# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume: 35</th>
<th>Iqbal Review: October 1994</th>
<th>Number: 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>IQBAL AND QUR'AN: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>PAN-ISLAMISM AND IQBAL</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>CONTOURS OF AMBIVALENCE: IQBAL AND IBN ARABI: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>ISLAMIC METAPHYSICS: A RESTATEMENT</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>SENSE — MIND RELATIONSHIP IN GHAZALI'S EPISTEMOLOGY</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>A YOUNG MUSLIM'S GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whatever Iqbal has thought he has thought through the brains of the Qur'an and what-ever he has seen he has seen through the eyes of the Qur'an. Truth and Qur'an were for him, one and the same, and in this one thing he was so absorbed that among the theologians of his century I have never seen any person who may have lived such life of fanaf'I Qur'an (annihilation in the Qur'an) as this M.A., Ph.D. Bar-at-Law.¹

These obsevations of Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi reflect the immensurable understanding of the Qur'an with which Allah had endowed Dr. Iqbal. The fact is that Iqbal was trained for the transmission of the Qur'anic message to mankind even from his childhood. It seems the advice of his father, Nur Mohammad that he should so recite the Qur'an as if it had been revealed upon him,² had a profound impact on Iqbal. Iqbal used to analyse the meanings and messages of Qur'an from the depths of his soul. He advised people to recite the Qur'an in a manner that it cultivates Mohammedan relation among them.³ In consonnance with his father's advice, he was of the opinion that:

No understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is actually revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet.⁴ "

---


² Ibid., at 35.

³ Ilias Rana, "Qur'an Aur Iqbal" in Bahar Allahabadi (Ed.), Tafsir-i-Iqbal, 13-26 at 13 (Urdu); Schimmel, 222.
In Bal-i Jibril he writes:

When the Book is not revealed to thy heart

Then neither Razi nor the author of Kashshaf opens the knot.\(^5\)

Iqbal admonishes the Muslims, and says:

Thou art the prisoner of Sufi and Mulla thou does not gain life from the wisdom of the Qur'an--

Thou hast nothing else to do with its verses

But to die easily by Yasin.\(^6\)

Mirza Jalal-ud-Din Barrister writes about Iqbal:

On Qur'anic meanings he always concentrated. While reading Qur'an, he used to think over each and every word. While offering prayers he used to recite Qur'an loudly and think over Qur'anic verses and after getting impressed, he used to weep. There was a special attraction in Iqbal's voice. When he used to read Qur'an loudly, the listener's heart used to melt.\(^7\)

Iqbal used poetry as a device for communicating Qur'anic commandments to mankind and so had a disliking for those people who forgot his missionary aim and treated him purely as a poet.\(^8\) His doctrines of Khudi, Mard-i-Momin, Faqr, 'Adl, Haq and so on, had origins in Qur'an. He was Ahl-i-Qur'an but disliked this attribution for himself in view of its

\(^4\) Schimmel, op. cit., 224.

\(^5\) Ibid. 225; Bal-i-Jibril, 78.

\(^6\) Armughan-i-Hijaz, 101.

\(^7\) Supra note 3 at 16.

\(^8\) Abu Muhammad Muslah, Iqbal Aur Qur'an, 25.
sectarian consequences. His faith in "Qur'an as the best guide" can be well explained by the fact that while proceeding to attend the Second Round Table Conference, he was questioned by the Hindustan Times correspondent with what special thing he was attending the Conference? Iqbal replied: "I have nothing except Qur'an. I will present the same". Iqbal considers the Qur'an as a constitution not only for Muslims but for the whole of humanity. About the aims and objects of Qur'an, he writes:

So far as my study of Qur'an is concerned, the aim of Islam is not only the ethical guidance of mankind. Its aim is also that gradual but fundamental revolution is brought in the social life of mankind. And instead of national and racial considerations, complete human consciousness and realization is developed.

Iqbal wanted to write an everlasting and an exemplary book about Qur'an before his departure from this world. In this regard, he was confident that contemporarily he was the only competent person who could write such a book. He even desired to secure government pension for this purpose. He favoured Qur'an movement in India.

Iqbal is emotionally attached to the Qur'an. He says:

Qur'an is a complete book and is itself claiment of its excellence. But what is needed is the practical demonstration


10 Supra note 8 to 17.

11 Supra note 3 to 21.


13 Iqbal's letter to Sir Ross Masood, 12th May, 1935. /bid,

14 Supra note 8 to 15.
of this excellence with regard to human politics, meaning thereby that all important principles are present in it and such and such rule can be deduced from such and such verse.\textsuperscript{15} It is my belief that any person who analyses contemporary jurisprudence or legal fundamentals from the Qur'anic viewpoint and proves eternity and permanence of Qur'anic principles, he would be mujadid of Islam and a great servant of mankind.\textsuperscript{16}

Iqbal considers the spirit of Islam completely imbedded in the Qur'an and advises Muslims for not going outside the Qur'an for discovering the aim and object of Allah.\textsuperscript{17} In a letter to Dr. Nicholson, he writes:

\begin{quote}
Qur'an is not only the book of metaphysics but whatever has been said in it about this world and the hereafter, has been said with absolute finality. This is another thing that it is related to metaphysical problems.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Iqbal, however, deplores, the victimisation of Qur'an by the Muslims. He says:

\begin{quote}
Qur'an is the most victimised book in the sense that those who do not get any work in the world, they get busied in its translation and commentary, though it is the most sensitive and reserved obligation.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

\section*{II}

\textsuperscript{15} Supra note 3 to 14.


\textsuperscript{17} Supra note 9 at 11.

\textsuperscript{18} Supra note 3 at 15.

\textsuperscript{19} Supra note 3 at 16. See also "Jawab-i-Shikwah", Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, I.A.P., Lahore, 1990, p.
For the Muslims the Qur'an is not only an awakener and a message of
dynamism, it is also their basic source of law. In view of its revelatory
character, it is believed that all its contents have eternal validity and these
provide complete guidance in all spheres of human life. Regarding its legal
content, Iqbal writes:

The primary source of the law in Islam is the Qur'an.'

The Qur'an, however, is not a legal code.20

It is evident that Iqbal acknowledges Qur'an as the primary source of law but
he does not give us the reasons as to why it is not a legal code. Gillani
specifies the reasons as to why Qur'an does not contain law in a codified
form. He says:

The reason is that it is not merely a Book of Law. It governs
the whole of human life in a very whole-some manner. It
convinces man to submit to God's sovereignty and persuades
him to liberate himself from the other bonds... It lays down
law at the proper places and points out, as well, that the
legislative powers have been delegated to the Prophet (peace
be upon him)21 ... If the Qur'an itself described all the
principles and details of Islamic society and culture, Islam
would have not been practicable, at least, for a common man.
It would have been the concern of the scholars alone and that
too, with practical limitations. But the Qur'an is a book,
which, in the words of Iqbal, emphasised some of the
detailed rules as foundation stone of the institutions and
delegated rest of this function to the Holy Prophet (peace be
upon him) to complete and practically demonstrate that.22

21 R.H. Gillani, The Reconstruction of Legal Thought in Islam, Delhi, 1982...p. 54-55.
22 Id. at 56.
Although the reasons for the Qur'an not being a code have been properly highlighted by Gillani, we fail to agree with him that Iqbal anywhere in his works says that Allah delegated rest of the legislative function to the Holy Prophet alone; he rather vests the delegation of power in the whole Ummah inclusive of the Prophet.  

