race, the Mediterranean race, the Mongolian branch of the Alpine stock and the Alpine race. This was the position in prehistoric times. As we all know, in course of time, many ethnic groups, such as the Aryans, the Scythians, the Kushans, the Huns and the Semitics migrated to this sub-continent, peacefully or otherwise. This racial diversity, according to Professor Dixon, lies at the root of the Caste System in India. His analysis of the data available led him to the conclusion that "Caste groups do differ from each other racially, and that the social status of the caste usually bears a direct relation to the racial composition of its members."

So much for racial unity. As regards language, according to Mario Pei, author of *The Story of Language*, "India has thirty-three major tongues along with a host of minor tongues and dialects." At present there is hardly any language common to India and Pakistan except English

which has been inherited from the British administration and which both countries regard as a temporary expedient. Urdu, which developed as a result of Hindu-Muslim contact in the days of Muslim rule and which was the lingua franca of the larger part of the sub-continent before Independence, has been replaced in India by the highly Sanskritised Hindi, which cannot be understood by people in Pakistan. Pakistani Urdu has, on the other hand, shown a tendency to become more Persianised and Arabicised than before. Similarly, the Bengali language in East Pakistan has shown a different trend from the Bengali of West Bengal and Calcutta both in form and content. In the circumstances, if there was at any time a common linguistic factor between India and Pakistan, it is virtually no more.

The next question to consider is whether the sub-continent was at any time a political unit in the true sense of the word. Starting from about 500 B.C. which represents more or less the dawn of history in the sub-continent, we find that before the advent of the Muslims, the sub-continent, as a whole, was hardly ever consolidated into a single political and administrative unit except, perhaps, for a few years under Asoka. With the Muslim conquest, the larger part of the sub-continent was brought under centralised control and during the reign of Alauddin Khalji in the fourteenth century, Malik Kafur, the famous general, also subdued almost the entire region of South India. Subsequently disintegration set in and it was not till the Mughals came to power that India was again ruled by a strong hand at the centre. After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the Provincial Governors gradually became independent, even though some semblance of allegiance to the Mughal throne was maintained for some time in certain cases. In any case, the sub-continent was far from being politically united when the British took over. Indeed, the lack of political unity was one of the main reasons for the success of the new rulers. The British, who ruled the larger part of the sub-continent for two hundred years and the whole of it for a century, consolidated the administration of the sub-continent with the help of roads, railways, posts and telegraphs and improved inland water transport. Towards the end, air communications were also established within the country. Incidentally, Burma was also a part of British India until it was separated from India in 1937, ten years before the sub-continent itself was partitioned. Burma had never been part of India, and its inclusion in the British Indian dominions gave the whole British administration an artificial complexion. Moreover, the British were always regarded as foreign rulers and their consolidation of the sub-continent was based on considerations of their own administrative convenience rather than any process of inner political evolution. The consolidation did not grow from

within; it was imposed from without. Nevertheless, when in the latter half of the nineteenth century the British Government began to think of devolution of political power to the people of the country and constitutional reforms began by instalments, the Hindu intellectuals of the time were quick to take advantage of the British consolidation of the sub-continent. Having come into contact with European ideas of nationalism and democracy, these politically conscious intellectuals who were the main force behind the newly-formed Indian National Congress, which the British Indian Government under Lord Dufferin had themselves promoted and fostered, saw a rare opportunity before them, and in the name of democratic freedom began to claim India for the majority community, which was no other than themselves. What they overlooked was the fact that the terms "majority" and "minority" can legitimately be applied to political groups under the democratic system only when the population is otherwise homogeneous. The Muslims, who regarded themselves as a distinct and separate people, therefore, did not take kindly to this orthodox but impracticable view of the future Indian democracy. As the British Government desired to associate the people with the administration in increasing measure, particularly in the shape of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 and the establishment of Provincial Autonomy in 1937, the scramble for power and position in the political and administrative set-up of the country became more bitter and the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims deteriorated progressively. Communal riots became so common that the period from 1913 onwards, with a brief interval for the Lucknow Pact and the Non-Co-operation Movement of 1921, can best be described as one of continued civil war. The Simon Commission counted 112 major communal riots in the sub-continent in the five years 1923-1927 only. The subsequent period was, if anything, worse than this. Under these conditions the Muslim politicians, who had been active since the foundation of the All-India Muslim League at Dacca in 1906, concentrated their attention on devising safeguards for their people against the dominance of the Hindu majority in a democratic India. The Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 had conceded separate electorates to Muslims but this was only the beginning of the solution.

Subsequent events were, however, not encouraging. The Partition of Bengal in 1905, which Lord Curzon undertook as an administrative measure, and the consequent establishment of a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, which incidentally was a province with a Muslim majority, was violently opposed by the Hindus. Its annulment, which was announced by King George V at the Delhi Durbar of 1911, was an occasion for deep frustration for the Muslims and great jubilation for the Hindus. Notwithstanding these adverse developments, Muhammad

Ali Jinnah, who at the time was President of the All-India Muslim League though still an ardent Indian nationalist, negotiated the Lucknow Pact with the Indian National Congress. The Pact confirmed and extended the principle of separate electorates for the Muslims in the Central and Provincial Legislatures with reservation of seats, but this could be achieved only at the expense of their majority in the crucial provinces of the Punjab and Bengal. The Muslims regarded this as too high a price to pay as the Pact gave them no effective voice either in the minority provinces or in the Punjab and Bengal where they were in a majority. The atmosphere of goodwill built up by the Pact was shortlived and there was a renewal of communal tension after the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 transferred power to the elected representatives of the people. The Non-Co-operation Movement, which brought the Hindus and the Muslims nearer each other than at any time before and as a result of which the Hindus, under the leadership of Gandhiji, all but succeeded in destroying the Muslims as a political entity, was followed by the severely communal movements of *Shuddhi* and *Sanghtan*, which aimed at the wholesale conversion of the Muslims or their expulsion from the sub-continent, and the Muslim reaction in the form of the *Tabligh* and *Tanzim* movements which sought to promote Muslim missionary activity and the political solidarity of the Muslim community. It is significant that the leaders of both these movements were some of the former leaders of Hindu-Muslim unity, namely, Mr. Shardhanand, Dr. Moonje and Pandit Malaviya on the one hand and Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew on the other: The foundation of the aggressive anti-Muslim Rashtriya Sewak Sangh in 1925 and the increase in the activities of the militant All-India Hindu Mahasabha increased the fears of the Muslims still further. There were numerous attempts by Muslim leaders, including Jinnah's famous "Fourteen Points," to arrive at some solution which may provide satisfactory safeguards to the Muslim community. No such solution was forthcoming, as none was acceptable to the Hindus.

The Nehru Report, which represented the thinking of the Hindu-dominated Nehru Committee about the future constitution of the sub-continent, recommended a unitary form of Government and repudiated the principles of separate electorates and weightage for the Muslims in the provinces in which they were in a minority. This Report was followed by the publication of the Report of the Simon Commission which represented British thinking about future Constitutional Reforms. From the Muslim point of view, this Report also went against them, particularly on the issues of their adequate representation in the Punjab and Bengal Assemblies, and raising the status of the Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces. The Report was followed by two Round Table Conferences

in London, to which political leaders from the sub-continent were invited and asked to agree on a scheme for the future, particularly on the issue of representation for various communities. No settlement, however, was reached at these conferences, with the result that the British Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, had to give his own Award on the issue. The Award, while conceding the continuance of separate electorates, maintained the previous position in regard to the majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal where the Muslim majority was not allowed to be reflected in the legislature. All this added to the disappointment of the Muslims.

In the rapidly changing world around them, the Muslims, who were poorer and less educated than the Hindus and had little influence in the administration, were preoccupied with the idea of preserving themselves as a political and social entity in the sub-continent. They could not, however, think of anything except the somewhat negative approach implied in the demand for safeguards. This led them nowhere, and their frustration increased. It was left to Iqbal to realise that the Muslims needed a State of their own in order to be able to live their life as a people in their own way. This now seems to us to have been the obvious solution, but, strange as it may seem, it appeared as a revolutionary idea at the time.

It is hardly possible to understand the political struggle without taking note of two factors which are of basic importance—the economic position of the Muslims and their status as a distinct and separate cultural entity. I have dealt with the subject at length elsewhere, and would content myself with a brief resume of the position on the present occasion. Let us take up the economic factor first. The Muslims ruled the sub-continent for more than a thousand years and while their administration was moderate and considerate (had it been otherwise, it could not have continued for a thousand years), their own position as rulers was one of undisputed advantage. They had hardly any economic problem to worry about. When, however, their political power declined and the East India Company supplanted them as rulers, they suffered loss of wealth and social status along with their political position. The British, who had taken power from them had no particular reason to trust them. On the contrary, they began to take early steps to make sure that the Muslims were reduced to a position of helplessness. In Bengal, for instance, after Lord Clive took the Diwani from Emperor Shah Alam in 1765, the Muslims, who held a majority of posts in the Revenue and Judicial Departments and in the Military, lost these avenues of employment. Again, their educational system suffered from the resumption by the East India Company of the grants given by

Muslim kings and nobles to Muslim educational institutions. In 1793, Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General of India, introduced the Permanent Settlement of Bengal which, in the words of James O'Kinealy, "elevated the Hindu Collectors, who up to that time had but unimportant posts, to the position of landlords, gave them a proprietary right in the soil, and allowed them to accumulate wealth which would have gone to the Muslims under their own rule." On the other hand, the old Muslim Zamindars, formerly the lords of all they surveyed, were reduced to poverty and destitution. Sir William Hunter has given us a picture of the misfortune that had overtaken the once powerful Muslim community in India. In 1837, when Persian was replaced by English in the Company's offices, the prospects of employment for Muslims diminished still further. The British policy was to cultivate and trust the Hindu and to leave the Muslim to his fate. Lord Ellenborough as Governor-General wrote to the Duke of Wellington in 1842, urging patronage of the Hindus who, according to him, were nine-tenths of the population, rather than trying to appease the Muslims, who were only one-tenth and could not be reconciled to the British power. "It seems to me most unwise," said he, "when we are sure of the hostility of one-tenth, not to secure the enthusiastic support of the nine-tenths which are faithful." The events of 1857 made the Muslim position still worse. Notwithstanding the fact that the Hindus and the Muslims were jointly responsible for the rebellion and the first mutineer, Mangal Panday, whose name became a generic appellation for all mutineers, was a Hindu, the British thought the Muslims were at the root of the trouble. "Toll these rascally Musalmans," said Lieutenant Roberts (later Field Marshal Lord Roberts), "that by the grace of God we shall still be masters of India." This kind of feeling led to further persecution of these Muslims. In 1871, after the Crown had taken over the administration, a survey of employment conducted by E. C. Bailey, a Secretary to the Government, was summed up by him by saying that there was scarcely a Government office in Calcutta at that time in which a Muslim could hope for "any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-pots and mender of pens." The educational movement of Syed Ahmad Khan aroused the Muslims to a sense of their degradation as a community and helped them to some extent to participate in Government administration and economic activity. The Hindus, however, were so far ahead in the race that there was no hope of catching up with them in the ordinary way. On the other hand, the Muslims were growing in population and poverty. From about 18 million in 1850 or thereabouts, they had grown to about 50 million by the turn of the century. In a famous speech in 1907, Iqbal has described the abject poverty of the

Muslim people. As time went on there was some improvement in the position, particularly after the British Government had agreed to a reservation of posts in the services for Muslims. The relative position of the Hindus and the Muslims, however, continued to be that of "haves" and "have-nots" down to the Partition. The economic disparity between the two peoples, the almost complete absence of industries in the Pakistan areas (which was hardly noted by any European observer except Professor Coupland) and the lack of any prospects of economic well-being among the Muslims in the face of the Hindu monopoly of the economy was one of the major contributory factors in the demand for Partition. On the 23rd of March, 1940, the Muslim League adopted the Pakistan Resolution at its Lahore Session, and thenceforward Pakistan became the accepted goal of the Muslims of the sub-continent. Nevertheless, in 1946, the Muslims, in the interest of peaceful political evolution, agreed, under Jinnah's leadership, to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan which envisaged an undivided India with a Group System which would have allowed some freedom for economic development for the Pakistan areas in the Indus and the Ganges-Brahmaputra basins. It was, however, precisely this feature of the Plan which provoked Hindu opposition. The Plan, therefore, did not go forward. It was the last of an innumerable series of attempts to find a solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem in an undivided India. It failed because the Hindus failed to inspire any confidence among the Muslims and, indeed, succeeded only in giving the impression that they wanted to damage, if not altogether destroy, the political, cultural and economic position of the Muslim community. The outbreaks of communal violence against the Muslims culminating in the Bihar tragedy of 1946 did nothing to allay these fears. There was no question any more of the Hindus and the Muslims living together; they had to part and part they did.

More important than the economic aspect of the Hindu-Muslim relationship is the cultural aspect. Indeed, it is the most fundamental line of cleavage between the Hindus and the Muslims. In order to understand the significance of this cleavage, it is necessary to bear in mind the revolutionary impact of the Islamic movement on men and peoples. Those who accept Islam have their whole personality transformed, with a clear break with the past and a complete change of direction. Islam, with its distinct moral values and approach to the problems of life, binds its adherents into a compact ideological community. History gives us more than one example of a people who started their career by a campaign of destruction against Muslim countries and Muslim culture and ended up by becoming devout adherents of Islam. The Saljuqs and the Mongols are two such examples. "Just as in the case of the Saljuqs," says

Professor Hitti, speaking of the Il-Khans, "the religion of the Moslems had conquered where their arms had failed. Less than half a century of Hulagu's merciless attempt at the destruction of Islamic culture, his great-grandson Ghazan, as a devout Moslem, was consecrating much time and energy to the revivification of that same culture."

The fact that a large number of Muslims in Pakistan and the rest of the sub-continent are descendants of Hindu converts to Islam is irrelevant, for once a man becomes a Muslim, his whole outlook on life becomes different. His loyalty and allegiance and his whole attitude to life and the universe—in a word, his *Weltanschauung*—is completely changed. As an example of the dynamic impact of Islam, we may mention Iqbal himself, who was a Kashmiri Brahmin of the Sapru caste by origin and who has become the greatest exponent of Muslim thought in modern times.

The problem of culture in the sub-continent is not as simple as it is sometimes made out to be. In the course of a thousand years of Muslim rule contacts developed between the ruler and the ruled, particularly after the first five centuries of Turkish sway, and a semblance of a common culture emerged. This culture, which was shared by the upper strata of Hindu and Muslim society, had inevitably a Muslim bias. It was based on Persian language and literature, in which both Hindus and Muslims acquired proficiency and produced poets, writers and scholars of eminence. We have, for example, Tekchand Bahar, the great lexicographer of the Persian language, and Chandar Bhan Brahman, the famous poet, and a whole host of Hindu scholars of Persian. The Mughal school of painting produced some outstanding Hindu artists like Manohar and Bachitter, while the old classical Hindu music was supplemented and improved by eminent Muslims like Amir Khusro, Sultan Husain Sharqi and Mian Tan Sen. Again, the Bhakti movement with its emphasis on monotheism was a product of Islam's impact on Hinduism, and produced such great men as Guru Nanak, Kabir and Chaitanya. Social contacts in the upper layers of Hindu and Muslim society were frequent and intimate, culminating in Akbar's marriages with a number of Hindu princesses and similar other matrimonial alliances. The Hindus filled a large number of civil and military offices, including some of the highest. Todar Mal Khatri, who was the Revenue Minister of Sher Shah Suri before he became Imperial Chancellor under Akbar, Hemu the grocer, the commander-in-chief of the Suri forces at the Second Battle of Panipat, and Man Singh, one of the highest ranking generals of the Mughal Army, are three out of many examples. The judicial system aimed at even-handed justice to the Hindus and the Muslims alike. Kings and Emperors were personally accessible to anyone who cared to knock at their door

for justice. Trade and industry was largely in the hands of the Hindus, who were free to exercise their religion. In the lower strata of society, they were free even to maintain, as they did, a social boycott of the Muslims throughout the period of Muslim rule. The Muslim rulers had settled down in the country and had severed their connections with their ancestral territories of origin, but the Hindus never really accepted them as their own. They were still *Malechas*, the low and the impure, or *Jabans*, the hateful foreigners, as Bankim Chatterjee calls them.

The Muslim rulers generally maintained an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity which encouraged friendly relations between the Hindus and the Muslims. It must be admitted, however, that, as was inevitable, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled was not always a balanced one. Moreover, there is no doubt that with all the concessions they enjoyed, the Hindus were a subject people. The relationship between a ruling people and a ruled population can never be a healthy one and is bound to leave a trail of bitterness behind it. You cannot expect gratitude from the people you rule. It was hardly surprising, therefore, to find that as soon as the Muslim power declined and the British established their authority over the sub-continent, the Hindus lost no time in turning their back on their former rulers and in ingratiating themselves with the new power in the land. Soon the last vestiges of the old Hindu-Muslim culture disappeared. The Urdu language, which has a foundation of Sanskrit and a superstructure of Persian and which developed as a result of Hindu-Muslim contact under Muslim rule, is a particular case in point. Some of the great poets and writers of this language have been Hindus like Daya Shankar Nasim, author of the classic poem *Gulzar-i Nasim* or *Gul Bakavali*; Rattan Nath Sarshar, author of another classic, the prose romance of the *Fasana-i Azad*, and a number of other well-known works; Prem Chand, the greatest short-story writer of the language; Ufaq Lakhnawi; Barq Dehlavi; and Naubat Rai Nazar Lakhnawi, all front-rank poets and writers; Brij Narain Chakbast Lakhnawi, an outstanding poet, writer and critic; Lala Sri Ram, author of the monumental *Khumkhana-i Javid*, the best known biographical dictionary of Urdu poets and writers; Pyare Lal Ashob, a pioneer of the Urdu language in the Punjab; Ram Babu Saksena, author of the best known history of Urdu literature; Daya Narain Nigam, editor of one of the foremost Urdu literary magazines, the *Zamanah*; Suraj Narain Mihr, one of the best known writers of children's poems; Talok Chand Mahrum and Labhu Ram Josh Malsiani, both poets of high rank (the latter an authority on the Urdu language); Durga Sahai Sarur, a leader of the transition from the neo-classical to the modern Urdu school of poetry; Professor Firaq Gorakhpuri, an outstanding exponent of the new ghazal; Anand Narain Mulla, a polished and versatile poet and

writer; Pandit Brij Mohan Dattatrya Kaifi, a famous scholar, poet and writer; and a number of others. Even in our own generation, we have had men of the stature of Hari Chand Akhtar, a master of the Urdu ghazal, Rajinder Singh Bedi and Balwant Singh, two of the best short-story writers of Urdu, Arsh Malsiani, Jagan Nath Azad, Dwarka Dass Shula and Munawwar Lakhnawi, who rank with the best poets of their generation, Malik Ram, a scholar of great eminence and an authority on Ghalib, and a great many others. Indeed, no account of Urdu language and literature would be worth the paper it is written on if the Hindu contributions were to be omitted from it. And yet Urdu became an early victim of the Hindu hostility towards the Muslims. The Hindus began to promote Hindi as against Urdu and some of the most acrimonious controversies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries centered round the Urdu-Hindi problem. Indeed, the French scholar, Garcin de Tasse, was moved by these controversies to remark that the Hindu wanted to do away with everything that reminded them of Muslim rule.

In the new environment in which the two communities found themselves under the British Raj, with the old common culture disappearing, both the Hindus and the Muslims were thrown back on themselves, and there was a revival of culture on both sides. When they were not concentrating on their own culture, the Hindus and the Muslims could live together in an atmosphere of social and cultural amity, but with the revival of Hindu and Muslim culture which took place in the latter half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, the differences were seen to be obvious and fundamental. Let us take the Hindu and Muslim views on some of the important problems of life. The Hindu view of Ultimate Reality is flexible, while the Muslim view is not. You may believe in one God or in a million gods or no god at all and yet you can be a Hindu. A Muslim, however, can remain a Muslim only if he believes in one God and one alone. Let us take the influence of the incidence of birth on the social status of the human individual. A Hindu is expected to be loyal to the caste in which he is born. If he is a Shudra, he has to be a good Shudra. He should perform all the duties of a Shudra and not aspire any higher. As Ambedkar tells us, a Shudra is not expected to aspire even to listening to the sacred Vedas; if he does, he may have molten lead poured into his ears. Good conduct may enable him to be born in a higher caste in the next life. On the other hand, a bad Shudra may descend to the body of a lower animal when born again. Islam, on the other hand, recognises no caste system. A man may be born in any station in life; he is entitled to rise to the highest rung of the social ladder on his merits. The Slave Kings of India and the Mamlukes of Egypt are remarkable examples of men born in slavery

or descended from slaves rising to the highest positions of power. Again, coming to habits of eating and drinking, the Hindus and the Muslims do not eat or drink together, except when they have been Europeanised beyond redemption. A good Hindu would not let a Muslim touch his glass or his eating utensils. Again, rightly or wrongly, the Muslim is fond of eating the cow and, rightly or wrongly, the Hindu regards it as a sacred animal entitled to protection. The Hindu loves music, which forms an integral part of his devotional activities. The Muslim may like music, but would not like to mix it with prayers. That is why we have had so much bloodshed over cow-slaughter and music before mosques. In the field of literature, the Hindu sources of inspiration lie largely in Sanskrit and its dialects, while the Muslim turns to Persian and Arabic. Mario Pei makes an acute observation when he points out that Gandhi, the Hindu leader, derived his title of "Mahatma" from Sanskrit, while Jinnah, the leader of the Muslims, had his popular name of "Quaid-i Azam" from Arabic. Before Independence, the Indian National Congress adopted "Bande Mataram" as the national song of India, without regard to the fact that this song, which occurs in Bankim Chander Chatterjee's *Anando Moth*, is written as a battle-cry against the foreigners, including the Muslims. Added to all this is the fact that the process of history which forms the main explanation of the separate existence of so many States in the Western world, has produced persons in the sub-continent in the course of a thousand years or so of Muslim rule who have come to be regarded as heroes by the Muslims and villains by the Hindus and *vice versa*. Shivaji and Aurangzeb are two well-known examples. Their quarrel was political, but in the nineteenth century, the Hindu nationalists gave it a deeply communal colour and made Shivaji a national hero of the Hindus. To this the Muslims reacted by making Aurangzeb a hero of Islam.

The relationship between the Hindus and the Muslims at the beginning of the twentieth century is illustrated by an anecdote related by Sir Walter Lawrence in his book *The India We Served*. "Sir Partab (the Maharaja of Idar)," says Sir Walter, "had come up to Simla to be present at a farewell dinner Lord Curzon gave to my wife and myself the night before we left, and after the dinner Sir Partab and I sat up till two o'clock in the morning talking of his hopes and ambitions. One of his ambitions was to annihilate the Muslim people in India. I deprecated this prejudice and mentioned Muslim friends common to both of us. 'Yes,' he said, 'I like them too, but very much like them dead.' "

It is sometimes suggested that the sub-continent forms one geographical unit. While it is true that the sea and the Himalayas provide a geographical boundary, the inherent geographical unity of the

sub-continent is far from obvious. Indeed, it would appear that the area south of the Vindhichals which is technically a peninsula, with its separate physiography, terrain and climate, has hardly any connection with the rest of the sub-continent. In the same way, the Indus basin and the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin, which broadly represent West and East Pakistan respectively, are self-contained geographical (and economic) units, distinct from all others. Similarly, Rajputana is a separate arid zone. The diversity in natural geography in the sub-continent has resulted in a variety of climate, with a variety of related features, such as fauna and flora. As a matter of interest, the sub-continent has areas of the heaviest and the lowest rainfalls in the world, namely Cherapunji and the desert areas around Khairpur, respectively. Similarly, we have in the sub-continent what has so far been regarded as the hottest place on earth, namely Jacobabad, while, at the same time, we have some extremely cold places in the Himalayan regions. In the circumstances, it must take a great deal of courage on the part of anyone to assert the geographical unity of the sub-continent. Speaking of geographical units, would it not be correct to say that North Ireland and Eire are one unit, and Canada and U.S.A., excluding certain extremely situated areas, another unit?

Again, it has been said that the separation of East and West Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian territory makes Pakistan an unusual geographical phenomenon. At first sight this may appear to be so, but a little reflection would place this phenomenon at least on the same footing as the U.S.A. and Alaska, not to mention Hawaii.

Let us try to sum up. We have seen that there is no racial or linguistic unity between India and Pakistan. We have also seen that the revival of Muslim culture on the one hand and of Hindu culture on the other has disclosed the existence of an unbridgeable gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. With cultural outlooks so divergent, it is impossible to think that the two peoples would be prepared to live together and devote their combined efforts to a joint purpose. We have also seen the growth of economic disparity between the Hindus and the Muslims under British rule, a disparity which could not have been remedied in an undivided India with the Hindus holding a monopoly of economic power. We have also had a glimpse of the political process which caused ceaseless controversy and growing bitterness between the two peoples. We have also seen that the sub-continent was never really a political unit (nor is it a geographical unit). Whatever political unity was achieved from time to time was imposed from without by strong and alien rulers.

Our study of the past makes it clear that history charted different courses for the Hindus and the Muslims in the sub-continent. It could

not have been otherwise. There was hardly anything in common between them. The question before the Muslims was whether they should live as a free and independent people, preserving their religion and their culture for themselves, or should they let themselves be merged into the Caste System of Hindu India, with its inhuman limitations. But Islam is too vital a force to suffer such a fate. The result, therefore, was the partition of the sub-continent. This was inevitable. There were historical forces working themselves to their logical conclusion. The Hindus, with rare exceptions like G.K. Gokhale and C.R. Das, did not understand these forces, and were, therefore, not amenable to the obvious solution until it was wrested from their hands. The Muslims, on the other hand, were fortunate enough to produce a seer—call him a visionary if you will—who could discern the inner process of history behind the outward events, and give voice to the latent aspirations of the Muslims in clear and unambiguous terms. Pakistan represents the struggle of Muslim culture to survive in this part of the world. "The construction of a polity on national lines," said he, "if it means the displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity is simply unthinkable to a Muslim."¹² He demanded the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of Islam and India. That, for him, was the only way to peace in the sub-continent, provided, of course, that the Hindus showed understanding of the position. Let us hope that, in spite of all that has happened, a proper understanding of the meaning of Pakistan will dawn on those who are still somewhat confused about it. It is only through such an understanding on the part of the Indian rulers and the world at large that a permanent solution can be found of the problems of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

(April 66)

12. Shamloo (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

THE KEY POINT IN IQBAL'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

Muzaffar Hussain

For any meaningful discussion on Iqbal's educational philosophy it is essential that we should first try to understand his views on man's nature, and his ultimate destiny. According to Iqbal, the "essential nature of man, then, consists in *will*, and not intellect or understanding".¹ He regards human will as "a germ of infinite power, the gradual unfoldment of which must be the object of all human activity".² In his view, "a strong will in a strong body is the ethical ideal of Islam".³ Criticising the educational system of his times he says very emphatically :

"I venture to say, that the present system of education in this country is not at all suited to us as a people. It is not true to our genius as a nation, it tends to produce an un-Muslim type of character, it is not determined by our national requirements, it breaks entirely with our past, and appears to proceed on the false assumption that the ideal of education is the training of human intellect rather than human will."⁴

The key point in Iqbal's educational philosophy, therefore, is the training of human will.

Personality. Man's personality can be defined as a combination of various wills held together by a unity of directive purpose.⁵ To explain more elaborately, the wills constituting the various aspects of human personality can be listed as below :

<i>Personality Aspect</i>	<i>Needs</i>	<i>Will-Attitudes</i>
Biological	1. Food	Will to be
	2. Dress	Will to live
	3. Shelter	Will to survive
Socio-biological	1. Marriage	Will to survive and preserve species
	2. Procreation	

1. Syed Abul Vahid, Ed. *Thoughts & Reflections of Iqbal* (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 35.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 41

4. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

5. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1965), p.

Personality Aspect	Needs	Will-Attitudes	
Socio-cultural	1. Education	Will to acquire knowledge and skill	
	2. Training for economic products	Will to produce and earn	
Psychological	1. Cognition	Harmony Will to cognition	
	2. Conation		Will to conation
	3. Affection		Will to affection
Psychical	1. Conscious	Harmony Will to harmonise consciousness and unconsciousness	
	2. Unconscious		
Transcendental	1. Knowledge	Will to know the Ultimate Reality	
	2. Art	Will to transfer world into aesthetic order	
	3. Morality	Will to transfer world order into moral order	
	4. Religion :		
	(a) Communion with God	Will to have communion with God	
(b) Efficacy of Prayer	Will to pray		
(c) Yearning to live in eternal conscious co-presence with God.	Will to love God and achieve eternal life		
5. Ideal social order	Will to achieve ideal world order		

Each of the wills listed above is an *energy* or *force*. Human personality can, therefore, be conceived as a combination of these forces which admit of various arrangements.⁶ These various arrangements/formations of the wills are referred to as *Shākila* by the Holy Qur'ān which determine the value of man's actions :

"Every man acteth after his own manner but your Lord knoweth who is best guided in his path" (xvii. 84).

One definite arrangement in which the transcendental (more specifically, religious) wills assume the governing or directive role is the real personality of man. Such personality is bestowed on man as his potential nature, the actualisation of which must be the highest aim of life and hence the ultimate aim of education. To achieve his real personality man has to make effort and various wills have to be arranged in such a manner that the will to love God becomes the supreme overriding will and all other wills are governed and disciplined by it. When a personality with such will-attitudes is constituted, man takes a new birth. In fact,

6. Javid Iqbal, Ed. (Muhammad Iqbal), *Stray Reflections* (Lahore : Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1961), p. 17.

only such a personality is worth the name of personality as the Holy Qur'an warns :

“And be not ye as those who forgot Allah, therefore He causeth them to forget their souls (personalities)” (lix. 19).

This verse is the very basis of Iqbal's concept of the self.⁷ His concept of soul, personality, ego or self is, therefore, only that kind of man's self-consciousness which is aroused and activated by God-consciousness.⁸ When God-consciousness

7. The present author pointed it out for the first time in his serialised article under the caption *Khudi Aur Akhīrat* which appeared in *Islāmi Ta'lim* two-monthly Journal of the All-Pakistan Islamic Education Congress, Lahore, in Vol. I, No. 2 (March-April 1973), and again in Vol. II, No. 4 (July-August 1974) that Iqbal derived his idea of the self from this verse of the Holy Qur'an. The views of the author were confirmed indirectly by Sayyid Nazir Niyazi in his "Reminiscences" published in the *Mithāq* (a monthly journal of Anjuman Khuddām al-Qur'an, Lahore), January-February 1974, p. 74. The relevant portion is reproduced below :

”نشے کا فوق البشر زیرِ بحث آیا تو میں نے درخواست کی کہ اس باب میں دانستہ یا نادانستہ جو غلط فہمیاں پیدا ہوگئی ہیں یا کر دی گئی ہیں ان کا ازالہ ضروری ہے۔ ناقدین نے خواہ مخواہ فوق البشر کا سلسلہ نائِبِ حق سے جوڑ رکھا ہے۔ فرمایا : ان کا ازالہ تو میں کر چکا۔ میں نے جو کچھ کہا میرے ناقدین اسے غور سے کیوں نہیں پڑھتے ؟ میں نے عرض کیا : میں انہیں کے خیال سے کچھ ضروری سمجھتا ہوں کہ ان غلط فہمیوں کے پیشِ نظر چند ایک باتوں کی ایک حد تک وضاحت ہو جائے اور وہ بھی آپ کی طرف سے ، تو اچھا ہوگا۔ فرمایا : اگر تمہارا ایسا ہی خیال ہے تو کل سہ پہر کا وقت مناسب رہے گا۔ ذرا جلدی چاہے آنا۔ دوسرے روز حاضر خدمت ہوا اور کاغذ فلم لے کر بیٹھ گیا ، تو فرمایا : یہ سامنے کی الہاری میں قرآن مجید رکھا ہے۔ قرآن مجید اٹھا لاؤ۔ میں اپنے دل میں سمجھ رہا تھا کہ شاید مجھ سے فلسفہ کی بعض کتابوں کی ورق گردانی کے لیے کہا جائے گا۔ میں قرآن اٹھا لایا تو ارشاد ہوا : سورہ حشر کا آخری رکوع نقل کر لو۔ رکوع نقل کر چکا تو پھر چند ایک عنوانات کے تحت یکے بعد دیگرے کچھ شذرات لکھوانے لگے۔ یہ دن تھا جب میں پوری طرح سمجھا کہ اقبال نے نائِبِ حق کا جو تصور قائم کیا ہے اس کی اساس فی الحقیقت کیا ہے۔“

The Quranic verse quoted by Iqbal is the first verse of the portion of the Holy Qur'an which Sayyid Nazir Niyazi was asked by Iqbal to reproduce.

8. *Ḍarb-i Kalīm/Kulliyāt*, p. 15/477 :

خودی کا ستر نہاں لا الہ الا اللہ خودی ہے تیغ ، فساں لا الہ الا اللہ

becomes the illuminating centre of man's self-consciousness, he realises his real position in the universe as one of the greatest energies of Nature called upon by God to remake and refashion the universe by conquering the natural environment and bringing an ideal social order into being.

Character. Every educational endeavour should, therefore, aim at carving out of human life a *character* which Iqbal regards as "the ultimate equipment of man, not only in his efforts against a hostile natural environment, but also in his contest with kindred competitors after a fuller, richer, ampler life."⁹ It is, therefore, not difficult to understand Iqbal's utter dissatisfaction and disgust with those educational systems which restrict their function to mere intellectual development of the human self. He favours only that type of educational system which can bring out characters or volitional personalities :

"The intellectual self is only one aspect of the activity of our total self. The realisation of the total self comes not by merely permitting the wide world to throw its varied impressions on our mind, and then watching what becomes of us. It is not merely by receiving and intellectually shaping the impressions, but mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature."¹⁰

When the love of God dominates the entire will-hierarchy of man he develops a personality with a Divine taste kindling an insight of looking upon the world of matter as subservient to man in the realisation of his social goals.

Struggle. The obstruction of the world of matter in the realisation of human ideals, then, becomes an incentive for struggle and a favourable circumstance in the development of his self. Science is a useful weapon in this struggle. According to Iqbal, "the Universe that confronts us is not *bāṭil*. It has its uses." The world of matter is an indispensable obstruction which forces our being into fresh formations. Its most important use is that, in our efforts to overcome the obstructions offered by it, we "sharpen our insight and prepare [ourselves] for an insertion into what lies below the surface of phenomenon" "coming closer to God. He believes that "it is the intellectual capture of and *power* over the concrete that makes it possible for the intellect of man to pass

9. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 41.

10. Ibid., p. 115.

11. Ibid., p. 114.

beyond the concrete."¹²

Neomysticism of Science. Thus, according to Iqbal, science is important for two reasons: (i) It bestows power on man which enables him to capture the material world, and (ii) it sharpens his insight for a closer and better appreciation of God.

Science and technology, therefore, assume an extremely important place in Iqbal's philosophy of education. He regards the scientific observer of Nature as a kind of mystic seeker in the act of prayer; because scientific observation of Nature keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality."¹³

"The quest after a nameless nothing, as disclosed in Neo-Platonic mysticism—be it Christian or Muslim—cannot satisfy the modern mind which with its habits of concrete thinking demands a concrete living experience of God."¹⁴

The education of science thus become a God-seeking, God-appreciating and God-finding activity in the educational system of Iqbal which "disenthrals man from fear giving him a source of power to master his environment".¹⁵ He, therefore, proposes an educational system in which "Religion and Science may discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies"¹⁶ and are no longer antagonistic. For him science blended with religion is a kind of mysticism most appropriate to the minds of the present generation. He proclaims emphatically that science divorced from religion is nothing but blindness and woefully laments that secular science and technology presently in vogue in our educational system inculcates a forgetful attitude towards God. He, therefore, raises a clarion call for waging war against Godless science which has polluted the minds of the present generation.¹⁷ He exhorts the Muslims to create a new world order by integrating science with religion in their educational system so that it gives "a spiritual interpretation of the universe" which is one of the basic needs of humanity today.¹⁸

12. *Reconstruction*, p. 131.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

16. *Ibid.*, p. vi.

17. *Zabūr-i 'Ajam/Kulliyāt*, p. 95/487 :

اے مسلمانانِ فغان از فتنہ ہائے علم و فن

اہرمن اندر جہاں ارزاں و یزداں دیریاب !

خیز و نقشِ عالمِ دیگر بنہ عشقِ را با زیرکی آمیز دہ

18. *Reconstruction*, p. 179.

Individual's Spiritual Emancipation. In the training of human will for spiritual emancipation, Iqbal maintains that "the medium of great personality" is essential. For him religion of a people is "the sum total of their life-experiences finding a definite expression through the medium of a great personality".¹⁹ He believes that the personality of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) is operative in the spiritual emancipation of individuals and all mankind, and will continue to be so for all times to come.²⁰ Our educational system must, therefore, impart such instruction to its educatees as motivates them to follow the life of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) as an ideal of individual spiritual emancipation of the highest order as well as for the creation of a unique society based on the freedom and equality of all the individuals. He says: "in view of the basic idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation binding on man, we ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated peoples on earth".²¹ He also revered the illustrious personalities of great Muslim saints (mystics) as in their company great transformations of character used to take place and the model of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) shone in their lives in full glory. He greatly admired their role in the society as upbringers.²² He, however, lamented that such saints are so rare in our times, and it saddened his heart that this great institution of sufism had become so barren.²³ For the revival of this great institution he prescribes neo-mysticism of

19. S.A. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 31. Iqbal derives this idea from the following Quranic verses :

لکل امت رسول

and

قل ان کنتم تحبون الله فاتبعونی يحببکم الله

20. *Jāvid Nāmah/Kulliyāt*, p. 128/716.

ہر کجا بینی جهان رنگ و بو ہر کہ از خاکش بروید آرزو
یا ز نور مصطفیٰ اورا بہا است یا ہنوز اندر تلاش مصطفیٰ است

Also see Iqbal's letter to Muhammad Niyazuddin Khān published in *Makātib-i Iqbal* (Lahore : Bazm-i Iqbal), p. 40.

21. *Reconstruction*, pp. 179-80.

22. *Bāl-i Jibrīl/Kulliyāt*, p. 14/306 :

یہ فیضانِ نظر تھا یا کہ مکتب کی کرامت تھی
سکھانے کس نے اسماعیل کو آدابِ فرزندہی ؟

23. *Asrār-o Rumūz/Kulliyāt*, p. 18 :

کیما پیدا کن از 'مشت' گلے بوسہ زن بر آستانِ کاملے

God-appreciative science. It is now for the Muslim scientists to play the role of mystics and evolve "a method physiologically less violent and psychologically more suitable to a concrete type of mind".²⁴

Spiritual Democracy. Iqbal views democracy as the most important aspect of Islam.²⁵ "Islam," says he, "has a horror of personal authority. We regard it as inimical to the unfoldment of human individuality."²⁶ According to him, the "best form of Government for such a [Muslim] community is democracy, the ideal of which is to let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable".²⁷ He, however, confesses that the Muslims with democracy as their political ideal could do nothing for the political improvement of Asia and that their "democracy lasted only for 30 years and disappeared with their political expansion".²⁸ He pays rich tribute to the British empire which spread this civilising factor with missionary spirit in the political evolution of mankind.²⁹ But at the same time he also maintains that democracy in Europe could not fully bloom and soon degenerated into an instrument of exploitation:

"The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich."³⁰

Our educational system must, therefore, provide instruction, training and practice in the Islamic concepts of freedom and equality in order to bring about that kind of "spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam."³¹

Conclusion. Briefly speaking, the central theme of Iqbal's educational philosophy is to produce an Islamic type of personality and character through the training of human will so that they can play their destined role in the world in meeting the challenge of this age. According to him, "humanity needs three things to-day:

- [i] a spiritual interpretation of the universe,
- [ii] spiritual emancipation of the individual."
- [iii] spiritual democracy.³²

24. *Reconstruction*, p. v.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

32. *Ibid.*

25. S.A. Vahid, Ed., *op. cit.*, p. 51.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

30. *Reconstruction*, p. 179.

28. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*

For the attainment of these objectives we may recommend for practical purpose that:

- (i) Science should be made a God-seeking, God-appreciating and God-finding source of knowledge. For this purpose the concept of *Tauhīd* should be integrated with scientific teachings.
- (ii) The *sirat* of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) should find a central place in our educational system so that the students develop an emotional and intellectual attachment with his great personality and practically follow him as a model of ideal character throughout their lives.
- (iii) The Islamic concepts of equality (*masāwāt*), fraternity (*ukhuwwat*) and freedom (*hurriyat*) should be taught and inculcated in the students so that they are enabled to practise "spiritual democracy" when they start practical life after their education.

(October 82)

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IV

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IQBAL ON THE NATURE OF TIME

PROFESSOR M. M. SHARIF

What is the nature of time? is one of those knotty questions which have troubled the philosophical mind throughout the ages. It was hotly discussed by the ancients and the medievals and the same is the case today.

Common sense takes time vaguely to be something like a stream moving towards the future from one moment to the next—something in which events float down to the past. This is very much like saying that the stream flows in one direction, and its flow carries the floating logs of wood in the opposite direction—a palpable contradiction. This is, however, one of the many contradictions which the common sense view involves and which the philosophers have tried to remove throughout history.

The flow of time involves change and more than three thousand years ago the Vedic writers vaguely felt the difficulties involved in the idea of change and declared that the world of experience is a mere appearance of Reality and Reality itself always remains unchanged. The first great thinker who philosophised on this problem came to the same conclusion, but on purely logical grounds. It was Parmenides of Elea,¹ who was in the prime of his life in about 500 B.C. According to him, a thing either *is* or *is not*. Whatever is not, *i.e.*, has no being, cannot be thought or spoken of, for that is logically impossible. As the past can be thought or spoken of, it has not passed away into non-being, but still *is*. As the future also can be thought or spoken of, it already *is* and cannot be said to be *going to be*. Since whatever is in the past, present and future *is*, there is no coming into being or ceasing to be, no becoming and no passing away. In other words, there is no change in time. There being no change in time, Reality is eternal and unchanging.

There may be other reasons for holding the view that Reality is without change, but the reason advanced by Parmenides is not sound. It is true that whatever can be thought and spoken of in some sense *is* or exists. The present object does exist, but whatever is past has ceased to exist. What still exists and is thought and spoken of is not 'it', but a

1. Elea was a Greek Colony in the south of Italy.

recollection or description of 'it'. Likewise whatever is in the future does not already exist. What exists and is thought and spoken of is not 'it', but an anticipation of 'it'. Parmenides' mistake lies in taking the existence of the recollection or description of an object that has passed away as the existence of that object and the existence of the anticipation of a future-event as the existence of that event. Therefore his conclusion that whatever is past, present and future exists is unwarranted and the further conclusion that there is no passing away and no becoming unjustified.

Iqbal, like Bergson, takes just the opposite view. Both of them are inspired by Heraclitus (500 B.C.) who denied permanence altogether and held that reality is ever-changing and always in motion. Nothing is constant. "It is not possible to step twice in the same river". The waters of the river have already changed when you plunge into it a second time. The fact that the stone on which drops of water fall for years wears off at the point of contact, shows that a change is effected in it with the fall of each drop. In fact it ever changes by friction of one sort or another and is never the same. It is impossible to touch the same substance twice, for it is no longer the same after the first touch, even though the change is imperceptible. There is no rest; every thing is continually in motion and in the process of transformation. This perpetual change of things is effected through struggle against each other. The struggle of the forces inside the drop and the stone transforms both.

Bergson accepts Heraclitus's theory of continual change. Iqbal in a way accepts also his theory of perpetual struggle. With this latter theory we are not at present concerned.

Following Bergson, Iqbal makes a distinction between pure time and serial time, pure time for him is not unreal as Zeno and Plato had thought. Nor is it cyclic, everything in it repeating itself as with Heraclitus and the Stoics. It is a genuine creative movement, the path of which is not already determined.

Like Bergson he holds that pure duration is identical with life and is an unceasing flow or a continual change, as perpetual flux.

دما دم رواں ہے ہم زندگی ہر اک شے سے پیدا ہم زندگی

In reality there is no rest and no permanence.

قریب نظر ہے سکون و ثبات تڑپتا ہے ہر ذرہ کائنات

تبہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود کہ ہر لحظہ تازہ ہے شان وجود

To real time or pure duration the distinctions of past, present and future do not apply. In this flow the past rolls into the present:

دوش در آغوش امروزش نگر دوش را بیوند با امروز بین

and the future consists only of open possibilities. Neither the future nor the past has any independent existence. Nor are distinction of hours, days and nights true of real time.

اے خوش آن روزی کہ صبح و شام نیست صبح اورا نیم روز و شام نیست
اس شب و روز کی اور حقیقت ہے کیا ایک زمانے کی رو جس میں نہ دن ہے نہ رات

Bergson does not deny succession to pure duration. With him the flow of pure duration is a succession of interpenetrating states. Iqbal takes away succession altogether. For him pure duration is eternity in the sense of change without succession. It is different from serial time the moments of which are successive and space the points of which are always simultaneous. If we must picture it in spatial terms, it is a line in the drawing—an actualisation of open possibilities. It is selective and purposive in the sense that it preserves the selected remnants of the past and supplements them by continual creative activity. In this sense it is identical with history.

You can know pure duration only by looking within your own self for both space and time are states of the mind.

چشم بکشا ہر زمان و ہر مکان
این دو احوال است از احوال جاں

To explain further pure duration in its aspect of activity, Iqbal takes a dictum of Imam Shafi'i, الوقت سيف (Time is sword) and writing under the title a whole poem of sixty one couplets in *Asrar-e-Khudi*, attempts to inject its significance into his own Bergsonian conception of pure duration, though it does not seem to have been fully assimilated by it. Pure duration which is indistinguishable from life is a cutting sword. Its flashing edge is the self.

“Its owner is exalted above hope and fear
His hand is whiter than the hand of Moses.
At one stroke thereof water gushes from the rock
And the sea becomes land from dearth of moisture.
Moses held this sword in his hand,
Therefore he wrought more than man may contrive.
He clove the Red Sea asunder

And made its waters like dry ear
The arms of 'Ali, the conqueror of Khaiber
Drew its strength from this same sword."

The self by its act seizes pure duration, nay, the relation is closer. To exist in pure duration is *to be a self*. To know pure duration we must turn our eyes from serial time and look into our own selves.

تو از شمار نفس زنده نمی دانی که زندگی به شکستِ طلسم ایام است

As for Bergson, so for Iqbal, the self has two aspects. While Bergson called these aspects the fundamental self and the social self, Iqbal, more appropriately, calls them the appreciative self and the efficient self. The appreciative self lives in pure duration, in eternity which means change without succession. Its life consists in movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, from pure duration to serial time which can be measured by days and nights. Serial time is born of this movement.

شام و سحر ما از گردش ما خیزد دانی که نمی سازد این شام و سحر ما را

By making the efficient self an important stage in the outward journey of the life of the appreciative self, Iqbal assigns to it though secondary yet an important place. But there are moments when carried away by poetic contrasts he speaks of it rather disparagingly, as for example, in these lines:

اے اسیر دوش و فردا در نگر در دل خود عالم دیگر نگر
در گل خود تخم ظلمت کاشتی وقت را مثل خطی پنداشتی
باز با پیمانہ لیل و نهار فکر تو پیمود طول روزگار
وقت را مثل مکان گسترده امتیاز دوش و فردا کرده
اے چو بورم کرده از بستان خویش ساختی از دست خود زندان خویش

Iqbal criticises Bergson, for making time prior to the self, which I don't think he ever did, and says that the intellect of the enduring self is prior to the multiplicity of pure duration, it seizes this multiplicity, breaks it up into an infinity of instants and transforms it to an organic whole of synthesis. He rightly accuses Bergson taking this activity of the intellect as a mere analysis. It involves as much synthesis as analysis. This organic structure of events in the life of the self constitutes its behaviour. The complete removal of succession from Bergson's concep-

tion of pure duration, has enabled Iqbal to regard the human soul as eternal and has made it easy for him to pass from the human self to the ultimate self and from the Ultimate Self to the universe, and thus to vindicate what he regards as the true philosophy of Islam. By analogy from our own self, Iqbal regards the Ultimate Reality as the Absolute Self, and Nature as its behaviour. Pure time as revealed in our own selves leads to the notion of the Ultimate Reality as Pure Duration, as change without succession, as eternity in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form a unity. Again on the basis of an analogy from our efficient self, the Ultimate Self, God, is viewed in His creative activity as making Himself appear as Divine behaviour, as a *successive* creative movement, as Nature. The self as appreciative knows itself and its pure time—eternity—by direct intuition; as efficient self it tries to do so by the *intellectual* study of its *own behaviour*—personal events spread out in serial time. On the same analogy; as the appreciative self it knows God by direct intuition, and as efficient self it tries to do so through an intellectual study of *God's behaviour*—of Nature spread out in serial time. It would have been all well if Iqbal had grounded his view of the Ultimate Reality only on intuition, for an intuition it is; but by unnecessarily invoking the help of analogy he has dangerously exposed it to attacks from formal logic.

Iqbal's attitude towards the activities of the self in its relation to Nature is truly reflected in these lines:

دھے با ساز بیکن همنوا باش	زمانے با ارسطو آشنا باش
مشو گم اندرین منزل سفر کن	ولیکن از مقام شان گذر کن
شناسد اندرون کان و بیم را	به آن تعلقے کہ داند بیش و کم را
بگردون ماه و پرویں را کمیں کن	جہاں چند و چون زیر نگیں کن

But in this very poem his enthusiastic preference for the intuitive approach to God makes him describe taking this journey as adorning the dead (مکرشب و روز) and being in the snares of nights and days (صورت نگاری مردہ) and in the poem quoted before as moving inside the walls of a prison. These metaphors seem to ill accord with the idea of Nature as God's behaviour.

The difficulties in explaining time in relation to Reality forces both Bergson and Iqbal to make a profuse use of simile and metaphor, but whereas the use of simile and metaphor is an advantage inasmuch as it

makes the imaginative picturing of an experience easy, it is also a disadvantage in so far as it makes acute analysis of these experiences difficult. But both of them, very consistently with their presuppositions believe that analysis, however, acute cannot be of much use in the true apprehension of Reality. But can imaginative picturing which, in their view, is also infected with space, be of any great help?

In *Payam-i-Mashriq* there is an exquisite poem entitled *Nawa-i-Waqt*, "The Song of Time." It gives expression to most of Iqbal's ideas about time in unforgettable language. I quote it in full:

خورشید به دامنم انجم به گریبانم در من نگری هیچم در خود نگری جانم
 در شهر و بیابانم در کاخ و شبستانم من در دم و درمانم من عیش فراوانم
 من تیغ جہاں سوزم من چشمہ حیوانم
 چنگیزی و تیموری مشتے ز غبار من ہنگامہ افرنگی یک جستہ شرار من
 انسان و جہاں او از نقش و نگار من خون جگر مردان سامان بہار من
 من آتش سوزانم من روضہ رضوانم
 آسودہ و سیارم این طرفہ تماشایم در بادہ امروزم کیفیت فردایم
 پنہاں بہ ضمیر من صد -ائم رعنائیم صد کوکب غلطان بین صد گنبد خضرا بین
 من کسوت انسانم پیراھن یزدانم
 تقدیر فسون من تدبیر فسون تو تو عاشق لیلانی من دشت جنون تو
 چون روح رواں پاکم از چند و چگون تو تو راز درون من، من راز درون تو
 از جان تو پیدایم در جان تو پنہایم
 من رھروو تو منزل من مزرع و تو حاصل تو ساز صد آہنگے تو گرمی این محفل
 آوارہ آب و گل! درباب مقام دل گنجیدہ بہ جامے بین این قلمز بے ساحل
 از موج بلند تو سربرزدہ طوفانم

IQBAL ON QUR'ANIC CONCEPT OF HISTORY

Muhammad Munawwar

The literal meaning of the word "*tarikh*" is to write, to narrate and to make entries. If we have to say that a letter had been written on such and such a date, we would use *mu'arrakhah*, i.e. written on: be it 11 September 1977. On the death of a certain historian a poet said mournfully :

وكان يؤرخ ذكر الا نام !
و هاهو ذا اليوم قد أرخا

[He used to write the accounts of other people.
Lo ! today he himself has been written down.]

In more plain words, the above verse means that the historian himself became a "part of history". This shows that in technical terms "history" deals with the past, but not the past at large; it is rather the past of man in a society. Professor Toynbee defines history a bit more precisely. In his words: "What we call history is the history of man in a civilized society."¹

Professor Toynbee, continuing, maintains that if history means all that period which human beings have spent on this earth, then the civilised span will be only two per cent of the total. Keeping this stance in view, perhaps it would not be far from truth if history, as a particular branch of knowledge, is considered as a link with the dawn of civilisation. Prehistoric ages, on the contrary, should be studied under the title of Anthropology.

Now if history is taken for the story of the past, then what is the purpose served by the study of history? Should it be studied as we study fiction? That eventually would mean a sort of amusement. Surely it is not like this; at least Muslim historians did not

1. *A Study of History* (abridged edition, 1971), I, 61.

accept it as fiction or fable. According to Muslim historians, the contents of history are living realities. Therefore, they invite those who are really alive to listen attentively and to observe the phenomena of the past with vigilant eyes. This will make man learn lessons which will add to his knowledge and wisdom and will reshape him into a better human being.

In fact, the viewpoint of Muslim historians is influenced by the Holy Qur'ān. The Qur'ān asks the human beings time and again to go through the world with open eyes and diligent hearts "(so that they may) see what was the End of those before them. They were superior to them in strength: they tilled the soil and populated it in greater numbers than these have done."²

Abdullah Yusuf Ali, interpreting the above-quoted verse of the Qur'ān, lays down:

"Let not any generation think that it is superior to all that went before it. We may be 'heirs to all the ages, in the foremost files of time'. That is no reason for arrogance, but, on the contrary, adds to our responsibility. When we realise what flourishing cities and kingdoms existed before, how they flourished in numbers and prosperity, what chances they were given, and how they perished when they disobeyed the law of God, we shall feel a sense of humility, and see that it was rebellion and self-will that brought them down."³

Those who transgressed the limits and gave themselves to covetousness, carnal pleasures and cruelty were annihilated. There were others who lost heads on account of power. Power corrupted them so much so that they saw in themselves the attributes of God and declared that they were gods. The reality was simple; they had ceased to live as human beings. What else could be the result? They collided with the pervasive order of God and became extinct.

Whenever and wherever human beings lose balance, the inevitable consequences are anarchy, cruelty, chaos, bloodshed, carnage and ruin. All the Prophets of God preached Justice, i.e. equilibrium, individual as well as collective, in all fields of life. They instructed people to outgrow animality and attain humanity.

2. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Tr., *The Holy Qur'ān*, xxx. 9.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 1053, footnote 3515.

Man is not all matter. Man is not all soul. Soul and matter go together. Balance has to be maintained. Wherever, in some era and in some society, the great majority of individuals became temperate, society became strong, prosperous, integrated and free. It is only this kind of society which can produce great individuals who in return add glory to their society—sometimes to all mankind. But the hard fact is that temperateness and equilibrium are seldom maintained for a long time. Ease brought about by affluence and nonchalance, resulting from a sense of security, begin to tell. Then the bell tolls. That is the march towards the end. Ups and downs, with short levels in between, be it material or spiritual, construct the story of man in society.

What else history is? One should not forget that man himself is the author of this sad and gay story, repenting now and taking pride then. He is the author because he is a thinking, analysing and foreseeing existence. He is not like inert matter; he does not belong to the world of plants and animals as such. History asks man to feel his responsibility and be always on the alert. History is among the open books of God. It must be studied in the light of the Book.

Taqī al-Dīn Maqrizī (845/1441) in his renowned book *al-Khiṭaṭ* writes:

“In short there are two kinds of knowledge, rational and revealed. One should be proficient in both kinds of knowledge, according to one's needs. After that he should get absorbed in the study of history and speculate over the lessons taught by it. He whose heart is open and eyes awake, by the grace of God, gets to know as a reward for his deep thinking the ruinous end of those who prided in their wealth and fighting forces. And so on and so forth.”⁴

The same author, in another book, *Al-'Uqūd al-Farīdah*, explains:

“God Almighty makes mankind inhabit the world generation after generation, split into tribes. The aim is that the forerunners should leave behind the lessons to be learnt by those who follow

4. *Al-I'lān Bī al-Taubīkh* (Urdu translation, Markazi Urdu Board, Lahore), p. 86.

and that they who follow should keep the stories of their forbears fresh to be related to others so well that the wise refrain from things despised and the well-mannered adopt the agreeable conduct."⁵

Another historian, al-Badr Husain al-Ahdal, states in the beginning of his book *Tuhfat al-Zamān Fī Ta'rikh-i Sādāt-i-Yaman* :

"This [history] is a very useful branch of knowledge. Through it the successors come to know of the circumstances of their progenitors and thus the just stand higher in the estimation of men than the unjust. The reader of history profits by its lessons. He is enabled to evaluate the intellect and wisdom of the former generations. He comes to understand their rationale. Had there been no history, mankind would not have been able to know the affairs and conditions of various governments, lineages, characteristics, causes and events of the preceding peoples. There could then have been no discrimination between the reasonable and the unreasonable, the foolish and the wise."⁶

Yet another Arab historian, Abū 'Alī Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ya'qūb al-Rāzī Miskawaih, states that when he studied the circumstances and events of foregoing nations, the character of their kings and the description of their cities and when he read the books of history, he realised that he had gained the knowledge of things that occur again and again. Thus the occurrence of like events is expected any time. This is why he wrote his book called *Tajārib al-Umam wa 'Awāqib al-Ē'imam*—which is in four volumes.⁷ The book deals with the experiences of various nations belonging to the past ages, what they did, desired, deserved and how they met their end.

Through these and other like references it becomes crystal clear that, in the opinion of Muslim historians, history does not mean the history of kings and their kingdoms. It is rather the stories of nations which include kings also. History describes the character and behaviour of different peoples. It records the extent of their intellect, wisdom and other accomplishments. It depicts the phenomena of collective rise and fall of communities. It reports the causes and reasons of the rise and fall that appear again

5. Ibid., p. 88.

6. Ibid., p. 89.

7. Ibid., p. 93.

and again. Ibn Khaldūn vehemently says⁸ : قالباضي اشبه بالاتي من الماء : [The past is more similar to the present than water is to water].

Ibn Khaldūn also defines in the manner the other Muslim historians have done. However, he emphasises that history should be studied with profound contemplation so that truth may be achieved, realities of things may be discerned and one may know the causes behind the creation, evolution and changes that occur in things. According to Ibn Khaldūn, the study of history demands depth of knowledge, breadth of vision and clarity of thought which enable one to understand Causes and Effects. Ibn Khaldūn asserts :

فهو (التاريخ) لذلك أصيل في الحكمة عريق و جدير بأن يعد في علومها و خليق -⁹

[Hence it (history) is solidly rooted in philosophy and is quite worthy of being treated as one of its departments.]

Hegel stresses : "Philosophy of history means nothing but the thoughtful consideration of it."¹⁰

The truth is that with the thoughtful study of the Qur'ān a particular worldview takes place giving birth to a particular behaviour. And if we penetrate a bit deeper, the study of the Qur'ān brings us to the conclusion that the fountainhead of several sciences and disciplines is the Book itself. History is one of them.

Faqīr Sayyid Wahīd al-Dīn narrates :

"When Dr Iqbal was residing at a bungalow on the McLeod Road, a new visitor called at him. Stray conversation went on for a while. Then the new visitor put a question to Dr Iqbal saying, 'You have read books on religion, economics, politics, history, philosophy, etc. Which one of them is the best and most profound in respect of wisdom? Dr Iqbal stood up from the chair, made a gesture with his hands indicating that he should wait as he would be back in no time. So he went in. After two or three

8. *Al-Muqaddimah* (al-Maktabah Tijārīyyah, Egypt), p. 10.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

10. *Philosophy of History* (Dover Publications, New York), p. 8.

minutes he returned with a book, He put the book into the hands of the questioner and said, 'The Qur'ān'.¹¹

At the moment we are not concerned with other branches of knowledge. We are here to deal with history only. According to Iqbal, the general historic vision of Ibn Khaldūn had sprung from the fountainhead of the Qur'ān. It goes without saying that Ibn Khaldūn is the founder of sociology and is regarded as a pillar of philosophy of history. This is how Iqbal explains:

" . . . It is, therefore, a gross error to think that the Quran has no germs of a historical doctrine. The truth is that the whole spirit of Prolegomena of Ibn-i-Khaldun appears to have been mainly due to the inspiration which the author must have received from the Quran. Even in his judgements of character he is, in no small degree, indebted to the Quran."¹²

Almost all Muslim historians and a great majority of Orientalists are of opinion that the beginning and development of Islamic history has been due to the Holy Qur'ān. Iqbal also upholds this view. He points out that the Holy Qur'ān has established a principle for knowing the facts correctly.

"O believers! if any bad man comes to you with a report clear it up at once."¹³

In this regard Iqbal explains:

"Since accuracy in recording facts which constitute the material of history is an indispensable condition of history as a science, and an accurate knowledge of facts ultimately depends on those who report them, the very first principle of historical criticism is that the reporter's personal character is an important factor in judging his testimony."¹⁴

Fāsiq means a profligate, wicked person, who leads a disorderly life and, therefore, becomes untrustworthy. He who is of a vicious nature must create, concoct and spread scandals. If such a person holds a pen and assumes the role of a recorder of events or of a

11. *Rūzgār-i Faqīr* (ed. Nov. 1963), pp. 92-93.

12. *Reconstruction* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Asbraf, 1944), p. 139.

13. The Holy Qur'ān, xlix. 6.

14. *Reconstruction*, p. 140.

historian, can he be expected to hold fast to truth and support it? His vicious nature will certainly mar the face of events in order to quench his own thirst for scandal-mongering. Ibn Khaldūn is quite aware of this sequel. He refers to a number of scandalous narrations and states thus :

“There are many such stories. They are always cropping up in the works of the historians. The incentive for invention and reporting them shows a tendency to forbidden pleasures and for smearing the reputation of others. People justify their own subservience to pleasure by citing the supposed doings of men and women of the past. Therefore they often appear very eager for such information and are alert to find it when they go through the pages of published works.”¹⁵

We have already laid down that in Iqbal's opinion the *Muqaddimah* of Ibn Khaldūn appears to have been influenced by “the inspiration which the author received from the Quran”.¹⁶ It is quite evident that, according to Iqbal, a student of history needs deep knowledge, wide experience, and mature intellect, because history encompasses the entire life. All theories and practices thereof, crafts and professions, arts and letters, politics, economics, mythologies, religions, physics and metaphysics and what not have a history and hence are to be regarded as history. But of all these multifarious, multi-coloured and multiplex activities, professions and departments, none has profound meaning if taken separately, however high the standard of any performance might be. Life is one integrated whole. It is a meaning which is always one though it has innumerable shades. Hence no art can be comprehended apart from life. Rather no accomplishment can fully be attained or appreciated without referring to other accomplishments. So it is with history. Without comprehending the comprehensiveness of life history and its pedigree of evolution cannot be construed. Let us take a crude example, that of an elephant. If the elephant is not kept in view, can the trunk and its functions be fully explained and understood? What does the trunk of the animal stand for, without reference to the comprehensive elephant?

15. *The Muqaddimah*, Eng. trans. Rozenhal, abridged by N. J. Dawood (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 23.

16. *Reconstruction*, p. 139.

Similarly, no philosophic doctrine, political revolution or economic change, etc., treated separately can make us feel its full significance. Iqbal, in respect of a complete history of philosophy, states :

“The progress of thought cannot be divorced from other phases of human activity. Our histories of philosophy tell us what various peoples have thought, but they give us no information as to the various causes—social and political—which have determined the character of human thought. To write a complete history of philosophy would certainly be a tremendous task. A mere theologian cannot fully reveal to his readers the rich content of Luther’s Reform. We are apt to isolate great ideas from the general stream of man’s intellectual activity.”¹⁷

In this context, Iqbal’s Presidential Address of 11 June 1932 may also be taken into account. It was read out in a public meeting of the Muslims, held outside Mochi Gate, Lahore. The Muslims had gathered to protest against a move put before the Senate of the University of the Punjab in which it was proposed that the Indians should be taught the history of India only and Islamic history should be excluded from the syllabus. It should be remembered that the University of the Punjab and its bodies were in those days predominantly Hindu concerns. The proposal was made at the behest of the Hindus, by Professor Bruce, who then was the Chairman of the Department of History. In this regard the strongest argument given by Iqbal was that history had never belonged to any particular group of people, related to a certain area. History in his view belonged to all mankind. For the whole of humanity history was a common heritage. A few lines from that address are given below :

“History in its totality is a movement of human soul. Human soul has no specific environment. The whole world is its environment. . . . To treat it as belonging to a particular nationality is to demonstrate narrow-mindedness. I went to Italy and came across a gentleman called Prince Caetani, who was fond of Islamic history. He has written so many books on history and has expended a large wealth in this pursuit. No Muslim country can undertake the task of even getting all this huge material trans-

17. *Javid Iqbal*, Ed. (Iqbal), *Stray Reflections* (Lahore : Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1961), pp. 60-61.

lated. I asked him as to why he was interested so much in Islamic history. His answer was that it turned women into men."¹⁸

The man was an Italian and not one of the inhabitants of Muslim lands nor was he a Muslim that he felt attracted towards Islamic history on account of religious affinity. The reason quite obviously is that history of mankind is a spiritual outcome. It represents all. It teaches all. It is a common treasury. Borders are only material impressions. There exist no borders for soul, neither spatial nor temporal. We cannot cut time into pieces. We cannot cut away the past from the present. We, for our convenience, do take into account the serial time and devise years, months, days, hours, minutes and seconds and even fractions of seconds, but the Duration is one. It is indivisible. Iqbal vehemently declares:

زمانہ ایک ، حیات ایک ، کائنات بھی ایک
دلیل کم نظری ، قصہ جدید و قدیم¹⁹

[Time is one, Life is one, the universe is one,
To talk of ancient and modern is but shortsightedness.]

For Iqbal life is a continuously evolving movement which serves as a field of action for man to put his capacities to test and show his worth. The Qur'ān says:

“Every man's fate We have fastened on his neck: on the Day of Judgment, We shall bring out for him a scroll, which he will see spread open.”²⁰

Through this verse God has made it abundantly manifest that the fate of man depends on his deeds, good or evil, and they hang round his neck. Man is the maker of his fortune.

Here I feel tempted to quote some verses of Iqbal from his famous poem *Zamānah* (Time) included in *Bāl-i Jibrīl*. The diction of the poem is superb. It seems to have a celestial music. As to its meanings it is one of the most profound poems, although it consists of only ten verses. Anyway, the following verses have direct bearing on the subject alluded to above:

18. Rafīq Afdal, Ed., *Gustār-i Iqbāl* (Punjab University, Lahore), p. 153-54.

19. *Darb-i Kalīm*, p. 26.

20. xvii. 13.

مری صراحی سے قطرہ قطرہ نئے حوادث ٹپک رہے ہیں
 میں اپنی تسبیحِ روز و شب کا شمار کرتا ہوں دانہ دانہ !
 ہر ایک سے آشنا ہوں، لیکن جدا جدا رسم و راہ میری
 کسی کا راکب، کسی کا مرکب، کسی کو عبرت کا تازیانہ !
 نہ تھا اگر تو شریکِ محفل، قصور میرا ہے یا کہ تیرا ؟
 مرا طریقہ نہیں کہ رکھ لوں کسی کی خاطر مٹے شبانہ !
 مرے خم و پیچ کو نجومی کی آنکھ پہچانتی نہیں ہے
 ہدف سے بیگانہ تیر اُس کا نظر نہیں جس کی عارفانہ !

[New realities are trickling from my goblet, drop after drop,
 —I tell every bead of my rosary of day and night.

I am everybody's acquaintance but my behaviour with each of them is
 different,

For some I am the rider, for some others I serve as a means of con-
 veyance (or vehicle) and there are yet others with whom I deal as a
 whip of warning.

If you did not attend the feast the fault is yours, not mine,
 It is not my custom to hold back the nocturnal wine for any absentee.
 My twists and turns are not discernible to astrologer's eye,
 He who does not possess the intuitive eye cannot hit the target with his
 arrow.]

No doubt, every moment is a creative moment. Things are coming to life. Things are dying out. Every moment the universe is a new universe. Hence no human being can afford to be inert, neither physically nor mentally. One has constantly to be alert, up and doing. Time gives no special consideration and makes no concession to any individual or society. Those who capture the spirit of creation and change know what to do, how to do and when to do. They subjugate Time. Those who are otherwise are subjugated by Time. There are people who learn and conquer. There are people who do not learn and are trampled upon by others. Their affliction serves as a warning to those who follow. Moreover, it is not the knowledge of natural laws alone that leads man to the abode of reality. Development of spiritual faculties is also needed, otherwise our understanding of the world we live in will not be sound. Ideas will fall and ideals will crumble down to earth before long adding yet another sad chapter to the record book

of human failures: failures caused by stubborn ambitions entertained by immature minds. But what history is otherwise?

Anyway ours is not a universe which is locked or blocked. It is an ever-developing and ever-expanding universe with open possibilities, where everything is in search of its ultimate fate. Man, whom Nature has equipped with material as well as spiritual powers, has also to toil constantly, consciously and wilfully to maintain his dominance over the forces of Nature. If he slackens, he falters. For him to rest is to rust. Islamic thought and especially Muslim view of history is replete with this very spirit. Iqbal explains this fact as under:

“Thus all lines of Muslim thought converge on a dynamic conception of the universe. This view is further reinforced by Ibn-i-Maskawaih's theory of life as an evolutionary movement, and Ibn-i-Khaldun's view of history. History or, in the language of the Quran, ‘the days of God,’ is the third source of human knowledge according to the Quran. It is one of the most essential teachings of the Quran that nations are collectively judged, and suffer for their misdeeds here and now.”²¹

After quoting the following verse of the Qur'ān: “Every nation has its fixed period” (vii. 32), Iqbal stresses that the verse “suggests the possibility of a scientific treatment of the life of human societies regarded as organisms”.²² Now life regarded as an organism means that nations are connected with previous nations as one generation is to its predecessor and successor generations. This shows that history is a continuous movement towards progress, a movement which cannot be divided into past, present and future. Time-process has no compartments. The seed is present in the sapling. The seed and sapling are both alive and grow in the tree. A baby growing into boyhood is really the same baby as he was born. When the boy became a full-grown human being, the baby and boy were there within him, living. Then the organism began to decline into old age, being reduced to a mere skeleton. Still it was the same person. Similar is the position of societies, nations, rather humanity at large.

21. *Reconstruction*, p. 138.

22: *Ibid.*, p. 139.

It is already quite apparent that by history we mean the history of man in society. If human beings are not there the world is void. All sensibilities end. Every sort of perception or intuition is extinct. It means there would be no self-consciousness, no senses, no knowledge, neither qualities, nor quantities, neither attributes nor tributes. What a world where there is no colour! Where there is no grace. Where there is no perfume. Moreover, where there is neither pleasure nor grief nor victory nor defeat. Still further where there is no notion of good and evil. Without man the universe is deaf and dumb and blind. Meanings lose all meanings. Says Maulānā Rūmī, in one of the opening verses of his *Mathnawī* :

عالم از ما هست شد نے ما ازو
بادہ از ما مست شد نے ما ازو !

[The world came to exist through us and not we through it,
Wine became intoxicated through us and not we through it.]

In other words, we may say that man is the measure *for* all things (not the measure *of* all things). He is the critic, the analyst, the judge, the umpire, and the guardian examiner. It is he who lauds. It is he who denounces. All worlds from atoms to celestial spheres, all beginnings and ends, all tastes and colours, all relations and proportions, in short, the whole world of perception and ideas is in reality the world of man. Man is the meaning and all other created existences are absurdities if man is not there. Iqbal addresses God and lays bare the pride of man in humble words :

قصور وار ، غریب الدیار ہوں ، لیکن
ترا خرابہ فرشتے نہ کر سکے آباد !²³

[I am guilty, I am alien,
Yet this desolate world of yours could not be inhabited and cultivated
by your angels.]

At another occasion Iqbal repeats this same theme :

نمی بینی کہ ما خاکی نہادان
چہ خوش آرامتیم این خاکدان را²⁴

23. *Bāl-i Jibril*, p. 8.

24. *Armughān-i Hijāz*, p. 18.

[Do not you see that we clay-born things,
How pleasingly have decorated your Earth !]

It is all man's toil, his sweat and blood, which has made the world colourful, graceful and musical. Yet all done is just in a tiny speck of brilliance in relation to the universe. The worlds and heavens, trillions into trillions in number, are yet to be explored. Every breath taken consciously brings man face to face with awfully immeasurable challenges. To know and to conquer is man's perpetual enterprise. It is all man's manifold history. And it is all in Time.

The Qur'ān says: "And teach them to remember the days of God,"²⁵ and "Such days (of varying fortunes) We give to men and men by turns."²⁶

Both the above-quoted verses relate to human beings. In brief, Time is the touchstone of human performances whether they were pure or dross. Thus to them who are blessed with vision, history shows how to live. To them history is a record of the manifestation of human capabilities. Simultaneously it is a "whip of warning". So that man's endeavours continue to make him better every moment. If Time is not taken as a vital reality, then Iqbal's whole philosophy loses its very basis. Self-consciousness, self-preservation, self-fulfilment, in other words full realisation of man as such cannot be apprehended in a universe which is not ever-growing. An inert world is a senseless concept. It must move on, it must progress and evolve. It's not even to slow down. And its rest is its end. Similarly, man in this world—a restless world—cannot rest. In rest lies his death. Iqbal says:

ہم سوزِ ناتمام، ہم دردِ آرزویم
بگماں وہم یقین را کہ شہیدِ جستجویم²⁷

[The whole of me is burning and it has not burnt out the whole of me
is a series of pangs of unfulfilled desires.

I turn certainty into uncertainty because I am madly devoted to search
and inquiry (and it should never come to an end).]

It has been stated in the beginning, in relation to Maqrizi,

25. xiv. 5.

26. iii. 140.

27. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 87.

Ahdal and Ibn Khaldūn that the stories of the past related by the Qur'ān are not just a stock for amusement. It is rather a school where the call *fa'tabirū*, i.e. "learn from the plight of former generations" keeps resounding perpetually. Like the great majority of Muslim historians, Iqbal too is of opinion that history is not simply a collection of amusing anecdotes, stories or tales. He very artfully and yet in plain words tells what history stands for :

چست تاریخ اے ز خود بیگانہ
 داستانی ، قصہ ، افسانہ ؟
 این ترا از خویشتن آگہ کند
 آشنائے کار و مردِ ره کند
 ہمچو خنجر برفسانت می زند
 باز بر روی جہانت میزند
 شمع او بختِ اُمم را کوکب است
 روشن از روی امشب و ہم دیشب است
 چشم پرکارے کہ بیند رفتہ را
 پیش تو باز آفریند رفتہ را
 سر زند از ماضی تو حال تو
 خیزد از حال تو استقبال تو
 شکن ار خواہی حیاتِ لازوال
 رشتہ ماضی ز استقبال و حال²⁸

[Do you know what is history? But you do not know even your own self. Do you think it is just a story, a tale or a romance?

Instead, it makes you know yourself. It makes you know your purpose and then sets you to the path (of achievement).

It sharpens you as a dagger on the whetting-stone and then strikes you against the face of the world. . . .

Its candle is like fortune-star of nations which illumines the present and the past night.

It is an eye well trained. It reads the past, recreates it, and puts it before you. . . .

Your past bursts forth into the present and from your present your future is born.

If you desire to live a life everlasting then do not cut asunder your past from your present and future.]

The Qur'ān has instructed human beings repeatedly to get acquainted with the affairs of former generations. They should explore the world and see how the ancestor nations and societies became exterminated although they were very strong in every respect. They had huge man-power and unlimited wealth. Nothing could save them from ruin. The Qur'ān emphasises off and on that lessons should be learnt from history which is an open book containing guidance as well as warning. Good things of the past should be upheld and imbibed, bad ones are to be avoided. This shows history lives in us as a vital force. Therefore, we must always keep in mind factors which gave strength to individuals and societies in the past and also the factors which brought about their doom. Hence the concept of history with Semetic races, i.e. the inheritors of revealed books, was different from those who had none. For example, the Greek mind had been dominated by the idea of frequency and recurrence of events, while the Semitic religious thought held that events were immediate, non-recurrent and unique, and this fact introduced dynamism to historical movement.²⁹

B.A. Dar proceeds further with this idea and, explaining Iqbal's view of history, lays down :

“History as thus considered is both creative and conservative and the historical process would be incomplete with either. The conservative element means a tie with the spiritual tradition and an acceptance of the sacred heritage of the past. But it also demands a dynamic-creative element, a creative purpose, an urge towards fulfilment.”³⁰

One thing is of great import. It is that for Iqbal, as for almost all the Muslim historians, history is not essentially the history of kings, courts and caliphs. Iqbal, as is the Qur'ānic way, always

29. B.A. Dar, *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy* (Ghulam Ali & Sons, Lahore), p. 253.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 253-54.

deals with communities, races, groups and societies—kings no doubt included. Kings, kingliness and kingdom is just one department of the comprehensive life of society. That department is administrative-cum-political. Surely this department is of utmost importance. Yet the difference between the collective life of communities and kings is made adequately manifest in the following quatrain :

مکندر رفت و شمشیر و علم رفت
 خراجِ شهر و گنجِ کان و یم رفت
 امم را از شہاں پایندہ تر دان
 نمی بینی کہ ایران ماند و جم رفت³¹؟

[Went away Alexander and with him his sword, his banner,
 and all sorts of tributes that came from cities, his treasures (of pearls
 and rubies) brought from mines and seas.

Know that communities are much more lasting than the kings :
 Do you not see that Iranian nation is there while Jamshid is no more]

Yet the influence of lords, chiefs, dignitaries and families that wield power and also individuals and groups possessing vast riches is great because they are imitated by others who are less fortunate. People bereft of character, education and self-confidence are sheer imitative animals. Hence the responsibility of the "Biggies" is commensurate with the extent of their influence. They influence the society they are related to, according to their importance. This is what the famous Arabic saying connotes : *الناس علی دین* : *ملوکہم* [People follow the ways of their kings].

This imitation right from the uppermost circles of a society comes down step by step to the lowest one. This is why the Holy Prophet enjoined upon every individual, man and woman, to feel his and her responsibility to their juniors in age and station : *کلکم راع و کلکم مسئول عن رعیتہ*³² [Every one of you is a herdsman (guardian) and hence accountable for his charge].

And higher the station, the greater the accountability. Accord-

31. *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 70.