Besides, Iqbal seems to be of the view that, ordinarily, there was no need of incorporation of legal verses in the Qur'an but the earlier Christianity versus Judaism conflict propmted Allah to put legal verses in it. In other words it can be argued that the domain of law sould have been inherently independent of religious discipline of Islam and it is the compulsive nature of the past which brought legal provisions in it. We have reached at this conclusion on the basis of his following observations:

No doubt the Qur'an does lay down a few general principles and rules of a legal nature, especially relating to the family the ultimate basis of social life? But why are those rules made part of a revelation the ultimate aim of which is man's higher life? The answer to this question is furnished by the history of Christianity which appeared as a powerful reaction against the spirit of legality manifested in Judaism. By setting up an ideal of other worldiness it no doubt did succeed in spiritualizing life but its individualism could see no spiritual value in the complexity of human social relations. 'Primitive Christianity' says Naumann in his Briefe uber Religion, attached no value to the preservation of the State, law, organization, production. It simply does not reflect on the conditions of human society. And Naumann concludes: 'Hence we either dare to aim at being without a State, and thus throwing ourselves deliberately into the arms

23 This contention has been arrived at by us on the basis of the views expressed by Iqbal in the lecture "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam", See Reconstruction, op.cit., p. 116-124.
of anarchy, or we decide to possess alongside of our religious creed, a political creed as well.  

Thus, behind the incorporation of legal verses in the Qur'an the personalization and individualization of religion by Christianity to such an extent that it became divorced from State, law and other temporal institutions. So the Qur'an brought along with religion all the temporal institutions. Iqbal recognises this fact when he says:

Thus the Qur'an considers it necessary to unite religion and State, ethics and politics in a single revelation much in the same way as Plato does in his Republic.

Iqbal is somewhat indifferent to the highlighting of legal content of the Qur'an but precisely says in this regard:

It is most copious on marriage and divorce, most precise in rules of inheritance and if compared to Christianity (Bible), possesses far greater vitality and responsibility instead of being arbitrary and despotic. It has true democratic characteristics in form and substance.

III

Muslim in general believe that the legal verses of Qur'an are eternal and unchangeable. However, the views of Iqbal are not uniform in this regard. His one view is that the legal injunctions laid down in the Qur'an — heritage, polygamy, etc. — are not to be changed and that these rules are of eternal validity. He writes:

24 Reconstitution, p.132 (Emphasis mine).

25 Ibid.

26 Gillami, op. at.. p. 55.

According to my creed, and perhaps according to the creed of every Muslim, it is the cause of prosperity (falah) to remain inside the limits of the Shari'ah, and is unhappiness to transgress them.\textsuperscript{28}

These rules are not only totalitarian, the true form of the family, of the State, of the economics, and worship being discoverable through the they are everlasting and eternally valid: Prayer and fasting and offspring and pilgrimage_____ All these are 'everlasting, but thou are not lasting.\textsuperscript{29}

The fact is that the question of eternity and noneternity of Qur'anic legal rules was attending his mind for a long time. In a letter to Syed Sulaiman Nadvi,\textsuperscript{30} he enquires as to whether:

Inheritance verses relating to shares are inherently eternal or only the rules which relate to inheritance regulations are unchangeable and there can be change in shares according to circumstances. I have not been in a position to comprehend the commandments relating to wills.

What answer came to this query from the Syed is still unknown but in response to the Turkish Poet Zia Gokalp's criticism of Islam allowing half share to females as against males and advocating equality for women in divorce, separation and inheritance,\textsuperscript{31} Iqbal makes the following extensive observation:\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{_________________________}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{28} Iqbal Nama, Vol. II, 240. Cf. Schimmel, op. Lit, p. 233
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{29} Schimmel, op. cit., p. 233.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{30} Letter to Nadvi dated 18th March, 1926; For details, See Tahir Tawnsawi. Iqbal. Aur Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, 77.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{31} Reconstruction, p. 134-5.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
With regard to the Turkish poet's demand, I am afraid he does not seem to know much about the family law of Islam. Nor does he seem to understand the economic significance of the Qur'anic rule of inheritance. Marriage, according to Mohammedan Law, is a civil contract. The wife at the time of marriage is at liberty to get the husband's power of divorce delegated to her on stated conditions, and thus secure equality of divorce with her husband. The reform suggested by the poet relating to the rule of inheritance is based on misunderstanding. From the inequality of their legal shares it must not be supposed that the rule assumes the superiority of males over females. Such an assumption would be contrary to the spirit of Islam. The Qur'an says:

> And for women are rights over men,

> similar to those for men over women (2:228)

The share of the daughter is determined not by any inferiority inherent in her, but in view of her economic opportunities, and the place she occupies in the social structure of which she is a part and parcel. Further, according to the poet's own theory of society, the rule of inheritance must be regarded not as an isolated factor in the distribution of wealth, but as one factor among others working together for the same end, while the daughter, according to Mohammedan Law, is held to be full owner of the property given to her both by the father and the husband at the time of her marriage, while further, she absolutely owns her dower money which may be prompt or deferred according to her own choice, and in lieu of which she can hold possession of the whole of her husband's property till payment, the responsibility of maintaining her throughout her life is wholly thrown on the husband. If you judge the working of the rule of inheritance from this point of view, you will find there is no material difference between the economic position of sons and daughters and it is really by this apparent inequality of their legal shares that the principles underlying the Qur'anic Law of
inheritance this supremely original branch of Mohammedan Law, as Von Kremer describes it, have not yet received from Muslim lawyers the attention they deserve.

(Schimmel, otherwise highly appreciative of Iqbal, remains unconvinced by Iqbal's justification for half share to females under Islamic Law of inheritance).\(^{33}\)

Contrary to the above mentioned thesis of eternity and justifications for the Qur'anic legal rules, Iqbal has advocated deferring of implementation of the Qur'anic laws under certain specified circumstances. While referring to the book A'al al-Muqi'in by Ibn Qayyim, he writes to Maulana Mas'ud Alam Nadvi.\(^{34}\)

From this book one learns that under some special circumstances there can be change in punishable commandments of Qur'an. For example the Prophet (S.A.W.) himself made amendments relating to cutting off of hands of a thief during war.\(^{35}\) Likewise, relating to infancy period which is two years according to the clear Nass there is found some mention regarding increase or decrease of the period.\(^{36}\)

Commenting on this letter, Schimmel\(^{37}\) writes. "He thought therefore that this [Qur'anic punishment] would not be essential in a modern legislation on Qur'anic basis. He was of the opinion that a Prophet is sent for training one peculiar people",

And to use them as a nucleus for the building up of a universal Shari'a. In doing so he accentuates the principles

\(^{33}\) Schimmel, op. cit., p. 236.

\(^{34}\) Letter dated 12 February, 1936.