32. *Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn* (Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, Beirut), p. 281.

ing to the Qur'ān, evil-doing spreads in a society much more easily through the wealthy and affluent individuals than through any other mode. This is why whenever a certain society met its ruinous plight, it could be taken for granted that the well-to-do members of it had surely fallen into bad ways. They were followed by others. Gradually the whole social body became a moral wreck. Then they heard the call. Their time was up.

“(And) when We decide to destroy a population, We (first) send a definite order to those among them who are given the good things of this life, and yet transgress; so that the word is proved true against them: then it is that We destroy them utterly.”³³

Interpreting the above verse says Abdullah Yusuf Ali:

“Those who are highly gifted from God—it may be with wealth or position, or it may be with talents and opportunities—are expected to understand and obey. They are given a definite order and warning. If they still transgress there is no further room for argument. They cannot plead that they were ignorant. The command of the Lord is proved against them, and its application is called for beyond doubt. Then it is that their punishment is completed.”³⁴

As already quoted, Iqbal believes that one of the most essential teachings of the Qur'ān is that nations are collectively judged and suffer for their misdeeds here and now. The Qur'ān emphasises the fact that whenever the majority of the members of a society fall into evil ways, the nation is deemed fit for punishment. Then it is given no time. If good individuals form the majority and those who are bad are in minority, then a society is treated to be a healthy society and it can pull on. But the position is reversed when the society is to be taken for a diseased body which without timely and proper treatment may give way and expire. Individual evil-doers are also not let off. They along with the majority receive punishment here, but the punishment in the next world is far severer and longer. Says Iqbal, as already quoted:

33. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Tr., *The Holy Qur'ān*, xvii. 16,

34. *Ibid.*, p. 698, footnote 2192.

فطرت افراد سے اغراض بھی کر لیتی ہے
 کبھی کرتی نہیں ملت کے گناہوں کو معاف³⁵

[Nature may at times ignore individual misdeeds,
 but the collective misdeeds of a community are never ignored or
 forgiven.]

Individual laxity is like a negligible defect in a body otherwise healthy and stout. The body can put up with it, but when ills become strong and rule over the body, the body crumbles. Similarly, a small number of ill-meaning and evil-doing persons can be, though with reservation and reluctance, tolerated, but when evil gets hold of society due to overwhelming numbers, then there can be no remedy. The result is death. This death, i.e. collective punishment, takes place in the shape of epidemics, earthquakes, droughts, excessive rains, floods, famines, foreign invasions, civil wars and, worst of all, slavery. Slavery is collective death in life because the slave societies are like breathing dead bodies. The fact needs no amplification.

After all what do we mean by evil? In plain words, it is the surrender of a man's soul to his animal self. It is a constant tussle between the soul and the body of a human being, one trying to subjugate the other. Sometimes the values pull up, sometimes the material considerations of pomp and pleasures transgress limits and drag down. Now a certain person enjoys the thrill of soaring high and then the same one is seen stooping down to carnal ferociousness. Now he thanks and then repents. But this process of thanks and repentance concerns only those whose spiritual death has not yet occurred. It is obvious that the complete subjugation of material self by the spiritual self is almost impossible while the contrary is not impossible. We know, people become so much reconciled to their animal level of existence that they seem no more capable of understanding what humanity denotes. According to Bergson, to become a human being an individual has to outgrow his animality. In his words: "Evolution is the effort of life to free itself of the domination of matter."³⁶ Similarly, Iqbal

35. *Darb-i Kalim*, p. 86.

36. *Masterpieces of World Philosophy* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 769.

says in respect of a disciplined and principled life achievable through the observance of *Din* :

چھیست دین برخاستن از رومی خاک
تا ز خود آگاہ گردد جان پاک! 37

[What is *Din*, it is to outgrow the earthliness (earth-rootedness) so that soul achieves self-consciousness.]

Soul's journey upward is slow and difficult. But the downward movement is always much easier as if automatic, because it is pro-earth. Relation of the body with earth is immediate. Hence matter is attracted by matter. This means the downward pull is always far stronger than the upward. But soul, as long as the complete surrender to matter does not take place, tries somehow to defend the body's individual existence and tries to protect it from mass matter (the earth) which is always after it to make it an easy morsel. Strife is life. Surrender is tantamount to death. Says Shelley :

“First our pleasures die and then
Our hopes and then our fears and when
These are gone, the debt is due,
Dust claims dust and we die too.”

It means wherever a society's demise occurs it occurs on account of the surrender of soul to matter. Societies rise trying to be human. Societies fall when reconciled to animality. Dominance of soul can be illustrated as Prophet Sulaimān who, with all his wealth and possessions, soared high in the air while the dominance of matter can be characterised as Qārūn (Korah) whose treasures dragged him down into deep dark abyss leaving no trace behind. In respect of wealth to “possess” it is spiritual. To be possessed by it is material. One state makes the master, the other slave.

For Iqbal, the whole history of mankind is a sort of perpetual strife between soul and matter. Islam for him symbolises all that is good for man and that good is the soul-dominion. To reconstruct Muslim societies, in Iqbal's view, is to enliven the

soul, is to strengthen belief in God, the Fountainhead of all soul atoms. That would mean to put the flow of history in Islamic spheres again on the right track. This view was a gift of God to him through the discerning study of the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān being the mirror of the past, the present and the future is the best warner as well as the most reliable source of hope.

The concluding paragraph is the translation of Iqbal's speech delivered at Muslim University Aligargh in 1929.³⁸ It is helpful in respect of understanding as to how Iqbal's view of history was shaped and to what extent it was impressed by the Qur'ān. And here it is :

"Another subject, which I want to emphasise, concerns the discovery of our past. I am not one of those who love their past only, rather I have faith in the future. I need the past in order to understand the present. It is the need of the day that we should have an understanding of the mainspring of culture and civilisation so that we may comprehend the significance of the events taking place in the world of Islam today. It is for the same reason that I exhort you to know your past. As we are unaware of the principles of modern civilisation and culture, we are lagging behind the other nations in the acquisition of modern knowledge. I want you to consider and observe those lost links which relate our past to our future. One such link is the inductive method which has been applied to modern sciences. It is a blessing bestowed on the world (of man) by the Holy Qur'ān. The results and fruits of the inductive method are quite apparent today. I have been diligently studying the Holy Qur'ān for the last twenty years. I recite its verses every day, but I cannot claim that I have understood even a few of its chapters. If God grants me time and courage, I shall, one day, write a comprehensive history to point out how the modern world has reached its present stage by developing the ideals of life set forth in the Holy Book. I hope that the university will produce a group of people who will dedicate their lives to the study of the Holy Qur'ān. I wish that you should collaborate with me. For the last several years I have been the owner of my body only but my soul has always remained in your service and, as long as I live, it shall continue to serve you" (applause).

38. *Guftār-i Iqbāl*, pp. 104-05.

**IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY—
An Analysis & Comparison.**

PROF: USMAN RAMZ

Definition:—

The distinction between an event and history is a priori. It is abundantly perceptible. We distinguish between the death of Prophet Muhammad (Sm) and the history of Arabia, between the invention of steam engine and the history of Industrial Revolution, between the date of the publication of *Javed Nama* and the history of the evolution of Iqbal's thought. It is true that we 'stumble' on events in the context of history, we 'understand' events in terms of history, we 'isolate' events within a history, we 'abstract' events from history and we 'locate' events in a history, but it is, after all, true that events and history are different from though not stranger to, each other.

What then is history? Like all familiar terms, it is very difficult to define history too. We can not invite risk by saying that history is nothing but a bundle of events, which make it up. The risk is obvious because events evaporate, they stand annihilated by the passage of time. What at best we can assert is that 'events' and 'history' are correlated terms. To explain the relation between 'events' and 'a history', we can borrow a metaphor. The metaphor is known as PATTERN. The idea which the 'Pattern-hypothesis' intends to convey is very well illustrated in a familiar newspaper drawing, containing scattered numbers which the reader is invited to connect by means of lines. The reader, at the out set, does not find any 'pattern' in the drawing, rather he is embarrassed to look at it. But as soon as he proceeds to fill in the lines from number to number, he begins to see the 'pattern'. The 'pattern' was there for all time. On the basis of this analogy we can amplify our point in question as below:

Scattered numbers	=	Events.
Drawing of lines	=	Tracing of connections in history.
Seeing the picture	=	Grasping the history.

This 'pattern-hypothesis' may be treated as rudimentary and not final. For some historians it is a plausible hypothesis, as it helps us in coining terminologies to suit our purpose of understanding history.

So "the claim that there is patternedness, we could call it historical rationalism. The claim that there is no patternedness, we could call historical nihilism. The claim that we do not know whether there is a pattern, we could call historical scepticism".

We are not concerned with the varieties of history as mentioned above. What I am labouring at to bring in lime-light is the evident distinction which exists between an 'event' and 'a history'. Iqbal was fully aware of this distinction. He raises the question in the following verse:

چیست تاریخ اے ز خود بیگانہ
داستانے قصہ افسانہ

The reply of his question is a big 'No'. A story, a fiction and a narration is an event in its context. Iqbal is reluctant to give any one of them the status of 'a history'. The reason is obvious, we have to trace out the inner connections, which binds together one story with another story and one narration with another narration. Then we have to 'grasp' the 'relatedness' of different stories and narrations as a whole.

Iqbal defines history in the following positive terms:

این ترا از خویشتن آگاہ کند
آشنائے کار و مرد راه کند
روح را سرمایہ تاب است این
جسم ملت را چون اعصاب است این
شعلہ افسردہ در سوزش نگر
دوش در آغوش امروزش نگر
شمع او بخت امم را کوکب است
روشن ازوے امشب وهم دیشب است
بیادہ صد سالہ در مینائے او
مستی پارینہ در صہبائے او
ضبط کن تاریخ را پائندہ شو
از نفس ہائے رمیدہ زندہ شو

To Iqbal history a medium which helps one in understanding himself. It makes a man active and self-conscious of the duties to be performed by him. It is a rich glamour for one's soul. History, metaphorically

speaking, is the nervous-system for the body of a millat. Iqbal exhorts human being in general and muslim in particular to see their 'yesterday' in the mirror of 'to-day' of their history. He contends that the 'lamp of history' is the guiding-star for a nation. A nation should take lessons from her history.

The true spirit of Iqbal's Philosophy of history teaches us that history is the expression of the "collective-mind" of a nation. It is a continued creative force with the help of which we evaluate and criticise life, laws and values. Such a "force", for Iqbal, is not mootonous. There are changes in it. These changes, sometimes create unity and uniformity in our system of life and sometime they create diversity and chaos. If we at all want to know anything about a nation, we should, then, study the history of that nation, because it is history which preserves and maintains record of the activities of the same.

METHOD:

If history plays such a vital role, and it is decidedly so, then what is that 'method' which we can apply in understanding the same? It has become a fashion of the day to apply the method of natural Sciences in the domain of history. The stubborn pride of Industrial Revolution, the shallow boast of the advancement in technology, the ever increasing lust for colonialization and the evergrowing indignation for religion in Europe and other western countries have all contributed to help create an atmosphere in the laboratories of our Universities and Colleges, where man is compared with ants, bees and horses. The result of the application of the method of Physics, Biology and other natural sciences is that man has been reduced to a mechine. It is on the basis of the result of Natural Sciences that man is said to be governed by his 'instincts'. He is said to have been under the strict control of his 'blind-impulses'. This sophistry of our age is pregnant with dangers.

Those who have an 'insight' equal to that of a "peasant and nomad, who have discovered the art of governing the vegetable and the Animal kingdom", may share with them in their sardonic smile "at the boastful industrialist who glories in his facile conquest of the material universe and has not paused to remind himself" that "the proper study of MANKIND is MAN". "The industrialist has concentrated all his effort and attention upon the relation of Man with the Physical Nature to the neglect of the relation between Man and Man; and he has thus hightened the effect — for good or for evil — of every human action by

putting at its disposal a terrific deriving-power, without having taken thought to improve the wisdom or the virtue... Virtue of the human beings whom he has been endowing so recklessly with these improved technical facilities".

The proposition of the application of the method of Natural Sciences in the field and sphere of history is totally untenable. "Why should we think that a scientific method of thought, a method which has been devised for thinking about inanimate nature, should be applicable to historical thought, which is the study of living creatures and indeed of human beings".

Iqbal's poetical works, his lectures and other writings, which explicitly speak of his grasp of both the Western and the Eastern civilizations, both the Western and the Eastern Philosophies and religion, do not cast vote in favour of the application of the method of Natural Sciences in history. He all along toiled hard to study 'Man-kind' with the help of 'Man'. He exhorts men to "learn the true status of Man". The relevant verses, surcharged with strong moral precepts, are worthy of consideration:

با خبر شو از مقام آدمی	آدمیت احترام آدمی
کافر و مومن همه خلق خداست	حرف بد را لب بر آوردن خطاست
می شود بر کافر و مومن شفیق	بنده حق از خدا گیرد طریق
دل اگر بگریز از دل وائے دل	کفر و دین را گیرد در پهنائے دل
این همه آفاق، آفاق دل است	گرچه دل زندانی آب و گل است

Iqbal in the above-quoted verses raises the question: What is humanity? And his reply is simple: It is the respect for man. Iqbal thinks it to be a sin to utter a single harsh word to one's fellow-being, as all are equally created by God, who is equally gracious to the believer and the non-believer. He asks to betide the heart, if it runs away from the heart of one's fellow-being. Iqbal in his last verse unveils the deep-seated secret and truth. He says that the human heart undoubtedly, is shut within the prison house of clay, but one would do well to keep it in his memory that the entire Universe is the empire of his heart.

There have had been thinkers and philosophers whom we find too much prone and inclined to the study of 'macrocosm' and not 'microcosm'. This tendency to study 'microcosm' is a result of the overemphasis

laid on the Method of Induction. The method is not bad in itself. Iqbal is not averse to the use of the method of Induction. Iqbal, having been inspired by the teaching of the Islam and Quran, admits the value and importance of the Method of Induction. But with what he dissents is the misuse of this method, through which 'Man' is reduced to the awful status of a machine—a passive, lifeless and an inert machine. He, as a leading pioneer of the Science of Human Nature, is openly opposed to any such move of the present-day civilization.

His interpretation of the status and station of man in the universe is thrilling, thought-provoking and a self-radiating truth. He says:

از گل خود آدمی تعمیر کن	آدمی را عالمی تعمیر کن
خیز و خلاق جهان تازه شو	شعله در بر کن خلیل آوازه شو
با جهان نا مساعد ساختن	هست در میدان سپر انداختن
مرد خودداری که باشد پخته کار	با مزاج او بسازد روزگار
گر نه سازد با مزاج او جهان	می شود جنگ آزما با آسمان
اے ز آداب امانت بے خبر	از دو عالم خویش را بہتر شمر

"Build thy clay into a Man" and "Build thy man into world" is the message of Iqbal. He pursues Man to "arise and create a new world". He commands, "wrap thyself in flame, be an Abraham". Iqbal speaks of those warriors with whom this world does not comply in their 'taste' and 'ehumour'. Iqbal suggests them to wage war against heaven, as it is the raply of the cruelties of this world. Iqbal had total confidence in 'power' and 'potentialities' of 'Man'. He is optimist of the future of 'Man'.

To repeat once again: "the proper study of mankind is Man"—a 'Man' who is "superior to both the world". Then why the modern Western thinkers have shirked to study "Man"? The reply is very clear. The Western mind has lost itself in the 'quest' of nature. It has not attempted to 'conquer' it. The Western mind holds that 'Man' is nothing but a part of 'Nature'. It holds Nature to be superior to Man and not Man Superior to Nature. In this regard the study of the Natural Sciences had led them to the confirmation of their belief and stand about Man. But they have not yet been able to see the hollowness of their belief; they have not yet realized that the whole process of the study of Natural Sciences is devoid of the higher Values of life. The Western mind has not been able to get a true epistemology; they have

not been able to find out the point of equilibrium in 'rationalism' and 'empiricism'. Though the services of the Western mind are immense in different walks of life, yet Iqbal is the last man to give them a blank-cheque in the appreciation of their services.

He says:

علم را بر تن زنی مارے بود
علم را بر دل زنی یارے بود

Knowledge does not come from 'Accumulation of Facts', 'Definition', 'Classification' and 'Explanation' as a host of Western Scientist and thinkers would suggest, it rather springs from 'Heart' too. Again two verses from Iqbal:

اچھا ہے دل کے پاس رہے پاسبان عقل
لیکن کبھی کبھی اسے تنہا بھی چھوڑ دے

سپاہ تازہ بر انگیزم از ولایت عشق
کہ در حرم خطرے از بغاوت خرد است

It is the analytic attitude of a Western mind which has created hurdles in his way of getting 'unity' in his thought. But as the Western mind is the creation of its own civilization and as the civilization is "بے نور", the Western man is not getting any way out to withdraw himself from the vicious alley.

He voices his conviction as below:

تہی وحدت سے ہے اندیشہ غرب
کہ تہذیب فرنگی بے حرم ہے

Iqbal does not deny the sensory faculties of man or the knowledge gained through them. He does not minimise the faculties of reasoning in man. What he contends are the limitations of both. To remove such limitations and to compensate them, other than 'Revelation', Iqbal adds his own theory of 'love'. The 'love' in the teaching of Iqbal is the key to the understanding of that 'Man-within-man', who escaped the eyes of such Western-minds, whose laboratories are packed up with tools, instruments and animals of lower species.

The inner self of the Western-mind is dark, nay of the whole Western civilization is without light, as it has failed to give man the true status of Man. Howsoever proud they may be of their advancement in the field of Industry and technology, they should not forget that they are creating 'events' and not 'history'. There is no such thing as the 'Age of Machine' "for all that we know, the older techniques, from flint-chipping to iron-smelting inclusive, may each have been invented a number of times over by different societies in different times and places An invention does not make 'a clear cut' between two epochs of world History. It rather sets in motion a wave of mimesis; and this psychic wave behaves like other waves in media. It travels outward in different direction from its points of origin; it takes time to travel and it takes a different length of time in different sectors according to the size and disposition of the local obstacles which it encounters, and the degree of local resistance which it has to overcome." The two verses, quoted below, are sufficient to prove his stand regarding the issue:

وہ حکمت ناز تھا جس پر خردمندان مغرب کو
 ہوس کے پنجہ خونیں میں تیغ کار زاری ہے
 نظر کو خیرہ کرتی ہے چمک تہذیب حاضر کی
 یہ صناعی مگر جھوٹے نگوں کی ریزہ کاری ہے

'MOTIF'

Granted the legitimacy and importance of the Method of History, let us now proceed to the consideration of the problem of 'Motif'. The search for 'Motif' is no doubt the starting point of our subject, but the very process of history speaks that it has had been the stumbling-block. Many a spiritualist and materialists stumbled and they stumbled repeatedly, even then they could not find out the real and true nature of 'Motif'. For one "heros" are the real 'Motif' of history, for other 'territorial nationalism', for yet others "Environment, Race and 'Colour' are the Motif of history. But we can be sure that they have mistaken, that they have mistaken. They have stumbled upon their cherished ideals, which carry little importance for a Universal-historian like Confucious, Buddha, Prophet Muhammad (sm), Ibne-Khaldum and Iqbal. For Iqbal the 'Motif' of history lies in the struggle of two forces—the force of "Good" and the force of "Evil". This 'Motif' which governs human history is not only comprehensive but eternal too. It will be better

to quote Iqbal in original:

ستیزہ کار رہا ہے ازل سے تا امروز چراغ مصطفوی (ص) سے شرار بولہبی

The broader idea of the struggle between two antagonistic forces is neither new nor novel. If we turn over the pages of history that an encounter between two super human personalities is the central theme of some of the greatest stories and dramas of the world, which human mind could ever produce. An encounter between Yahweh and the Serpent in the book of Genesis, an encounter between the Lord and Satan in the Book of Job and an encounter between the Lord and Mephistophles in the Faust of Goethe are the crystal instances which support the proposition. We are revolted with wonder when we find almost similar encounter in the sphere of Science being expressed in new terminologies e.g., the two operative factors in Darwin—(1) Variation and (2) Natural Selection. Our wonder knows no limit when we find an astronomer explaining the problem of creation with the help of the principle of two encountering stars.

The apparent similarity between Iqbal and a poet, a philosopher and a scientist is no doubt interesting, but the differences are fundamental. Iqbal's conception of the 'Motif' of history is (1) ideological (2) impersonal and (3) non-mechanical. Whereas some other conceptions are either non-ideological, personal or mechanical. Iqbal undoubtedly, has used the names of two personalities—Mustafa (sm) and Abu Lahab, but the words چراغ and شرار should not be detached from their context. In this connection, a comparative survey of Iqbal with Goethe will reveal the fact that the latter is a determinist in belief as Goethe says "the external factor is to supply the inner creative factor, a perpetual stimulus of the kind which suits best to evoke the potent creative variation", whereas Iqbal treats the individual 'ego' to be a free creative force. To him life is a ceaseless endeavour.

He says:

ہستم اگر می روم گو نہ روم نیستم

The Views of Universal Historians

From the study of 'Motif' in history I now switch over to the description of the different philosophies of history, propounded by some

great thinkers of the world. Not many persons hold a philosophy of history. The reason is obvious. Either they do not find any "patternedness" in history or they have such a vast treasure of history at the disposal—of their memory that they become scriptical about any single theme; yet their number who could safely see a 'pattern' in human history is many. I propose to deal with Augustine, Ibne-Khaldun, Kant, Hegel Marx, Spengler and Iqbal.

Augustine:

This Bishop of Hippo lived in an age when man's soul was tried for no fault of its own, when the barbarian tribes were invading the Roman Empire and when the West Goths, under Alaric, in 410 A.D., had captured and sacked the city of Rome. A few years latter the Vandals, under Genseric, had moved in the Roman territory in North Africa. These events and others compelled Augustine to think about the fate of Rome.

Augustine started his enquiry into the realm of history from the origin of Man. The Celestial King, the winged musicians and messengers, the creation of Adam and the first woman "from his rib" are all the subject matter of the pope. The Pope proceeds onward and asserts that a time came when "the herbs and roots lost their original potency", due to which the man turned his face "to the flesh of other animals". This resulted in the fact that "death gained upon life", and man sank deeper in wickedness. Hence arose two spirits, two parties or as Augustine would prefer to call "two Cities"—the city of 'Satan' and the city of 'God'. Our history is nothing but a conflict between two cities; between two moralities, one natural and the other super-natural; between two philosophies, one rational and the other revealed; between two institutions, one the world, the other the Church.

In the opinion of Augustine, "man is still in his childhood, for he can not respect his ideal which is not imposed on him against his will, nor can he find satisfaction in a good created by his own action. Man is always afraid of a universe that leaves him alone." Freedom appeals him". Man is a sinister by birth. One can not expect that he would be competent to safeguard all that is given to him by God. Lest the works of His hands wholly perish, God promised to redeem some of "Adam's children and restore them to a natural life. Augustine, then does not hesitate to disclose that the eternal city is not Rome" but

congregation of all who will be saved through the death of Christ and shall pass their eternity in Paradise.

Ibn-e-Khaldun

Unlike Kant and Hegel, who were born in the brilliant centuries of human civilization, Ibne-Khaldun was born in a 'dark age'. Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties had broken down. In North-West African and the Iberian peninsula "the last Vestiges of the old order had been swept away by a conflux of barbarians from the three continents: European Austrian, Frank from Pyreness and African Nomads from Sahara". The destruction was brought home to Ibn-e-Khaldun by his family history as well as by his personal experience.

Ibne-Khaldun was ever occupied in thinking over the causes of the changing interregnum. He was too much involved in court life as such he could not find time before A.D. 1375 to write all about the subject which pressed his mind. It was somewhere in the year 1375 A. D. that Ibn-e-Khaldun got time to get himself settled at Qilad-bin-Salamah. It was at this place that he composed his immortal work, on Universal History in four years. He gives a first-hand account as quoted here: "I installed myself in a large and solid suite of room that had been build there (at Qilad-bin-Salamah) by Abu Bakar-bin-'Arif'. "It was in this retreat that I composed the Muqaddemat, a work which was entirely original in its plan and which I made out of the cream of enormous research".

The vitality and life of Ibn-e-Khaldun's philosophy of History is found in his 'Motif' of Asabiyah (*آسَابِيَاة*)—the esprit de corps. It expresses itself in effective social action. It is a rare phenomenon and is found in Nomad hordes. "In the mental picture which Ibn-e-Khaldun constructs out of his historical evidence, the lack of Asabiyah or deficiency in social vitality is taken to be the normal ethos of sedentary population in all times and places". Some more observations of Ibn-e-Khaldun are noted below:

- (1) "Asabiyah is not the only kind of Social protoplasm; an alternative and superior-kind exist in the shape of religion"
- (2) It is impossible to find a dominion or dynasty without possessing the support of a people animated by the esprit de corps".

- (3) Early Muslims succeeded because they had both the dynamic force of religion and *asabiyah*".
- (4) The decline of Umayyad, Abbasid and Banu Hilal were due to the atrophy of the socially unconstructive ethos. "When an empire has acquired its natural form through the establishment of autocracy and the introduction of luxury, it tends to decay".
- (5) "In empires the habit of the nomadic life are gradually replaced by those of the sedamtry life." "The faculty of living in the deserts is confined to communities that are animated by a strong *esprit de corps*".

Kant

Hume, Voltaire, Condorcet, Rousseau and many others had repudiated the views of Augustine. A clear shift from an "Age of faith"—to an "Age of Reason" was then visible. Kant, in such a period of transition, was faced with the question: What philosophy of history could a man propose that would command the belief and support of the peoples of Europe?

Kant, who said, "I have . . . found it necessary to deny knowledge of God, freedom and immortality, in order to find out a place for faith", had also admitted the superiority of 'Practical will.' The man who had "indeed neither life nor history in the proper sense of the word" wrote the idea of a Universal history in 1784. In his work on history Kant proceeds with the belief that man is predisposed by nature to develop tendencies. It involves the use of reason. Such development does not occur in any single individual rather it takes place in the species as a whole. Nature has created man in such a way that the human tendencies develop through antagonism, conflicts and give and take of life in society. The highest problem nature has set before man is the creation of society which will not stand destroyed by conflicts. It requires, for its final solution, the establishment of a world-state. Thus a world-state is the ultimate goal of man.

Having emphasized the development of tendencies in human species as a whole, Kant makes haste to observe that "man should transcend the mere constitution of his animal existence and that he

should be susceptible to no other happiness or perfection than what he has created for himself through his own reason". In controlling his "animal existence" and attaining "perfection" Kant emphasises the role of reason and attaches little importance to "instinct". According to him the forethought of man needs no help of instinct. Even for his security and superstructure of delight man requires no aid of instincts. But how to bring instincts under the control of reason was the question with which Kant was faced. In this connection Kant adds that no doubt man has "gregarious instinct" in him; but he is equally bestowed with antigregarious instinct. It is the antigregarious instinct which forces every thing into compliance with the humour of man. "It derives him to master his propensity to indolence and in the shape of ambition or avarice, impels him to procure distinction for himself amongst his fellows". It was through this process of mastery over the gregarious instinct that man marched onward from the savage stage to the stage of culture. And such a stage of culture is the stage of the social worth of man.

The stage of culture was not achieved by man in a single attempt. Man had to struggle hard and he had to struggle against himself. It was all a problem of the right understanding and the realisation of the meaning of "freedom". "The history of the human species as a whole may be regarded as the unraveling of a hidden plan of nature for accomplishing a perfect state of civil constitution for society". The urge for freedom in man is innate. Nature herself has put this urge in him. To attain freedom man required an equilibrium both in the control of his instincts and the application of his reason.

A nation after hard test and turmoil may attain freedom. But it will not be itself exempted from danger, because other nations would always look at it with covetous eyes. Should we, then, give up our hopes regarding the future of man? Kant's reply is an emphatic 'No'. On the contrary he suggests the cure in these words: "a philosophical attempt to compose a universal history tending to unfold the purpose of nature in a perfect civil union of the human species is to be regarded as possible." It is possible through the establishment of a world-state. The duty of such an institution will be to put a curb on the freedom of a nation (as a nation will impose curb on the freedom of man) and to compel it into submission to a Universal will, which "may" secure the possibility of "Universal freedom".

Hegel

The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Great Revolutions of the modern age, the rise of science, the growth of industrialism and the spread of territorial nationalism have had been moulding and re-moulding history. Thanks to the effort of last four or five centuries that man has unmistakably learnt the worth and value of 'Freedom', though he could not attain even to that degree which was the proud possession of the early Arabs. No doubt the century of Hegel was a century of the demand for 'freedom' but this demand gradually degenerated in the demand of 'License.' This demand for 'licence' brought the 'iron-handed' regime of Napoleon, whom Hegel termed as "the world-spirit on the horse-back". In such circumstances, saturated with conflict and contrast, Hegel was out with a three point-mission noted below:

1. To save the concept of 'freedom' by establishing distinction between 'law' and Licence.
2. To create a place for a greatman or 'Hero'.
3. To justify the attempt of the 'Reaction' to save Europe from Licence and tyranny in the name of "rational freedom" or 'freedom under law'.

Hegel delivered his lecture on "Philosophy of History" in the University of Berlin. The lectures were posthumously published in 1837. These lectures are very widely read, much more widely read than the work of Kant. As a true idealist Hegel starts with the observation that "the world history belongs to the realm of spirit, not to the realm of matter. The term world, indeed, includes both physical and psychical. But our concern is not with nature at large. On the stage of history, spirit displays itself in its most concrete reality". The development of spirit is our central theme. With the help of an analogy Hegel makes the point more clear. He says, "As the essence of matter is gravity, so the essence of spirit is freedom". The freedom, in turn, is the "capacity to act".

'Freedom' can be had in two ways. The means suggested by Hegel are: (1) the realization of freedom and (2) the study and analysis of human passion. In the words of Hegel himself, "one is the warp, the other the woof, of the vast arras web of world history". Hegel exhorts that the spirit, which is manifest and present in man,

must come out to gain freedom, it must achieve capacity to act. In realizing the true connotation of freedom man shall have to decide the 'aim', the 'Principle' and the 'destiny', first, in the second phase of the attainment of 'freedom' a man shall have to control his own passions. The decision of the 'aim' of spirit is not an easy task as it is something 'latent', 'profoundly hidden' or something which resembles an 'unconscious instinct'. Its knowledge cannot be had in a day or two. "The whole process of history is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one". This much about the 'warp'.

The 'woof' or the passion is "the concentrated energy". It is a sort of "private interest". Passion has been condemned by many a philosophers and psychologists. Hegel is opposed to such condemnations. He wants "to silence such pallid moralizing", because, "nothing great has ever been accomplished without passion self-seeking to the exclusion of all things else".

One should not think that Hegel gave a rosy picture of human history. He says that the price of 'freedom' is not only 'eternal vigilance' it is eternal 'strife' and Violence too. The history, as such, "appears to be the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of the people, the wisdom of states and virtue of individuals have been victimized". The explanation of strife and violence is dialectical. In the arena of history an encounter between a 'thesis' and an 'antithesis' is always going on. The antithesis, according to Hegel, is nothing but an off-spring of the thesis and the former inherits some qualities of the latter. The caravan is thus marching on.

According to the study of the ideal-Hegel—every period of human history is a unity, it is a total whole in itself. It is out of such 'uniformity' that 'diversity' springs. To be more explicit, Hegel contends that an antithesis appears at the declining stage of every period of human history. Such antithesis brings new ideals, values, trends and thoughts in its train, and thus a conflict takes place between the new and old ideas, new and old values, so forth so on. The struggle ends in a compromise between the rival thesis and antithesis. It ends in a synthesis, which very large-heartedly embraces certain dominant factors of the out-going phase of civilization. Thus the human history is necessarily moving onward. It does not move in a circle. Its course is also not like that of a horizontal line. It is, to be some after Hegel, is like a straight line.

The onward march of history is controlled and governed by the 'Absolute Spirit', which makes use of the great personalities of the world to unveil and unfold its reality. General masses are no more better than puppets in the hands of the Absolute and the world of matter is no more better than a mile-stone, which reckons the journey. As a true idealist Hegel believes that the encounter is held in the world of ideas and not in the world of matter, because the latter is the semblance and shadow of the former. The world is nothing but the 'exhibition ground' of the Absolute.

Hegel, at this juncture of his enquiry, comes to rescue what he calls "rational freedom" or "freedom under law". 'Freedom' is neither 'primitive nor natural'. Every man, of extraordinary will power, has to seek it. He has to win it. But the victory of man over 'freedom' supposes "an incalculable discipline of intellectual and moral powers". All that is given by Nature is not welcomed by Hegel. According to him nature has given man injustice, violence, untamed impulse and inhuman feelings etc. "Limits are certainly imposed by social organizations; but they are limits imposed on emotions and instincts. In more advanced stages, they are limits imposed on self-will, caprice, passion. Limitation of this kind is, impart, the means where by rational freedom, contrasted with unbridled licence, can be obtained". To make this hard-won 'freedom' secure and lasting Hegel suggests in unambiguous terms that individuals and states should get themselves related with other states.

The ideal of the relation of one state with the other has till now proved to be a wild-goose chase. Different peoples have been at daggers drawn. History is replet with the instances of bloody wars. Wars, for Hegel, has an ethical element. "It must not be regarded as an absolute ill" "Eternal peace is often demanded as an ideal toward which mankind should move. But nations issue forth invigorated from their wars." Thus the profounder of the 'Dialectic' remains true to his 'method' upto the last.

Marx

Marx was an intellectual disciple of Hegel but very different from the disciples of the 'East', who would not even think of criticizing their 'Gru' or Ustadh. The dialectic method of Hegel appealed the mind of Marx but the latter found it hard to accept the same without criticism. He made the reality stand on its feet and not on its head as it

was the case in the dialectic of Hegel. One may very well choose to differ with Marx, but one can not dare deny the depth of his knowledge, the sharpness of his insight and the boldness of his stand. He is termed as "one of the makers of the modern mind". His "Manifesto" and "Capital" have shed enormous influence on modern trend of thoughts. Iqbal did not hesitate to call him "پیغمبر بے کتاب" or 'a prophet without scripture.'

The force with which Hegel had asserted the reality of the "world of ideas" could not subdue Marx. He did not like to fly on "the wings of ideas". He attempted to unearth the root of the social evil. Being born in an age in which the smoke of gigantic chimneys had affected the lungs of the working class and the sore of capitalism had run deep into the body of every proletariat, Marx could hardly think of a fairy-land of the 'Absolute of Hegel'. He was himself an earthly man, as such he kept his feet undaunted on the earth. He ventured to give an economic interpretation of history, in which the theory of 'Production' works like a magic key. Marx claims "..... The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of man which determines their being, but on the contrary their social being that determines their consciousness."

With this magic key—the theory of 'production'—Marx unlocks the doors of human history. And he found that history is a "slaughter bench"—"Free men and slaves, Patricians and Plebians, Lord and Serf, Guild-master and Journeymen, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fights, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes". In the fight of the oppressor and the oppressed the 'dialectic' played its destined role. What was once a synthesis became a thesis e.g. there was a struggle between the serfs and chartered burghers, As a result of that conflict the "first elements of the bourgeoisie" developed. It was then the synthesis. Now it has itself become a thesis and is encountered by its antithesis—the communism.

Communism is the only cure of capitalism. It will do for the capitalists what they did for their masters of the feudal order. "But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself, it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those

weapons—the modern working class the proletarians”. These proletarians will bring a revolution which will involve the whole society; though “it will gather momentum in national movements”, it will gradually “spread into an international movement”. This class distinction of the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ will obliterate. It will cease in the long run. And “in place of the old bourgeoisie society, with its classes and class antagonism, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains”.

Oswald Spengler

The writer of the *Decline of the West* was opposed to the scheme of history termed as “ancient-medieval-modern”. He proposes his “copernican” view and it is the distinction between “Kultur” and “Civilisation”. Each epoch, for Spengler, begins with a “Kultur” and ends with a “Civilisation”. They are very intimately related; one is inseparable from the other. “Kultur” is the starting point and “Civilisation” is the destination. It will be better to reproduce Spengler in original: “Every culture has its own civilisation. In this book these two words are used in a periodic sense, to express an organic succession. The civilisation is the destiny of the culture. In this principle we obtain the view-point from which the problems of historical morphology becomes capable of solution. Civilisation are the most artificial and external states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. Civilization are a conclusion, death following upon life, rigidity following expansion..... To the culture belong: gymnastics, the joust, the tournaments. To the civilisation belongs sports”.

The growth of culture is analogous to the growth of an organic body. As a body passes through the stages of ‘birth’ infancy, childhood, youth and oldage so also a culture passes through the above-mentioned stages lying in between life time and death. “Each culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and never return.” And each culture “grows with the same superb aimlessness as the flowers of the field”. Spengler was very bold in asserting the aimless growth of a culture. He had no mind, no sign of any treaty of peace on this point. He re-affirms his views in these words: “I see world history as a picture of endless formation and transformations”.

If a culture "never returns" then does it mean that it dies for ever. For Spengler the culture of a particular epoch dies, but certain 'events' may re-appear in another culture. The re-appearance of certain events or traits of a culture does not mean the re appearance of the culture as a whole. At this point Spengler passed to develop the thought that a history of many different epochs will inevitably develop analogies between one epoch and another. The use of the method of analogy in the past was a curse, "for they had enabled historians to follow their own tastes, "yet it might be a blessing to historical thought. The historian despite risk, should be prepared to make large use of analogies. "He will be interested in noting what things in epoch A are contemporary with things in epoch B." And the word 'contemporary' in Spengler's use means happening in one epoch at relatively the same point as in an other epoch.

With these general ideas in mind Spengler focussed his attention to the main subject of his famous book—the Decline of the West. He contended that the peoples of the West "live at the end of an epoch", they are living in a civilization and not in a culture. His massive book is an inductive survey of the evidence for his claim.

Criticisms

There was an age when human history was highly saturated with religious legends. Education was then not democratized. It was the monopoly of a few. Popes and Bishops had final say in every matter. Augustine was blessed with the same status and position in his age. His theory of 'universal history' is a fine piece of legends. The most striking weakness of his theory lies in the antagonism of 'revelation' and 'reason' and the 'church' and 'world'. The second point of weakness is found in the fact that Augustine called man a 'sinister' by birth and he found him "in his childhood; for he can not respect an ideal which is not imposed on him against his will nor can he find satisfaction in a good created by his own action". One can very well see that the Bishop of Hippo had totally ignored the achievements of the civilizations of China, India and Egypt etc. He had ignored the achievements of the Greek civilization which was destined to play an important role in the formation and transformation of the civilization of Europe, before and after his own century. Augustine is an unsuccessful advocate of 'Determinism'. It sealed the fate of man. His theory drastically curbed the power and potentialities of

man. Augustine may the christianity as such, is guilty of this unholy 'interpretation' of the status of man.

Islam, almost after two centuries, unveiled the truth. It gave man the status he deserves in the cosmos. Ibn-e-Khaldun picked up the thread of discussion from the literature of his muslim predecessors. He had little charm for Christian legends. Ibn-e-Khaldun started with the principle of Asabiyah. It is the elan vital of history. But how the two entirely different historic transactions of the Early Muslim Arabs and Banu Hilal are to be explained? He solved this conundrum by stating that Asabiyah is not the only kind of social protoplasm, an alternative exists in the shape of religion, this Asabiyah is a trait of Nomadic life. It has a smell of 'nationalism'. Ibn-e-Khaldun, despite his effort to moderate his esprit decorps by an over coating of religion, could not make the Quinine tablet tasteful. It is too narrow a principle to bear the burden or to justify the range of his masterly journalization. The second point of criticism which surges in our mind when we come to the equation of Asabiyah with Nomadic hordex: as why it should be so and not otherwise? Had the Chinese, the Indians, the Egyptians, the Greeks and the North Europeans been deprived of Asabiyah in their respective ages of glories? The corollary, the principle of la-Asabiyah with the sedentary life seems too much sweeping. In offering these criticism we should not fee proud of our intellectual superiority. These criticism have been possible due to the fact that we have a wider field of historial evidences to work upon which Ibn-e-Khaldun did not possess. He deserves credit for his study of the human nature, for his introduction of the method of Induction in history and for the 'universal history', which he left for progenities to come. The main contribution of Ibn-e-Khaldun lies in the fact that he cleared up the mess of legends and fictions, created by the dogmatic Christian thinkers from the grand edifice of history.