\(^{35}\) Iqbal Nama, Vol. I, 404.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Schimmel, op cit., p. 238.
underlying the social life of all mankind and applies them to concrete cases in the light of the specific habit of the people immediately before him. The Shari' at values (ahkam) resulting from this application (e.g., rules relating to penalties for crimes) are in a sense specific to that people, and since their observance is not an end in itself, they cannot be strictly enforced in the case of future generations.\(^38\)

It is submitted that Schimmel's contention that Iqbal compromised with Qur'anic punishments for crimes and advocated for its unessentialness in a modern legislation is a pure distortion of Iqbal's views.\(^39\) Whatever Iqbal said about punishments in Islam in the above lines has reference to his views about the punitive rules coming from Hadith and not from the Qur'an. He discusses the issue under the heading "Hadith" and not "Qur'an". (However, it is a fact that the language used by Iqbal is not clear enough and can be utilized vis-a-vis the Qur'an. But true scholarship demands the faithful reporting of the matter).

From the above narrative it appears that Iqbal was somewhat not ready to accept the Qur'anic punishments for crimes applicable in all circumstances as well as the Qur'anic rule pertaining to the two-year infancy period of a child. But the Court in Pakistan—an Islamic State—has gone ahead while even refusing to recognise the Qur'anic rule pertaining to the family law. In Ghulam Bhik,\(^40\) one of the questions canvassed before the High Court was whether for the enforcement of a divorce on the ground of La'an

\(^38\) Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 136.

\(^39\) This passage from the Reconstruction, to say the least, is quite problematic. The fact has escaped the notice of the author that here Iqbal has based his opinion on a quotation from Shah Wali Ullah taken over from Shibli's al-Kalam on Shibli's authority (see notes of the editor of the Reconstruction on p. 196-198) where as Shibli had mixed, omitted and edited the text of al-Hujjat Allah al-Baligab to read his own ideas in Shah Wali Ullah thus giving rise to a confusion to this has. For a comparison of texts presented by Shibli and the original text of Shah Wali Ullah see Shibli, 'Ihn al-Kalam, wa al-Kalam, Nafis Academy, Karachi, 1987, p. 237-8 and Shah Wali Ullah, Hujjat Allah al-Baligab, Dar al Kutub al Hadithah, n.d. vol. I. p. 247-8. (Editor's note)

\(^40\) Ghulam Rink V. Hussain & gum, PLD 1957 Lahore 998.
(imprecation), .it was necessary for a court to follow the elaborate procedure prescribed by Qur'an. Answering negatively, Justice Kayani observed:

> He would have no hesitation in holding that a procedure whose adaptation has been recognised through the ages and which had become obsolete by our present law of evidence, should be allowed to remain obsolete because it did not possess any particular merit.  

The Judge, however, takes a defensive stand when he remarks:

> So far as the Qur'an goes, I have no intention of interpreting its provisions, which are accepted generally as immutable, though in some details interpreted differently.

Iqbal is of the view that the Qur'an teaches activism which is the part of a true religion. Activity for him means the shedding of a passive behavioural pattern and discarding of erroneous ideas about mobility and change. It simultaneously urges for the reconstruction of Muslim thought and life. In the Reconstruction, he writes:

> The teaching of the Qur'an which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism which recognises a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil.

---

41 Emphasis mine.


44 Id. p. 297.

45 Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 65.
Iqbal thus stands for activity in all spheres of life—be it social, economic commercial, etc. With regard to the legal domain, Iqbal informs us:

Turning now to the groundwork of legal principles in the Qur'an, it is perfectly clear that far from leaving no scope for human thought and legislative activity, the intensive breadth of these principles virtually acts as an awakener of human thought.\textsuperscript{46}

As to what sort of legislative activity is permissible in the Qur'an and are there any limitations on such activity were the other problems which confronted Iqbal. In this regard he is of the view that we should not be handicapped by the legislative activities of the past jurists. He writes:

Our early doctors of law taking their clue mainly from this groundwork evolved a number of legal systems; and the student of Mohammedan history knows very well that nearly half of the triumphs of Islam as a social and political power were due to the legal acuteness of these doctors... But with all their comprehensiveness these systems are after all individual interpretations, and as such cannot claim any finality.\textsuperscript{47}

The reasons as to why we should resort to legislative activity have been explained by Iqbal in the following words:

Since things have changed and the world of Islam is today confronted and affected by new forces set free by the extraordinary development of human thought in all directions, I see no reason why this attitude recognising the finality of scholars should be maintained any longer. Did the founders of our schools claim finality for their reasonings and interpretations? Never... The teaching of the Qur'an that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its

\textsuperscript{46} Id. p. 133 (Emphasis supplied).

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. p. 133 (Emphasis supplied).
predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems.\textsuperscript{48}

As to the problem of ensuring legislative activity contemporarily in the Muslim world, Iqbal recommends "dangerous but necessary" arrangement operating in Iran for Sunni countries whereby the king (in post-revolution period, Iran replaced him by a spiritual leader Ayotullah Khameini and, later on, by 'Ali Khaminai) is a mere custodian of the realm which belongs to the absent Imam and a committee of ulema supervises the legislative activity-of the mejlis.\textsuperscript{49} He thinks that by resorting to this device we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our legal system and give it an evolutionary outlook.\textsuperscript{50} Moreover he contends that a Muslim legislative assembly assisted by -ulema would help in guiding free discussion on questions relating to law.\textsuperscript{51} Iqbal is further of the view that:

The only effective remedy for the possibilities of erroneous interpretations is to reform the present system of legal education in Mohammedan countries, to extend its sphere and to combine it with an intelligent study of modern jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{52}

There are numerous verses in the Holy Qur'an whereby a Muslim has been told that this Book is an exposition of all things,\textsuperscript{53} and nothing has been neglected in it.\textsuperscript{54} Simultaneously the Holy Qur'an directs Muslims to grasp the

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. p. 139.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. 138

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. 140.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} e. g; Qur'an, 16:89

\textsuperscript{54} e. g; Qur'an, 6:38
meanings of its verses as that is the sign of the wise\textsuperscript{55} and visionary.\textsuperscript{56} Consequently the jurists interpreted these verses differently. Al-Maturidi is not ready to take the Qur'an always in the literal sense fearing gross anthropomorphism.\textsuperscript{57} Sir Syed Ahmad Khan is of the view that the brilliant allegorical method of the Qur'an makes it plain that every age has to understand the book in the light of its own requirements.\textsuperscript{58} He supports his view by the famous saying of Caliph Umar (R.A.) that "God's Book is sufficient for us".\textsuperscript{59} Iqbal endorses Sir Syed's view when he writes:

The question which confronts him [Turk] today and which is likely to confront other Muslim countries in the near future is whether the law of Islam is capable of evolution_ a question which will require great intellectual effort, and is sure to be answered in the affirmative; provided the world of Islam approaches it m the spirit of Umar the first critical and independent mind in Islam who, at the last moments of the Prophet had the moral courage to utter these remarkable words: 'The Book of God is sufficient for us.'\textsuperscript{60}

Iqbal now informs us about the device which Muslims should employ for an evolution of the Islamic law. He writes:

The claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to reinterpret the foundational legal principles deduced from

\textsuperscript{55} e. g; Qur'an, 29:43

\textsuperscript{56} e. g; Qur'an, 59:2


\textsuperscript{58} Abdul Hamid, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as Politician, Historian and Reformist" in M.M. Sharif (Ed.). op. cit., Vol. 11, 1580-1597 at 1591.

\textsuperscript{59} B. A. Dar, "Renaissance' in Indo-Pakistan: Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan as a Religio-Philosophical Thinker" in M. M. Sharif (Ed.) op. cit., 1598-1614 at 1612.

\textsuperscript{60} Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 129.
Qur'an\textsuperscript{61} in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life, is, in my opinion, perfectly justified.\textsuperscript{62}

So Iqbal is an ardent supporter of 'Reinterpretation' of Ijtihad. But the question which arises is what type of reinterpretation he envisions regarding the Qur'an? The above lines suggest that he favours re-interpretation of foundational legal principles in the light of one's own experience and altered conditions of modern life but the works of the predecessors should guide and not hamper the solution of the problems.\textsuperscript{63} In this regard, Iqbal comments upon the rule regarding apostacy contained in Hedayah and highlights its effect in the Punjab. He writes:

In the Punjab, as everybody knows, there have been cases in which Muslim women wishing to get rid of undesirable husbands have been driven to apostacy. Nothing could be more distant from the aims of a missionary religion. The Law of Islam, says the great Spanish Jurist Imam Shatibi in his Al-Muwafiqat aims at protecting five things Din, Nafs, Aql, Mal and Nasl. Applying this test I venture to ask: Does the working of the rule relating to apostacy, as laid down in the Hedayah tend to protect the interests of the Faith in this country? In view of the intense conservatism of the Muslims of India, Indian Judges cannot but stick to what are called standard works. The result is that while the people are moving, the law remains stationary.\textsuperscript{64}

By "foundational legal principles" we can conclude that all legal verses in the Qur'an, according to Iqbal, are not foundational or fundamental. But

\textsuperscript{61}The words in brackets have been supplied as Iqbal makes this observation under the heading "Qur'an".

\textsuperscript{62}Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 134.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid. p. 134 (Emphasis mine).
who is going to locate foundational legal principles and how? Does he treat only clear legal verses of Qur'an as foundational or includes in it all legal verses, though not explicitly clear? As regards the former, there is a least chance of re-interpretation as text does not envisage any other interpretation. For instance, if the Qur'an allows a widow or any other sharer a share in the property, there is no room for re-interpretation. Iqbal's thesis here seems to suffer from a paradox. On the one hand he justifies half share to daughters in the Qur'an\(^{65}\) and, on the other, he is convinced that under certain special circumstances Qur'anic rules regarding crimes,\(^{66}\) cases,\(^{67}\) infancy period\(^{68}\), status of children which are born after the legal period of gestation of the husband's death\(^{69}\) and awl\(^{70}\), can be changed or at least their implementation deferred.\(^{71}\) He thus treats some clear nass in the Qur'an as foundational and some as contingent.

Although Iqbal pleads for reinterpretation of foundational legal principles, we are of the opinion that he has personally recognised only one foundational legal principle, i.e. Tawhid. He says:

> The essence of 'Tawhid' as a working idea, is equality, solidarity and freedom. The State, from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization...\(^{72}\) Islam as a polity, is only a

---

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

\(^{66}\) Iqbal Nama, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 404e.

\(^{67}\) Schimmel, 237, quoting Ramuz, 124, talio with application of Sura 2/175 and 4/61.

\(^{68}\) Supra note 76 at 132.

\(^{69}\) Schimmel, 237 quoting M.I. 154, Iqbal does not refer to this problem in the Reconstruction.

\(^{70}\) Ibid., quoting M. I. 29 (dt., 1935).

\(^{71}\) Lettter to Maulana Masood ' Alam Nadvi dated 12 February, 1936.
practical means of making this principle Tawhid a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind.\textsuperscript{73}

Besides, we have the feeling that by 'equality, solidarity, and freedom', he did not mean their meanings from the Qur'anic context but from Western notions. Had he kept the Qur'anic explanations in mind, then he would not have insisted upon Muslims to be guided by developments in Turkey. He observes:

If the renaissance of Islam is a fact, and I believe it is fact, we too one day, like the Turks, will have to re-evaluate our intellectual inheritance...\textsuperscript{74} The truth is that among the Muslim nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber and attained to self-consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of intellectual freedom; she alone has passed from the ideal to the real—a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral struggle. To her the growing complexities of a mobile and broadening life are sure to bring new situations suggesting new points of view and necessitating fresh interpretations of principles which are only of an academic interest to a people who have never experienced the joy of spiritual expansion.\textsuperscript{75}

Turkey, for which Iqbal has all praise, had a national Constitution enforced in 1924 which, inter alia, provided for the adoption of a non-religious legal and judicial system.\textsuperscript{76} The Civil Code, 1926 strictly prohibited polygamy and provided penalty for a violator,\textsuperscript{77} recognized legitimacy of children born in a

\textsuperscript{72} Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 122.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. p. 117.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. p. 121.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. p. 128.

\textsuperscript{76} Tahir Mahmood, Personal Law in Islamic Countries, Delhi, 1987, 214-218

\textsuperscript{77} Art. 93,
void and voidable marriage, equal rights for men and women in matters of succession and abolished all forms of extra-judicial divorce. Apparently some of these provisions violate clear Qur'anic texts but he considers it as "original" contribution to the general thought of Islam. Turkish developments make us ponder as to what constitute "foundational legal principles" and of what we are going to have a reinterpretation. Turkish legislation in most cases was divorced from the Qur'anic nass and based on the Italian Criminal Code of 1889 and the Swiss Civil Code, 1912. It represented the absolute abandonment of personal law as a religion-based entity and its merger into a modern civil code. But Iqbal informs us that we should have ijtihad or reinterpretation on the lines of legislation in Turkey where:

religious and political thought has been reinforced and broadened by modern philosophical ideas and is grounded on modern sociological concepts.

It is an undisputed fact that Iqbal's concept of "reinterpretation" in general and of the Qur'an in particular has been quite liberal. It is this approach which made Coulsom to say:

There are two diametrically opposed attitudes in which the essence of the modernist-traditionalist tension lies: these can be summed up in two sentences.

The injunctions of the Qur'an, objectively interpreted, are eternally valid criterions of conduct and:

78 Art 125.
79 Art. 439-617.
80 Art. 129-138.
81 Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 129.
82 Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 121.
Islam commands time and is not commanded by it.\footnote{N. J. Coulson, "Reform of Family Law in Pakistan", Studi Islamica, Vol. VII (1957)p. 153.} Schimmel is of the opinion that Iqbal also suffers form this conflict. She observes:

The conflict between these two ideas is not only to be witnessed in separate ideological groups of theologians but also in the reformer in the person of Iqbal himself.\footnote{Schimmel, op. cit., 232. The Itallized words have been supplied. The original word is 'and'. If allowed to remain, it makes an ambiguous writing.}

This being the position, let us now see as to how far courts of law have recognised the principle that the Qur'anic verses and rules derived from other Shariah sources, namely Hadith, Ijma' and qiyas can be reinterpreted independent of their interpretation by earlier jurists. The question arose in 1964 before the Lahore High Court in Khurshid Jan. The case was heard by three judges, manely, Ya'qub 'Ali; Wahiduddin Ahmad, and Anwarul Haq. Only the last two judges gave their opinion on the raised question. Denying such a power to modern courts, Wahiduddin Ahmad, observed:

In my judgement this is a path not free from danger and must be avoided. It was for this reason that the Privy Council as early as 1897 disapproved of this tendency and discouraged the courts of law to put their own construction on the Qur'an in opposition to the express ruling of Muhammadan commentators of great antiquity and high authority... I am, therefore, not inclined to depart from the view taken by the Privy Council. Subject to this in cases arising under Muhammadan Law a clear injunction of the Qur'an and Sunnah is binding and no departure is permissible from them. Thus if it is possible to ascertain clear authority from these two primary sources in support of any proposition advanced as a rule it must be followed. But if no clear authority is available resort can be had to other sources referred to.
The learned judge supported his viewpoint with the rulings in Muhammad Yasin, Anis Begum, Aziz Banu, Abdul Fatch. Ahmad Ishak, Baqr d Khan and Fazlur Rehman and concluded:

The question still remains whether the court of law should embark on and traverse on this hazardous field (i.e., reinterpretation of the Qur'an). In my judgement nothing has happened since the above decisions were pronounced to justify any departure from the principle of interpretation recognised in them. I would, therefore, hold that it is not open to the courts of law to differ form the views of Imams and jurists of Muslim law if it is in accordance with the consensus or preponderence of authorities of the doctors of later time.