Kant "never travelled more than forty miles from his birth place or took a voyage upon the water of the Baltic on whose shores he lived; and the daily round of his activities was so monotonously regular that the towns people learnt to set their watches by his punctual passage past their windows on his daily 'constitutional' walk". His life was a mystry. And his works both on metaphysics and history are more mysterious than his life.

Kant had, no doubt, taken pains to study human nature. But in it he could not see no more than a fair reflection of his own life.

The antiregarian instinct was very strong in him. He gave it the strongest role in the formation of the nature of man. The reason was very strong in his thought and it enjoyed the same status in moulding the destiny of the human species as such. In short, Kant could not rise above his own introvert personality in his writing. Kants' interpretation of history in terms of 'Universal Freedom' is highly Utopian. His scheme of a world—state, without any solid support of a comprehensive code of life, appears to be a tall-talk. His contention that human history, as nature would have wished it, is necessarily marching onward is not above criticism. His statement that "Nature does nothing superfluously and in the use of means to her ends does not play the prodigal" gives human being a licence to go to Wars. Kants agnosticism in the sphere of noumena-soul & God etc. is the cause of his concentrated attention on nature. He could realize little that man is born to conquer nature and is not born to be enslaved by her.

Hegel's 'Philosophy of history' is no less romantic than that of Kant. The difference between the two German thinkers lies in the fact that the former is understandable to his readers, the latter is just the reverse. Though history is "the unrevealing of the plan of nature" to Kant he failed to show as why man would be a slave of nature. Hegel shifts the burden to God. He says that history is "the march of God on earth". The how and why of this contention of Hegel has not been explained by him. As such the claim becomes a fiction, a chimera and an episode. According to Hegel history is a theatre Hall, where man plays the role of a puppet devoid of intention, power and knowledge. Man is a tool in the hands of the Absolute, which creates conflicting ideas in him. These ideas undergo a fight, then a stage comes when the Absolute itself dictates the terms of compromise between the conflicting ideas.

Hegel's Dialectic process has an iota of truth in it. He is correct in his reading when he says that a conflict (in history) is going on between rival ideas and that the 'synthesis', got at the ends of every conflict, formed a part of human culture. But he did not go deep into the process. He could not find out the real nature of thesis and anti-thesis. He could not explain as why a synthesis in course of time becomes a thesis. His speculative genius failed to earn an unconditional support from his readers.

An Inductive inquiry and an unbiased analysis of history will show that:

- (a) History does not move in a straight line.
- (b) History is not necessarily an onward march of events.
- (c) There have had been rise and fall in human cultures and civilization. History is not a one-way traffic. There are ups and downs in it.

Marx as stated earlier is an intellectual disciple of Hegel. He converted the Dialectic of his master into 'Dialectic materialism'. The conclusions which can be drawn from the thought of Marx are now examined critically.

1. The civilization of every period is a unit-whole. The arts, Science, philosophy, religion and values are all the manifestation of their age. With the change in the system of production and distribution there is change in all walks of life.

2. When a civilization is ripened an antithesis is born out of the womb of the outgoing civilization. The latter is comparatively better than the former.

3. The ideas and the ideals are all similar in similar system of production.

These deduction from the teaching of Marx do not stand the test of history. Marx, who applied the Heraclitian principle of change in his interpretation of history, is ever faced with a Zeno. Science, Philosophy, religion, values and art do not change with the change in the system of 'production'. It is a change in ideology of a nation which leads to the changes in different departments of human life. The economic conditions of Rome and Persia were almost the same, yet before the advent of Islam they possessed different religions, different values and different philosophies of life. With the spread of Islam we find a new change introduced in the social body of Persia etc. People, in general, changed their religion, their values and philosophies of life in favour of Islam. Then, does this change in the social body of Persia etc. mean that their economic conditions were similar to the economic conditions of Arabia—an abode of a revolutionary code of life?

Marx is also incorrect in his statement that the emerging civiliza-

tion is necessarily better than the preceding one. Is our modern Western civilization better than any of the ideological civilization of the past? The development in Science and technology should not make our eyes shut to see the truth. We have to see whether man has got the true status of man in this civilization. The reply is a clear 'No'. Man might have learnt to fly like birds and to swim like fishes but he has to relearn that he is a man. In past kings and emperors exploited their subjects, in medieval ages popes and Bishops looted the general masses, in modern history capitalists and the 'Capitalist of the capitalists' have been performing the same drama of inhuman cruelties, oppression, and tyrannies. So where lies the difference? The difference lies in the technique of oppression and not in its nature. In old days 'have not' were killed by swords but to day they are killed by devastating bombs.

Last of all, the contention of Marx that the distinction of the 'haves' and 'have not' will cease by the establishment of the 'dictatorship of the proletariats' is not simply a hoax but also a bad example of self-contradiction. Marx could not realize the dilemma: If class distinction ceases, the process of history also comes to a stop, as according to Marx class-struggle is the only 'Motif' which makes and unmakes history; if the class-distinction does not cease then there can not be a universal 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which further means that capitalists will continue to exist. He could not rebut this 'major premise' of the dilemma which flows from his teaching.

The distinction between 'Kultur' and 'Civilisation' in Spengler is shallow and sweeping. Had he studied the civilization of Greece or India etc. coolly, circumspectively and thoroughly, he would have changed his views. The notion of 'Kultur' profounded by Spengler is a posteriori and empirical. By the term 'Kultur' he understood the manifestation of the forces of morality, economics, policies and international Law of a nation. This view of culture is superficial. Culture is not a bundle of sensory emblems of a nation. It has its deep roots in the mind of the people. It has a deep-seated connection with the thoughts, ideologies and values of a nation. And it is the 'root' which can be termed as 'civilization'. It can be characterized as that mode of thinking (of a nation) which results in the preparation of a unique, type of collective character. In other words we can say that it is a specific ethico-rational make up of a nation. This real difference between 'Kultur' and 'Civilisation' was not picked up by Spengler. He failed to perceive it. Spengler committed another mistake. He

thought of 'Kultur' on the analogy of an individuals' organisms. He plainly believed that as an individual's organism passes through the stage of childhood, youth and old-age, the 'Kultur' also "arise, ripen, decay and never returns". History does not testify this view. We find that a culture and a posteriori manifestation of a nation—have been dying from age to age but the civilization and a priori ethico-rational make-up of a nation never dies. A further analysis of the view of Spengler confronts us with a simple question. Can we determine the spans of childhood youth and old-age of a nation? The reply is a definite 'NO'.

Iqbal

Iqbal, like Kant, Hegel and others has written no separate treatise on philosophy of history. But it does not mean that he has no philosophy of history. His game of wisdom are scattered here and there (both in his prose and poetry) like the twinkling stars studded in the blue sky hanging over our heads. Other than the verses quoted earlier, Iqbal in his preface to the *Rumuz-e-Bekhudi* gives a thought-provoking description of history. He says: as an individual's will to act, aspirations for higher values and realization of an end lie in the gradual unfolding, extension and stability of his ego, similarly the secret of the life of a nation of a millat lies in the realization and preservation of her 'history'. In individuals the continued realization of 'ego' is based on his 'memory'. It is his 'memory' which gives him a continued existence and saves him from the anarchy of discrete ideas. Likewise, it is 'history' which helps a nation in maintaining and preserving her records. The 'continuity' 'relatedness' and 'pattern' in human life are due to history. The 'patternedness' in 'national-ego' is based on history. As an individual, through his affection and conation, reaches to the depth of his ego, a millat determines her ultimate objective with the help of history. It is history which tears the darkness created by the abstraction of 'events'. Our social existence gets its meaning from history. It is history which interprets human actions. If any nation forgets her history, then history also forgets her.

زنده فرد از إتباط جان و تن
 زنده قوم از حفظ ناموس کهن
 مرگ فرد از خشکی رود حیات
 مرگ قوم از ترک مقصود حیات

قوم روشن از سواد سرگذشت
 خود شناس آمد ز یاد سرگذشت
 سرگذشت او گر از یادش رود باز اندر نیستی گم می شود

We human being are prone to divide time into past, present and future. The division is a posteriori. "If we regard past, present and future as essential to time, then we picture time as a straight line, part of which we have travelled and left behind, and part lies yet untravelled before us. This is taking time not as a living creative movement but as a static absolute". A deeper insight into human conscious experience leads Iqbal to believe that beneath a posteriori duration there is a true apriori duration. History is related with the apriori duration, a duration which transcends all limits of human experience. Iqbal and Spengler accidentally coincided on this point. Like Iqbal, Spengler is also opposed to the understanding of history in terms of 'ancient-medieval and modern'.....But to both of them the causes of such arbitrary division of time are different. For Spengler the division is due to the fact that each nation treats itself a "steady pole" and "great histories of millennial duration and mighty far away cultures" are made to revolve round it. For Iqbal the division is due to the misconceptions of the philosophy of TIME. Time regarded as the fourth dimension of the space-time continuum is relative, but time regarded as destiny is real. "It is not a mere repetition of homogenous movements which makes conscious experience a delusion". To Spengler the solution of the division of history lies in his copernican theory of 'Kultur' and Civilisation', that is the solution lies in an organic study of history. To Iqbal the solution of this problem lies in the attainment of 'Khudi', which will master time and will not allow itself to be mastered by it.

'Khudi' is the "Warp" and 'Bai-Khudi' is the "Woof" of Iqbal's philosophy of history. The 'Khudi' is the "rationally directed creative will". It is spiritual. But there are degrees of spirits. The ultimate reality is the ultimate Ego, from which finite egos proceed. In his Lectures, Iqbal speaks "the creative energy of the ultimate Ego, in whom deed and thought are identical, function as ego-unities. Every atom of Divine energy, howsoever low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of ego-hood. Throughout the entire gamut of beings runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood, until it reaches its perfection in man". Iqbal did not believe in a universal life. To him all life is highly individual in charac-

ter. God himself is an Individual. Man is also an individual and the highest form of life in man is 'Khudi' or Ego. In his state of 'Khudi' man becomes a "self-contained exclusive centre". Human personality is a "state of tension. It is" a kind of tension caused by the Ego.....invading the environment and the environment invading the Ego". This makes human life dynamic and restless. The key to the success of human life in his ceaseless pursuit of fresh scope for self-manifestation, self-expression and self-realisation.¹ If man ceases to 'Act', he is then no better than a piece of stone.² The creative activity in man which helps him to rise from one state to another.

This pursuit of 'becoming'—a pursuit to find out new scopes for self-expression—is not aimless. The ultimate end of human 'ego' is 'freedom'.³ The term freedom in the philosophy of Iqbal has a wider denotation. It includes:

- (a) Freedom from one's animal desires and passions.
- (b) Freedom from the so-called tradition and convention, which stem out from belief in mythologies and hearsay.
- (c) Freedom from the 'rules' of one's fellow-beings.
- (d) Freedom from the bondage of extraneous and blind forces of nature. Life is, thus, a perpetual endeavour to be free. And the 'Ego' "reaches fuller freedom by appropriating the individual who is most free—God". Such a freedom does not mean either 'anarchy' or 'Licence'. It has its own limits. These limits come from God who is most free. God has created this world not with a sportive spirit. He has a clear

¹ پیکر ہستی ز آثار خودی است ہرچہ می بینی ز اسرار خودی است
خویشتن را چون خود، بیدار کرد آشکارا عالم پندار کرد

خودی کیا ہے راز درون حیات خود کیا ہے بیداری کائنات

² وہی جہاں ہے ترا جسکو تو کرے پیدا یہ سنگ و خشت نہیں جو تری نگاہ میں ہے

³ خودی کے نگہباں کو ہے زہر ناب وہ ناں جس سے جاتی رہے اسکی تاب
وہی ناں ہے اس کے لئے ارجمند رہے جس سے دنیا میں گردن بلند

design behind his creation. To have this design realized, God has given man a complete code of life. The code of life is known as 'Islam'.⁴

"Islam", says Iqbal, "is not a departmental affair, it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man". Without Islam, 'Khudi' cannot be developed. If the development of 'Khudi' is checked, the attainment of freedom also becomes an impossibility. In the light of the teachings of 'Islam', Iqbal enumerates three stages of the development of 'Ego'—(1) obedience to law (2) self-control and (3) divine Vicegerency. It has already been said that the final end of 'Ego' is 'freedom' and 'freedom' to Iqbal does neither mean 'anarchy' nor licence. To check the degeneration of freedom into licence, obedience to law, self-control and divine vicegerency are all equally indispensable.

A recollection of the preceding discussions of Kant and Hegel would show that both of them advocated the cause of human 'freedom'. They had duly emphasized it too. But they failed to give a proper solution of the time old problem of the degeneration of 'freedom' into licence. They might have realized that 'freedom' is an inner urge. But they did not realize that an extraneous check on 'freedom', to save it from degeneration, have had failed. Human history has proved it beyond doubt that the man-made-laws, the states and the so-called League of Nations have all failed to put an effective check to the degeneration of 'freedom' into 'licence'. Iqbal gave the best of his thought to this problem; he suggested that the inner urge of freedom must be controlled and guided by the inner forces of man.¹ The forces which control the inner urge of freedom are to be found in Islam, which is a comprehensive code of life and as such does not simply fortify faith but also inspires its adherent to see the faith wedded with action. Consequently the verdict on freedom, as what it is and what it is not, must come from God, the most free Ego.² Total submission to God means full freedom. The acid taste of a total submission to God is found in the establishment of a state based on the principle of the vicegerency of man and the sovereignty of god.

گر تو می خواهی مسلمان زیستن
از یک آئینی مسلمان زنده است
نیست ممکن جز بقرآن زیستن
پیکر ملت ز قرآن زنده است
هست دین مصطفی دین حیات
شرع او تفسیر آئین حیات

The establishment of such an idealogical state implies the problem of the relation of one finite ego with another finite ego. In other words the question can be put like this: What is the relation between society and individuals? This is indeed one of the stock questions. These are two stock answers to it. One answer is that the society is an aggregate of atomic and autonomous individuals. The other stock answer is just the opposite. According to it society is a perfect and intelligible whole, which the individual is simply a part of the whole. The classic view of a segregated atomic and autonomous individuals is very well described by Homer in painting the character of cyclops poly phemus. This view of Homer is quoted by Plato in his dialogue-laws. The verses run as below:

Mootless are they and lawless. On the peaks
Of mountains high they dwell, in hollow caves
where each his own law deals to wife and child
In sovereign disregard of all his peers.

This view of individualism was a favourite theme of the protagonists in the past. It was a creed with Locke and Spencer in modern age. But this Cyclopic conception of man is a myth and a fiction. The second view that society is a sort of entity, existing independent of individuals and in a real sense of superior worth, was a tune on which many thinkers of the past played well. In modern period Fichte and Hegel did their best to prove the superiority of society over individual. To them the social order is a concrete embodiment of the 'Weltgeist'.

In its extreme shape, doubtless, neither of these statements of society is acceptable. "Society in the individual," the "individual in the society" seems to be a more plausible view.¹ It is a matter of importance and emphasis and not a question of fundamental difference between individual and society. Iqbal studied the problem from this angle of vision. His philosophy of 'bekhudi' is an antidote of the philosophy of 'Khudi'. 'Bekhudi' means the losing of self (or Khudi) in the community life to serve a common end. By 'Bekhudi' I do not understand self-negation as it is found in pantheism in general and in morbid Sufism or Yogism of the East, in particular. Bekhudi does

¹ در جماعت فرد را بینیم ما
فطرتش وارفته یکتائی است
فرد و قوم آئینه یک دیگراند
از چمن اورا چو گلہ چنیم ما
حفظ او از انجمن آرائی است
سلکو گوهر کهکشانی و اختراند

not even mean self-extinction or self-annihilation. To borrow a phrase from Toynbee to express my idea, I understood by 'Khudi and Bekhudi' a constant and continued process of "withdrawal-and-return" of an individual in society. An individual will at times, 'withdraw' himself from the society but he will again 'return' back to it with his findings and finally he will develop his Khudi to such an extent that he will not hesitate to submit himself to the 'millat'. Neither the 'withdrawal' of an individual will cut him as under from the society nor the 'return' will make him merged in it. In the whole process of repeated "withdrawal-and-return" the Khudi will remain animated with an intense love for action and freedom. Only such individuals will prove to be a source of strength to the 'millat', consequently the millat will exalt the position of such individuals.

Man is a social being. He does not live in a vacuum, in the allegorical cave of Plato. He lives in a society of his fellow-beings. The individual and the millat reflect each other. The individual is exalted through 'millat' and the 'millat' is organised through individuals. A cyclopic-fashion man, according to Iqbal, is supposed to be ignorant of his ideals and capabilities. It is the 'Millat' which inspires him with adequate knowledge of his function in life and forces him to attain freedom under the 'rule of law'. It is the craving for association that the individual forms the basic unit of the millat. It is an inner urge in man. It is not dictated by the extraneous forces of nature. As soon as an individual loses his 'self' in the millat, he finds his personality an embodiment of past traditions. Future also reflects in his personality. And thus the empirical barriers of time are transcended by him.

Iqbal's stock answer to the stock question, related with the individual and society, may appear to be an utopia. But one will feel obliged to correct himself, if one has at all any knowledge of Islam and the Prophet of Islam (Sm). In its revolutionary 'Kalma', Islam presents only two fundamental points of its teachings. One is لا اله الا الله—there is no 'ilah' but Allah, the other is محمد الرسول الله—Muhammad (Sm) is the messenger of Allah. Iqbal deals with both the cardinal points of the 'Kalma'. His handling of the subject is not metaphysical. He does not hanker after an 'abstract', logical and a contentless reality. On the contrary Iqbal's philosophy of 'Tawhid' spring up from his philosophy of Khudi, as the Philosophy of 'Khudi' itself springs up from his philosophy of 'Tawhid'. Iqbal had realized that the world is highly mysterious. One can not 'discover' all that is embedded in it. There is every likelihood, that a man, unaware of his 'Khudi',

may lose himself in the 'Talisman' of the universe¹. If man is to save himself from such a loss, he must know his 'Khudi'. This knowledge of 'Khudi' is the knowledge of 'Khuda',³ as both are inter-related. The statement of Caliph Ali (peace be on him) that "he who had recognised himself, has recognised God", conveys the same message.

Iqbal continues his contention and observes that: unless a man unveils the secrets of 'La ilaha', he can not break the idols of different types of polytheism to pieces.² In one or the other sphere of life man shall have to bow down his head to the perceptible or imperceptible gods, created by him or his society in which he lives. It is the denial of petty gods which lead to the consequential affirmation of God—the ultimate 'Ego'—which impowers man to control the universe. This belief alone is the key to the secrets of nature.³

'Tawhid' is the highest virtue in the scheme of virtues. It is analogous to the position of heart in a human body. 'Tawhid' makes an individual 'Lahooti' and a millat 'Jabroti'¹. It gives 'Jalal' to the individual and 'Jamal' to the millat. In other words all true theistic cultures and civilizations spring from it. The best yard-stick, to measure the progress of culture and civilization is 'Tawhid'.

ملتی چون می شود توحید است	قوت و جبروت می آید بدست
فرد از توحید لاهوتی شود	ملت از توحید جبروتی شود
هر دو از توحید می گیرد کمال	زندگی این را جلال آن را جمال

'Allah' has his own attributes. In surah-e-Nas, the Quran speaks of three such attribute: (1) Rabbin-Nas, (2) Malek-in-Nas and (3) Ilah-in-Nas. Allah is the sustainer, the sovereign and the object of worship. No individual can even dream of sharing his attributes. Each attribute has its own impact on the character and conduct of an individual and a society at large, provided both of them have come to realize His existence from a practical point of view. Thus "Islam as a polity is only a practical means of making the principle (Tawhid) a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideals".

To make man free from the loyalties of thrones and to give an incentive to man's loyalty to his own ideals, Allah sent His prophets.

The message of the Prophets was one and the same. It did not differ in fundamentals. Islam's view of human civilization is different from all those views which have been propounded on the basis of natural sciences. Modern Sciences believe that 'man' is an evolved species of lower animals. He had to traverse a long-way of prehistoric era. He got the light of civilization and culture at a pretty later stage of history. These were the forces of nature which unfolded his potentialities. Islam, against the 'findings' of anthropology says that the first man-Adam-had got the light of culture and civilization direct from God. He did not allow Adam to grope in darkness. Adam was the first man, as well as, the first messenger of God. According to Iqbal the life of Adam on Earth started when he realized his 'ego'.

In Payam-e-Mashriq, Iqbal depicts the birth of Adam as below:

نعرہ زد عشق کہ خونین چگرے پیدا شد
 عشق لرزید کہ صاحب نظریے پیدا شد
 فطرت آشت کہ از خاک جہان مجبور
 خود گرے، خوشکنے خود نگرے پیدا شد
 زندگی گفت کہ در خاک تپیدن ہمہ عمر
 تا ازیں گنبد دیرینہ درے پیدا شد

Adam's life in heaven symbolises the stage when he had got no consciousness of his 'ego'. He had not learnt to adjust himself with nature. His knowledge and power were of little use to him. It was the pre-evolutionary stage of the life of Adam. God gave the consciousness of ego to Adam as a gift. The gift has been inherited by the posterity of Adam.

The mission of the prophets was to revive the awareness of human ego on the basis of the code of life revealed to them. Muhammad (sm) is the last of all prophets. Like all prophets he had to undergo the process of withdrawal and return. And this process of withdrawal and return of a prophet is different from that of a mystic and all other individuals of the world. "The mystic does not wish to return from the repose of 'unitary experience' even when he does not return, as he must, his return does not mean much for mankind at large. The prophets return is creative. He returns to insert himself into the sweep with a view to control the forces of history and thereby to create fresh world of ideals. The mystics or other individual egos

do not create fresh ideals. Prophets did create fresh ideals. Prophet Muhammad being the last Prophet gave the last ideal of the series. This Ideal-Islam-is perfected by God, but it was translated into action by the Prophet. As we have to surrender to God, we have to obey the Prophet. Obedience to the Prophet is obedience to Allah. He must be an 'Uswa-e-Hasna' for a believer, as his acts are the acts of God and his deeds are the deeds of God.

طرح عشق انداز اندر جان خویش
تازہ کن با مصطفیٰ پیمان خویش

بہ مصطفیٰ بہ رساں خویش را کہ دین ہمہ اوست
اگر بہ او نہ رسیدی تمام بولہبی است

Mankind, both as an individual and a society, gets all that is needed through and from the Prophet (sm).

از رسالت در جہاں تکوین ما
از رسالت دین ما آئین ما
از رسالت صد ہزار مایک است
جزو ما از جزو ما لاینفک است

ما ز حکم اینست او ملتیم
اہل عالم را پیام رحمتیم
کثرت ہم مدعا وحدت شود
پختہ چون وحدت شود ملت شود

Islam is the last code of life. Prophet Muhammad (Sm) is the last prophet. And the muslims are the best people to give a lead to the rest of human folk. The finality of prophet leads to the finality of 'Ummat-e-Muslimah'. The most crucial task of controlling the forces of history can not be performed by a single individual. This power is vested in the 'Ummat' by God. The Quran says :

Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had organised a nucleus of his companions to further the forces of history. To keep the equilibrium of the hard-earned freedom intact, he emphasized the subjugation of one's animal existence along with its instincts passions and emotions—to the forces of love—a love for the Prophet and God. The Prophet himself had submitted totally to the Will of God.

اند کے اندر سرائے دل نشیں
محکم از حق شو سوئے خود گام زن
لشکرے پیدا کن از سلطان عشق

ترک خود کن سوئے حق ہجرت گزین
ملات و عزائے ہوس را سر شکن
جلوہ گر شو برسر فاران عشق

Prophet Muhammad (sm) gave meaning and content to the body social of the Muslims. The Arabs were grossly engaged in tribal Asabiyah. Strifes, discords and struggles were the order of the day. The tribal Asabiyah of the pre-Islamic Arabia, has manifested itself in territorial nationalism, linguisticism and racialism of the world of today. The cure does not lie in the so-called scientific analysis of man. It lies in total submission of man to God. Man must behave as an 'Abd (عبد) all through his life. He must feel every moment that he is not the 'Lord, of the universe, rather a 'slave', a 'servant' and a 'Vicegerent' of God on this earth. But this will not mean that a man has attained the goal. The goal lies yet ahead. It lies in the attainment of the status of 'Abduhu' (عبدہ). The 'Abd is he who is in search of God, the 'Abduhu' is he when God searches. The 'Abd is the 'lover' and the 'Abduhu' is the 'beloved' of God.

عبد دیگر عبدہ، چیزے دگر ما سراپا انتظار او منتظر

The Prophet was an 'Abd', as in every walk of life he obeyed the dictates of God. In his obedience to Allah he did never attach any weight to a worldly loss, he expressed little apprehension to the tyrannies and oppression of the forces of opposition, he could not be bribed by wealth, woman and wine. History is a witness that Muhammad (Sm) proved to be a solid rock unmoved by the tidal-bores of the forces of 'Darkness' of Arabia. He emerged victorious from the troubled water. It was not the victory of an individual. It was the victory of an ideology, which roused the Khudi of the Arabs from their dogmatic slumber and made them a force in the world. This awakening of Arabia, in particular and of mankind in general, is not welcomed by Toyenbee. He observes, "..... in the first stage of his career he—Muhammad (Sm) withdraws as a merchant and returns as a prophet, in the second stage he withdraws as a prophet and returns, as a conqueror. In other words the second stage of Muhammad's career which is conspicuously successful stage, is apparently the exact in-verse of the career of Lyola; and if Lyola's career is a striking example of spirituals transfiguration Muhammad's by the same token is an equally striking example of spiritual bathos". Had Toyenbee studied the career of Muhammad (peace be upon him) in the light of the ideology of Islam, he would have refrained from passing such silly and absurd remarks on it. Muhammad was no doubt a merchant, a prophet, a conqueror a commander in chief a judge and a reformer but in all phases of his life he was an 'Abd'. The ideology he preached, the plan he suggested the programmes he made, the re-

forms he introduced were all revealed to him by God. Muhammad's (peace be upon him) comparison with Loyla is fallacious. Loyla was a mystic. Muhammad (peace be upon him) was a prophet. Loyla, in the world of Iqbal could not return from "the world of unitary experience" to create "fresh ideals". Muhammad (peace be upon him) did return from the same world and he created an immortal world of fresh ideals. He has created a new 'millat', which is destined to survive upto the day of Resurrection. He established a polity, which shall ever remain an 'objective' and an 'end' for the millat.

Thus we see that religion, which was entrusted with a secondary role in moulding the forces of history in Ibn-e-Khaldun, has re-appeared as a basal force in the philosophy of Iqbal. Iqbal's philosophy of history is constructed on the corner stones of (1) Ultimate Ego (2) Prophethood (3) Individual Ego (4) Ego of the nation and (5) Stability of the individual Ego. The idea of 'Ego' is a system in Iqbal. It is co-extensive with Islam. Islam helps creating 'Ego' and 'Ego' is stabilized by Islam. Without 'Ego' Islam can hardly be known; and without Islam 'Ego' can hardly be realized. Whole history is the history of the realization of 'Ego'. The ups and downs of history are related with the corresponding stability and instability of the 'Ego'.

In *Asrar-e-Khudi*, Iqbal presents his reading of the history of muslims. In his opinion the cause of the downfall of this millat—lies in the fact that it lost its 'Khudi' which was a proud possession of its ancestors. The 'millat' allowed itself to be deceived by the "flock of sheep" that is the 'Ajmi nations'. The 'Ajmi nations had realized in full that they could not then, rise to the standard of the muslim millat, as such they conspired to pull down the millat to their own status in life. To achieve this end the 'Ajmis preached the 'gospel' of non-violence and the philosophy of the negation of self. Like the sheep of jungle, the Ajmis precepted the muslims—the lions—to surrender their 'Ego' to humility, modesty and lowliness of mind. The sheep further advised the lions to give up the habit of taking flesh, because one who cultivates such habit is loved by God. This sheepiness was adopted by the fatigued lions which ultimately resulted in atrophy of action. The muslim millat likewise was persuaded by the 'Ajmis to sheepiness, and as a result of that philosophy of easy-going-life the muslims had to lose the spirit of Jihad. The loss of the spirit of Jihad consequently led to a loss of will-power, determination and action. The muslims got entangled in splitting hairs in the name of academic discussion and stood mesmerised by the creed of 'Ruhbaniyan'. All

these factors combined together led to the downfall of the muslims.

دل بتدریج از میان سینہ رفت جوہر آئینہ از آئینہ رفت

The muslims earned name and fame in art, science, music, literature philosophy, logic and mysticism, but all at the cost of Jihad-fi-Sablilah.

آن جنون کوشش کامل نہ ماند
آن تقاضاء عمل در دل نہ ماند

The muslims to-day have not yet got themselves liberated from the mental slavery of the 'Ajmis'. In old days the 'Ajmis preached the gospel of Ruhbaniyah, in our age the 'Ajmis are advocating the gospel of materialism. The muslim all over the globe, after two great world-wars, have been successful in earning freedom from respective foreign yokes, but they have not been able to get themselves liberated from the hold of the western ideology. The class which is at the helm of affairs in different muslim countries is bent on aping westernism. Though they do not feel shy of exploiting the name of Islam, yet they have a scheme of their own to fit Islam in the frame of westernism and not westernism in the mould of Islam.

Iqbal is fully alive to the dangers of westernism. He knew it well that the edifice of western civilization is built on the foundation stones of secularism, nationalism and democracy. He has condemned each one of them. His criticism on the western civilization, as a whole, is noted below:

یورپ میں بہت روشنی* علم و ہنر ہے حق یہ ہے کہ بے چشمہ حیواں ہے یہ ظلمات
یہ علم یہ حکمت یہ تدبیر یہ حکومت پتے ہیں لہو دیتے ہیں تعلیم مساوات
بیکاری و عریانی و میخواری و افلاس کیا کم ہیں فرنگی مدنیت کے فتوحات
وہ قوم کو فیضان ساوی سے ہو محروم
حد اسکے کمالات کی ہے برق و بخارات

He compares the two civilization of the East and the West. The latter possess the forces of life but does not possess any lofty ideal, its efforts and strivings are aimless; the former lacks in the forces of life, though it knows its destination and goal:

بہت دیکھے ہیں میں نے مشرق و مغرب کے میخانے
یہاں ساقی نہیں پیدا وہاں بے ذوق ہے صہبا
لبا لب شیشہ* تہذیب حاضر ہے منے لا سے
مگر ساقی کے ہاتھوں میں نہیں پیمانہ* الا

or

مردہ لا دینی* افکار سے افرنگ میں عشق عشق بے ربطی* افکار سے مشرق میں غلام

The reconstruction of a healthy civilization and culture lies in the assimilation and synthesis of the codes of the East and West. The true equilibrium and balance, between spiritualism, and materialism, between 'revelation' and 'reason' and between 'church' and 'state', is furnished by Islam. Islam alone guarantees the stability of human civilization and culture. This gigantic task starts with the realization of the individual 'ego'. The realization of 'ego' is nothing but a step toward moral rearmament of a nation.

اس قوم کو فولاد کی حاجت نہیں رہتی ہو جسکے جوانوں کی خودی صورت فولاد

It is a moral rearmament in the sense that the realization of 'ego' is the realization of the code of life (دین)

چیسٹ دین دریافتن اسرار خویش
زندگی مرگ است بے دیدار خویش

The present day muslim generations are very much fond of sheepiness of the west. They wrongly believe that they can climb upto the peak of culture and civilization by adopting the 'hedonism' of the west. They further believe that a competition in dance and music will help them to attain the goal. Iqbal unambiguously corrects this notion of the present generation:

آ تجھکو بتادوں میں تقدیر امم کیا ہے
شمشیر و ثنائ اول طاؤس و رباب آخر

The 'Khudi' can not be realized through musical instruments it requires the weapons of knowledge and sword. The philosophy of Tawoos-o-rabab has always appeared at the decaying stage of a civilization,

opposed to it, the philosophy of shamsheer-o-sana appeared at the beginning of every civilization. The symbols of shamsheer and sana stand for the creativity of thought and 'Jehad'. Creativity of thought for Iqbal is a matter of faith. If one possesses 'creativity of thought' one is a 'momin', in case otherwise he is no better than a 'Kafir' or 'zindiq':

هر که او را قوت تخلیق نیست نزد ما جز کافر و زندیق نیست

Similarly 'Jehad' is also an article of faith to Iqbal. It does not mean war for the sake of war. It is not a synonymous of colonization. 'Jehad', etimologically means to make effort. It is of different types. It includes (1) Jehad bin Nafs (2) Jehad bil Muashara and (3) Jehad-bil-Hukumat. If any of the three entities stand in the way of realizing 'Khudi' according to the ideals of Islam, one shall have to wage 'war' (Jehad) against it.

زندگی در جستجو پوشیده است
اصل او در آرزو پوشیده است
آرزو را در دل خود زنده دار
تا نه گردد مشتم خاک تو غبار

It is a message of the dignity of labour, hard-work and ceaseless activity, without which life becomes meaningless.

The message of Iqbal has no doubt earned appreciation but has not yet been put to action. The muslim youths, starting from Indonesia upto Morrocco, still complain of the hardness of Islam.

شکوه سنج سختی آئین مشو
از حدود مصطفی بیرون مرو
حکم د شوار است تاویلے مجو
جز بقلب خویش قندیلے مجو

The complain is due to the fact that the Muslim youths are generally ignorant of the ideology of Islam. They are not to be blamed for their apathy and ignorance because in educational institutions, set up under the regimes of the foreign 'masters', all except Islam has had been taught to our youths. In the first instance Islam has been kept

out of syllabi of such institutions. In the second instance Islam has been very skilfully distorted by the foreigners. With the movements of liberations from the foreign yokes a new conscience dawned upon the Muslim world. And as a result of it the conspiracy of our 'masters' has been detected. All that is now required is the forceful method of revitalization of our faith in Islam.

The first step in this direction, suggested by Iqbal, is to realize the 'Khudi'. It is due to the loss of Khudi that the Muslim youths are blindly aping the "culture" of the West. The revival and realization of Khudi presupposes the knowledge of self and the knowledge of the ideology which governs the self, the society, the Government and the State. It is the knowledge of the self which dispels the darkness of ignorance and the shadows of skepticism. The knowledge of Khudi is a prelude to 'Yaqeen-e-Muhkam' or the 'firmness of faith'. If the Muslims possess the firmness of faith in Islam they are destined to rise, to progress and to prosper. But if they lack in this fundamental virtue they are, by the same token, fore-ordained to see their downfall continued. The reason is very simple. If the Muslims profess Islam in words and pay lip service to it but they refrain to translate it into action in their individual and collective life, hypocrisy will set in. And it is hypocrisy which eats up the vitality of life. Yaqeen-e-Muhkam and hypocrisy are contradictory to each other.

It is 'Yaqeen-e-Muhkam' which leads to actions. Action or the will to act is the berometer of Yaqeen e 'Muhkam'. They are inseparably related. One proceeds, the other follows. One is the antecedent, the other is the consequent. But what is the nature of action? Action is the effort of an individual ego to become something. Every action takes its start from 'becoming' and aims at 'being'. The goal of 'being' is unattained and remains unattainable, as such the action is ceaseless and perpetual. It has no terminous. Action begins with the beginning and ends with the ending.

It is not 'Amal alone but 'Amal-e-Paiham'. It is not action alone which is required for the reconstruction of culture and civilization, rather it is continued action with counts much.

Yaqeen-e-Muhkam and 'Amal-e-Paiham are followed by Love that is a conquering force. To Iqbal 'love' has a very wide denotation. It includes the love for knowledge, love for God and His Prophet, love for the ideology of Islam and Love for the humanity at large.

This love transcends geographical barriers, racial discriminations, linguistic differences and the feeling of parochial nationalism. This message of love, as profounded by Iqbal is, totally opposed to the concept of the survival of the fittest and the idea of the conflict between thesis and antithesis, as they breed hatred. The concept of the survival of the fittest and conflict between thesis and antithesis are the successful allies of nationalism. But the concept of love in Iqbal can only be an ally of Internationalism—an Internationalism which is not a "Law of Jungle".

The 3 point programme of Iqbal, to conquer the world is laid down in the verse quoted below:

بقیہ محکم، عمل پیہم، محبت فاتح عالم
جہاد زندگانی میں یہ ہیں مردوں کی شمشیریں

Iqbal was fully convinced that the world trend is fastly moving toward a war of ideologies, in which the atomic weapons will stand obsolete. As such he devoted himself to the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam.

A writer on Political Science advocated that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty". But where from this, eternal vigilance, is to come? Will it come from the atomic weapons? Can it be had from the coterie of rulers deeply engrossed in wealth, woman and wine? The reply is a manifest No. 'Eternal vigilance' is an act of mind and a trait of character of an individual and a society. It must come from all those values which educate the individual and the society. In other words it can be had from an ideology. Iqbal recommends the values of Islam to cultivate 'eternal vigilance' to safeguard liberty. Yaqeen-e-Muhkam 'Amal-e-Paiham and Mubabbat-Fatah-e-Alam are the values stated by him. These values will solidify the Khudi of an individual and a society. The Khudi will invigilate liberty and will effectively check it from deterioration and degeneration.

Contrary to these values of Islam, the powerful nations were ever deluded by the lust and luxuries of their so-called cultures built on the corner stones of wealth, woman and wine. They thought that their hedonistic culture will safeguard their liberty. But they proved to be a failure. Instances can be multiplied both from the history of the East and the West. History bears witness to the fact that only those

people rose to power who, comparatively speaking, have had (1) better characters (2) strong feeling of continued action and (3) an undiluted love for simple living. History also supports the fact that people with such traits were successful over people who were deeply plunged in wealth, woman and wine. There has been a coterie of rulers which thought of defending its liberty by the help of its soldiers and the deadly weapons, which their scientists invented for them at a heavy cost. But history has proved it beyond doubt that such coteries, were killed by their own weapons.

The problem of the vigilance and equilibrium of liberty is highly complex. It can not be over-simplified. From the study of different civilizations and cultures one can easily come to the conclusion that the seed of decay and downfall is inherent in every culture and the march of civilization is not a march on the straight line. It is full of incombatale ups and downs. The moral rearmament ever led a nation to its zenith and the moral degeneration of a nation pulled her down to the lowest ebb. The only understandable code is that the goddess of liberty does not yearn for the damsel of beauties, goblets of wine, pompous dresses etc. All it desires is the unadulterated worship of those principles which make an individual a man of character and a man of action. Thus we come to the conclusion that in reconstructing our culture, the first and the last arm is morality. Likewise in creating an atmosphere of 'eternal vigilance' to safeguard one's hard earned freedom all amount of so-called material prosperity, all sort of totalitarianism, all kind of deadly weapons are ordained to fail. The rule of wealth, woman and wine has had ever collapsed. The man-made rule of Law has had proved ineffective, sterile and barren. Great monarchs and dictators did great disservice by usurping powers. All that the lofty end demands is the rule of Ideology—the rule of Islam—which gives man what is due to him and which takes from man what is due on him.