However, these observations of Wahiduddin, J. were not agreed upon by Anwarul Haq, J., who held:

My answer, therefore,... is that the courts must be given the right to interpret for themselves the Qur'an and the Sunnah; and that they may also differ from the views of "the earlier juris-consults of Muslim law on grounds of Istihsan (i.e. equity) or Istislah (i.e. public good) in matters not governed

85 Extracts of the case have been reproduced in Keith Hodkinson, Muslim Family Law, London, 1984. p. 27-66.


87 Anis Begum V. Muhammad Istafa Wali Khan, (1933) 55. All. 473.

88 Aziz Banu V. Muhammad Ibrahim Hussain, A.I.R. 1925 All. 790.

89 Abdul Fateh Ahmad Ishak V. Russomoye Dhur Chowdhury, 22, Cal. 619-212.

90 Baqr Ali Khan V. ANjuman Are Begum, 25 All. 236.


92 Supra note 83. (Emphasis laid).
by a Qur'anic or Traditional Text or Ijam' or a binding Qiyas. At the same tune, it must be reiterated that the views of the earlier jurists and Imams are entitled to the utmost respect and cannot be lightly disturbed but the right to differ from them must not be denied to the present day courts functioning in Pakistan, as such a denial will not only be a negation of the true spirit of Islam but also of the constitutional and legal obligation resting on all courts to interpret the law they are called upon to administer and apply in cases coming before them.93

The learned Judge derived support for the above observation from several cases particularly Balqis Fatima94 and Rashida Begum.95 In the former case a Muslim wife claimed from the Lahore High Court the issuance of a divorce decree as a right, merely on the ground of there having occurred, no matter for whose fault, a situation in which a harmonious married state is no longer possible between the spouses. Agreeing with the wife's contentions, the Court recognised the Judge's power to dissolve the wife's marriage by way of Khula' in spite of the unwillingness of the husband, provided the other pertinent requirements for the relief were satisfied. Kaiskaus J., who delivered the judgement of the Full Bench, observed:

The... reply is that we are really dealing with the interpretation of the Holy Qur'an and on a question of interpretation we are not bound by the opinions of jurists. If we be clear as to what the meaning of a verse in the Qur'an is it will be our duty to give effect to that interpretation irrespective of what has been stated by the jurists. Ati' ulla ha wa ati' ur Rasul, is the duty cast on the Muslims and it will not be obedience to God or to the Prophet if in a case where our mind is clear as to the

93 Supra note 97 at 65.


95 Mst. Balqis Fatima V. Shahab Din PLD 1960 Lah. 1142.
order of the Almighty or the Prophet we fail to decide in accordance with it...  

In the latter case, Muhammad Shafi J., spoke in the same tune:

If the interpretation of the Holy Qur'an by the commentators who lived thirteen or twelve hundred years ago is considered as the last word on the subject, then the whole Islamic society will be shut up in an iron cage and not allowed to develop alongwith the time. It will then cease to be a universal religion and will remain a religion confined to the time and place when and where it was revealed... I would also like to make it clear at this' stage that this difference of interpretation does not, and cannot mean a departure from a clear injunction of law as contained in the Qur'an or Sunnah or even Ijma' on any ground of equity, good conscience or public policy.

The above quoted judgements reveal that Iqbal was right in inviting Muslims to a reinterpretation of the Qur'an. Even the first Caliph of Islam did discard known interpretations of the Qur'an on many occasions. In Himariya case, Caliph 'Umar distributed the property firstly according to the Qur'anic verses but, when appraised by the one of the litigants that the Qur'anic rule works hardship, he reviewed his judgement although in doing so he had to violate the Qur'an. Viewed form this angle, the following observation of Professor Mushir-ul-Haq deserves a dispassionate consideration:

It is said that there cannot be any Ijtihad (reinterpretation) in Mansusat . (definite and unequivocal Shari'ah rule)? Is Nass the substance of the verse or its interpretation? For example, let us take the question of inheritance. Since the Qur'an has fixed the shares of different heirs with separate details, so it is said that whatever may be the demands of the times, there

---

96 Supra note 85 at 61.

97 Ibid. (Emphasis Laid)

cannot be any change in the fixed proportion of these shares. The social, economic and political conditions are all immaterial. As the shares of inheritance are Munsus so the male in all cases has to get double share than a female. But it is worth consideration that since a man cannot fully comprehend the divine knowledge, so how can we say with confidence that whatever we have understood about inheritance provisions, that is its final meaning. Is not there any possibility that if situations and circumstances change and jurists point towards a different interpretation not against the spirit of Islam, cannot the previous interpretation be reconsidered?  

Likewise, Kamal A. Faruqi, has put the view that:

The Qur'an must be approached for the fullest possible understanding, both in the context of early Islamic Arabic of the heroic and classical periods and also in the context of Arabic as a living and developing language.  

Gillani contends that the term "Kalalah" used in the Qur'an does not carry the meaning which has been given to it in the past, i.e. uterine relations. Rather it means the relatives other than parents and children, like uncle, aunt, brother, sister, etc. This new meaning, if given effect, would entitle those relations to inherit who were so far excluded and exclude or simultaneously allow those who are exclusively inheriting the property at present. However, this tendency, if recognised, is likely to refute the contention that:

---

99 Mushirs-ul-Haq, "Ilm-i-Kalam Aur Shari'at Ki Navi Ta'beer" in Zia-ul-Hassan Farooqi and Mushir-u-Haq (Ed.), Fikr-i-Islam Ki Tashkeel-i-Jadeed, 262-270 (Delhi, 1978).(Translated from Urdu by the author). Professor Haq makes similar observations regarding the authority of males over females and equivalence of a male's evidence to two females.

100 Kamal A. Faruqi, Islamic Jurisprudence, Delhi, 1988 p. 108.

101 Supra note 21 at 176.
Nearness to the Prophet, in time and space, implies a greater accuracy in understanding the Qur'an and that, therefore, we of this generation, being farthest in time, are not hest able to understand the Qur'an.  

THE PROSPECTS

The above discussion reflecting Iqbal's views about dynamic and awakening features of the Qur'an; legal content of the Qur'an; consonancy of legal activities of a Muslim with the Qur'anic spirit, interpretational permissibility enjoined by the Qur'an and overall Judicial and intellectual endorsement of the above tendencies, is yet-to ensure a bright future. The promulgation of offence of Zina, (enforcement of Hudud Ordinance VII of 1979; offence of "Qadhf", (enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance XXIX of 1979 and Zakat and 'Ushar- (Organization) Ordinance XXIX of 1979 in Pakistan during Zia regime and the introduction of Shari'at Bill on 10th April, 1991 in the National Assembly of Pakistan, by the then Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif and its recent passing by the said Assembly with an overwhelming majority and sending it to Senate for passage in that House show that overall the Muslim community is still of the view that all the legal verses in the Qur'an are of eternal value and future legislation has to take place in the light of all these verse. Proclamation in Iran of Bakhshnnanzah in 1982 directing the courts in the country not to apply any un-Islamic legislative enactment of the pre-Revolution era and extensive amendment of the Penal Code of 1912 and the Civil Code of 1928-1935 in order to reinforce Islamic legal principles, especially Qur'anic rules and restoration of uncodified Islamic personal law both for the Shi'ite majority and the Sunni minority, are some of the pointers of the pristine revival of classical interpretation of the Qur'anic text. In India, it still holds good that in administering Muslim law no court should attempt to put its own construction on any Qur'anic text, or examine the conformity of any traditionally settled legal principle with the relevant text of the Qur'an or in any way circumvent or deviate from the

102 Supra note 85 at 54.

103 Supra note 77..

104 Aga Mahamed Jafar V. Koolsum beebee (1897) 24 I.A. 196. 105 Ibid.
law as settled by the jurists of the past even if it does not sound "modern", "just" or "logical". Like-wise lawyers of modern age are not allowed to introduce new rules of law by claiming that they logically follow from the texts of the Qur'an. It seems that it would take, if not centuries, at least decades, to realize Iqbal's dream of Muslim nations, like the Turks, re-evaluating their intellectual inheritance and shaking off their dogmatic slumber. So far Iqbal's suggestion to identify foundational legal principles from the Qur'an has least impressed the legislators and jurists of the Muslim countries.

105 Ibid.


107 Baqar Ali V. Anjuman Ara (1903) 301.A. 94. ICS. Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 121.

108 Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 121.

109 Ibid. p. 128.

110 This appears to be an understatement. Though the author has given a fairly clear idea of Iqbal's view of the issue of legislation, he sees not to have taken account of the activity, in all like likelihood generated and triggered by Iqbal's comments in the early part of this century, which has covered much ground in this direction and provided fresh insights on the questions of ijtihad and its practical modes of implementation in the modern world. (Editor's note).
PAN-ISLAMISM AND IQBAL

Shereen Aslam

All discussion of Iqbal's political activities and his contribution to the Muslim political awakening must begin with the recognition that Iqbal was in no sense a politician. He composed poetry and wrote extensively in prose. He was essentially a poet and a political philosopher; in both the fields he achieved outstanding international repute. Although, Iqbal was pre-occupied with literary activities, a sensitive mind like his could not remain unconcerned with what was happening around him in the field of politics. His participation in practical politics was confirmed only during the last decade of his life.\textsuperscript{111}

Iqbal was born in Sialkot on 9th November, 1877,\textsuperscript{112} which was the second phase of the Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Islamism or Muslim universalism was a cardinal feature of Iqbal's political thinking. The historical survey of Pan-Islamic movement admits of being divided into three periods. Although, the divisions are arbitrary, they are useful for the purpose of our study.

The first consists in the period from the death of the Prophet (PBUH) to the 18th century. It started from the hey day of Muslim power and ended at its decline.

The second period begins with the 18th century and ends in March, 1924, when the Turkish National Assembly dismissed Khalifa Abdul Majid and abolished the Khilafah.\textsuperscript{113} The period deals with the rise of wahabism

\textsuperscript{111} Waheed-uz-Zaman, Towards, Pakistan, Lahore, Publishers United Ltd., 1978, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{112} Faqir Syed Waheed-ud-Din, Roozgar-i-Faqir, Lahore, 1963, pp. 229-43 and Syed Abdul wahid "Date of Iqbal's birth" Iqbal Review, October, 1963, pp. 21-32.

\textsuperscript{113} Khushwant Singh, "Pan Islamica", Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society, vol. IX. p. 31.
and the revolt of the Muslim world against the European political and spiritual encroachments. It is an important period because it witnessed a united and political Muslim front imbued with Pan-Islamic ideology. Muslim India was included in this general awakening. During this phase, Iqbal's name was closely associated with the Pan-Islamic movement. In fact, certain circles believed that Iqbal's message was the continuation or rather culmination of the movement which was started by Syed Jamal-al-Din Afghani\textsuperscript{114}, who was the leader of the new Pan-Islamism.

The third period belongs to the 19th and 20th centuries in which nationalism took the place of Pan-Islamism.\textsuperscript{115} The purpose of my paper is to study the idea of Pan-Islamism or Muslim Universalism in Iqbal's writings.

The term "Pan-Islamism" was coined by the Western orientalists during the 19th Century\textsuperscript{116} and was hardly used in a complementary sense. "Pan Islamism is defined as a kind of league of the "Muhammadan states for the defence of "Mussalman Faith".\textsuperscript{117} The growing feeling of solidarity of the Muslims has time and again been designated as fanaticism and a resurgence of the Muslim hostility towards Christianity".\textsuperscript{118} Later, even Muslim writers frequently used it to explain Muslim brotherhood.\textsuperscript{119} The meaning definition of Pan-Islamism is feeling of solidarity amongst all Muslims irrespective of race or nationality. It expresses itself practically in the international sphere as a desire to operate as a single entity under a common leadership.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid. p. 36.


\textsuperscript{116} Khushwant Singh, op. cit., p. 31.


The origin of this movement can be traced back to the rise of Islam itself. The object of Islam was to demolish all discriminations based on caste, colour, creed and territory. The Qur'an and the traditions (Hadith) of the Prophet (SaS) are replete with the instructions and the injunctions against sectional tendencies among human beings. The Qur'an laid down the principle: "The believers are but one brotherhood"\textsuperscript{120}

Similarly, one of the many traditions of the Prophet (SAS) is "The Muslims are as a wall, one part supporting another, the Muslims are all one body. If the eye is injured, the whole body suffers; if the foot is injured, then too the whole body suffers.\textsuperscript{121}

It is a matter of history that for centuries the Muslims of the world used to move freely from one Muslim country to another without visas or permits. They settled freely wherever they liked and even rose to eminent positions in local governments. Grunebaum, mentioning this fact, says that according to the Muslim law any Muslim was a full-fledged "Citizen" of a Muslim ruled state in which he happened to find himself and no Muslim was an alien in any Muslim land\textsuperscript{122} However, the conquest of Muslim lands by European powers was the first blow to this principle. European powers imposed territorial restrictions and gave to the different lands specific nomenclatures of nationalities. They put restrictions on movement and travel as well which, with the passage of time, were made more rigid and thus the Muslim world was divided into watertight compartments and this is how the Muslims lost a scene of unity and purpose. When the Muslims lost politic independence history of Muslim Universalism also disappeared with it.\textsuperscript{123}

Muslim Universalism meant the rule of caliph whose spiritual and political ascendancy was supreme in the Muslim Empire. The whole Empire

\textsuperscript{120} Qur'an, 40:10.