It is the schism in soul which has posed a very threatening challenge to the Man of to-day. "The physical force generated by splitting an atom" can be used for the services of man. It is no threat in itself. Iqbal has exhorted the Muslims to get control over the forces of Nature because Man is to conquer it and he is not supposed to be conquered by it. The same view is upheld by Toynbee, a well-known historian of our age. He has very aptly remarked: "The devastating agency that Western Man has thus let loose to his own mortal peril was not the physical force generated by splitting an atom; it was the spiritual force generated by a schism in the soul....."

He must reorient his spiritual out-look by once more taking for his QIBLAH his father's ABRAHAM'S MECCA in place of his prospector bentham's New Jerusalem." Greater the number of challenges thrown to man by man, society, his Government and the forces of nature, the more active is the Man in giving response. This flow of Challenge-and-Response is a blessing in disguise. It has convinced Man that he must surrender to God alone, because the Oneness of God means the Oneness of man and the Oneness of state. Iqbal expressed his hopes in the future of Man. He says:

شب گریزاں ہوگی آخر جلوۂ خورشید سے
یہ چمن معمور ہوگا نغمہ توحید سے

(October 63)

IQBAL'S EMPHASIS ON THE STUDY OF HISTORY

Reyazur Rehman

Dr Abdullah¹ is of opinion that Iqbal should be included among historians. No doubt, Iqbal's thoughts are pregnant with historical events, but the importance of history to him begins from the poem "March 1907".² Before this, it must be remembered, the study of history was discouraged by him. He was very much vocal in explaining his point of view. What, says Iqbal, remains there in the tales of old times?³ The events of the past have had no meaning. Now since 1907 the past is all important. That poem promises the regeneration of the past glory.

Some contents of the poem "March 1907" like the Divine promise to the Muslims, of the conquest over the Roman empire, the reference to Ḥijāz, the emphasis on desert and the tiger-like bravery of the Muslims. There is warning for the Western civilisation that it will not last long.

It was his "study" of the history of early Islam which could make him conscious of the missions, to glorify *Tawḥīd* and to establish Khilāfat as he emphasises in "Jawāb-i Shikwah".⁴ Besides, in the themes of "Shikwah" and "Jawāb-i Shikwah," Iqbal is echoing the voice of the past. To improve the deteriorating conditions of the present, the rehabilitation of qualities of the other time are of great importance, the most vital element of which is *Tawḥīd*. It was the faith in *Tawḥīd* which made them dynamic, chivalrous, fearless, truthful, just and selfless.

1. *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, 'Allama Iqbal Centenary Celebrations, 1977.

2. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū Bāng-i Darā*, pp. 140-42.

3. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū Bāng-i Darā*, pp. 68-76.

4. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū Bāng-i Darā*, pp. 199-208.

In the poem "Khitāb Ba Jawānān-i Islām"⁵ (1912), again, it is history which presents to Iqbal the qualities and conditions of the early Muslims. He wants the Muslims to know their ancestors who were great conquerors, although the desert was their abode and who remained indifferent to wealth and to worldly pleasure. All these are reflections of history.

Besides, in one of the poems, "Muslim,"⁶ composed during this period, that is 1912, Iqbal himself tells us that history has been the source of his inspiration.

Conducive to National Consciousness. As for an individual, it is equally necessary for the nation to know its goal without which its life would be meaningless. Life without purpose would become a lifeless entity. Iqbal says: "A living nation is living because it never forgets its dead."⁷ It is history which keeps the spirit of a people alive. And because it records the achievements of the past, which is to be the source of inspiration to the present, it leads to the path of national mission.

"The skilful vision that beholds the past
Can recreate before thy wondering gaze
The past anew ; wine of a hundred years
That bowl contains, an ancient drunkenness
Flames in its juice. . . ."⁸

Iqbal asserts that for maintaining the national entity, the glories of the past should not be forgotten. In a crisis to improve upon the present and to ensure a happier future, the inspiration must be derived from the past.

"Break not the thread [of continuity] between the
past and now
And the far future. . . ."⁹

Thus to Iqbal history is all important. It is the source of national cohesion. It is the source of national consciousness and national mission. National life can become inspiring and active

5. Ibid., p. 180.

6. Ibid., pp. 195-96.

7. S. A. Vahid, Ed. *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal* (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 45.

8. A. J. Arberry, Tr. (Iqbal's *Rumūz-i-Bekhidī*), *Mysteries of Selflessness* (London : John Murray, 1953), p. 62.

9. Ibid.

for the mission. This is what Namier says : "History pleases and inspires . . ." ¹⁰ ; ". . . the past is on the top of us and with us all time." ¹¹

Role of Muslims in History. According to the general consensus of opinion, serious thinking generally emerges during the period of crisis. There starts pondering under the conditions of insecurity and dissatisfaction. Minds are engaged in an endeavour to know as to why the situation is heading towards more and more anxieties, insecurities and dissatisfaction. ¹² "In an hour of crisis, when the order of a society flounders and disintegrates, the fundamental problems of political existence in history are more apt to come in view than in periods of stability." ¹³

At such an hour Iqbal makes the Muslims conscious of their responsibility. They must rise and save humanity from destruction. ¹⁴ It is his love for mankind that he denounces Machiavelli for causing bitterness and dissensions in human society against the teaching of Christianity. ¹⁵ His anguish at the sufferings of humanity is revealed in his New Year's Message broadcast from Lahore station of the All-India Radio on 1 January 1938 :

"As I look back on the year that has passed and as I look at the world in the midst of the New Year's rejoicings, it may be Abyssinia or Palestine, Spain or China, the same misery prevails in every corner of man's earthly home, and hundreds of thousands of men are being butchered mercilessly. Engines of destruction created by science are wiping out the great landmarks of man's cultural achievements. . . ." ¹⁶

Iqbal's unreserved admiration and eulogy for scientists, poets, saints, thinkers, irrespective of creed, colour or language, who have contributed to the greatness of man, clearly shows his humanist attitude.

Although there has been the general opinion that Iqbal was

10. L.B. Namier in the *Varieties of History*, ed. Frits Stern (*History and Political Culture*), pp. 372-73.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 373.

12. Sorokin, p. 3.

13. Eric Voegelin, *The New Political Science* (University of Chicago, 1969), p. 193.

14. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī (Zabūr-i 'Ajam)*, p. 475.

15. Arberry, *Tr.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33

16. S.A. Vahid, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

concerned with the Muslims, and he wrote for the Muslims. But this is not the whole truth. He was particularly but not exclusively concerned with the Muslims. Alongwith the Muslims he was concerned with humanity at large. To quote Iqbal himself: "I feel it is my duty as a Muslim and as a lover of mankind, to remind them of their true function in the evolution of mankind."¹⁷ This is evident also from his poem "March 1907" wherein he expresses the desire of serving humanity. He believes in the creation of a new world for a new "Adam".¹⁸ Ābid Husain is correct in supporting this view.¹⁹ Muslims should act to improve human situation in order to save humanity.

It must be remarked that in so many of his works Iqbal has stressed upon the Muslims²⁰ to fulfil their historical mission of liberating mankind. In his lecture "Islam As A Moral and Political Ideal" (of 1908), it has been stressed on the Muslims that "it is their mission to set others free".²¹ In *Rumaz*²² the Muslims are being cited as a "just nation" according to the Qur'ān. They are called upon to establish justice. In the *Jāwīd Nāmāh*²³ and *Pas Chih Bāyad Kard*,²⁴ it is being impressed upon the Muslims that they have come with a revolutionary mission and they must act to save the civilisation.

Quite naturally, at this stage one would find oneself at a loss to discern the elements of humanitarianism in Iqbal's rejoicings in poem "March 1907" at the destruction of the Roman empire by Islamic forces. On course, to understand Iqbal's viewpoint some amount of ingenuity is necessary.

Some of the elements of humanitarianism are to be envisioned in the poem of 1907 where the destruction of Roman empire has been elugosised. The silent voice from "Hijāz" has brought the

17 Ibid., p. 98.

18. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl, Fārsi (Payām-i Mashriq)*.

19 *Iqbāl Bā Kamāl*, pp. 240-41.

20. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsi : Zabūr-i 'Ajam*, p. 475 ; *Payām-i Mashriq*, p. 361 ; *Pas Chih Bāyad Kard*, p. 44 ; *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū : Bāng-i Darā*, p. 240.

21 S.A. Vahid. Ed , op. cit., p. 55.

22. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsi (Rumūz-i Bekhudi)*, pp. 139-40.

23. Ibid. (*Jāwīd Nāmāh*), p. 43.

24. Ibid (*Pas Chih Bāyad Kard*), p. 46.

message that the lion that once emerged from the desert and had upset the Roman empire will awake once again.²⁵ In these lines 'Abd al-Qādir²⁶ finds him to be only a seer and nothing more than that. Seer he might have been; this does not concern us. What concern us here is the political implications in these lines. It must be noted that the emergence of Islam is desired, not as a conquering force, but as a force of liberation as it did in the past. To Iqbal defeat of Rome implies the victory of the forces of liberation. This is what Iqbal emphasises in other places. The defeat of the Roman empire in his view was the defeat of tyranny and oppression and victory of the power of freedom. It is being asserted²⁷ here that the tyrannical rule could be destroyed by the power of Ḥaidar, by the asceticism of Bū Dharr and the truth of Salamān.

Such a view of Iqbal finds its expression in so many places of which a few are noted below.

(a) In the *Shikwah*²⁸ it is stressed that Muslims destroyed the rule of the Kaisar who enjoyed god-like authority, and thence they secured equality and freedom for mankind.

(b) This view that the victory of the Muslims over Rome was the victory of forces of liberation appears again in a speech delivered in a meeting at Lahore after the First World War to protest against the unjust treatment meted out to Turkey by Britain. The irony of the situation, Iqbal pointed out, was that the right to control over their own territory was being denied to those who secured liberty to the people of Rome at a time when they were smarting under the oppressive rule of the Kaisar.²⁹

Many Western thinkers support the view that the Muslim conquest brought benefit for the conquered. Even B. Russell, although not sympathetic to Islam, has had to admit that the Muslims in history had been more tolerant and humane:

"Throughout the Middle Ages the Mohammedans were more civilized and more humane than the Christians. Christians

25. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbal Urdū (Bāng-i Darā)*, p. 140.

26. 'Abd al-Qādir, p. 97.

27. *Kulliyāt-i Iqbal Urdū (Bāng-i Darā)*, p. 270.

28. *Ibid*, pp. 165-66.

29. B.A. Dar, Ed., *Anwār-i Iqbal*, pp. 43-44.

persecuted Jews. . . . In Mohammedan countries, on the contrary, the Jews at most times were not in any way ill treated."³⁰

W. Durant also holds a similar view about the tolerance shown to the religious groups.³¹

B. Lewis unequivocally holds the Muslim rule preferable to that of the Romans. To substantiate it, he quotes a few "Apocalyptic and a Christian historian" who in the criticism of the Roman Empire for tyranny far excelled Iqbal as it will be seen :

"We may compare with this the words of a later Syrian Christian historian : 'Therefore the God of vengeance delivered us out of the hand of the Romans by means of the Arabs. . . . It profited us not a little to be saved from the cruelty of the Romans and their bitter hatred towards us.'"³²

For their liberating role, the Muslims drew their inspiration from the Prophet, who was the harbinger of the principles of freedom, equality and brotherhood, as is evident from Iqbal's lecture of 1908. Here it is emphasised that Islam had "elevated those who were socially low".³³ Very significant is his dedicated love and reverence for the Prophet whom he refers to as the one "who brought the final message of freedom and equality to mankind".³⁴ This lecture concludes with a message for the Muslims that "it is their mission to set others free". The Prophetic role as the herald of freedom, equality and brotherhood has been emphasised also in the *Asrār-i Khudī*.³⁵ And in the *Rumūz*, paras after paras have been devoted to the liberating role of Islam and as a mission left by the Prophet as a legacy.

But Iqbal is not content merely be emphasising the liberating role of Islam. He is equally anxious to create conditions for the individual to enjoy freedom and equality including economic justice. For this, Khilāfat as a political system is much more suitable than other forms of government : Khilāfat is based on the supremacy of law where there is no place for "personal authority,"

30. B. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 343.

31. W. Durant, p. 147.

32. Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (London : Hutchinson and Co., Fourth Edition, 1966), p. 58.

33. Vahid, Ed., op. cit., p. 54.

34. Ibid.

35 *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī (Asrār-i Khudī)*, p. 20.

and where both the ruler and the ruled are "subject to the same law".³⁶ These are the basic conditions for the enjoyment of freedom and equality.³⁷ Something more would have been said about Iqbal's inspiration from the liberating role of the past. But in the present context glance must be given to the charge on Iqbal for communalism. Let us examine its validity.

Search for Golden Age in History. Iqbal has been charged for preaching his own creed for he ceased to believe in Indian nationalism. He drew inspiration from the glorious past of Islam and for the re-emergence of which he urged Muslims to act and to struggle.³⁸ It has been commented by Kiernan that Iqbal "indulged in unguarded rhetoric about holy wars and the Sword of Islam, and extolled action as if it were an end in itself."³⁹

It is an evasion of the facts of history that has led them to misread the ideas of Iqbal. It is known that the crisis was largely responsible for the emergence of his ideas. To resolve the crisis, to tide it over and to improve the situation, it has been the case of all the nations to seek inspiration from its own national history. It has been rightly asserted by Crossman:⁴⁰ "We attempt to seek a golden age, or to reconstruct a broken society in the pattern of that age." The study of Greek philosophers and specially of Plato assumes much importance today in view of crisis.

There is, therefore, nothing communal here. It is known to a student of history that every nation must have a history of its own, which may be the source of inspiration for it. The most dominating and powerful factor for maintaining national consciousness, in the words of J.S. Mill is: "the possession of a national history and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incident in the past."⁴¹

And if a nation does not have its own history with a glorious

36. Vahid, Ed., op cit., pp. 51-52.

37. H. Laski, *Grammar of Politics*, p. 150.

38. S. Sinha, *Poet of the East*, p. 93; W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 162.

39. Kiernan, op. cit., p. xxiii.

40. R.H.S., Crossman, *Plato Today*, p. 14.

41. J. S. Mill,

past, it seeks inspiration from the history of other nations which influenced its ideas and thoughts.

Although "Greek philosophy is philosophy of the Greek and for the Greek," yet, as just said, it continues to inspire the West: "Now history matters more to us, and none is more really contemporary than that of the Greeks."⁴²

The West has had to depend upon Greek philosophy because there was no other source for her to seek remedy against the enslavement of man in the name of religion. The Renaissance was mainly inspired by Greek thought.

To improve the conditions in the present, it becomes necessary to seek its link with the past to justify a movement or a revolution; if no such link can be traced out in history, it is even invented, as, for example, the social contract theory. "The contract theory of the origin of state is false and worthless as a record of facts. . . ."⁴³

Now, if social contract theory which is the basis of modern democracy is unhistorical, there is no reason to mark a thinker as a communalist, if he is inspired not by any "imaginary golden age in history," but rather by an age which is well recorded in the past events. A period of history in which he finds the dignity of man being ensured through the establishment of the supremacy of impartial and impersonal law, treating both the ruler and the ruled alike, and where the power was exercised not for any other purpose than to establish the supremacy of law.

42. Barker, *Greek Theory of State*, pp. 17-18; *idem*, *Principle of Social and Political Theory*, pp. 109-10.

43. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 56.



Iqbal's Tulip of Sinai

Rayazul Hasan

The nature of Dante's
influence on Iqbal.

S.M. Abdullah

The "Pseudo-Dramatic"
Poems of Iqbal.

C.M. Naim

IQBAL'S TULIP OF SINAI :

Prof. A.J. Arberry's Translation

Reyazul Hasan

Prof. Nicholson of Cambridge University set the pace of translating Iqbal's poetical works in the West by first turning into English medium his *Asrar-i-Khudi* (Secrets of the Self) in 1922. He found the poem "so powerful and original" that he sought Iqbal's permission to dress it into an English garb.

Twenty-five years later Prof. A. J. Arberry, then Professor of Persian in the University of London, undertook the translation of the Persian quatrains from the first part of Iqbal's *Payam-i-Mashriq* (Message of the East), written in reply to Goethe's *West Oestlicher Divan*. Prof. Arberry published his translation under the title *Tulip of Sinai*.

In making the translation Prof. Arberry says : "I have sought to be as faithful to the letter of original as possible and have imitated the stanzas used by Iqbal...Iqbal is not an easy writer to understand, as Prof. Nicholson himself confessed and the form of the quatrain he uses in the *Tulip of Sinai* further augments the difficulty of grasping his full meaning. But think I have made out his intention and have endeavoured to compress it into the version."¹

Persian is a language of symbols and in poetry these symbols are profusely used to denote a certain meaning. In a literal translation of symbolic words the reader will catch only the peel but the kernel inside will escape his understanding. Thus in a literal translation the whole range of meaning will fall flat upon the ears of the English readers and will be a source of puzzlement to them.

It is true that Iqbal is a difficult writer to understand. The difficulty lies in the fact that he uses the traditional symbolic expressions, imparting a new meaning to them. I quote an Urdu verse of his to explain this point :

1. Prof. A. J. Arberry: *Tulip of Sinai*, Introduction.

ٹپک اے شمع! آنسو بن کے پروانے کی آنکھوں سے
سراہا درد ہوں، حسرت بھری ہے داستاں میری!

O Candle! fall in tears drop by drop from the eyes of the moth,
For I am ever so full of pain and my story is so full of anguish and
deep yearning.

Now the moth and the candle are one of the important and familiar traditional symbolic themes of Persian poetry. In it the moth is so fond of the light of the candle that it burns itself in its fire. This theme is also well expressed in the famous poem, *Sehensucht* of Goethe included in his *West Oestlicher Divan*.

Now Iqbal in invoking the candle has put the stress not on the moth traditionally put on it, but on the candle which is made to melt into tears and flow from the eyes of the moth due to the pain and strong yearning of the poet. This transferred epithet gives a new meaning to the verse and deepens its effects. This may cause difficulty even in the minds of those most well versed in the symbols of Persian poetry.

Now I give below a few quatrains of Iqbal in original along with Prof. Arberry's translation and shall try to show how a literal translation has deviated from the meaning of the verse and may cause confusion in the mind of English readers. Such readers may even find Iqbal an extravagant poet.

دراين گلشن پريشان مثل بويم نهي دانم چه مي خواهم چه جويم
بر آيد آرزو يا بر نيابد شهيد سوز و ساز آرزوم²

A spent scent in the garden I suspire,
I know not what I seek, what I require,
But be my passion satisfied, or no,
Yet here I burn, a martyr to Desire.

The word *parishan* (پريشان) has been translated as spent and the idea behind the word, "spent" is "consumed or exhausted," while the proper idea of *parishan* (پريشان) here is scatteredness like the spread of the fragrance in the garden.

دلا نارانی پروانہ تاکے نگیری شیوہ¹ مردانہ تاکے
یکے خود را بسوزِ خویشتن سور طواف آتش بیگانه تاکے³

1. *Bang-i-Dara*, p. 63.
2. *Peyam-i-Mashriq*, p. 14.
3. *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

How long this fluttering of the moth, my heart?
 When wilt thou take at last the manly part?
 Why honest thou about another's flame?
 Go, burn thyself within the Fire thou art!

The word *narai* (نارائی) has been translated as "this fluttering" but it does not indicate the character of fluttering. The word *narai* (نارائی) shows, however, the immaturity and lack of sobriety of the moth because it burns itself in the fire of others.¹ It would have been proper for it to burn itself in its own fire.

I have before me the German translation of the same quatrain by Prof. Annemarie Schimmel which reads as follows:

Herz, schwach gleich Schmottrlingen-wirlangenoch?
 Willst Mannheit nicht essingen-wie langench?

Its literal translation reads as follows:

O, heart, frail like a moth—how long such a course?
 Will you not attain manhood—how long such a course?

In German the adjective "frail" gives only a partial idea of *narai* (نارائی) which the English version totally fails to convey. As I have said before, the proper sense would be immaturity or a senseless act.

تنے پیدا کن از مش غبارے تنے محکم تر از سنگین حصارے
 درون او دل درد آشنائے چو جوئے در کنار کوهارے²

A hand of dust a Body fortified
 Firmer than rocky rampart shall abide,
 Yet beats therein a sorrow-conscious Heart,
 A river flowing by a mountain side.

The phrase *dil-i-dard ashnai* (دل درد آشنائے) has been translated as "sorrow-conscious" which does not convey the complete idea of the phrase. Properly it is a tendency to share another person's emotion or mental participation in another's trouble—i.e., a sort of sympathy with another person's misfortune. This is what Heine has called "Heiligkeit der Schmerzen" (holiness or sanctity of pain).

شنیدم در عدم پروانہ می گفت
 دمی از زندگی تاب و تبم بخش²

1. *Payam-i-Mashriq*, p. 18.

2. *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

Thus in annihilation, spoke the moth;
Give me a while the glow and fever of life.

The word 'adam' (عدم) has been translated as "annihilation". When a living being is annihilated, it is no more able to do or to speak anything. But the word "adam" (عدم) has a whole philosophy behind it. It means the world beyond where the soul lives, although the body is annihilated. The proper meaning of the word "adam" (عدم) would be the world beyond.

In quatrain 22 the word *adharniyaran* (آذرنياران) has been translated as the "sons of Fire". In Arab tradition Adhar was the father of the Prophet Abraham and he was an idol maker. Thus *adharniyaran* (آذرنياران) would mean those who possess a tendency to shape idols and not the sons of fire.

بگو جبریل را از من پیاسے
ولے تاب و تب ما خاکیاں بین
مرا آن پیکر نوری ندادند
بنوری ذوق مہجوری ندادندا

Speak this my message unto Gabriel:
My body was not made with light aglow :
Yet see the fervour of us sons of earth,
This joy-in-grief no child of light can know.

Here *paikar-i-nuri* (پیکر نوری) has been translated as a body made with light aglow. In fact it means here the angels who are supposed to be made of light. In the last line the "child of light" becomes ambiguous and it gives no clear indication as to whom it refers. *Zauq-i-mahjuri* (ذوق مہجوری) has been translated as a joy-in-grief. It gives a sort of sadist meaning while the real connotation is the joy in separation. Iqbal's entire theory of mysticism deals not with the final merging of the human soul into God but in its remaining separate. And in this separation there is a desire and yearning to be near God but not to merge into Him. The phrase "joy-in-grief," becomes a contradiction in terms and perplexes understanding. Here lies the difficulty in literal translation.

میارا بزم بر ساحل کہ آن جا
نوائے زندگانی نرم خیز است
بدریا غلط و باسوجش درآویز
حیات جاودان اندر ستیز است؟

Take not thy banquet on the shore; for there
Too gently flows the melody of life;

1. *Payam-i-Masnriq*, p. 34.

2. *Op cit.*, p. 41.

Plunge in the sea, do battle with the waves,
For immortality is war in strife

The word *bazm* (بزم) has been translated as banquet which is generally associated with dinner. But *bazm* (بزم) may or may not mean a dinner. It is a meeting of people for merry-making and enjoyment. If we take the meaning of dinner, then it would be improper to ask the people just to jump into the sea after having a good dinner. However, the poet gives a contrast between merry-making and doing battle with the waves and considers the latter act as proper for life for lies immortality in it.

In quatrain 141 *rah-i-khwabida* (راه خوابیده) has been translated as "the way sleeps long," while the proper sense is the lonely way.

تو می گویی که من هستم، خدا نیست
جهان آب و گل را آنها نیست
هنوز این راز بر من ناکشود است
که چشم آنچه بیدر هست یا نیست¹

"I am, and God is not": thou sayest,
"Water and clay into the boundless god";
Yet I have not resolved this mystery
Whether it is mine eye that sees or no.

Here the last line is rather completely inverted. Its literal translation would be as to whether what my eye sees exists or not. The emphasis is on the transitoriness of the objects seen but the seer is always there. Prof. Arberry's translation changes the object into subject and is made to question the observer's vision; i.e., whether it is the observer's eye that sees the object or somebody else's. This world is in flux and every moment some change is taking place. The old Greek idea that you cannot step twice in the same stream has been the subject matter of philosophy both in the East and West for long. And Iqbal mentions this flux in a poetic way.

به برگ لاله رنگ آمیزی عشق
بجان ما بلا انگیزی عشق
اگر این خاکدان را وا شگافی
درونش بنگری خونریزی² عشق

The love that paints the tulip petal's hue,
'This Love that stirs the spirit's bitter hue;
If thou couldst clear this carrier of clay,
Thou shelt behold, within, Love's bloodshed too.

1. *Payam-i-Mashriq*, p. 89.

2. *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

The word *khakdan* (خاکدان) has been translated as "carrier of clay". Perhaps the translator means by it the human form itself when it is dead and becomes a carrier.

But *khakdan* (خاکدان) is not a "carrier". It means the "form or house of dust", pointing to this universe.

Describing the function of Love, the poet first mentions its effect on the tulip leaf, then he goes to speak of its influence "on our own soul". And then he goes a step further and includes the entire world of matter which bears inside itself the tumult of love.

Yet these are many beautiful quatrains beautifully done in English. There is no doubt that it had been rather a difficult job for Professor Arberry to translate into English metre Persian verses with all their implications and symbolic pitfalls. And again to compress them within the metrical length was even more difficult. The attempt was praiseworthy but at places it has been done at the expense of meaning, perhaps due to metrical necessity.

THE NATURE OF DANTE'S INFLUENCE ON IQBAL

S. M. Abdullah

Almost all the important writers on Iqbal have referred to Dante's influence on Iqbal, so far as the *Jawid Nama* is concerned.

This has left an impression in the minds of some students of Iqbal that *Jawid Nama* is an *imitation*, and lacks originality because of its resemblances with the *Divine Comedy*.

That *Jawid Nama* has some similarities with the *Divine Comedy*, there is no doubt. But mere resemblance in a few details or even imitation of certain aspects does not necessarily prove that Iqbal was an imitator having no scheme of his own, conceptual as well as artistic. In fact, Iqbal's work is almost original in ideational approach as also in the architecture of his story.

Inspiration in the field of ideas, life and culture is one of the commonest phenomenon of human culture, even great masters like Shakespeare not excluded. Dante's own borrowings from old poets and men of letters (including the Muslim authors and Scholars) were considerable. Yet, Dante's masterpiece, the *com-media* stands aloft as a wonderful piece of originality. Similarly, Iqbal's claim to originality and greatness is not vitiated because of a few resemblances, or for reasons of casual inspiration from Dante.

This assumption necessitates a critical and fuller discussion on a few points, e.g. :

- (a) What is the nature and extent of Iqbal's borrowings ?
- (b) Why should Iqbal solely depend upon Dante, when he could fall back directly upon the muslim materials (like *Mirajnamas*, prophetic traditions relating to Miraj and their adaptations in verse and prose) which, according to Miguel Asin (the author of the famous book *Islam and the Divine Comedy*) Dante also used profusely.
- (c) What are the characteristic features of the *Jawid Nama*

which account for its distinction and individuality as against the *Divine Comedy*.

(d) Some other notable aspects of the *Jawid Nama*.

Nature and extent of resemblances

It can not be denied that the *Jawid Nama* seems to have some similarities with the pattern of the *Divine Comedy*. It may also be surmised that the idea of compiling such a book may have struck the Poet of the East, after studying the memorable book of Miguel Asin on the subject, the first English Edition of which had already appeared in 1926, and become very popular among the Muslim intellectuals of the time. However, we know on the authority of the late Chaudari Muhammad Husain, a disciple and trusted associate of Allama Iqbal—(who wrote an article on *Jawid Nama* soon after it was published) that the Allama had always in his mind a book on the mysteries of the *Miraj* of the Holy Prophet, till in 1929 he decided to compile the present work *Jawid Nama* (see *Nairang-i-Khayal*, Annual Number 1942, pp. 108). In any case, Dante's work may have been taken as model by Iqbal.

Similarities

In fact, the basic scheme of the work is the same. Of course, differences are there as we shall see later, but the general outline is the same, e.g. 1 (1) the starting point (an incident in the *D.C.* (*Divine Comedy*), mis-track in a Jungle), (2) sudden appearance of a guide (Rumi in the case of the *Jawid Nama*., and Virgil in the case of the *D. C.*), (3) Ascension of both poets stage by stage, according to the Astronomical (or theological) arrangement, (4) Interviews with several men or personalities in Hell and Heaven, (5) Various kinds of torments and tortures and rewards to the sinners and the righteous men respectively, (6) description of several places providing an atmosphere to each situation (rivers of gold and silver, mountains covered with snow, landscape, characters and mythological figures and several other things.

Differences

This is a list of similarities but as already observed differ-

ences are more glaring and are of a basic nature.

As against Dante, who takes deeper interest in the spiritual conversion of the individual on theological basis of the Catholicism, in vogue in the 14th Century, A. D., Iqbal is more concerned with the metaphysical questions of his own age, and political questions of the Muslim world during the twentieth century.

The age of Dante was that of scholastic rationalism as expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas but Iqbal belonged to the age of Science, Mathematics and Space—Physics. While Dante insists on the identity of Religion and Reason, Iqbal emphasises the unity of spirit and Matter, hence of Religion and Science. So, the interpretation of Reality is different in both cases.

In a sense, we come across two different voices while going through the texts of these two poets. In Dante, we have a Christian voice while in Iqbal, we find a Muslim voice expressing ideas, characteristically Muslim.

For Iqbal Ascension to the Divine Sphere (معراج) is not an unfamiliar phenomenon because every Muslim believes in *Miraj* (ascension) and *Isra* (nocturnal journey) of the Holy Prophet. Iqbal refers to the idea of of the *Mi'raj* in the first section of the book.

He thereby suggests that ascension of man to the Divine Shpere was not an impossibility. No doubt, Iqbal's view of *Miraj* apparently does not strictly conform to the traditional belief, and he interprets *Miraj* as a change or revolution in consciousness but this is his interpretation. The case of the Holy Prophet is quite different and specific as we shall see later.

Here we have two different tempers. Generally speaking Dante is always seen frightened, depressed, terrified, confused and panicstricken throughout his heavenly journey, while Iqbal even in a very grave situation looks calm and composed, although enthusiastic and eager to know more. Again, Dante is too much submissive, even timid. When he accompanies his guide he puts very few questions, and when he has ever the courage of asking about anything, he is snubbed and is satisfied with one or two casual remarks of his guide. As against this, Iqbal is very inquisitive, goes deep into delicate questions, and, in most cases argues with 'heavenly personalities', nay even with his Guide.

Jawid Nama begins with *Munajat* (prayer in Quietude or

whispering with the Lord, in which the poet expresses his craving for a vision of Reality. Here Iqbal's approach is positive. His passion for Higher Knowledge is intense. In such a state of Mind, he prays that he may be granted light, yet more light.

Dante's attitude throughout his journey smacks of his conviction in the Christian idea of the 'original sin', whereas Iqbal's idea of human dignity and glorious destiny is based on God's declaration on the eve of Adam's mission to earth that Man is going to be the Deputy of God on earth (خليفة) and has a great future. There is no guilt complex, no indication of inferiority, no wavering, no defeatism. In a section of the *Jawid Nama*, there is an assurance from the Angels about the superiority of Man (of *Naghma-i-Mala'ik*—the Song of the Angels), after which the great Rumi appears on the scene with a surer and more confident voice. Those interested may examine the Canto in the D. C. regarding the emergence of Virgil who exhorts the Poet (Dante) to proceed under the lure of Poet's beloved Beatrice idealised by him (Dante).

Here we find the two poets on two different planes. While Ideal Love is the chief motive with Dante, with Iqbal it is love for the knowledge of Reality which is the main motivating force.

Another great difference between the two poets lies in their treatment of the *super-natural element* as a means of the development of the story. In Dante, this element is very strong. He creates an atmosphere completely flouting the *law of probability*. He wishes his reader to believe what is not believable. He carries his reader through his undoubtedly superior power of description and delineation which captures the imagination not allowing him to ponder rationally. However, Iqbal does not lose his rational sense under any situation. In most difficult situations necessitating the intervention of the super-natural element, his regard for the *law of causality* and probability never fails him. For instance, if we compare the episode of the Heavens, appearance of the suburbs of the *inferno* in the D. C. and of reaching the lower limits of the sphere of the Moon in the J. N., we will at once find that while Iqbal's approach is gradual and almost natural and therefore intelligible, Dante's approach is sudden like a jerk.

Iqbal passes through the various stages methodically : for instance, after the first prayer (مناجات) there is (1) *Tamhid-i*

Asmani, (2) the Song of the Angels, (3) *Tamhid-i-Zamini*, (4) Rumi's Appearance and sudden emergence of Zarwan—(the Higher spirit controlling time and space—and then entrance of the two poets) (the Guide and the Disciple) into the *Aflak-i Falak-i-Qamar*, *Falak-i-Utarad*, *Falak-i-Zuhra* and so on : All this process is gradual and therefore credible.

But in Dante, in the 3rd canto (of the *Inferno*), Caronte refuses to take poets further; a severe whirlwind takes over, an earthquake sets in along with lightening and lashing winds. Here Dante falls down unconscious. But after a thunder, when he regains his consciousness, he finds that someone has carried him across the chasm which was hitherto impassible.

Now this is sheer '*phantasy*' overloaded with fiction of the most violent type. Usually we find Dante crossing one stage after the other in a state of unconsciousness.

As observed before, the differences of the two are those of the age—and also those of the religious tradition.

Iqbal follows the Holy Quran which maintains that nobody from the Earth could penetrate into the Heavens, except with the essential (spiritual or divine) powers (Quranic words : *الابساطان*). This means that the Heavens could through Sultan be pierced through by human being—and the Holy Prophet set an example of that.

The recent Space Conquest has further strengthened the view, but Iqbal's reference may be read in a wider context.

Dante could not conceive that Heavens could be pierced through. Therefore he proceeded *fictionally*. Yet another sphere of distinction between Dante and Iqbal is found in the handling of the mythological materials. Dante has utilized *Greek mythology* to the fullest extent,—three-headed demons, some creatures, half human and half animal and so many other things. But in Iqbal use of mythology is rare. It exists only in the episode dealing with the Hindu saint *Jahandost* (Vishwa Mitr) and the Hindu poet Bhartari Hari.

Dante is *allegorical* throughout, while Iqbal's statements are *factual, logical*, with allegorical significance only rarely. However, in spite of all this, Dante excels in his superb characterisation, excellent artistry and marvellous power of description, as also in his great *dramatic skill*, and this justifies T. S. Eliot's remarks that "Shakespeare gives the greatest width of human passion ;

Dante the greatest altitude and greatest depth. They compelment each other. It is futile to ask which undertook the more difficult job." (T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, p. 265). One thing, however is certain that Iqbal's job was decidedly more difficult because he belonged to the *age of scientific thought* in which concrete reality rather than fiction reigned supreme.

The system of the Universe which Dante employed was *Ptolemic* and not the familiar *Copernican*—, the macrocosmic system as one would say. But Iqbal is not very strict about the system : he simply follows the usual familiar astronomical system in vogue among the Muslims.

Anyhow, in the words of Robert H Lynn, (Notes on the Divine Comedy, vol. 1 p. 9) "the *Commedia* is a cathedral in language and is unique in several ways" and so is *Jawid Nama* unique in certain other ways.

Miguel Asin, who has already been quoted above, has taken great pains to prove that Dante based his book on the Muslim legends of the *Isra* and the *Miraj*. *Isra* mean's undertaking of journey at night as the Holy Prophet did, according to the Holy Quran (سَبَّحَانَ الَّذِي أَسْرَىٰ بِعَبْدِهِ، لَيْلًا نَّازِلًا), from the Holy mosque of Makkah to the Holy mosque of Aqsa (Jerusalem), followed by ascension to the Heavens. Quite a large mass of Muslim literature exists on these topics, and M. Asin has examined it to arrive finally at the conclusion that Dante with all his fame as a great poet, which praise he deserves, has substantially borrowed from the above-mentioned Muslim sources.

In this article, I do not propose to go into the merits of the above-mentioned conclusion. I am only referring to the question of Iqbal's utilization of the original Muslim sources from which Dante undoubtedly borrowed a lot.

I do not claim to have gone through the entire body of this literature but I have an impression that Iqbal did not depend much on these stories of the *Miraj* and the *Isra*. Conversely, he partially based his poem on the plan of the Divine Comedy as is suggested by the systematic arrangement of the episodes having almost the same details here and there.

Iqbal did not follow the pattern of the *Isra* and the *Miraj* out of respect for the Holy Prophet whose special privilege it was to have ascended the Heavens with prophetic dignity and sublimity.

No other human being according to Muslims can have that honour.

This also accounts for Iqbal's interpretation of the ascension (معراج) that it could only be a higher state of Ordinary human consciousness (and not specific), without involving any physical implication. This, refers to men other than the Holy Prophet. Others can attain to some sort of superconsciousness but the Ascention of the Holy Prophet's is a unique experience and without parallel.

It is quite certain that Ibn-i-Arabi's *Fatuhāt* and his other work on *Isra* could not be the models of Iqbal for his *Jawid Nama* because details differ widely and basically. Similarly al-Ma'arri's *Risalatul-Ghufran* could not catch the imagination of Iqbal because its contents contain heretical materials. There are certain other works of importance such as the *Miraj Nama* of Ibn-i-Sina (in Persian), and certain poems on *Miraj* in the *Mathnawiyat* of great Persian poets such as Nizami Ganjawi, Amir Khusru, Jami and others. These also could not serve as models because most of these contain vague rhetorical statements lacking in accuracy and precision.

Ibn-i-Sina's work is more or less an interpretation of the facts of *Miraj* in philosophical terms, and in Amir Khusru's *Matla'-ul-Anwar*, the only resemblance with *Jawid Nama* is that Khusrau also describes the various stages of the heavenly journey but that is only casual.

There are certain chapters in the *Ma'arijun-Nubuwah* also which could benefit Iqbal but their subject matter is different and more theological.

In any case, Iqbal owes a bit to Dante but only to the extent indicated in this article. But with all his indebtedness to Dante he has his one scheme and his own ideals,

(April 83)

THE "PSEUDO-DRAMATIC" POEMS OF IQBAL

C.M. Naim

Burdened with such epithets as the *Hakim al-Ummat*, "the Wiseman of the Community," and the *Shā'ir-i Mashriq*, "the Poet of the East," Iqbal has rarely received the notice he deserves as a poet-craftsman of great skill and sensitivity. Many writers have reviewed Iqbal's ideas on Poetry and Aesthetics but very few have made note of the aesthetics and poetics of Iqbal's own verses. One notable exception that immediately comes to mind is Professor Muhammad Sadiq, who devoted an entire section to that matter in his history of Urdu literature.¹ Another, much earlier and rather disreputable, though historically quite interesting, case is that of the anonymous reviewer in the *Avadh Punch* who wrote a lengthy series of articles soon after Iqbal's second Urdu volume, *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, "Gabriel's Wing," came out in 1935.² He castigated Iqbal for mistakes of idiom and for transgressing the traditional conventions of Urdu and Persian poetry. Needless to say that Lucknow critic remains buried in well-deserved neglect, while *Bāl-i Jibrīl* is universally regarded as Iqbal's finest book of poetry in Urdu. The credit for that goes to Iqbal the poet-craftsman as much as to Iqbal the thinker.