\textsuperscript{121} Muhammad Marmmaduke, Pickthall, The Cultural Side of Islam, Madras, 1927, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{122} G.E.V. Grunebaum, Modern Islam, The Search for Cultural Identity, Berkeley, 1962, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{123} Perveen Feroze Hasan, op. cit., p. 211.
is one great entity of believers where unity and oneness under the divine law governed the affairs of the individual and the community, after the end of the period of the, pious caliphate, the Muslim world went through sort bitter experiences. During the second half of the 19th century, the political scene changed rapidly and the Muslims lost most of their political bases.\textsuperscript{124}

In 1857, after India's First war of Independence, the Mughal empire in the Indo-Pak subcontinent finally came to an end. Between 1857 and 1864 Russia conquered the independent Muslim states of the Caucasus. By 1886 the Uzbek Khanates were also subjugated. British Indian government waged many wars against Afghanistan. Iran had become a bed of international conspiracies. Malaya and Indonesia had become colonies of the Western powers. In North Africa, Algeria had been occupied by France in 1850. Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881 and a year later Britain occupied Egypt. In Eastern Europe, the Ottoman Sultan had to cede large territories with a substantial Muslim population—Bosnia, Bulgaria and several other areas to the non-Muslim powers. Sudan was also conquered by Britain. Thus, the entire Muslim world was in a state of political, social, religious and moral degeneration.

This confusion was further increased by the impact of westernization because the western educated elite looked at even their own religion with suspicion. It was under these circumstances that during the last decades of the 19th century, in an atmosphere of protest and bitterness, the Pan-Islamic movement arose in the Muslim World.\textsuperscript{125}

The outstanding hero of this movement, from whom Iqbal took inspiration, was Jamal-al-Din Afghani. Who led a single-handed crusade\textsuperscript{126}, with his knowledge of the Shari'ah and an exceptional gift of eloquence? Wherever he went, Afghani's magnetic personality left a mark of awakening and group of followers to carry on his mission. His Pan-Islamism was basically a doctrine of unity of the Muslim world and constitutionalism. His


\textsuperscript{125} Perveen Feroze Hasan, op. cit., p. 213.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
primary aim was to emancipate the Muslim lands from western imperialism and to re-kindled among the Muslims a love for Islamic ideals of unity, purity and progress. To many he was the chief spokesman of modernism in Islam.

According to some historians he was born in 1839, near Kabul. \(^{127}\) Where as Nikki Keddie says, Jamal al-Din was an Iranian, born in Asadabad near Hamadan, into a family \(^{128}\) of Sayyids Till the age of 10 he studied in the local school and thereafter at various places in Persia and Afghanistan. At the age of 18, he had a good knowledge of Muslim sciences, Arabic, philosophy, Muslim history, Muslim theology, sufism, logic, physics, mathematics, medicine and other subjects. \(^{129}\) At the same age, Afghani came to India and stayed for about a year and a half during which he created a great impact on the Indian Muslims. \(^{130}\) Thereafter, throughout his life, Afghani visited various countries in Asia, Europe and North Africa speaking against the occupation of the Muslim lands by the Western powers and stressing the need for the unity of the Muslim Ummah. \(^{131}\) He died in Constantinople (Istambul) on the 9th of March, 1897. \(^{132}\) In the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent Afghani's influence was deep and lasting. Wilfrid Scwa Blunt in his diary remarked about Afghani's popularity in India. Thus: for Jamal-ud-Din they professed something like worship" \(^{133}\)

---


\(^{132}\) Perveen F. Hasan, op. cit., p. 216.

Afghani was such a great leader that nearly every renowned leader in the sub-continent during the twentieth century including Mohammad Iqbal, has paid tribute to his contribution to the cause of Muslim awakening. Afghani believed that the modern reform movement in Islam should be based on the original Islamic principles of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, He believed that to be subjected to an alien rule was against Islam.\textsuperscript{134}

**IQBAL'S VIEWS**

Iqbal's main contribution was to develop a distinct Muslim consciousness along with the sense of continuity with their nationalist feelings. Born during the midst of the process of the downfall of most Muslim empires, he not only witnessed the end of the process but also the beginning of the birth of the new aspiration among Muslims for a future which could be created and molded by themselves.\textsuperscript{135} He said:-

"If the Turks were overwhelmed by disaster, what then?"

"The morn is born of the death of a million stars"\textsuperscript{136}

Iqbal's earliest poems reveal no interest in politics. These are only marked by a spirit of ardent nationalism. His appeal throughout the years was for the union of two great communities of Hindus and Muslims of India. One of the famous poems of this period is "Tarrana-i-Hindi".\textsuperscript{137}

During his stay in Europe, Iqbal absorbed new ideas. He found the idea of nationalism as inadequate to solve the problems of humanity. Greed and selfish competition between man and man between nation and nation could

\textsuperscript{134} Jacob M. Landau, op. cit., p. 14.

\textsuperscript{135} Mohammad Safdar Mir, Iqbal the Progressive, Lahore, (Book Traders) 1990, p. 136.


\textsuperscript{137} Waheed-uz-Zaman, op. cit., page 125.
not be the basis of a society of which Iqbal was dreaming. The following line composed in March, 1907\textsuperscript{138} revealed his thoughts.

O residents of the West, God's earth is not a shop

The gold which you are thinking to be genuine will now prove to be of low value,

Your civilization is going to commit suicide with her own dagger;

The nest which is made on a frail bough cannot be secure"\textsuperscript{139}

Disillusionment with European culture made Iqbal look inward to seek inspiration from his, own religion. Thus Western civilization, instead of estranging Iqbal from his roots, made him turn to Islam. He said that if Islam had to face the West, some superficial practices in Islam would have to be discarded. This led him to believe that pantheism was a destructive force which had killed the will to act in the Muslims and resulted in the decline of Islamic civilization. He was of the view that the pantheistic God was very different from the vigorous depiction of teh Quranic God.\textsuperscript{140} His study in Europe had therefore equipped Iqbal to play an important role for the uplift of the Muslim Ummah.\textsuperscript{141} As a matter of fact, he returned home to British India fully determined to reconstruct a new world for the Muslims of India. Just back home, he wrote:

Nationalism in the sense of love of one's country, and even readiness to die for its honour, is a part of the Muslim's faith: it comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of a political concept, and claims to be a principle of human solidarity demanding that Islam should recede to the

\textsuperscript{138} Al-Beruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, p. 172.

\textsuperscript{139} Al-Beruni, Makers of Iqbal; His Art and Thought, Lahore, 1949, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{140} Masud-ul-Hasan, Life of Iqbal, Vol. 1, Lahore, Feroze Sons Limited, 1978, pp. 82-83).

\textsuperscript{141} M. Saeed Sheikh, Studies in in Iqbal Thought, Lahore, 1972, p. 63.
background of a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life.\textsuperscript{142}

He further discussed Iqbal's criticism of Nationalism, "Thus Iqbal's criticism of nationalism was based on moral, spiritual and political factors. He sincerely felt that the doctrine lacked spiritual and moral basis".\textsuperscript{143}

Hence, he was not inconsistent in his views, with and having contradiction in his poetry as stated Moin Shakir,\textsuperscript{144} but he only switched off his pro-nationalism view to Pan-Islamism which it was quite natural. This was the process of historical evolution of Iqbal's philosophy.