Iqbal was an innovative poet, in spite of the fact that he wrote neither free nor blank verse. He wrote *ghazal*, the conventional lyric, and *naẓm*, that is poems in various stanza forms

1. Muhammad Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 372 ff.

2. "Idbar" (Pseudonym), "*Miqrāḍ-i Idbaril dar Bāl-i Jibrīl*" (The Scissors of Adversity at the Wings of Gabriel), in *Avadh Punch* (Lucknow), 12 May, 1935, and several subsequent issues. The nature of the comments can be guessed at from the fact that the contentious critic deliberately calls Iqbal's *ghazal* "naẓm".

but with regular metres and rhymes. I am not concerning myself here with Iqbal's *ghazal*, where his innovations are significant, particularly in the way he expanded the range of associations of various traditional symbols. This brief paper deals with only one of Iqbal's favourite modes of poetic expression in his *nazm*. Iqbal's poems are metrically conventional, yet they possess an effect of variety and freshness which is not merely of the surface. He creates this variegated effect by using different, often unusual, stanza forms, by displaying a remarkable ear for the music that choices of metres and words can create, and by creating a heightened sense of drama through dialogue. It is to this latter aspect that this paper seeks to draw attention.

Some of Iqbal's most important poems, in Persian as well as in Urdu, are exquisite examples of what may be called "pseudo-dramatic" poetry—they are poems with certain elements of drama in them and their success is essentially due to the way they are structured. In dramatic poetry, according to one writer, poets "speak through interior monologues or assumed masks; they liberate minor objects and elevate them as striking symbols; they indulge in contrasts between great and small, or private and public, or ancient and contemporary, or elegant and tawdry—in short, they strive for a heightening, not by connected discourse, but by ellipses."³ Iqbal did not write interior monologues, but he did create a "dramatic" effect through other ways, as we shall see below.

Iqbal is primarily didactic in his intentions; in his poems he is aware of an audience and consciously addresses it. Toward that end he insists on using what Eliot calls the second voice of poetry. Didactic poetry can be rather tiresome for most people except the true believer. Iqbal, however, enchants his reader and keeps his interest alive by assuming masks and by turning simple objects into potent symbols. By doing so he relieves the monotony of the didactic second voice, giving it a semblance of the third voice of authentic drama. He discards continuous discourse, and instead presents to his reader pseudo-dramatic situations of

3. John J. Enck, "Dramatic Poetry," in Alex Preminger, et al., Eds., *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (Princeton, 1974), p. 199.

contrast and confrontation. In calling them "pseudo-dramatic" my intentions are not at all pejorative. What I wish to convey is the fact that they are devoid of bare narrative—as is proper for true drama—and yet they lack genuine action. The characters or personae do not take on the kind of three-dimensional individuality that can come through action alone, Iqbal was not writing plays. He had no models available to him for that purpose in any Islamic language, nor was there a viable stage in India at that time. Iqbal's "pseudo-dramatic" poems are not, however, mere lifeless tableaux, for something does take place in them, invariably through a verbal exchange. One can, therefore, call them poems of dialogue. Of course, a closer look brings out finer distinctions. In some the dialogue forms a disputation, in others a chain of inquiry. There are other variations too. In some of these poems, the poet may himself be one of the protagonists—sometimes with a mask on—in others, a mere observer or recorder of the event. But the core structure is always that of a dialogue, and, in that sense, reflects perhaps Iqbal's training as a jurist and a philosopher.

Below, some such poems will be discussed under three headings. As will be evident, further sub-categories can be made, but have not been made here. Neither does the discussion include all the poems that show "pseudo-dramatic" characteristics.⁴

(1) *Poems of Disputation*. In certain poems the dialogue is in the spirit of a disputation between two protagonists; in some cases, each trying to assert one's supremacy over the other. The poet simply presents the individual arguments, ostensibly leaving the verdict to the reader. As is well known, this is a fairly respectable, old genre of poetry in both Persian and Arabic, its

4. A partial listing of such dialogue poems would include 'Aql wa Dil; 'Ishq aur Maut, Shikwah, Jawāb-i Shikwah, Akhtar-i Şubḥ, Khiḍr-i Rāh, Ek Mukālamah—in *Bāng-Darā* (1924); Lenin Khudā Ke Ḥuḍūr Men, Farishton Kā Gīt, Farmān-i Khudā, Pīr-o Murīd, Jibrīl wa Iblīs, Adhān,—in *Bāl-i Jibrīl* (1935); Taqḍīr (Iblīs-o Yazdān), Şubḥ-i Chaman—in *Ḍarb-i Kalim* (1936); Iblīs ki Majlis-i Shūrā, Taşwīr wa Muşawwīr, 'Ālam-i Barzakh—in *Armughān-i Hijāz* (1938); Taskhīr-i Fiṭrat, Muḥāwarah-i 'Ilm-o 'Ishq, Muḥāwarah-i Mābāin Khudā wa Insān, Ḥūr wa Shā'ir—in *Payām-i Mashriq* (1923); and the entire book *Jāvid Nāmāh* (1932).

origin lying in Middle Eastern antiquity.⁵ In Arabic such poems are called *munāzarai* or *muḥāwarai* and it is the latter term that Iqbal frequently uses in the titles of such poems. An excellent example would be his Persian poem, *Muḥāwarah Mābain Khudā wa Insān*, "A Dispute between God and Man,"⁶ but before we look at that let us glance at a simple, early poem titled '*Aql wa Dil*, "Intellect and Heart"⁷:

One day Intellect said to Heart,
 I guide those who are lost.
 From the earth I range to the heavens,
 Just see, how far I can reach.
 I give meaning to the Book of Life;
 I make visible God's great glory.
 You?—a mere clot of blood,
 I put to shame the finest ruby.
 Heart said, That may be true, but
 See what I really am.
 You merely *know* Life's secret;
 I *see* it with my eyes.
 You beget learning; I, gnosis.
 You search for God. I show Him.
 See, how high my status is,
 In me resides the Almighty.⁸

5. Jes P. Asmussen, *Studies in Judeo-Persian Literature* (Leiden, 1973), Chapter II, "A Judeo-Persian Precedence-Dispute Poem and Some Thoughts on the History of the Genre," pp. 32-59.

Through Arabic this genre also spread into various European languages. Cf. *Streifdichtung* in German. Some of the very earliest poems by Iqbal are Urdu adaptations of several English poems for children that belong to this genre. For example, "The Spider and the Fly," "The Mountain and the Squirrel," "The Cow and the Goat" in *Bāng-i Darā*, all written before 1905.

6. It occurs in *Payām-i Mashriq [Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl (Fārsī)]*, (Lahore, 1973), p. 284.

7. It occurs in *Bāng-i Darā*; it was written before 1905 [*Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl (Urdu)*, (Lahore, 1973)], p. 41.

8. This incomplete translation is by the author of this paper. A complete translation can be found in *Poems from Iqbal* by Victor G. Kiernan (Bombay, 1947), p. 24. The later edition of the book, however, does not contain it.

The final word is with Heart, so we know who the winner is in that dispute, but in the dispute between God and Man, as delineated by Iqbal, we see a stalemate: God is all powerful, but Man also plays a crucial role in the scheme of things.

God

I made this world, from one same earth and water,
 You made Tartaria, Nubia, and Iran;
 I forged from dust the iron's unsullied ore,
 You fashioned sword and arrowhead and gun;
 You shaped the axe to hew the garden tree,
 You wove the cage to hold the singing-bird.

Man

You made the night and I the lamp,
 And You the clay and I the cup;
 You—desert, mountain-peak, and vale:
 I—flower-bed, park, and orchard; I
 Who grind a mirror out of stone,
 Who brew from poison honey-drink.⁹

A different kind of disputation is found in the two long "complaint" poems written in Urdu, *Shikwah* and *Jawāb-i Shikwah*, "Complaint" and "Answer to the Complaint".¹⁰ To the best of our knowledge, Iqbal did not originally plan the second poem at the same time as the first, but the immense popularity of the *Shikwah* and the logic of Iqbal's thought both demanded a sequel, and the two now form a pair. Together they are perhaps the two most popular Urdu poems of Iqbal. In the first, the poet complains to God on behalf of all Muslims concerning their down-trodden and humiliating state in the affairs of the world. He enumerates the past deeds of the Muslims to underscore his

9. Victor G. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal* (London, 1955), p. 93.

10. These poems occur in *Bāng-i Darā [Kulliyāt (Urdū)]*, pp. 163 and 199, respectively. According to Muhammad Sadiq (op. cit.), they were written in 1909 and 1912, respectively.

complaint of God's neglect.

We erased the smudge of falsehood
 from the parchment firmament,
 We redeemed the human species
 from the chain of slavery ;
 And we filled the Holy Kaaba with
 our foreheads humbly bent,
 Clutching to our fervent bosoms the
 Koran in ecstasy.
 Yet the charge is laid against us we
 have played the faithless part ;
 If disloyal we have proved, hast
 Thou deserved to win our heart ?¹¹

He then continues :

Why no more are worldly riches
 among Muslims to be found,
 Since Thy power is as of old beyond
 compute and unconfined ? . . .
 All we have is jeers from strangers,
 public shame, and poverty—
 Is disgrace our recompense for laying
 down our lives for Thee ?¹²

There is much more in a similar vein, expressing the sentiments of an average Muslim, often in a delightfully playful tone. A more serious note comes in near the end, and the complaint ends in a supplication.

Grant at last Thy sore-tried people in
 their difficulties ease,
 Make the ant of little substance peer
 of Solomon to be ; . . .¹³

In the second poem, God responds to the complaint by pointing out the listless state of the Muslims themselves.

11. A. J. Arberry, Tr., *Complaint and Answer* (Lahore, 1955), p. 15.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

We would fain be bountiful, but no
petitioner is there ;
When no traveller approaches, how
can We guide on the way ? . . .¹⁴

God charges the Muslims with a lack of initiative. They are also disunited, having fallen victim to rising nationalism, and have lost the true spirit of Islam that was a combination of Faith and Action.

Nations come to birth by Faith ; let
Faith expire, and nations die ;
So, when gravitation ceases, the
thronged stars asunder fly.¹⁵
Who erased the smudge of falsehood
from the parchment firmament ?
Who redeemed the human species
from the chains of slavery ?
Who once filled the Holy Kaaba with
their foreheads lowly bent,
Clutching to their fervent bosoms the
Koran in ecstasy ?
Who were they ? They were your fathers ;
as for now, why, what are you,
Squatting snug, serenely waiting for
tomorrow to come true ?¹⁶
Sure enough, you have your Syeds,
Mirzas, Afghans, all the rest ;
But can you claim you are Muslims,
if the truth must be confessed ?¹⁷
If the child learns not the knowledge
that has made his father sage,
Then what right has he by merit to
his father's heritage ?¹⁸

The poem ends with a promise from God :

14. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

Be thou faithful to Muhammad, and
 We yield Ourselves to thee;
 Not this world alone—the Tablet and
 the Pen thy prize shall be.¹⁹

(2) *Poems of Inquiry*. In such poems the dialogue consists of questions asked by the poet, speaking in the first person, addressed to some figure, historical or imaginary, and answers given by that figure. These answers essentially represent the opinions of the poet himself concerning various issues; he quotes the other protagonist or puts words in his mouth to express his own conclusions. In a poem like *Pīr-o Murīd*, "The Master and the Disciple," Rūmī's responses to Iqbal's questions are Rūmī's own verses²⁰; in other poems, Iqbal provides the words, for example in *Khidr-i Rāh*, "The Khidr (Guide) of the Road",²¹ Most of these poems are too long to quote in full; only a few selected verses from the latter will have to suffice.

Poet to Khidr

To thy world-ranging eye is visible the storm
 Whose breakers now sleep silently beneath the sea;
 The poor man's boat, that wall of the orphan, that pure
 spirit!
 The wisdom even of Moses stood in awe of thee;
 Thou shunnest all abodes, to tread the wilderness,
 Of day and night, of yesterdays and tomorrows, free.
 What is the riddle of life? what thing is kingship? why
 Must labourer and merchant bloodily disagree?

Khidr to Poet

The chapter of the Kings, let me
 Unriddle to your mind.—

19. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

20. It occurs in *Bāl-i Jibril [Kulliyāt (Urdū)]*, p. 426.

21. It occurs in *Bāng-i Darā [Kulliyāt (Urdū)]*, p. 225. According to Sadiq, it was written in 1921.

A conjurer's wand is sovereignty,
 That conquering nations find.
 If ever a little in their sleep
 His subjects stir, the sure
 Enchantments of the ruler steep
 Their wits in night once more. . . .
 In the West the people rule, they say;
 And what is this new reign?
 The same old harp, the same strings play
 The Empires' old refrain. . . .²²

(3) A third category can be set up of certain poems, which, for the sake of convenience, may be referred to as *Poems of "Witnessing"*. Poems falling into this category consist of a dialogue or a series of dialogues between two or more protagonists, not involving, however, the ego of the poet and not necessarily always in the nature of a disputation. The poet is, in fact, observing or witnessing an imagined scene, which he desires to share with his readers. The scenes contain hardly any action; they consist of verbal exchanges. Even these verbal exchanges may sometime appear to be a great deal independent of each other. In other words, rather than a sustained dramatic scene, it may turn out to be a series of tableaux, somewhat static in themselves, yet capable of generating drama through their juxtaposition. Some of the important poems belonging to this category would be the trilogy consisting of "Lenin in the Presence of God," "Angel's Song," and "God's Command,"²³ or the cycle titled *Taskhīr-i Fiṭrat*, "The Conquest of Nature",²⁴ I can quote here only a short poem titled *Taqdir*, "Fate".²⁵

22. Kiernan, op. cit., Bombay edition, pp. 43-47.

23. They occur in *Bāl-i Jibrīl [Kulliyāt (Urdū)]*, pp. 398-402. An English translation can be found in Kiernan (op. cit., London edition, pp. 42-44). He does not, however, include the second poem of the trilogy.

24. They occur in *Payām-i Mashriq [Kulliyāt (Fārsī)]*, pp. 255-58.

25. It occurs in *Ḍarb-i Kalīm [Kulliyāt (Urdū)]*, pp. 508-09. A note by the poet tells that it is an adaptation from some writing of Ibn 'Arabī.

Satan (to God)

O God, Creator! I did not hate your Adam,
 That captive of Far-and-Near and Swift-and-Slow;
 And what presumption could refuse to *You*
 Obedience? If I would not kneel to him,
 The cause was Your own fore-ordaining will.

God (to Satan)

When did that mystery dawn on you? before,
 Or after your sedition?

Satan (to God)

After, oh brightness,
 Whence all the glory of all being flows.

God (to His Angels)

See what a grovelling nature taught him this
 Fine theorem! His not kneeling, he pretends,
 Belonged to My fore-ordinance; gives his freedom
 Necessity's base title;—wretch! his own
 Consuming fire he calls a wreath of smoke.²⁶

One of the books that Iqbal published in Persian was *Jāvid Nāmāh*, "The Book of Jāvid". All critics agree that as a brilliant achievement of poetic art it is Iqbal's finest work. It is a dazzling panorama of shifting scenes, unusual juxtaposition, and fascinating exchanges. Its language is simple yet elegant; its rhythms and rhymes musically vibrant as well as contextually perfect. No English translation has succeeded in doing justice to it, and the task is wellnigh impossible.²⁷ Reading it one wishes some brilliant composer would set it to music, like an oratorio or a concert opera. It is a dialogue poem, but on a scale never before attempted

26. Kiernan, op. cit., London edition, p. 64.

27. The most readable translation in English is by A. J. Arberry: *Jāvid Nāmāh* (London, 1966).

by Iqbal. Myriads of protagonists—some historical, some mythical—carrying symbolic values, speak in it in their own as well as in Iqbal's voice, to each other as well as to *Zindahrūd*, the mask adopted by Iqbal on that celestial journey. In short, *Jāvid Nāmāh* is a brilliantly executed dialogue poem, and as an Urdu speaker I regret the fact that Iqbal did not find time to write something equally grand in Urdu.

Iqbal did not write a play. It is not known if he ever even planned to write one. Near the end of his life he wanted to write two long poems, one in Urdu on the story of the *Ramayana*, the other in English, "The Book of an Unknown Prophet," modelled after Nietzsche's *Also Sprache Zarathustra*. No record indicates that any progress was made on either of the projects. It is also regrettable that Iqbal had a very low opinion of both the stage and the screen. One cannot blame that on the poor quality of the theatre and cinema in India at that time, for Iqbal had had ample, though little availed, opportunity to experience the art of the stage while in Europe. His short poem titled "Cinema"²⁸ reads like a fanatic's diatribe, refusing to see in it any possibility of aesthetic and intellectual reward. Cinema, for him, is nothing but "new fetish-fashioning, idol-making and mongering". His contempt for the theatre arises from the same impulse: acting involves a denial and suppression of one's own selfhood, and that is the worst crime in Iqbal's eyes.

Your body be the abode of another's ego,
God forbid! Do not revive the mongering of idols!²⁹

It is an interesting question to ask ourselves: why did the Muslims all over the world fail to create viable theatre until quite recently? The Arabs translated Greek philosophy and sciences but completely ignored the great plays. Was it simply a matter of a difference in literary tastes? Was it because of the sexual segregation in the society? Was it due to the despotic nature of the milieu which, as Baraheni suggests, was not

28. It occurs in *Bāl-i Jibril*. An English translation can be found in Kiernan, op. cit., London edition, pp. 57-58.

29. *Tiyātar* (Theatre) in *Ḍarb-i Kalīm [Kulliyāt (Urdu)]*, p. 568.

conducive to a true "dialogue" ?³⁰ Was acting or impersonation actually regarded as a blasphemous act? This is, however, not the right place to speculate on these issues. We only know that Iqbal felt no desire to write true drama, remaining quite satisfied with the "pseudo-dramatic". That in itself was a major contribution to Urdu poetry, for which we are grateful to him.

(April, 79)

30. Reza Baraheni, *The Crowned Cannibals* (New York, 1977), p. 70.



Recent Advances in Science and Iqbal's Concept of Life and Death. K. A. Rashid.

Iqbal and Outer Space. Shaheer Niazi

RECENT ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF LIFE AND DEATH

Lieut.-Colonel (Rtd.) K.A. Rashid

Introduction. In this article I shall be dealing mainly with bio-chemistry and bio-physics, as I feel the days of philosophy are over and the noumenal world and the phenomenal world have become more closely related, interconnected and inter-transferable. It has now become easy to discern the similarity between the two. The details of this relationship, which were hitherto unknown to philosophers, are now being discovered with more precision, and, as we have arrived in the computer age, philosophical imaginings have become volatile. Physics has discovered the philosophical aura in electromagnetic waves and in vibrations of atoms and radioactivity.

The bio-chemists of today are the alchemists of old. Each one has been trying to prolong life in his own way: the bio-chemist by working on the genetic code and the alchemist by seeking the elixir! But life is not worth prolonging unless it is worth living. It appears that in olden days—in the time of Noah—life was indeed worth living, as people lived for longer periods. The pleasures of life have indeed dwindled gradually and life has acquired a short span.

It has now been proved that the individual cells of living being have a blueprint of the entire human being and the genes which are the smallest part of a chromosome are capable of rejuvenating by assimilation. The genetic code has first to be translated into the "albumin language". This code is a physiological script recently discovered in the chromosomes which lays bare a programme of life and death. This indicates the human capacity for renewal. This programme includes the materialisation of consciousness.

It has also been discovered that all the living forms of life are radiating with energy. In short, they are vibrating in different wavelengths which depict their function. The entire human body is surrounded by an aura which has now been photographed. It has been found that man is enclosed in an envelope of invisible forces. This aura changes in colour and in intensity according to its emotional and physical state.¹

Not only man but all forms of life in this universe are an ordered and controlled creation manipulated in an electromagnetic field. This can be measured and recorded with precision. They form a pattern for every living being which is unchangeable and every time it is renewed it assumes the same shape as the original pattern. The Holy Qur'ān has categorically stated that the creative power of God has created man on a set pattern which is unchangeable. This pattern is particularly interesting in the case of man. It was previously assumed that all the cells of the human body are turned over and renewed every ten years. But it has now been found that the proteins of the human body are being turned over every six months, and in some organs of the human body even earlier! This electrodynamic field of the human body serves as a matrix or a mould which we have called the pattern and it does not change shape even when the cells are being renewed. They fall in the same pattern just as iron filings form the same pattern every time they are poured over the magnetic field. Although science has proved this to be renewing every six months, the Holy Qur'ān clearly indicates this renewal taking place every day! It says:

“And those in the solar system and the earth ask of Him (of their survival). (Say :) Every day He is in a new state (of glory).”

This verse clearly indicates a renewal of form, which may not be perceptible to the naked human eye. This is going on all the time. And this life, which is ever changing on this planet, is not isolated from the rest of the universe, but is a part of it and is influencing and affecting the life of other beings in different ways.

1. Johannus V. Buttler, *Journey to Eternity*, London : Neville Spearman, 1975.

Animals and plants are also controlled by the same electrodynamic field and are thus an integral part of the universe and are hence subject to the same universal laws (*taqdīr*). "Plants nourish man and animals, animals feed on each other, so when we remember that we should starve without sunlight from some ninety-three million miles away, it is not hard to accept that we were subject to the other great force of space."²

It is most interesting to see that against the universal law (*taqdīr*) man has invented spiritual laws (*qismat*) to satisfy his appetite for the Unknown which comprises mostly fiction and fables! Man has failed to understand that this creation is the work of a Beneficent and Benevolent God, and nothing but good prevails here. All evil and pollution is of man's making. In spite of this, man believes his views about *qismat* to be true. Haunted houses, ghosts and evil spirits are of man's own imagination sprung out of his primitive religion of magic and taboo. The strangest paradox is that man, being a rational knowledgeable being, lingers on to such intellectual fraud! These spiritual laws have one set of meaning in the Western world and another in the Eastern world. The truth of this is that they are both confused. This attitude is so foolish that it cannot be considered even as a recreational pastime. The only reason these ideas arise is to satisfy the appetite for the urge to know the unknowable, which is unknowable. Hence any search for it will lead to confusion and fantastic tales based on lies which an honest man cannot confirm. "Nature is reluctant to reveal its secrets to the intellectually arrogant."³ It is for this reason that the Holy Qur'ān has discouraged such pursuits in several places. In one place it says: "And follow not of that which thou hast no knowledge. Surely, the hearing, the sight and the heart, of all these it will be asked." It is a clear indication for them to be aware of listening to ghost stories and clairvoyance demonstration!

The Vibration Theory of Creation We have been talking of vibrations, electromagnetic and electrodynamic waves in the process of creation and prevalent in this universe. These are not new ideas, but have lingered in the mind of man quite for some time. The

2. Harold Saxton Burns, *Blueprints of Immortality*, London: Neville Spearman, 1972.

3. Ibid.

following quotation will be of interest to the student of religion, science and philosophy, which has been taken from the eighth letter of Ḥaḍrat Mullā Shāh's *Maktūbāt* (b. 1072/1661) :

”آمدم بر سر مقصود و آن چه گفتم و مضمون آن را بتو معلوم کردم
حقیقت بجز اینست که آن متموج گشته یعنی بر سر موج زدن آمده ، وقتیکه
موج زده یک موج تو شدی مثلاً و دیگر زمین شد و دیگر آب شد دیگر
هوا شد و دیگر آتش شد دیگر آسمان شد -“

It may be rendered into simple English as follows:

”I have come to the conclusion, and whatever I have said, the meaning of this has been made clear to you. The truth is nothing beyond this: that that started to vibrate, that is, it forced out its wavelength and the moment the waves spread, one of them became you, and the other the earth, and yet the next turned into water, and the other became air and still another became fire and yet another turned heavens (solar system).“

In the eleventh letter of his *Maktūbāt*, Ḥaḍrat Mullā Shāh talks of sound patterns in terms of *āwāz-i hayūlā* (آوازِ هیولی), that is to say that when God Almighty created the pattern of this universe, it was enveloped in sound waves which were vibrating and congenially condensing to assume different forms. I have already discussed elsewhere,⁵ that this sound was the sound of *hū* (هو)—He, which was vibrating, and condensed to form a glowing mass of clouds (دخان) from which the universe emerged, and later separated after cooling and contracting. Says the Holy Qur'ān :

”Do not those who disbelieve see that the heavenly bodies and the earth were closed up. So We rent them asunder. We made from water everything living. Will they not then believe?“ (xxi. 30).

Two things are now clear from this: first, the solar system was one mass which cooled and contracted and broke off to occupy space and became the cosmos; and, secondly, as the mass cooled it gave off vapour which came down in the form of rain, and from

4. Persian Manuscript.

5. "Qurānic Cosmogony," *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 5 September 1976.

this rain-water life was created. Modern bio-chemistry has proved that life was created out of water and modern cosmology also has confirmed that the cosmos was a glowing mass which cooled and contracted and broke off to form the various galaxies.

“In our own day and generation, brain waves, heart waves, concomitants of nervous impulses of muscle contraction and of glandular activity have filled the literature with a great deal of exceedingly important information.”⁶ This entire discussion will recall that biology has taken over from philosophy! In modern times the electrodynamic theory of life was developed by Dr F.S.C. Northrop of Yale.⁷

The Human Brain. The human brain is the seat, the control and the transformer of total vibrations in the human body. It must be realised that the localisation of brain function is not yet complete. But when completed it will be found that the brain not only controls all the physical movements of the bodily organs, but also emotions and extra-sensory or supra-sensory perceptions. The quality of these vibrations is electromagnetic and is functionally dynamical. Such vibrations pervade the atmosphere and have the capability of emanating and transforming even what is called astral aspects of the human body. Telepathy and premonitions are part of the brain which remain dormant and undeveloped in individuals not prone to such practices. The brain is a transformer for these vibrations which are usually called the spirit or the soul, and the astral projection is also a part of the brain function. But unless and until the localisation of the functions of the brain is completed, it will be futile to discuss the problem any further. But suffice it to know that in the present scientific age everything is offering a scientific explanation by experimental methods which are verifiable, or could be verified in the very near future.

A very interesting and significant aspect of such experiments was discussed in a very high conference held in 1971 in Bijurakan in the U.S.S.R. to discuss extra-terrestrial intelligence.⁸ In this

6. Burns, *op. cit.*

7. S.H. Burt and F.S.C. Northrop, *Quarterly Review of Biology* (1935), 10 : 322-33.

8. Buttler, *op. cit.*

conference some very important decisions were obtained from Soviet scholars, which may be briefly stated as follows. Civilisation similar to earthly civilisation did exist in the universe, but not necessarily anthropomorphic, yet technically man advanced. This civilisation of ours, therefore, is not unique. Contact between any two civilisations was possible. It was possible that the progress of technology on any planet could stop, either due to "self-destruction" or as a result of some "cosmic catastrophe," or "possibly owing to a change in the philosophy of a form of life that does without technology."⁹

It is now confirmed that technology has progressed on this earth so much that we can send and receive signals up to a distance of a hundred light years! Even the Russians have invented computers to decipher signals in code. These new methods of communication have brought out the discovery of the LASER (Light Amplification of Stimulated Energy Radiation) and MASER (Microwave Amplification of Stimulated Energy Radiation). Even telepathy is being considered as a means of interstellar communications. It is supposed to do away with electromagnetic methods, but it is again overlooked that these telepathic waves are emanating and projecting from the brain. The speed of thought which is emerging from the brain is much greater than the speed of light!

A lot of work has also been done on parapsychology in recent years parallel with natural sciences, such as physiology, biology and bionomics. It is now considered that extra-sensory perceptions like telepathy, clairvoyance and premonitions are similar faculties which lie dormant or latent in man, unless they are developed and utilised, by realising and appreciating the force with which the brain is vibrating. "Many indications show that in olden times man possessed strongly masked ESP faculties that have gradually been lost without an increasingly technological environment. But every now and then these faculties crop up again in individual cases."¹⁰

ESP is frequently seen to exist in animals and birds. This is

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

evidenced by the fact that many a time when a calamity like an earthquake or fire is apprehended the animals like dogs and birds come to know about it beforehand and even leave the locality. The Holy Qur'ān says in one place that they are species like yourselves: "And there is no animal in the earth, nor a bird that flies on its two wings, but (they are) communities (species) like yourselves" (vi. 38). They are, therefore, endowed with the same faculties of self-preservation of which premonitions are more prominent in them than man who has other faculties also to preserve himself. These birds and animals are not only endowed with human instincts, but they also have their own languages and methods of remembrance (prayers). Says the Holy Qur'ān again: "Seest thou not that Allah is He Whom do glorify all those who are in heaven and earth, and the birds with wings outspread? Each one knows its prayers and its glorification. And Allah knows of what they do" (xxiv. 41).

I have mentioned this in passing to illustrate that birds and animals are species like human species. In fact, I would not be far wrong if I said that I see human caricatures in them all!!! They may have been human communities in the past, but due to their evil actions they received punishment. After all we have a clear instance of a community being turned into monkeys: "So when they revoltingly persisted in that in which they had been forbidden, We said to them: Be (as) apes disposed and hated" (vii. 166). I am surprised that this verse of the Holy Qur'ān was never brought to the notice of Darwin, otherwise he would have perhaps reversed his theory of evolution of man from monkeys! However, this cannot be denied that the faculty of ESP is most prominent in animals and birds and lies dormant in man unless developed.

Mechanism of Communication. The premonitions and telepathic communications originate from brain cells in the form of vibrations which establish contact with future events through a pattern which is forming and which they understand and interpret. Up till now, "all telepathic radiations are unrecognised source of energy".¹¹ But this energy exists in the form of vibrations which I

11. Ibid.

have described above at some length. The brain, I have said, is a kind of transformer for this energy which can project itself out.

The human body is created on a pattern of extreme excellence, which is unchangeable. Each organ is composed of cells of respective tissues. There are 60,000 billion cells in the human body! It is estimated that 500 billion cells of some type die every day and are being renewed. The intake of food regenerates them; and the excreta which issues forth from the holes of the human body is the waste product of the body resulting from the metabolism of body tissues.

The vibrations of communication emanate from the brain and are known as electromagnetic waves. These have been measured and mapped.¹² It is also now established that "atomic fission has shown that matter—once considered 'solid'—can sometimes be converted into waves of energy."¹³ It is this wave of energy which I consider to be the soul or spirit. These fields of electromagnetic waves are emanating not only from the human body, but from every leaf of the trees and wings of birds and other animals.

Universal Organisation. "This Universe is the product of organisation, not chance."¹⁴ Hence there must be an organiser. If there was no Creator this world would not have continued to exist for long. It must, therefore, have a plan of organisation. This Planner and Organiser is Allah, the Great Supreme Organiser. This leads the modern scientific researches to formidable conclusion. "As the matter in the earth is a part of the original matter of the Universe, so life on earth is part of the original life of the Universe."¹⁵ There is evidence before us that Nature is no fumbling hobbyist.¹⁶ Says the Holy Qur'ān: "Our Lord! Thou hast not created this (cosmos) in vain" (iii. 191). And says He again: "Do you think We have created you in vain, and that you will not be returned unto Us?" This hobbying is not an attribute of the Creator, but man considers this world as a playground and this life as jest. Says the Holy Qur'ān again: "And the life of this world is but a sport and play". And finally it says: "We did not create the heavens and the earth and that which is between

12. Edward Russell, *Design and Destiny*, London: Neville Spearman, 1973.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

in sport" (xliv. 38).

A very pertinent question has been asked by a Western writer : "Where did the earth get its raw material to evolve?" I have discussed the answer to this question in my article : "Qur'ānic Cosmology".¹⁷ And I have also mentioned some details about it above under my theory of vibrations. It is a very vital question to which an answer must be sought before proceeding any further to study the organisation of this earth.

We have said above that a process of self-renewal is going on in body tissues, and it is estimated that after every six months the entire proteins of the body are replaced with new proteins and the tissues are renewed. Not very long ago it was thought that these tissues are renewed every ten years and a new being appears. The interval has now been reduced to six months, but, as I have stated, according to the Holy Qur'ān, this renewal is taking place every moment. This change is so rapid that it is imperceptible, but the most amazing phenomenon is that the original pattern remains the same. There is no alteration except when man advances in age and certain features change due to fair decay relaxing the surface tissues. While the tissues are changing in advancing age, they are communicating with each other. That is to say, each cell communicates with the other through electromagnetic vibrations. This process continues in the brain cells also and in thought and memory. Thought stimulates thinking with the aid of memory, and this circuit is completed by constant communication. Western scholars do not agree with this idea of mine. Edward Russell says: "Nobody has ever found one molecule chatting with one another."¹⁸

In 1958, while I was in London studying at the Royal Army Medical College, I was looking at a specimen of stools under the microscope. I suddenly came across a colony of giardia lamblia which presented to me a most fascinating sight. I watched them very carefully. This organism resembles the face of man. It has a mouth, a pair of eyes and ears and has a beard. I saw very clearly that some of them would recognise a passerby and stop to

17. See footnote 5 above.

18. *Op. cit.*

talk to him. And if anyone was not acquainted with the passerby he would quietly swerve aside and leave his path. I was extremely thrilled by their behaviour and I wrote a detailed letter to the late Maulānā ‘Abdul Mājīd Daryābādī in India who published it in his weekly *Ṣidq*.¹⁹ This episode clearly indicates that the cells or molecules do communicate with each other, and one day, like the genetic script, a molecular language would be discovered and recorded in the instruments to be invented. This script and language would disclose secrets of the creative pattern. This is tantamount to saying that vibrations prevailing in the atmosphere are not only communicating with each other externally but also communicating internally between the cells of the human body. They are affecting the behaviour of everyone. They are indestructable, but interconvertable into matter.

Another very interesting thing has been recently discovered and it is the process of recording our actions in the human body. Says Edward Russell: "There is within the brain a Ganglionic record of past experiences."²⁰

The main vehicles of experience in the human body are the limbs, the sexual organs, and the organs of sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell. Each of these organs are vibrating and communicating with the brain and with each other as well as with the outer world. Personally I was of opinion that this record was being maintained in brain cells in the form of tiny hairlike fibrous tapes, which would be projected as if on a TV screen to show man on the Day of Resurrection what he had been doing! An enormous portion of brain is yet unlocalised in its function, as I have already stated. When new regions of the brain are allocated their functions, new light would be thrown on this aspect of man's life. The Holy Qur'ān has a verse to show that such recording does exist: but in what form, it has yet to be discovered. Says the Holy Qur'ān: "And We have made everyone's actions to cling to his neck and We shall bring forth to him on the Day of Resurrection a book which he will find wide open" (xvii. 13).

The word used here for neck is '*unuqihī*', which really indicates

19. *Ṣidq-i Jadīd*, Lucknow (India) (1968).

20. *Op. cit.*

height. This is a clear indication that the book of actions will not be found tied to the neck, but preserved in a record stored in the brain. This is not mere imagination but supported by facts and scientific investigation. Recording of waves and vibrations has now been proved scientifically and fully established. It is a well-known fact that "thought can produce chemical changes in the silver-bromide molecules of a photographic emulsion."²¹ Similarly, thought can record all experience suitably converted into appropriate and relevant pictures. Thoughts vibrate and act like an electromagnetic field. There is not the slightest doubt about this fact, and we have already indicated above that certain areas of the brain are linked up with the five senses of the human body.

All the vibrations and recordings are taking place in accordance with the Universal Law—the Law of *Taqdir*—the Law of Estimates, under which all established scientific laws fall. Some of these scientific laws keep changing as discoveries keep coming, thus conforming to the Universal Law. Actions do not have to wait to see the result till resurrection. The good and evil actions of man attract and dispel clouds or bring in other calamities. Action vibrations make our fate during our lifetime. Man thus moulds his destiny. Man is responsible and answerable for his own acts. He is not determined but answerable. The fatalism has ruined the character of man. The fate of the ancient people as described in the Scriptures overtook them during their lifetime after they had been duly warned. The fate of Joseph's brothers and Potifer's wife became apparent to them after a short while of their lifetime. It is law which is predestined and predetermined, but not actions. The law has been known to every living being in this creation and actions are taking place according to a set will which determines the results. Nature does not relax its Universal Law of *Taqdir* for anyone, nor can man bribe, or for that matter any living being can bribe, Nature! Nature is neither "wrathful" nor "vindictive". Everything here is for the good of man. But man does not apply brakes to his conduct and thus upsets everything!

21. Edward Russell, *op. cit.*

The Pattern. We have talked about vibrations which, in modern terminology, may be called electromagnetic waves. It is now established that these move at a rate of 400 million waves per second! The speed of vibrations for each sense is different, and so also is the speed of thought. This speed becomes slower as we advance in age: as, for example, our sense of hearing and of sight become deteriorated. This is due to the change in frequencies. There are patterns of vibrations within the universe on which is based the temperament of beings, colour and sound. This is unchangeable. These patterns are based on the creative power of the Almighty Who has designed each species in accordance with its purpose and environment. Even the atom has a set pattern and is a system within itself. Thus each being in this creation is self-contained. "Our feeling of ourselves resides entirely in the body, and even our spiritual emotions are deemed to rise within this shell."²² Not to talk of individual entities, the whole creation is an amazing phenomenon. To give you an idea, "this whole solar system is but one of some 1,000 million similar systems which make up the galaxy known as the Milky Way. . . . Even this is only one of 10,000 million galaxies in the known Universe."²³ This gigantic creation is indeed awe-inspiring. Scientists specialising in cosmology and cosmogony are left astounded at the Creator's method of creation in which everything is vibrating, communicating, transforming and is reinterpreted through the brain to expose noumenal and phenomenal worlds.

The reinterpretation of all paranormal psychological phenomena is revealing the extra-sensory perception world, and laying bare the facts of life in a more concrete and factual way. Thus the subliminal sophisticated spiritual aspects of human belief are being converted into facts of life discernible to ordinary individuals in a more scientific manner, shedding away the spiritual garb of traditional interpretation. Even the water-diviner's twig is vibrating to locate the stream of water which is hidden from the human eye. It even locates hidden minerals in the mountains.

22. A.H. Reyner, *The Diary of A Modern Alchemist*, London: Neville Spearman, 1974.

23. Ibid.

These vibrations are being “translated into action” and virtually converted into material results, just like light is converted into green matter in plants (chlorophyll)! It is indeed a super-intelligent universe. “We need to be little more inspired in our thinking, and recognise these patterns, and many other equally fascinating are the result of programmes laid down by a superior intelligence in the noumenal world.”²⁴ The noumenal world like the phenomenal world is also of cosmic nature except that it is vibrating and is being translated and transformed into the phenomenal world.

The Holy Qur’ān talks of this phenomenon in a more amazing way when it describes fertilisation and pollination through the aid of breeze. Says the Holy Qur’ān: “And We send the winds fertilising, then send down water from the clouds . . .” (xv. 22). This verse of the Holy Qur’ān will clearly indicate that not only the vibrations of the breeze are communicating, but they are also pollinating. It is translating a factual process through vibrational vehicle. Not only this, the Holy Qur’ān has also a chapter on vibrations entitled, “al-Dhāriḡāt” (li.) which is normally translated into English as “Scatterers”. Anyone can see that our translation is more appropriate. The opening verses of this chapter run as follows:

“By those scattering broadcast! and those bearing the load! and those running easily! and those distributing the affairs (orders). What you are promised is surely true. And the judgment will sure come to pass” (li. 1-6).

Do these verses of the Holy Qur’ān not indicate vibrational activities in the cosmos? It clearly shows how the vibrations of different qualities are being transported and the purpose for which they are transported. It requires a clear rational mind to appreciate the pattern of programme of the Almighty and how it is working. If now, this chapter is read along with chapter lxxvii. called “al-Mursalāt,” the whole pattern will become clear. The title “al-Mursalāt” can be translated as the “Communications,” but it is normally translated as “Those Sent Forth”. I feel our translation

24. Ibid.

is more to the point. After all, what is that which is sent forth? —mostly communications. This chapter relates to the vibrations communicated, and runs as follows:

“By those communications (sent forth), spread goodness, then those push on with a forceful pushing, and those spreading goodness far and wide, then those making a distinction, then those offering the reminder, to clear or to warn. Surely that which you are promised comes to pass.”

How are these pollens being directed to the appropriate plant? And how are these appropriate wavelengths being picked up by the receiving stations? This is the universal pattern of cosmic programme.

We have described in some detail how the pattern is projecting the vibrations which are being translated and transformed into various actions. Pollens are attracted in the manner of vaginal vibrations. There is a trigger network spread all around which is attracting the desired waves to fulfil the errand. This is happening in the emotional field as in the field of dreams, with our para-normal senses. Actually, this phenomenal world is a “pattern of rhythms” translated from the vibrations of the noumenal world! This was popularly known as the spiritual world, of which we know nothing. It is today the world of vibrations emerging from the universal pattern created by the Almighty. The creative power (*Fiṭrat Allah*) has created man on this pattern (*faṭarannās*) which is signified by the expression *faṭaran* (pattern). Says the Holy Qur’ān: “The creative power of God has made man on a set pattern” (xxx. 30). Such translations of the pattern of vibrations are taking place all over the universe and man has even acquired the knowledge of recording and interpreting such vibrations. We have already cited the examples of water-divining and mineral-divining above; such vibrations even descend from the supra-space where they are ever emanating from the echoing sound *Hī* (He). All patterns receive their vibrations from the original sound which is emanating and translating various forms of its wavelengths to meet the requirements of creation.

In the beginning of this article, I gave a small quotation from the *Maktūbāt* (Letters) of Ḥadīrat Mullā Shāh. It will be of

interest to see that a similar thing was said a hundred years ago by the German chemist Karl von Reichenbach who believed that the "Universe was permeated by a variety of non-physical vibrations."²⁵

Now, the question arises: How does one become aware of such vibrations? It is a matter of simple experience of one's consciousness of senses of the phenomenal world—which become related to the para-normal senses of the noumenal world, which are being translated into physical patterns. And consciousness is nothing but awareness of these facts! And the self is nothing without consciousness. The moment consciousness is withdrawn, man either falls asleep or dies and enters the noumenal world of vibrations. The Holy Qur'ān uses the word *nafs* for the "conscious self" or "consciousness," and in a few places for the physiological and anatomical heart. In one place the Holy Qur'ān says:

"Allah takes men's consciousness (*nafs*) at the time of death, and those that die not during their sleep" (xxxix. 42).

Obviously, the word *nafs* here means consciousness as we have indicated; for, if it is meant the soul or the spirit, as is usually understood, man would die, as the soul leaves the body only at death! But here it leaves temporarily at the time of sleep. It, therefore, means consciousness, and not soul.

Time Factor. Therefore, as soon as consciousness leaves the human body, man comes into contact with the supra-normal vibrational fields which give him an inkling into the noumenal world from where the waves are translating themselves into the physical field of consciousness. This projection of consciousness into the noumenal field is in the dimension of non-physical time, which is an extension of consciousness.

Time, according to the Qur'ān, is divided into three categories: (1) *Dahr*—this is eternal time of the noumenal world; (2) *Asr*—this is serial time or ages or periods; and, (3) *Waqt*—this is physical time which came into existence after the creation of the solar system.

25. Quoted in Reyner, op. cit.

This extension of consciousness from physical into eternal time comes about through a process of withdrawal of physical vibrations, thus entering the noumenal fields. This is a communicating procedure. It is also at the same time a translating and transforming procedure. Man becomes aware of such sensations as are absent from his conscious awareness. And, as the pattern of everything which has happened, is happening or has yet to happen from the beginning of this creation to its end, is present in the noumenal field, it becomes easy to perceive what is going on in the pattern once consciousness becomes attuned to the noumenal field. The body on such occasions is creating and liberating its own energy which is sending forth vibrations. This is meeting its counterpart from the cosmic pool, thus energising the whole system of give-and-take. This dimension of time we have talked about is merely an extension of consciousness into supra-consciousness, thus linking up various shades of the cosmic pattern. This extension in time is also a projection into space from the physical to the noumenal, thus completing the whole link. This is the field (path) on which the fore-knowledge and premonitions travel. No individual is especially endowed with this faculty. It is happening with everyone. We need to keep our eyes and ears open, reflect, ponder and rationalise (Qur'ān). These faculties lie within every human being. Not only that; it is also possessed by animals and birds! Other species are, therefore, not devoid of this faculty. Even the plants are equally gifted. Consciousness makes its transit through several paths in the noumenal world and is capable of scaling all obstructions and valleys, thus producing a link of associations with the vibrating patterns.

Before I close, I would like to say a few words on the various levels of consciousness and the method in which this universe is being maintained and sustained. There are different levels of being (consciousness). These levels are attainable by everyone. This requires adherence to certain laws of self-control. These laws are identical with universal laws, which are the universal patterns of creation. It is to these levels of being to which Iqbal refers in his poetical verses. Being (the conscious self) for Iqbal is *khudī*. Iqbal seems to think that it can conform to the pattern of *taqdīr* before

it takes its form in the phenomenal world. This pattern of *taqdīr* is the universal pattern of creation or, in the words of the Qur'ān, *fatarannās*. *Faṭāran* and *pattern* are identical words assuming different forms through a metathetical change, like *Paradise* and *Firdaus*, or as the word *Pharaoh* has developed from *Puru*, *Fara* and *Fir'aun*! "Each world order in the hierarchy of the universe possesses its own consciousness."²⁶ In modern times Ouspensky²⁷ and Gurdjieff²⁸ have also prescribed methods of self-control which are very vital in the achievement of higher consciousness.

I now come to a very important question which is vital to this article. And it is this. How is this universe maintaining itself? After all, this universe is not dead matter. Everything here is living. Even the particles of sand have to adhere to themselves to maintain their shape. And, of course, the animal and the vegetable beings are all living beings, and require to be sustained in order to maintain their living. The universal pattern of which we have talked about is a living pattern which is full of energy and from where all energy is flowing and emanating to sustain all living beings. This universal pattern in its own turn is being energised by the universal energy which is the source of all life, and this is the Almighty Creator. It is He Who is the Creator, the Destroyer and the Sustainer of everything. This is expressed by the Arabic word *Rabb*, which means all the three, that is, Creator, Destroyer and Sustainer. Energies are being transformed to suit the requirements of nourishment of every being and they are being sustained. Says the Holy Qur'ān.

"And (in) the variation of the night and the day and (in) the sustenance which Allah sends down from the heaven, then gives life thereby to the earth after its death and (in) the changing of the winds are signs for a people who understand" (xlv. 5).

It would be of interest to see that everything on this earth is being eaten by the one stronger than it, and in the end the earth eats them all up! Life does not end here. These bodily energies are

26. Ibid.

27. P.D. Ouspensky, *Tertium Organum*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957.

28. Gurdjieff, *All and Everything*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.

not being wasted. They are being transformed into other forms, and would reassemble on the Day of Ressurrection in this very form in which they have left. A very interesting story is related in the Qur'ān about Prophet Abraham. He was doubtful about this attribute of God Almighty as to how He would raise up the dead, and he asks of God Almighty :

“And when Abrāham said : My Lord, show me how Thou givest life to the dead. He said : Dost thou not believe ? He said : Yes, but my heart may be at ease. He said : Then take four birds, then tame them to incline to thee, then place on every mountain a part of them, then call them, they will come to thee flying. And know that Allah is Mighty Wise” (ii. 260).

Many people have been misled about the nature of life after death. Even Muslim scholars (Iqbal²⁹) have blundered, and have stated that Hell and Heaven are “states and not localities”. This impression, according to the Qur'ānic verse just quoted above, is entirely wrong. The life hereafter is just as material as this place, except that it will be absolutely pure, devoid of all pollution and evil which is the creation of man. The same vibrations will energise to reassemble and attain the same form which will carry no physical defects.

(January, 78)

29. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore : Sh. Mubammad Ashraf, 1960.

IQBAL AND OUTER SPACE

Shaheer Niazi

Almost all the poetical works of Iqbal are philosophical, but his *Jāvid Nāmāh* is of course an everlasting epistle of love, wisdom and insight. It is a descriptive celestial journey wherein he discussed most intricate philosophical problems and portrayed the lives of great men in the hereafter, placing them in different planets according to their calibre. Iqbal was of opinion that inter-planetary travel is possible, and to support his point of view he refers to the Ascension of the Holy Prophet. He says:

سبق ملا ہے یہ معراجِ مصطفیٰ سے مجھے
کہ عالمِ بشریت کی زد میں ہے گردوں !¹

[I learn from the Ascension of the "Chosen One" (Muṣṭafā)
That "Heaven" is within the reach of mankind !]

فضا تری مہ و پروین سے ہے ذرا آگے
قدم اٹھا یہ مقامِ آسماں سے دور نہیں²

[The sphere that may suit you is beyond the Moon ;
And if you venture a step forward, the place is not very far away.]

سہر و مہ و النجم نہیں محکوم ترے کیوں ؟
کیوں تیری نگاہوں سے لرزتے نہیں افلاک ؟³

[Why you (the Viceregent of Mine on the Earth) have failed in conquering outer space, and ruling the Sun, the Moon and other planets.]

In the Sun's family Mars is the next step⁴ beyond the Moon from our Earth. It is sometime 35,000,000 miles from Earth when it is nearer and in such a state it outshines even Jupiter. Its diameter is 4200 miles. The gravity is one-third of our Earth's and its atmosphere is relatively thin. A year on Mars amounts to 687 days and we will become younger if we are there (30 years = 16 years). The day is nearly equal to ours, say about

1. *Bāl-i-Jibril/Kulliyāt*, p. 27/319 2. *Ibid.*, p. 50/242.
3. *Armughān-i-Ḥijās/Kulliyāt*, p. 27/669.
4. Patrick Moore, *The Planets* (ed. 1962), p. 81.

14 hours, 37 minutes and 22.6 seconds. The cycle of its seasons is slightly different but basically similar. A suspicion about the possibility of life on Mars was aroused with the discovery of the Martian canals by an Italian named G.V. Schiaparelli in 1877 and then in 1892 when W.H. Pickering spotted some oases on the surface of Mars. The best photographs of the Martian canals were those taken by E. Pettit in 1939 and this was one year after the death of Iqbal (21 April 1938).

So far as the question of life on Mars is concerned, it may be pointed out that Mars is not the only planet where life is suspected, but it is probable that life or, more accurately, some sort of living organism may exist on Venus and other planets also, to be discussed later. According to Patrick Moore,⁵ Lowell was convinced that the canals on Mars were artificial and constructed by some intelligent being, to whom Mars was the abode of life.

It is surprising that Iqbal has portrayed the life of the Martians in a most singular style as if he were a real witness of it and he did this at a time when adequate information about Mars was not at hand. However, we should record his statement before we discuss it. The following translation of his verses is not exactly literal, but I have tried my best to interpret them as correctly as possible. He says:

“After a pause I found myself in another world wherein the conception of time and space was altogether different. Despite the fact that the same Sun shone there, it sanctioned a new order of the day and night to that planet. The most striking was that the body (of the inhabitants) was unaware of the customary way of maintaining the soul. There was no pain, no fatigue and no excess of work (including flight) that could cause old age.

“My guide Rūmī, the teacher of the men of insight, diverted my attention towards the wonders of this planet saying: ‘Look at it, this is Mars.’ I saw that in a great plain there was a very huge building of an observatory erected on a hillside where a very big telescope was installed.

“Rūmī said: ‘This is a world of the lure of varieties like that of our Earth, having cities, countries, palaces and streets. The inhabitants are well versed in physical and spiritual sciences, like learned men of the West; in comparison with us they are more advanced in all respects. They have got a perfect hold on space and time because they are better versed in cosmology and astrophysics. Contrary to the dwellers of the Earth, their body is subordinate to their soul. The Law of Nature for this planet is

5. Ibid., p. 98.

that when a soul enters a body it moves the physique as it wishes. There all the rapture and intoxication is due to the command of the soul over the existence and the non-existence of the physical body, while on our planet the existence is double-sided, i.e. the soul which is unseen and the body which is seen. To the people on Earth, the body and soul are like a bird and a cage but on Mars "Life" is something like mental behaviour. When someone is about to die on Mars, he becomes more active and happy than before, because of this change (departure) and usually one or two days before his death he declares it in the presence of his people, telling them what is going to happen. Their souls are not the product of their biological process and undoubtedly they are not dominated by their physical environment. When a Martian dies, it means nothing to him but to dissolve his body into his soul or to retreat from the physical life into "himself". This discourse is above your understanding because your soul is submerged in your body. Let us relax for some time here. Indeed such an interval would not have been granted to anyone by God.'

The Emergence of the Martian Astronomer from His Observatory

"An aged man wearing a snowlike beard (came out of an observatory) who seemed to have been busy with literary and philosophical works for a number of years. He was like a Seer of the West and his brief-case too was like theirs. He was a man of good height having a radiant face. He was well versed in all the manners and etiquettes and from his look he seemed to be a very serious thinker.

"When he saw a man (i.e. me) he was extremely glad and he addressed me in the language of Ṭūsī and Khayyām (Persian) and he said: 'It is strange that the "Man" made of clay has ascended so high despite all his disadvantages and drawbacks. The "Dust" (Man) has flown so high without an aeroplane. To those who were stationary has been given the trait of the moving.'

"His conversation was very fluent and flawless and I wondered how he was so eloquent and I doubted very much whether it was a dream or a magic that a Martian was speaking of the secrets so frankly. He spoke again: 'In the days of the "Chosen" (i.e. the Holy Prophet) there was a man amongst the people of Mars who resolved to visit the land of Adam. He propelled his wings in space and reached the desert of Arabia and then he recorded all that he had seen from the East to the West. His works are more attractive than the heavenly garden. I too myself have been to Iran and Europe and I have gone round the country of Egypt, the land of the Nile, and I have been to India, the land of the river Ganges. I have also visited America, Japan and China for my geophysical research work. I keep myself well informed about the day-to-day changes on the Earth and for 'his turn

I have been visiting the Earth. I know all about the soil and the oceans of the Earth. All the movements of the sons of Adam are in our knowledge while, contrarily, they are unaware of our adventures.'

"Rūmī told him : 'I am from the heaven and my companion belongs to the Earth and he is intoxicated without a cup of wine. He is a carefree man and his name is *Zindah-rūd* (the Living Stream) and his rapture is due to keen study of the "Nature of Things". Now when we happen to be in your city and being in the world without any bondage, we are naturally in the quest of new manifestations and we do request you to be with us for a while.'

The Martian Philosopher Speaks

" 'These are the suburbs of Marghadīn-i Barkhiyā, named after the Father of our forefathers (the Father of the Martians) whose name was Barkhiyā. It happened (once) that Farzmurz (Satan), commander of the evil character, went to see Barkhiyā in Paradise and said to him : "Why are you resting here in subordination to the God of Goodness, while there is a better world than yours ? That paradise is the abode of everlasting pleasure while this one where you stay is a timely blooming. That world is above all the worlds, even above 'Nothingness'. The God of Goodness is not aware of that and (I assure you that) I have never seen a world of more freedom than that because there is no interference of any god in its administration. There is no Book, no Prophet and no Gabriel. There is no circumambulation, prostration, prayer and the praise of a Prophet." Barkhiyā said : "Ye the Charmer ! go away from here and cast your spell in that world." '

"Then he (the Martian philosopher) told us : 'Simply because our Father Barkhiyā did not fall a victim to the evil designs of Satan, God (Almighty) gave us a new world. Come and see this God-gifted country "Marghadīn," its customs and its laws.'

Round the City of Marghadīn

" 'How should I describe the grandeur that was the city of Marghadīn and its magnificent buildings ? Its citizens speak softly and gently. They are handsome, cultured, polite and plainly dressed. Their way of thinking is free from the painstaking studies and still they are aware of the secret of the chemical formation of the Sun (Solarology—the science of the elements of what the Sun is made of). Any of the Martians who wants to have some silver or gold immediately produces it from the Light just as we procure salt from the water of the sea. On Mars the sole purpose of knowledge is the service of living beings. They

take no interest in the arts and crafts for the sake of monetary gains. They have no coins or currency and these idols could make no headway in their temples. The devil has cast no shadow on their minds. Their sky is not crowded with gaseous clouds. Their cultivator or tiller of the earth is always immune from the high-handedness of the landlords. Their farms and the means of irrigation are free from disputes in connection with the water-supplies and their crops are shared by none. There are no military forces and no one earns his livelihood by fighting against anyone or by killing people. This is also remarkable that in Marghadīn people do not use the pen to tell lies or for the propagation of Evil. There is no crowd or humming in the Bazaars of Marghadīn caused by the jobless people (as it is on the Earth) and no noises of the beggars tease the ears of the passersby.

A Dialogue Between the Martian Philosopher and Zindah-rūd

"The Philosopher :

" 'There is no beggar here and no one is in want of anything. There is no master and no "slave" here, no "governor" and no "governed".'

"Zindah-rūd :

" 'To be a beggar or in want of anything is by the Will of God. To be the "governor" or the "governed" is also by the Will of God. There is none other than God to will the destiny of anything and there is no remedy when it is His Will.'

"The Philosopher :

" 'If you are aggrieved because of a certain destiny, you pray to God for another destiny. It is legitimate to pray for another destiny because the Will of God is not limited. The inhabitants of the Earth have lost the sense of self-respect because they do not understand the meaning of "destiny". I imply that God behaves⁶ with you as you behave with yourself and that is the secret of life.

" 'If you live like dust, He will blow you in the air ; if you are like stone, He will smash you against a glass. If you are like a drop of dew, then a fall is your destiny and in case you are like an ocean, your destiny is a long life. But you have been inventing and introducing all the time new images of Lāt and Manāt⁷ and pray to them for the safeguard of your pleasures and interests. The unawareness of the "Self" has become your

6. "God will behave as you expect him to behave with you," says Ibn 'Arabī'. See, A.E. 'Affīf, *Mystical Philosophy of Ibn 'Arabi* (ed. 1939), p. 163.

7. ~~Lāt and~~ Manāt were two female deities which were worshipped by the Arabs at Mecca.

faith and your thoughts have become a bondage for you. You have grasped that there is a kind of destiny that gives you sorrows without any wealth and another destiny that gives you wealth without sorrows, but you do not understand that such a doctrine will make the poor poorer. Woe be to such a faith that gives you a deep slumber and keeps you sleeping for the worse! Is it a religion or a lure or a magic? Is it a religion or a pill of opium?

“ ‘Do you know from where the “intellect” emanates?
And from where a Houri comes in the dream of a man?
Do you know what is the source of the philosopher’s
thought?

Do you know what is the secret of the prophetic prayer?
Do you know what is ‘insight’ and “manifestation”?
Do you know what is the origin of the arts and the
miracles?

The power of eloquence that you possess is not from within
yourself;

And the fire that kindles in your heart to work is not from
within also.

It is all from ‘Blooming Nature’ and “Nature’s from God,
the Creator.

What is life? It is like a mine of precious stones.

You are simply a custodian while the owner is someone else
(God).

An enlightened heart is a grace for the righteous man, for
whom the object of life is nothing but the service of
humanity.

The service of humanity has been a tradition of the Prophets
but it becomes a bargain for those who want something in
return.

Like air, dust, cloud, farm and field, garden, forest, palace,
street, stone and clay, there is nothing that may be
claimed as your property. All of them belong to God.

The Earth that belongs to God, you say it is yours;

What is this way to interpret the Quranic verse *lā tufsid
fi’l ard*?

The sons of Adam are busy in evil deeds and naturally the
result of Satanic deeds is always disruption.

It is of course conventional that the security is not violated
by the custodian himself and therefore righteous are
those who believe that the State belongs to God!’ ”

There are seven or eight verses more in this poem, but they
are not useful here and the rest of the chapter deals with the
illegal entry of Qurrat al-‘Ain Ṭāhirah,⁹ in this region of Mars and

8. vii. 55.

9. Ṭāhirah was one of the most fanatic followers of Bahā’ullāh, the
founder of Bahaism.

her false prophecy.

We should see whether his statement is simply poetic imagination, intuition or a scientific speculation. The first part of this question can be dropped easily because the nature of his statement is evidently not poetical only and it seems to be based either on intuition or on some sort of scientific information, and that is what we are going to discuss further. There are some fundamental questions which may be posed as under : (1) What is "Life ? (2) Should "Life" exist on our Earth only and if not then what is the possibility of life on other planet and in what circumstances ? (3) What are the so-called 'Unidentified Objects' (U.F.O.'s = Flying Saucers) and from where do they come ? (4) Is it true that some visitors from outer space have been on our planet from time to time and what is the purpose of their visit ?

The meaning of "Life" (a living organism) is very difficult to define particularly when we are prone to prove it a result of some chemical or biological process, as we do in connection with the Psyche (Mind). However, I will take into account the opinion of the ancient and the modern scientists to solve the problem.

Life or A Living Organism

The most ancient thought was that the *anima* (shade) which can be identified with "soul" is the main source of living organisms whether this is human life or the life of the animals and plants. Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (387-322 B.C.) ascribed the various functions of living bodies to the Psyche and distinguished vegetable, animal and intellectual functions. Plato believed that the human Psyche was largely independent of the body and capable of a separate existence, but Aristotle regarded Psyche (Man or Soul) and *Soma* (Body) as inseparable. In the seventeenth century an Italian biologist Francesco Redi (1668 C.E.) worked on the biological analysis of living organisms and it was the beginning of an experimental approach towards this problem. In the eighteenth century Spallanzini (d. 1799 C.E.) added a lot of information to our biological knowledge. In 1887 C.E. Cagniard de la Tour, a French investigator, found that the fermentation of beer was the result of the activities of tiny organisms. Then the theory of the complicated microbes took a new turn with the germ-theory of Louis Pasteur.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century there was a considerable change in the method of discussion on the question of the origin of life. The writings of Charles Darwin, T.H. Huxley, Tyndall, Schafer and others had marked the beginning of pure materialistic point of view just opposite and contrary to all the religious philosophies and revelations. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European writers and thinkers were busy in presenting the old wine in the new cups to the world on the pretext of original thinking. I will not go into the details of such transmutations except to say that the Western scholars were reproducing the works of Muslim philosophers without making any reference to them, otherwise they could have mentioned Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā' and Ibn Maskawaih, who had not only propounded the theories of Plato and Aristotle but had added a lot to it and improved the ideas of Democritus, Anaximander and Empedocles.

Those who have gone through the essay of John Tyndall on "Vitality" (1866 C.E.) can recollect without being confused that he borrowed his idea from Anaximander (600 B.C.) who observed that the energy for life was derived ultimately from the Sun and that plants were essential for trapping solar energy and playing an intermediary role in the transmission of energy from the Sun to animals. I wonder how Charles Darwin's theory of Evolution, termed the "Origin of Species," could be popularised despite all its absurdities. I think it will be interesting if I quote some lines from a letter written by Charles Darwin to his friend Sir J. Hooker, wherein it reflects that Darwin was not serious on the point of physical evolution and the "Origin of Species". He wrote to Hooker: "It is mere rubbish thinking at present of the origin of life; one might as well think of the origin of matter."¹⁰

It is evident that modern biologists are still under the influence of Plato, Aristotle and Anaximander as we have already cited. In modern biology Psyche (Mind) is the product of certain elements and compounds and we cannot separate "Mind" from "Body" and this is what Aristotle said in 322 B.C. Thomas Henry Huxley¹¹ and Julian Huxley, the most noted biologists of the West, have discussed these theories in detail. Jackson and Moore¹² have

10. Jackson and Moore, *Life in the Universe*, p. 22.

11. The author of a book, *On the Physical Basis of Life*.

12. Jackson und Moore op, cit., p. 23.

surveyed the modern theories while discussing the possibility of life on other planets. There was a time when the Christian Church committed to flames all the scientific works and killed many of their scientists for propounding Pseudo-Christian doctrine, but the Church failed and David Hume very boldly declared :

"If we take into consideration any religious material we should try to find out whether there is some philosophy, logic or reasoning or not to establish some fact and in case it contains nothing but sophistry and illusion, then commit it to the flames."¹³

With the spread of academic teachings, European scientists, materialists, biologists, biochemists, bacteriologists, and embryologists were gradually becoming antinomians. After working for a long time on the "Theory of Elements" of Empedocles, a great biologist of Alexandria, they propounded two new theories of life. One of them was termed "Radiopanspermia," which proposed that "Life" may not have originated on the Earth itself but the "Seed of Life" or dormant forms of organisms might have been spread in Space and life could grow only where circumstances were favourable. The other one was termed "Lithopanspermia," which suggested that the "Seed of Life" was transported from another planet to this Earth by means of the meteorites. Both these theories were propounded by a Swedish scientist, Svante Arthenius. In my opinion these theories were a sort of religious hypothesis and were derived from the story of Adam's migration from Heaven to this Earth. It will not be out of place if I recollect once again that the "Four Elements" of Empedocles have become more than ninety-two now according to a Russian biologist Vinogradov,¹⁴ but still some elements like carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, phosphorus, sulphur, sodium, magnesium, chlorine, potassium, calcium, iron, copper and iodine are regarded as more important. Then, in 1920 two biologists, J.B.S. Haldane of England and A. I. Oparin of Soviet Russia, by chance reached one and the same conclusion in their hypothesis on the origin of life on this Earth and this theory was called the "Haldane-Oparin Theory"¹⁵ according to which the source of life on this earth was ultra-violet radiation, reminding us of the

13. Ibid., p. 24.

14. A.P. Vinogradov, *Biological Elements* (English translation from Russian).

15. Haldane, *The Inequality of Men*, Penguin Books, 1937.

Theory of Anaximander once again; but it should be noted that some organisms can survive without oxygen and water.

After a critical survey of opinions about the origin of life, no one can deny that almost all the biological definitions of "Life," "Psyche" (Mind), Soul (Arabic, *Nafs*) or the "Spirit" (Arabic *Rūh*) are entirely unsatisfactory and it is all due to our so-called "Rationalism," otherwise the Divine Message would have satisfied those who claim to be Christians or Jews. The Muslims are satisfied and they believe that "Life" or "Spirit" (*Rūh*) is the "Will of God"¹⁶ which cannot be explained despite all our efforts and attempts. We find that all the attempts are abortive and all the efforts are futile. Evidently the "Spirit" (*Rūh*) is a separate "Entity" and not a bi-product or the result of some biological process as the modern scientists believe. It is clear that the first hurdle to be removed is the misconception of the "Origin of Life" without which we cannot solve our problems quickly.

Exobiology : The Extraterrestrial Life

The second question is : "Should life exist on our Earth only and, if not, then what is the possibility of life on other planets and in what circumstances?" In reply we have nothing to argue against the possibility of life on other planets but to admit plainly that this is not necessary for a living organism to exist on our planet alone despite the fact that some scientists insist that there should be similar circumstances on another planet for the existence of a living organism. This is the point where I differ and in my opinion they are slightly mistaken because a different kind of living organism can survive in a different atmosphere and circumstances as plant life does on our Earth. I find that some European astro-biologists are gradually conceding this. However, it will be casier to discuss the problem if we take into account some specific points of view and fundamentally I prefer the views of Sir H. Spencer,¹⁷ who has stated :

"In attempting to discuss whether life can exist on any other world, we come up against the difficulty that *we have no certain knowledge of how life originated on the Earth*. Suppose we could show that on some other world the conditions were essentially

16. Qur'ān xxii. 85.

17. Sir H. Spencer Jones, *Life on the Other Worlds* (A Mentor Book, 1960), pp. 20-21.

similar to those on the Earth, would it be legitimate to assume that because life has come into existence on the Earth, there must necessarily be life also on the other world *though perhaps in different forms* from those with which we are familiar?

"On the other hand, if we could show that the conditions on another world differed from those on the Earth to such an extent, would it be a legitimate conclusion that the other world must be a world devoid of life?

"May we not have some justification for assuming that the forms of life that now exist on the Earth have developed through a slow process of evolution, to suit those conditions and that if different conditions were found to prevail elsewhere in the universe, different forms of life might have evolved?

"It is conceivable for instance that we may have beings, the cells of whose bodies contained silicon instead of carbon which is an essential constituent of our cells and of all other living cells on the Earth."

When we scrutinise the statement of Sir H. Spencer Jones, we find that his difficulty in not knowing the Origin of Life on this Earth with certainty is in vain because even a certain knowledge about it, apart from the Divine Revelation, would have proved futile to establish the fact that a living organism becomes essential when such and such conditions are available.

Secondly, even conditions to those on Earth may not similar essentially be the cause of life, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, there can be "Life" in different conditions, even in adverse circumstances, because the patterns of life are innumerable like stars in this universe, and we have no clear idea of the "Musts" and "Must-nots" for a certain organism which is not similar to our own and which is not known to us as yet.

Thirdly, modern biologists are not justified in assuming that life on our Earth has developed through a slow process of evolution because evidently the Darwinian Theory of the Species is an outdated hypothesis already rejected by many biologists. I have previously cited that Darwin was not serious about his hypothesis and that is why it is full of absurdities. Sir Jones is also self-contradictory on the point of evolution because he stated previously that people have no certain knowledge of the origin of life on this Earth. This and other similar difficulties of men are due to their disbelief in God and His Power of creation. However, we infer on scientific ground that there is a possibility of life on other planets, though it may be different from ours. Jackson is not wrong when he says that "it would be a sheer conceit on our part

to maintain that Homo-sapiens must be the ideal model for life on the other world."¹⁸ Now, what we conclude is that no particular combination of specified elements is required to give birth to a living organism which invariably comes into existence under unknown circumstances, very mysteriously and only by the Will of God; therefore "Life" can be anywhere even in the coldest planet like the Moon or the hottest like the Sun.

Visitors From Outer Space

It is already noted that Iqbal mentions the Martians' visitation to our Earth from time to time and to support this idea we shall have to produce documentary evidence, but first of all we should take into account the amazing stories about the mysterious U.F.O.'s (Unidentified Objects=The Flying Saucers) which will help us understand the problems of space-travel and the depth of our knowledge. Evidently our knowledge of outer space and universe is poor and our information scanty. We also find that our expanding knowledge about the Universe is creating puzzles. "As much as man unravels each new mystery, he is assailed by fresh doubts and torments for he has caught a glimpse of another mystery lying ahead. For the explorer in any field it is probably yet undiscovered territory vaguely seen in the distance that sparks the search for knowledge," is rightly observed by Vyacheslav Zaitsev.¹⁹

According to reports that appear occasionally in the Press, we can assume that the Flying Saucers began to appear after the use of Atom Bombs by America in Japan in 1945 and since then until now they have been appearing mostly in Russia, America, Britain, France, Australia and at last in China, which indicates that there is some mystery behind their visits and these mysterious visitors are seriously concerned with our Atomic tests and similar nuclear activities which are evidently less peaceful and more destructive, while it can be visualised at the same time that the destruction of our planet will involve some other planets within the Solar system or eventually it may cause the death of the Solar system as a whole.

In the beginning people did not take any serious notice of these mysterious shining objects which were generally shaped like

18. Jackson and Moore, op. cit., p. 115.

19. *Sputnik* (Monthly Digest), Jan. 1967, p. 164.

saucers and some scientists like Dr Donald H. Menzel,²⁰ a professor of Astrophysics at Harvard University, belied all the witnesses and declared that the so-called Flying Saucers were not spaceships but merely "sensory aberrations" of various kinds, or "atmospheric phenomena," but he and other scientists like him could not convince educated people in America and Russia who understand what an atmospheric phenomenon means. Today "optical illusion" theories of flying saucers carry no weight and they are rejected by Russian and American scientists, including Professor J. Hynek, the astro-physicist, and Professor. F. Salisbury, the astrobiologist. Dr Valleo,²¹ another participant in the 1966 International Mathematical Congress held in Moscow, is of opinion²² that the question of the visitors from outer space should be considered seriously.

So far as the reality of Flying Saucers is concerned, we know nothing definitely, but so far as their appearance is concerned, they are generally of oval shape, glowing with red and green lights. They are either cigar-shaped or like flattened balls. Their searchlight is very glaring and their speed is tremendous. Thousands of people have seen them throughout the world and once in early 1955 I saw them myself, when I was residing in Garden East (Karachi). They were four in number and were hanging in the sky near the mosque of Pakistan Quarters. The most tantalising habit of man is that he rejects everything which is beyond his reach or understanding and it naturally hampers his progress in many cases. Dr Gustave Naan,²³ a prominent Estonian scientist, is of opinion that our common sense becomes a most unreliable adviser when we are confronted with a perfectly new situation. There is a lot of literature on U.F.O.'s now and Daniel Cohen has discussed this issue in his review²⁴ on some books and articles in the *Science Digest*, but we have no scope for detailed discussions here and therefore a brief survey will suffice to understand the present situation of the U.F.O. s.

Mr Colin Norris, the Vice-President of the "Flying Saucers

20. Donald Manzel, *The World of Flying Saucers* (N.Y. edition).

21. Dr Jacques Valleo, author of *Anatomy of Phenomenon*, published by Henry Regnery & Co., New York. He is a French mathematician and astronomer now residing in Chicago (U.S.A.).

22. *Sputnik* (Digest,) Dec. 1967, p. 78.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

24. *Science Digest*, June 1965, pp. 41-44.

Research Society" (Australia), had issued a statement²⁵ to the Press in July 1963, on the basis of some trustworthy evidence of those responsible citizens who had seen the Flying Saucers themselves. One of his witnesses from South Australia was actually reduced to a nervous breakdown when he encountered a bright red object on the roadside near the small township of Sandy Creek. He revealed that the unusual craft was parked across the road but when he stopped his car to investigate it, the craft made a dreadful noise and shot up into the sky, leaving a trail of jet-like smoke. Norris also disclosed that two "space-balls" which were found near Broken Hill were identified by the scientists as being parts of some strange type of spacecraft. Another report was recorded on the authority of an Australian Church Mission in England. Thirty-seven natives had seen some Flying Saucers a few hundred feet above the building of the Mission at Papua (New Guinea) in June 1959. Marie Pierre Larrive²⁶ believes in the existence of Flying Saucers but fails to understand the purpose of their visits. Vasily Kuprevich, President of the Academy of Sciences of Byelorussia, holds a different view. In his opinion,²⁷ they are still visiting the Earth without contacting people and their intellectual development may have attained such a level that they hold us no higher in their opinion than we do our ancestors, the cavemen.

On 16 August 1960, in the presence of other geologists, N. Sochevanov, a geologist himself, saw an orange disc with a sizeable diameter between the mountain tops near the village of Koktal in Kazakistan. On 12 July 1964, Professor V. Zaitsev was flying from Leningrad to Moscow aboard a TU-104-A, when he saw that a huge disc suddenly appeared below the liner's fuselage, flew a parallel course for a while and then turned aside with a burst of speed. L. Tsekhanovich, an astronomer and geodesist, reported that he had seen a disc diving over Novy Afon, Abkhazia, on 24 September 1963. In the following year, on 17 June 1966, V. Krylov, a geophysicist, witnessed a similar phenomenon with a group of colleagues over an outlying district of Elista, in Northern Caucasus. The trajectory of the flying object was somewhat devious, almost spiral. V. Akhuratov, an experienced Arctic flier, has observed U.F.O.'s many times

25. *Daily News*, Karachi, 30 July 1963.

26. *Dawn*, Karachi, 15 May 1966.

27. *Sputnik*, Dec. 1967, p. 77.

from the ground and in the air. In addition to these reports²⁸ many people have reported similar experiences from the Soviet Baltic Republics and from Gorky, Kharkov, Murmansk and other regions of the U.S.S.R.

It is a reasoned statement by Russian scientists and, though there are hundreds of pieces of evidence from America, Australia and other places, there is no need to list them here. Therefore I leave aside the story of Truman Bethurum who claimed that he had spent some time on a Saucer from a planet Clarion whose captain was a beautiful woman named Mrs Aura Rhanes and other similar stories including that of George Adamski of California who claimed that he had been on friendly terms with some Venusians, Martians and Saturnians and that he had some experience of flying on Saucers, or the story of Cedric Allingham who produced²⁹ a photograph of his Martian friend whom he had met on the coast of Scotland. It will be interesting to refer to a report³⁰ about a "Visiting Card From Outer Space," which carried a story told by Joao de Rio, an employee of the National Wagon Factory at Cruzeiro, who met a visitor from Outer Space. "He was a tiny fellow having large luminous eyes and who addressed him in perfect Portuguese. He handed his visiting card to Joao. It was a piece of a strange metal which is not found on our Earth and it carried an inscription in some unknown language."

On the basis of the account which we have taken into consideration, it can be inferred that the U.F.O.'s (Flying Saucers) are something real and not imaginary. Now these Flying Saucers are recognised by American and Russian scientists including a man of the calibre of Boris P. Konstantinov who is the Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences (U.S.S.R.) and who has seriously dealt with the problem and collected³¹ all the important treatises written by top-ranking Russian scientists. In the same collection F.Y. Zigel on scientific grounds has rejected all those who regarded the U.F.O.'s as "Sensory Aberrations" or as "Atmospheric Phenomena".

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

29. Donald Keyhoe, *The Flying Saucer's Conspiracy*.

30. *The Washington Post* (Paris edition) 24 April 1967, reported on the basis of a book, *The International Cosmos* edited by Boris which includes articles written by prominent biologists and astrophysicists.

31. *Sputnik*, Jan. 1967, pp. 162-81.

Before proceeding further I would imply that Iqbal was not wrong when he cited in *Jāvid Nāmāh* that the Martians are the masters of space; they visit our Earth whenever they like and they can speak our languages. They know many things about us while we know nothing about them as yet.

Evidence From the Ancient Record

Now the fourth question is whether the inhabitants of some other planets have been visiting our Earth or not. In the past we had no reply but now when we have benefited from recent discoveries of some strange rock-images in Japan, Australia and Uzbekistan (U.S.S.R.), specifically in Farghana District, the native place of Bābur and Humāyūn, we are in a position to assume that the phenomena which we term U.F.O.'s are not strange and modern and these objects were known to the ancient world before us, but most probably they too were ignorant about their origin and that is why we find rock-images without descriptive inscriptions. These rock-images depict very strange man-like creatures wearing pressure-suits, pressure-helmets and fully equipped with breathing-filters, slot-goggles (to see in the dark) and transmitters in the form of helmet-peaks. These images are very old and they are placed in the Bronze Age, say about 2000 B.C.

According to a Russian report,³² "It was 1965 when a Chinese archaeologist startled the whole world by his hypothesis, implying that the spaceships from some other world have been visiting our Earth for the last 12,000 years", i.e. 10,000 B.C. A German magazine³³ had observed in its review that for the last twenty-five years Chinese archaeologists have been exploring the caves in the Bayan Kara-Ula Mountains, on the border of China and Tibet, and they have been discovering odd-looking stone discs covered with indecipherable writing. About 716 discs are already discovered which are apparently thousands of years old. Like a gramophone record, each disc has a hole in its centre from which a double-groove spiral makes its way to the circumference. The grooves are not sound tracks, but the oddest writing in China and in the rest of the world. The Chinese archaeologists and palaeologists took a very long time to decipher the ancient writings of

32. *Das Vegetarische Universum*.

33. "Groove Writing Relating to Spaceships As Recorded on the Discs, Existed 12,000 Years Ago." Cf. *Sputnik*, January 1967, p. 165.

the caves, but when the secret of the spirals was disclosed by these experts, the report was so shattering that its publication was banned by the Peking Academy of Prehistory. However, the ban was lifted very soon and the author published his book under an intriguing title. The caves high up in the Bayan Kara-Ula Mountains where the rock-images and inscriptions were discovered are inhabited by the Ham and Dropa tribes. When one of the hieroglyphs was deciphered it was revealed: "The Dropas had come down from the clouds in the gliders and when the men on Earth understood their sign-language they realised that the new-comers had peaceful intentions." Another Ham hieroglyphic inscription expresses regret over the loss of their own spaceships during a dangerous landing in high mountains and their failure in an attempt to build new ones on this Earth. For the sake of advanced research these mysterious discs were sent to Russian scientists who scraped them and found that these discs contained a large amount of cobalt³⁴ and other metals which are not found on our Earth. It was a shocking discovery when the Russian scientists found these discs were still vibrating to an unusual rhythm as if they carried an electric charge or were part of an electric circuit. These discs are of course a challenge to science. According to an ancient legend of China, once upon a time some small, gaunt, yellow-faced men had come down from the clouds. They had very big heads and extremely thin and weak bodies. The Chinese rode on their fast horses, fought against them and ultimately they fled away. Now the reality seems to confirm the legends. In some of the Bayan Kara-Ula caves archaeologists and speleologists have found 12,000-year-old vestiges of graves and skeletons. These remains belong to human beings with huge craniums and underdeveloped skeletons. The Chinese expeditions which discovered the burial grounds reported that they had found "an extinct species of ape," but the Russian scientists rejected this view on the ground that the apes do not bury their dead and they have no ability to write hieroglyphic symbols on stone discs.

Still more astonishing is that the inner walls of the caves are covered in many places with pictures of the rising sun, the moon and the stars, spaced by a multitude of pea-sized dots representing spaceships which are coming down from the sky and landing³⁵ in a mountainous region.

34. *Sputnik*, January 1967, p. 165.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

The famous Tassili frescoes which were found in the heart of the Sahara by a French military officer, Breuand, also mention some egg-like big objects from heaven. Another French expedition led by Henri Lhote found that, apart from the pictures of animals and hunting scenes, these frescoes depict strange figures dressed in what looks exactly like the most modern space-suits and the spherical helmets which are attached to the suits. Lhote³⁶ regards these enigmatic figures as "Martians". Describing the ancient drawings on the cave walls, the French explorer says that one of them depicts a man appearing from an egg-shaped object covered with concentric circles. To our astonishment there is a similar Peruvian legend according to which the ancient inhabitants of Peru were born from bronze, gold and silver eggs which had fallen from heaven. Jean Elisee Reclus has referred to this legend in his work entitled *La Terre*. We find that the French discovery, the Peruvian legend and the Greek mythology, according to which Helen and Nemesis were born of celestial eggs, have much in common. There is also a Latin American legend of the same type and we can infer that the legend of the celestial eggs, like other legends, would have originated from some *bonafide* impression of an actual event.

During excavations at different times in Japan, their archaeologists have also found some figurines (*dogu*) depicting human beings in odd-looking space-suits, with helmets wholly covering their heads. On their heads are visible marks of something like slit-type glasses, breath-filters, antennae (hearing aids) and even a kind of device to see in the dark. Reviewing the latest Soviet space achievements, a German magazine³⁷ printed a selection of rock-drawings and photographs of *dogu* and cited that these figurines were ample proof that our Earth has been visited by some beings from another world. Many similar rock pictures have been discovered throughout the world. There are pictures of spacemen on cave walls in the Val Comonique, the Swiss Alps, in Australia and at a place, twenty-five miles from Farghana, near the city of Navoi, in Soviet Central Asia, but I will not take all of them into account unnecessarily.

Now when it is proved that some kind of intellectual life is possible outside our world and this too that some intelligent beings have been visiting our Earth from outer space for peaceful

36. Ibid.

37. *Freie Welt*, Nov. 1966.

purposes, the only question that remains to be answered is as to why man is trying to reach some other planet so anxiously. A reply that comes from modern scientists is that the speed of the growth of population on our Earth is tremendous while our resources are limited, therefore we must possess³⁸ another planet to migrate to and also to utilise its resources to live a better life on this Earth. The Holy Qur'ān tells us that "Man" is hasty and ignorant, and now we realise that he really is, because he fails to understand that, though the resources on Earth are limited, they are not insufficient for mankind. Is it not a fact that we have not exploited the whole earth as yet?

Before I conclude it seems imperative to return to the question of the possibility of life on Mars. We cannot omit the possibility of life on Venus also, which is rapidly becoming a rival in this regard and Dr John Strong, Professor of Experimental Physics at the Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.), is very hopeful of finding the existence of an intellectual life on this planet, but we have to deal with Mars here and not with other planets. Another American biologist, Dr Sanford Siegel,³⁹ Head of the Extraterrestrial Biology Department Research Institute, Tarrytown (N.Y.), believes that an intellectual life may exist on the planet Mars. In the opinion of Nikolai Semyonov,⁴⁰ an eminent Russian physicist and a Nobel Prize Winner, "Mars has an atmosphere, though rarefied, with little oxygen for breathing, but our thermonuclear reactors may help to create an atmosphere and a climate favourable to human life on that planet. Mars has water and oxygen could come from water and from rocks too." Now there is reason to infer that if man can make a planet habitable, it may prove to be inhabited already by some intellectual being, with a slight difference in organism.

There is no doubt that before the death of Iqbal in 1938, some science fictions including H.G. Wells' *First Man On the Moon* and *The War of the Worlds* were in the world market and the photographs of the canals on Mars had been talked of for a long time, yet there was nothing to help Iqbal in portraying an intellectual life on Mars so lucidly. It is an incontrovertible fact that Iqbal was neither a scientist in the strict sense nor a prophet

38. *Sputnik*, January 1967, p. 216

39. *Daily News*, Karachi, 2 April 1965.

40. *Sputnik*, January 1967, p. 179.

who could base his statement on Revelation ; then what he is left to be is an eminent thinker with a gifted insight, which he really was.

It is remarkable that the visitors from outer space were invariably portrayed as ugly creatures while, contrarily, Iqbal tells us that Martians are well-dressed and handsome creatures. To our astonishment Cedric Allingham⁴¹ had cited the same in 1954. According to Iqbal, Martians are far more advanced than us in all respects and they are not only outstanding scholars, linguists, scientists, geologists, biologists and astrobiologists, but they are the masters of space and they can fly to other planets with as much ease as we travel from one city to another. However, we have no alternative but to regard Iqbal's work a science-fiction at the moment, which may prove its own worth along with the scientific progress and shocking discoveries in the future.

(October 82)

41. Cedric Allingham, *Flying Saucers from Mars* (London, 1954).



Iqbal in the witness box.

M. Abdullah Qureshi

Iqbal at a College Reception
in Lahore.

Q.M. Aslam

IQBAL IN THE WITNESS BOX

MUHAMMAD ABDULLA QURAISHI

In 1931, the Kashmir movement was at its height in Lahore. The Dogra ruler had made life difficult for the Muslims of Kashmir. The Muslim majority was being sacrificed at the altar of Hindu minority. Muslims all over India had raised their voice of protest against this high-handedness. Through public meetings and protest marches, deep sympathy for the persecuted people of Kashmir was being demonstrated.

In the beginning these public meetings were held in the famous Municipal garden outside Mochi Gate. Among those, who actively participated in these meetings, were Mian Nizam-ud-Din, Haji Rahim Bakhsh, Syed Mohsin Shah—all Kashmiri dignitaries—and Professor 'Ilm-ud-Din Salik of Islamia College, Lahore. The latter not only organized the meetings, but also telegraphically communicated to the Secretary of State, the Viceroy, the Political Agent, the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Resident and other officers concerned, the resolutions passed at those meetings.

Moved by this show of sympathy, outstanding Indian Muslim leaders, in the fields of politics, religion and law, assembled in Simla and founded the Kashmir Committee, whose first president was Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud and the last Sir Muhammad Iqbal. This committee was formed to render legal assistance to the people of Kashmir. It was through its efforts that a large number of persons, who were perishing in the State prisons, were set free. The committee also gave financial assistance to the national workers.¹

After sometime, the Majlis-i-Ahrar took charge of the Kashmir movement and the centre of activities moved to the garden outside

1. See, M. Abdullah Qureshi Article "Iqbal and Kashmir", in the *Iqbal*, Oct: 1956, Vol. No. 2 and *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*.

the Delhi Gate. The Majlis-i-Ahrar was an active organization. Its fire-brand speakers put aflame the whole of India, and the country began to resound with the slogan "*Kashmir Chalo*" (Forward to Kashmir).

This was a time when every problem was viewed from the communal angle. The demand for a democratic system of government in Kashmir was viewed likewise. The Hindus felt that the Muslims were carrying on the campaign against the Maharaja of Kashmir for the simple reason that he was a Hindu. They also felt that if a democratic system of government was established in the State, it would create a Muslim-majority region, which, in turn, will lead to Muslim ascendancy in Kashmir. On that account, the Hindus started opposing it and as a counter-measure started a movement against the state of Hyderabad Deccan, whose ruler was a Muslim. They raised the slogan "*Deccan Chalo*" (Forward to Deccan).

On 20th December, 1931, under the auspices of the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the Muslims of Lahore took out a big procession in connection with the Kashmir movement. The procession was essentially peaceful, but it provoked the Hindus to take out a similar procession. The Hindus took out their procession on 26th December. Beli Ram Telwala of Machhi Hatta (Shah 'Alami Gate) was the organizer and leader of the procession. He was a great fanatic. Raising provocative slogans, the procession, after passing the Circular Road, wended its way to Mochi Gate. With the connivance of the police, the processionists entered the gate and molested a few Muslim shopkeepers, who carried their trade in the shops located on the ground floor of the Unchi Masjid and the mosque of Mulla Muhammad Saleh Kamboh, an eminent historian of Shah Jahan's reign.

This upset the Muslims very much, as the behaviour and conduct of the Hindu crowd was obviously menacing. The Muslims also started collecting but the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mr. Salettary, dispersed them with a heavy hand. Mr. Salettary was commanding a big force. He was the same Mr. Salettary who afterwards was nominated as a member of the Panjab Public Service

Commission. Professors Sayyid Abdul Qadir and Maulana 'Ilmuddin Salik of Islamia College, strongly protested to Mr. Salettary against this high-handedness. But he did not listen to them and the situation grew worse. Hot words were exchanged and in the meantime the procession moved on. Mr. Salettary was forced to accompany it.

When the procession reached Anarkali Bazar, some irresponsible Hindu youngmen assaulted a Muslim, named Noor Muhammad, and killed him on the spot. Noor Muhammad lived in Kucha Kakkezaian, near Old Kotwali and Masjid Wazir Khan.

The news of Noor Muhammad's cold-blooded murder spread like wild fire in the city and sounded the bugle for a Hindu-Muslim riot. Section 144 was clamped over the city. The procession was dispersed and the body of Noor Muhammad was brought to the Mayo Hospital for a post-mortem examination.

The following day the police handed over the body of Noor Muhammad to his relatives in the burial ground, situated near the tomb of Ghore Shah. Despite the enforcement of Section 144, thousands of Muslims joined the funeral procession. The Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, with a strong police force, was present at the grave-yard. At his request, Mian Abdul Aziz, Bar-at-Law, the first Mayor of the Corporation of the City of Lahore, asked the Muslims to disperse but no one listened to his appeal. The angry crowd returned in the form of a procession and rioting and killing started in the city. The Hindus, if they got a chance, attacked the Muslims and the Muslims too did not spare the Hindus, if they could lay their hands on them.

On December 27, 1931, at about half-past three in the afternoon, near Chowk Rang Mahal, someone stabbed a Hindu shopkeeper, named Lal Chand. The assailant made good his escape. The neighbouring Hindu shopkeepers collected on the spot. The police also reached the place of the occurrence and the wounded Lal Chand was removed immediately to Ganga Ram Hospital in Wacchowali Street (inside Shah 'Alami Gate). In the hospital his declaration was

recorded by a 1st Class Magistrate, named Kehar Singh. In this statement, the deceased declared that he was assaulted by Ghulam Mustafa who once had a shop in Rang Mahal and now lived in Kucha Chabuk Sawaran. After making this statement, Lal Chand succumbed to his injuries and the police took his body for post-mortem examination to the Mayo Hospital.

The name of Ghulam Mustafa was put into the mouth of the deceased by the Hindu leaders, but there was no evidence to the effect that he was the assailant. As a matter of fact, the conspiracy to involve Ghulam Mustafa in a murder case was in keeping with the Hindu-Muslim mentality that was then the order of the day. There were several small shops on the ground floor of the mosque of Maulvi Fazl-i-Ilahi. In one of these shops Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa ran a book-depot ten years back. His shop in those days was the rendezvous of political workers and men of letters.

Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa was himself a poet. He wrote poetry in Punjabi and had taken "Hairat" as his pen name. He published a monthly magazine "FIRDAUS" and a weekly humorous journal "AKA BAKA". "FIRDAUS" was edited for some time by Badruddin Badr, Sirajuddin Nizami and the writer of this article. Among those who used to come to Ghulam Mustafa's book shop were (Dr.) Muhammad Din Taseer, Master Muhammad Bakhsh Muslim, Malik Lal Din Qaisar, Dr. Nazir Ahmad (present Principal of Government College, Lahore), (Col.) Majid Malik, Abul Asar Hafeez Jullundri, Ghulam 'Abbas (the well-known short-story writer), Prof. M. 'Ilmuddin Salik, Ustad Hamdam and Ustad Ishq Lehr (both well-known Punjabi poets), Professor Muhammad Jamil Wasti and Feroz-ud-Din Nizami. Another gentleman by the name of 'Ilmuddin of Chauhatta Mufti Baqir also used to visit this place. He was quite an active worker of the Majlis-i-Ahrar until 1940. When the Majlis-i-Ahrar organized its national guard, he also helped in its organization.²

2. Abdullah Malik, article "Yadon ke Mazar" in the *Weekly Lail-o-Nahar*, Lahore, January 10, 1960.

These were the days when Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa Hairat and Malik Lal Din Qaisar had actively participated in the different movements, namely the Fifty-six Percent Rights Movement, Nizam Committee, Warzish (Exercise) Committee, restoration of the body of 'Ilmuddin Shahid, Sarda Act, prohibition of Azan in Zafarwal. The Hindus hated them very much and wanted to involve them in some trouble. This was their opportunity and they made full use of it.

The deceased Lal Chand had named Ghulam Mustafa and the prosecution witnesses accused Lal Din and 'Ilmuddin also. But there was no way for the police to know that by Lal Din was meant Lal Din Qaisar. They arrested Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa Hairat, as he lived nearby. He was well known in the area. He once owned a shop there, and was currently employed in the Municipal Committee. But in place of Lal Din Qaisar, the police arrested another Lal Din who was a mason by profession. Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa was challaned under Section 302 IPC and Lal Din under Section 323 and 504 IPC.

After preliminary trial, the case was committed to the Sessions. In order to prove the innocence of Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa, many prominent Muslims offered to give evidence before the court. In all 46 witnesses were summoned. The names of some of them are given below:

1. Haji Mir Shamsuddin, who was not only a Life Secretary of the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam but also was one of its founders.
2. Nawab Sir Zulfiqar 'Ali Khan, Member, Central Assembly.
3. Sir Muhammad Iqbal.
4. Maulana Shaukat 'Ali.
5. Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan, Owner and Editor of the Daily *Zamindar*, Lahore.
6. Mian 'Abdul 'Aziz, Bar-at-Law, Chairman, Municipal Committee, Lahore.

7. Sheikh Sadiq Hasan (of Amritsar), Member, Legislative Assembly.
8. (Col.) Majid Malik, Editor, *Muslim Outlook and Sunrise*, Lahore.
9. Maulana Ghulam Rasul Mihr, Editor, the *Inqilab*, Lahore.
10. Maulana 'Abdul Majid Salik, Editor, the *Inqilab*, Lahore.
11. Sayyid Habib, Editor, the *Siyasat*, Lahore.
12. Maulana Muhammad Ya'qub Khan, Editor, the *Light*, Lahore.
13. Maulana Dost Muhammad, Editor, the *Paigham-i-Sulh*, Lahore.
14. Shamsuddin Hasan, Editor, the *Khawar*, Lahore.
15. Hakim Muhammad Yusuf Hasan, Editor, the *Nairangi-Khayal* and *Tazianc*, Lahore.
16. Qazi 'Abdul Majid Qarshi, Editor, the *Iman*, Patti (District Lahore).
17. Chaudhri 'Abdul Karim, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Lahore.
18. Chaudhri Sardar 'Ali, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Lahore.
19. Khan Sahib Ch. Fath Sher, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Lahore.
20. Sheikh Hasan Din, Pleader and Municipal Commissioner, Lahore.
21. Chaudhri Din Muhammad, Municipal Commissioner, Lahore.
22. Sheikh 'Azim Ullah, Pleader and Municipal Commissioner, Lahore.
23. Khawaja Dil Muhammad, Professor, Islamia College and Municipal Commissioner.
24. Sayyid 'Abdul Qadir, Professor, Islamia College, Lahore.
25. Maulana 'Ilm-ud-Din Salik, Professor, Islamia College, Lahore.

26. (Dr.) Muhammad Din Taseer, Professor, Islamia College, Lahore.
27. Master Muhammad Bakhsh Muslim, Editor, *Cooperation*, Lahore.
28. Khalifa Shahab-ud-Din, Secretary, Anjuman Khuddam-uddin, Lahore.
29. Hakim Muhammad Sharif, Secretary, Anjuman Mu'in-ul-Islam, Lahore.

During the hearing of the case, an interesting incident took place. One of the defence witnesses was an old man, named Malik Nabi Bakhsh, who was present nearly at the time of the occurrence. After receiving injuries, Lal Chand had gone to him to seek refuge. There was a great difference between his statement and the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the time of the occurrence. The prosecution with a view to proving that Malik Nabi Bukhsh was old and senile, put all sorts of questions to him. He, however, answered every question correctly and did not waver for a minute. Thereupon the court asked him if he had a watch at the time of the occurrence. The witness said he did not know how to tell the time as he never kept a watch all his life. The court then asked how he had calculated the time. The witness said that he found out the time by observing the sun, the moon and the stars. In order to test the veracity of his statement, the Sessions Judge asked him what time it was then. And the witness at once gave the correct time. The clock was at the back of the witness and it showed exactly the time mentioned by the witness. This incident impressed the court immensely and it was convinced that the witness was telling the truth.

The hearing of the case lasted several days. Khawaja Feroz-ud-Din, Bar-at-Law, appeared for Shaikh Ghulam Mustafa and drew much attention. The Sessions Judge, who heard the case, was Mr. J.K.M. Tapp, the same Mr. Tapp who was for some time the Secretary of the Lahore Municipal Committee and after whom the road in front of the Punjab Veterinary College was named Tapp Road. He lived there. The Session Judge held his

court in the Shah Chiragh Mosque, which had not yet been restored to the Muslims. Later on, Mr. Tapp became an Acting Judge of the Lahore High Court.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal took personal interest in the case. He wrote comforting letters to Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa while he was in jail and assured him of his assistance. In one of his letters he asked Shaikh Ghulam Mustafa to repeat the names of God *يا حي يا قيوم* which described him as the Ever-Living and Ever-Existing. It is a great pity that the collection of these letters was destroyed in a fire which burned down the house of Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa.

Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal went to the court for three consecutive days and gave his advice to Khawaja Ferozuddin, Bar-at-Law. On August 2, 1932, he gave the following statement before the Sessions Judge:

"I have known the accused Ghulam Mustafa for some years. I came to know him in connection with his editorship of a literary Magazine called *Firdaus*. Later he became the editor of a weekly paper. I have also come to know him in connection with general Muslim public movements. Ghulam Mustafa has made speeches on political and social matters at meetings in my presence. I knew him in connection with the 56 Per Cent Rights Movement. This movement was started by the Muslims of Lahore and Ghulam Mustafa also took part in the meetings relating to the MacLagan Engineering College. Ghulam Mustafa helped me and the late Sir Muhammad Shafi very largely in connection with the burial of 'Iminuddin. Ghulam Mustafa may be regarded as a prominent Muslim worker.

When cross-examined, Dr. Iqbal said:

"Ghulam Mustafa does not help me personally in political matters. Ghulam Mustafa accompanied me along with others to the meeting of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad. I presided over that meeting."³

3. Sessions Case No. 37 of 1932.

No more defence witness were examined after the court had recorded the statement of Sir Muhammad Iqbal.

On the advice of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Khawaja Ferozuddin, in his arguments, laid stress on the fact that none of the witnesses had corroborated the statement of the deceased that Ghulam Mustafa kept a shop in Rang Mahal.

At long last the case was dismissed. The accused were found not guilty, and after undergoing tortures for about eight months, they were set free on August 6, 1932.

The Muslims of Lahore went wild with joy over their release. Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan came out with a strong editorial and also published on the front page of the Zamindar the following poem which he wrote to commemorate this great event:

فیصلہ* تقدیر

ٹل گیا انگریز کے دارالقضا کا فیصلہ
 کیونکہ تھا کچھ اور عی رب العلا کا فیصلہ
 جو فنا کے گھاٹ اترنے کے لئے تیار تھے
 عرش اعظم پر ہوا ان کے بقا کا فیصلہ
 بے گناہوں کو کیا جانے کا عزت سے بری
 پہلے ہی دن ہو چکا تھا یہ خدا کا فیصلہ
 مصطفیٰ کی عمر کی قرآن میں کہا کر قسم
 خود کیا اس نے غلام مصطفیٰ کا فیصلہ
 سال بھر تک جس نے کاٹی قید جرم عشق میں
 ہو گیا آج اس گرفتار بلا کا فیصلہ
 آ پڑی ہے اکثریت اور اقلیت کی بحث
 ہونے والا ہے بھتیجے اور چچا کا فیصلہ
 ہم دکھادیں گے کہ کرتا ہے مسلمان کس طرح
 اپنی امیدوں کے خون ناروا کا فیصلہ

(فردوس - نومبر ۱۹۳۲ء)

The expected judgment of the British Court has been averted because God Almighty has decided otherwise.

He was willing to kiss the gallows but God wished him to continue to live.

God had decided on the day of creation that the innocent would be set free with honour.

Swearing by the life of Mustafa in the Qur'an, God Himself decided the case of Ghulam Mustafa.

He spent a year of distress in the prison for the love of God, but he is free today.

The struggle is between the majority and the minority and the issue between the uncle and the nephew is shortly to be decided.

He will show you how a Muslim settles account with one who slaughters his hopes.

* * *

Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa Hairat is still alive and as long as the statement of Iqbal is in existence, he will continue to live.

(April, 61)

IQBAL AT A COLLEGE RECEPTION IN LAHORE

Qazi Muhammad Aslam

I studied for M. A. Philosophy at Government College, Lahore, during the years 1921-23. Professor G. C. Chatterji our brilliant teacher (St. Stephens, Delhi and Trinity, Cambridge) had then just returned from abroad and taken charge of the M. A., class at G. C., which had been suspended or abolished since L. P. Saunders (1911-14) had left G. C., seven years earlier. Saunders himself had relieved Iqbal of his professorship at G. C. I had come to Lahore with a B. A., from Aligarh and from Aligarh I had brought with me a copy of *Secrets of the Self*, Nicholson's English translation of Iqbal's *Asrar-i-Khudi*.

Students including Muslim students of our generation, knew Iqbal largely through hearsay, to a lesser extent through direct reading. During a visit to Lahore I had listened to one of his public recitations at the Himayat-i-Islam and had read some of his longer poems then available in print. Whether we understood much or little of Iqbal, there was no doubt we were all proud of Iqbal, great Indian and great Muslim, leader, scholar, poet, and philosopher.

I returned to college from the 1921 winter recess at Amritsar on New Year's day. The newspapers carried the New Year's Honour list. I had barely looked at it in the *Civil and Military Gazette* when I found that Iqbal had been knighted. It delighted and even thrilled me. Thinking was in Hindu-Muslim terms. Muslims had to hear criticism issued from Hindu quarters that Muslims were backward in everything, in brains, in business, in the professions, in the services and so on. But here and there evidence cropped up and it was very welcome that Muslims were not so backward after all, that they had brains and professional and managerial gifts, and intellectual gifts sometimes of a very high order. The most outstanding example was Iqbal, Muslim barrister who wrote poetry and pursued philosophy as his hobbies, and who had been chosen now by a Western scholar for projection upon the Western intellectual scene. Iqbal proved that Muslims were not backward. Given the chance to express or

assert they could give an excellent account of themselves. Iqbal's verse proved that if Muslims lacked riches or education or social and political importance, they more than made up by their rich past and their promise of a rich future.

It was good Iqbal had been chosen for the honour of a knighthood. The British conferred this honour on their own distinguished men. Iqbal was not in politics, nor in any other field the British might wish to reward for imperialist ends. Iqbal's knighthood was a recognition of his intellectual gifts. Occasionally such recognition was present in Honours lists produced by the British. Iqbal had been knighted for his eminence as a poet and thinker and for his significance for Muslim Indian, Muslim Asian and Muslim world culture. When the college reopened our small class of 4 or 5 or 6 Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Sikh students talked about it and without any effort the decision came that students of philosophy at G. C., grouped in the Brett Philosophical Society should hold a reception in honour of Dr. (now Sir) Muhammad Iqbal, old G. C. student and professor, distinguished Lahore citizen, and Muslim poet and thinker, whom a Western professor and a Western publisher had chosen for the notice of the West. In crude Indian-Hindu-Muslim terms he could be placed next to Rabindra Nath Tagore, higher than Tagore according to some. If Tagore had been chosen for knighthood and for the Nobel prize Iqbal could also be. Office holders of college societies look for such occasions. The principal working officer of the Brett in those days was the Secretary, generally chosen from out of the B. A., students. The M. A. students were a minority not available or not important for the purpose. Brett Secretary, Kalimur Rahman, belonged to a family well-known in the cultural circles of Lahore. He was joined by Assistant Secretary Manohar Nath Seth, also a B. A., student, liberal and cosmopolitan by temperament. The mechanics of the reception was in the hands of these two: they raised the money, they chose the caterer, they made up the list of the guests to be invited from outside the hosting philosophical circle. They drew up the programme. The date carefully recorded on the group photograph taken on the occasion was late in January 1922. The honour of carrying the invitation of the Brett Society, which meant an invitation by G. C., staff and students functioning through one of their most celebrated societies, went to the M. A., students. We went in a group consisting of myself, Ranjit Singh who, let me record in sorrow, died

a young lecturer in Guru Nanak College, Gujranwala, and Dina Nath, later of Punjab Police. There could be others, Secretary Kalimur-Rahman, for instance, but I do not remember. The poet had shifted from his Anarkali residence to a bungalow on McLeod Road. We called sometime in the afternoon and found him in the verandah sitting crosslegged in an easy chair, may be with a newspaper, his *hookah* conveniently near and dressed in the easiest and simplest of ways, a shirt and shalwar and something woollen. There was no excitement on our arrival. Only, a visit by a group of students—Hindu, Muslim, Sikh—all from his own old G. C., and all students of philosophy meant something. We carried a letter from Professor Chatterji, addressed to *Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal*. Having handed over the letter we did not have to do much. Naturally and easily came the answer. Of course, after necessary inquiries, the answer was yes. The date and time were settled. It was also settled that some of us will come to his house to accompany him to the college. But we were not dismissed soon after. Courtesy and curiosity seemed to intervene. The poet asked us questions. We could not have said much in reply. But he seemed to take us seriously and talked to us as to his equals. One could see there was a big subject on his mind. He revealed some of it at this very meeting, some of it at the reception.

The reception was held in one of the smaller lawns to the west of the college tower. To this we repaired soon after the group photograph had been taken by Bali under the well known Indian laburnum which—with its clusters of yellow flowers—has supplied the background of 90% of all G. C., group photographs. In the photograph can be seen Principal A. S. Hemmy, model of British punctiliousness, who seemed to take a keen interest in our function the equally keen or even keener Professor G. C. Chatterji, head of our department, Professor Ahmad Husain, our only other teacher those days (recently retired at 78 as Principal, Islamia College, Gujranwala), all the M.A., and B.A., students of philosophy and some others. One may see, as indeed in any such photograph may be seen, how some of those who later became important in different walks of life in India and Pakistan looked in their early youth. Also in the photograph may be seen Major Shaikh Fazl Haq whose carefully kept copy of this historic photograph has been reproduced in this issue of *Iqbal Review*; also Anwar Sikander Khan who became important in public school administration in West Pakistan.

The reception itself was simple and rational. Tea was served by Lorangs, leading Lahore caterer of the time. Then came the speeches. Only two. One from the college side, the other in reply by Iqbal. There were also recitations from Iqbal. Somehow I had taken charge of the college speech and the recitations. The speech was done by me, for the recitations I asked a friend Kazim Husain, for many years one of the only two or three Muslim members of the faculty of the then Maclagan Engineering College. The recitation (or recitations) came at the end and every one—including Iqbal—enjoyed. Iqbal listened with great dignity, quietly, and somewhat seriously.

As for the college speech. I had written it out and got it up perfectly. A copy of it later went to the *Muslim Outlook* and was printed verbatim. (Who can now lay hand on this once great Muslim daily published by Maulana Abdul Haq from Bungalow Ayub Shah and edited by a brilliant Muslim Englishman or Anglo-Indian Daud Upson?)

In my speech I had—undesignedly—worked on the theme that philosophers differed very much amongst themselves, that philosophy was mostly concerned with defining differences, that students of philosophy had to choose soon enough the philosopher or philosophers they would rather belong to, that their choice depended very much on the impressions they received from their first readings or their first teachers, that philosophy in short, tended to be personality-dominated. One sentence in my speech ran like this:

Elsewhere there may be Kantians or Hegelians or what not, but we at GC are just Chatterjians!

A key description of my theme and also of how persuasive and popular was our own teacher Chatterji. The speech seemed to have worked well. It raised some laughter. Hemmy and Chatterji were the loudest to laugh. Among the students Ugra Sen later well-known Professor of English Literature sat as chief correspondent of the G.C., magazine *Ravi*. He wrote about it in the *Ravi*. I cannot say what Iqbal thought of it. Not much, I suppose. Except that it was a welcome speech by a student. But it made me glad to think I had come to his notice.

When Iqbal rose to speak every one adjusted himself, so as not to

miss a single word out of what he was going to say. Anything that came from the poet's lips was important and had to be listened to with attention. Iqbal did not speak much though. Maybe he was in search of a theme. Before an audience of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian students and teachers, among them an English Principal, a physicist of some learning, what theme was it best to raise? A completely Muslim theme would not go well with a mixed audience. An Indian theme was hard to invent. A philosophical theme could be tame or tenuous. If there was a search, it was settled by Einstein. Einstein was the rage those days. And Iqbal's interest in Einstein was unusual. In retrospect today, one can say that Iqbal at the time was thinking of what to make of Einstein in philosophy, in higher poetry and in religious experience. Einstein had set new dimensions for philosophical thought and scientific descriptions. No wonder, Iqbal had taken little notice of the speech he had just listened to. He went on to speak about something which, it became quite clear, was very much on his mind. It also became clear that what he was going to say was linked with the conversation he had raised with us when we went to invite him to this GC reception. And in the light of what Iqbal has said and written since (especially in his *Reconstruction*), we can say that in the 1920's Iqbal was thinking furiously of the philosophy and science of his day and of relating everything important in it to an Islamic world-view reconstructed after his own mind and heart. It is impossible to recall, now after about 50 years, what Iqbal actually said on the occasion. But from the images which happen to survive I think I could construct his speech in the following way:

My interest in philosophy—the last many years—has centred round the problem of space and time. Our earth and all around it occupies space. It is itself space and moves in space but has its being in time. So at least many of us would say. But how space and time appear to us in our daily experience may not be as they appear to a philosopher or a scientist. Space and time of daily experience may be dismissed as mere appearance. Philosophers have said this since Hegel. But what they are in reality, we have no means of knowing. Nobody knows, therefore there is also the problem of how space and time appear to God. These are problems also for theistic philosophers. And they have thought and speculated about them. In the Muslim

scripture—the Holy Quran—there are clear indications that time is important, very important, that there is human time and there is divine time. Divine time is reckoned in a way different from human time. There is also the infinite, unlimited knowledge of God, knowledge without dimensions; without a before and after except perhaps in a sense to be defined carefully; without, that is to say, a sharp distinction between past, present and future.

Muslim mystical poets and thinkers have been attracted to this theme and some of them have expressed themselves in startlingly modern ways. Their modern parallel is the German Professor Albert Einstein who has proved mathematically that *our* time and space are phenomenal. They may be important phenomenally, but they are nothing ultimate, nothing in their own right. They are symptoms of a more ultimate reality, to be described in ways very different from the conventional.

Einstein's thought is yet unknown except to mathematicians. Therefore, I have been discussing the subject with professors of mathematics. But they are unable to communicate the meaning Einstein's ideas have for ordinary men and philosophers. In mathematical language, mathematicians tell us, Einstein makes perfect good sense. I believe they are right. But Einstein should make perfect good sense even to the ordinary man and the philosopher. Perhaps not yet. I have been studying expositions of Einstein's mathematical work. Everybody says it is startling. And it does seem startling. Exactly what is startling in it, it is not easy to say. My own study of the subject—it is called Relativity—extends over the last many years. I have felt interested in it more and more. For, it seems to bring Islam, the Holy Quran, and the mystics of Islam, on the one hand, and the new physical and mathematical science, on the other, closer together. I have a mind to trace out the two strands and put them together so as to show how significant and how similar they are. The commonsense view of a world of solid matter moving in the stream of time, or of time flowing upon a world of space and solid objects, is not true. It has to change. It is truer

to say that space and time are signs of events. The world is made of events. No even can be described in terms of space *and* time, that is, partly space, partly time, but rather in terms of space and time all at once. We are still able to *speak* of space and time though. Space has to lose its rigidity and its status as something ultimate. In any case it is difficult to say which is more important ultimately, space or time? Perhaps time.

I hope I will have another opportunity of meeting you. I should also have time to consider the subject more carefully, also more time talking over and discussing. I may then explain more clearly how mystical religion—at least some mystical thinkers—and modern science are coming closer, trying to say the same thing. The outcome is interesting for every one, for students of religion as well as for students of science.

The speech—Iqbal's speech to the Brett Philosophical Society, Government College, Lahore—was over. Every one looked at every one else and all at Iqbal. A profound effect had been produced. Something very important—something that was yet unfolding—was on the poet's mind. Some of it had found expression; very much more of it was to find expression in its own good time. Iqbal's short speech had been heard by all agog. It was the promise of a longer speech to come. The promise was fulfilled at Madras in Iqbal's famous *Lectures on the reconstruction of religious Thought in Islam*,

After the speech came the recitations. Kazim Husain had taken charge of these. One piece sung beautifully by Kazim was especially well chosen. Kazim did not live long. He did not live to see all that Iqbal was to become in years to come. And certainly did not live to see Pakistan—Iqbal's conceptual and political child—take birth. So, let this reminiscence serve as a tribute to a forgotten friend who contributed much to the beauty of this occasion.

This piece I reproduce below from the *Bang-i-Dara*. It has a powerful universalist message and it fitted so well into the occasion.

Incidentally, few people realise that Iqbal remained a universalist

in his outlook and his thinking even when in politics he changed from an Indian nationalist to a Muslim communalist. For, as a leader of Indian Muslims he continued to argue for his positions not from partisan premises or for partisan ends, but from general premises, for general ends. How much he liked to talk of Asia and Africa and in the same breath! And not of Muslim Asia and Muslim Africa only, but of Asia and Africa as such. By Asia and Africa he meant the backward, the down-trodden, the exploited part of the world. The future of this part had to be assured before the future of the world could be assured.

The point is not understood by some of Iqbal's critics especially in India. Indian Muslim communalism was brought to birth by Indian Hindu communalism. But even after it had come to birth, its justification was sought in universalist, humanist terms, in the beauty of variety, in sub-grouping inherent in the political nature of man. This variety, this sub-grouping allowed to grow along healthy lines was bound to organise itself into a rich, meaningful, voluntary unity.

The piece I reproduce below describes the *lovers* of Iqbal's conception. Iqbal's lovers are devotees of big causes. Wherever found, Iqbal is ready to praise them, to stand up to them and salute them. The piece well-chosen, was as well-received at the Brett reception.

انوکھی وضع ہے سارے زمانے سے نرالے ہیں
یہ عاشق کون سی بستی کے یارب رہنے والے ہیں

علاج درد میں بھی درد کی لذت پہ مرتا ہوں
جو تھے چھالوں میں کانٹے نوک سوزن سے نکالے ہیں

بھلا بھولا رہے یا رب چمن میری امیدوں کا
جگر کا خون دے دے کر یہ بوٹے میں نے پالے ہیں

رلاتی ہے مجھے راتوں کو خاموشی ستاروں کی
نرالا عشق ہے میرا نرالے میرے نالے ہیں

نہ ہو چھو مجھ سے لذت خانماں برباد رہنے کی
نشیمن سینکڑوں میں نے بنا کر پھونک ڈالے ہیں

نہیں بیکانگی اچھی رفیق راہ منزل سے
ٹھہر جا اے شرر ہم بھی تو آخر مٹنے والے ہیں

امید حور نے سب کچھ سکھا رکھا ہے واعظ کو
یہ حضرت دیکھنے میں سیدھے سادے بھولے بھالے ہیں

مرے اشعار اے اقبال کیوں پیارے نہ ہوں مجھ کو
مرے ٹوٹے ہوئے دل کے یہ درد انگیز نالے ہیں

1. Strange in their ways and different from all the rest!
Wherefrom do they come? these lovers, my Lord?
2. Pain I must love, it maybe pain of the wound or pain of
the lancet,
The thorns in my wounds I have pulled out with a
needle-point.
3. May it ever remain rich and green, this garden of my
hopes,
Its tender plants I have watered with the blood of my
liver.
4. These still stars, night after night, oh they make me cry !
Strange is my love and strange are my love-laments.
5. Ask me not how happy it feels to be without hearth
and home,
How many nests have I built only to burn away !
6. Eschew not me your fellow-traveller, and
Tarry O fatas flame, we are doomed alike to destruction.
7. The saint lives on the hope of houries in heaven,
His innocence and simplicity are all assumed, all
appearance.
8. My couplets, Iqbal, why shouldn't they be dear to me?
Mournful laments they, they flow out of a mournful heart.

It only remains to add that Iqbal walked both ways, from his McLeod Road, house to GC and back. We walked with him. An experience never to be forgotten. Throughout we witnessed an exceptional love of students in a great man. From the moment we went to invite him to the moment we parted with him at his door, he made us feel his equals.

On the subject of Iqbal's interest in students and his simple unassumed kindness towards them it may be mentioned that during a year or so in the late 1930's, a group of students (majority Sikh, I think), let by—now the Indian Sikh scholar and leader—Kapur Singh, visited Iqbal now and then and returned invariably with interesting accounts of these visits. Between them—for a time—they also managed to bring out a Punjabi magazine (in Urdu script) called *Sarang*. An

earlier issue of *Sarang* carried a full-length interview with Iqbal. The writeup was Kapur Singh's. One of the questions perhaps the main question—discussed was why Iqbal did not write Punjabi. Iqbal's answer was he was not wedded to any language in the creation of his verse. The choice of language depended on the theme to be handled. Iqbal's themes required now Persian, now Urdu, as a vehicle. His famous *Lectures* he wrote in English. There was no objection to writing Punjabi, therefore. If a theme turned up which required the use of Punjabi, he would write Punjabi.

I know about this because Kapur Singh was then studying for M. A., philosophy and was in almost daily contact with me. He was a brilliant student and passed M.A., a Nanak Bakhsh Medalist of the Punjab University. He entered the ICS but resigned soon after 1947 over some differences. He is very much in politics now.

(October, 70)