After his return to India, Iqbal applied himself unceasingly to the interpretation of Islam and the spiritual values for which it stood. Henceforth, the most important quest was for an interpretation of Islam as a complete way of life. M.L. Ferrar says:

What strikes one first in Iqbal is the strength and the fervour of his love for Islam as an ideal which if fully realized should suffice for man's every want in this world and the next.\textsuperscript{145}

After 1908 Iqbal was now no longer confined to the limits of India. He had extended himself to cover the entire world of Islam, which knows no boundary, territory, race or caste. Iqbal was of the view that the Muslim commonwealth, as established by the Holy Prophet (SAS), was based on the equality of all Muslims. There was no privileged class, no priesthood and no caste system.\textsuperscript{146}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{142} Sayyid Abdul Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, Lahore, 1973, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{143} Perveen-F. Hasan, op. cit., p. 216.
\textsuperscript{144} Moin Shakir, Mohammad Iqbal; Constructive Revivalism. n.d., p. 122.
\end{flushright}
Here sectarianism triumphs, class and caste there rule the day.

It is thus you hope to prosper, to regain your ancient sway?

"But can you claim you are Muslims if the truth must be confessed?"147

According to Iqbal, Islam does not recognize difference of race or the historic differences of nationality. Nationality in Islam was not the highest limit of political development.148 Furthermore, according to the Islamic law, there is no distinction between the church and the state.149

We are not Afghan, Turk or Tartar, but are all of one family. Let us ignore our different colours for we are all children of the same idea.150

But to act as one, and Muslim - that would every bound exceed.151

Music of strange lands with Islam's fire blends, on which the nation's harmony depends;

empty of concord is the soul of Europe.

Whose civilization to no Mecca bends.152

Another aspect of his personality was Iqbal's inclination towards Sufism. Iqbal believed in the supremacy of intuition over intellect and the soul over


147 Dr. L. S. May, Iqbal His Life and Times, Lahore, Sheikh Mohammad Ashraf, 1974, p. 85.


152 Ibid., p. 15.
the body. His father was also a suf. (belonging to the Qadri order). Iqbal was a disciple of his father. The passivity in some sufi orders is due to the influence of Greek and Persian thoughts, For instance, the true spirit of Islam, according to Iqbal, was lost in the pursuit of idle tales, the believers had their way in the wilderness of traditions.

True religion has sunk lower than irreligiousness,

For the Mulla, though religious, is branding people as faithless.

The religion of the kafir consists in planning for earnest endeavour.

The religion of the Mulla is creating trouble in the name of God."\(^{153}\)

Iqbal was a sensitive person and much concerned with the politics of the sub-continent. In 1916, the Lucknow Pact was signed between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League after which Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad 'Ali Jinah was hailed as an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. However, Iqbal did not agree with the contents of this pact. He thought that under the terms of the Lucknow Pact Muslims would he lose in the Hindu crowd. As the philosopher of 'self' he wanted the Muslims to stand on their own to maintain their separate identity.

O knowing man,

learn that the soul is not confined in space,

but that the liberated man defies all goals, and furious grows at this dark earth;

for hawks cannot perform the work of mice.\(^{154}\)

Iqbal was opposed to the secularization of Muslim politics in India, He declared that Mr. Gandhi could not be a model to be followed by Muslims, In fact Iqbal stated that the Muslims could not follow any political guidelines

\(^{153}\) Faqir Waheed-ud-Din, op. cit., p. 180

\(^{154}\) V.G. Kiernan tr. Poems from Iqbal; (Bal-i-Jabrail), Kutub Publishers Ltd., 1951, p. 36.
laid down by human beings. Iqbal believed that it was imperative for the Muslims to seek guidance from the Qur'an and the Sunnah alone. Muslims could not make their conduct, political or otherwise, subsequent to the thinking or direction of Mr. Gandhi or other politicians.

After his return from London to India, the idealistic view of an Indian nation composed of Hindu and Muslims living in amity remained no more practical for Iqbal. It was strengthened due to Hindu prejudiced attitude towards politics; the best example in this connection was the annulment of the partition of Bengal, in 1911, due to the Hindu agitation followed by the partition of Bengal in 1905. In the meanwhile Muslims founded All-India Muslim League in 1906. So, he was looking at the Indian political scene at that time as a Muslim more than as an Indian citizen.

World politics also influenced Muslim India. September, 1911 convinced Indian Muslims that non-Muslim forces were bent upon crushing the Muslim forces every where. Iqbal was affected by those events and expressed his views at the annual session of the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, Lahore, in 1911. In his poem "Shikwa" Iqbal asks God the reasons for the lamentable disasters on His chosen people. Later during the non-cooperation movements in 1920 he refused to oblige them. He gave his resignation from the post of the secretary of the 'Khilafat Committee'. He criticized and warned those Muslims who were working under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi because Gandhi was using them for his own political purposes and for the sake of National Congress which were not acceptable to any Muslim.

Iqbal's intellectual and poetic maturity was consistent with the times, as the Pan-Islam movement had taken a firm hold over the religious and political thinking of the Muslim world during the years 1919–1924. After his initial enthusiasm for territorial nationalism, Iqbal had become an ardent Muslim Universalist. His concept of the Ummah was basically Pan-Islamic and his whole hearted advocacy was for a return to the Qur'an as a code of human conduct. It can be said that with Iqbal's genius, the movement which was started by Al-Afghani reached its highest watermark. Iqbal expressed great admiration for Jamal-ud-din Al-Afghani in his prose and his poetic writings.

Maulana Jamal, Sayyid of all Sayyids, whose
eloquence gave life to stone and shred.\textsuperscript{155}

behold, that world lies within your own heart;

now I will tell von of its firm foundations.\textsuperscript{156}

In his letter to a friend Iqbal had stated that in his view if anybody was entitled to be called a Mujaddid, it was Jamal al-din Al-Afghani. He regarded Afghani as the chief architect of the present day renaissance in the Muslim World.\textsuperscript{157}

Again while writing to Jawahar Lal Nehru, Iqbal further expressed his immense esteem for Afghani by saying that no other man in his time had stirred the soul of Islam more deeply than Afghani. He said that his spirit was still working in the world of Islam and nobody knows where it would end.\textsuperscript{158}

In poetry too, Iqbal devoted considerable space to Afghani's ideas, especially in his Javid Nama. Thus Iqbal's image of the future of Islam was Muslim Universalism. He firmly believed that denial of the universal brotherhood of Islam meant the rejection of the basic principles of the Quranic ideology. In his view, the main cause of the downfall of Muslim community was disunity among the Muslim Ummah. All students of Iqbal agree that Muslim Universalism lay at the core of his message to the contemporary Muslim World. For instance, Sinha is of the view that, "Islamic 'internationalism' or Pan-Islamism, is the keynote of Iqbal's poetry."\textsuperscript{159}

Professor Arberry in his introduction to Rumuz-i-Bekhudi mentions that Iqbal has made a case for international Islam. Arberry further writes that


\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.,p. 59.


\textsuperscript{158} S.A. Vahid, op. cit., p. 278.

\textsuperscript{159} S. Sinha, Iqbal; The Poet and His Message, Allahbad, 1912, p. 284.
Iqbal was constantly thinking about the possibility of the revival of the Caliphate.\(^{160}\) Professor Brown in his review of Asrar-i-Khudi writes that it is by no means a Western philosophy but rather a philosophical Pan-Islamism, designed to cure the ills of Muslims.\(^{161}\)

Muslim Universalism was not merely one of the phases of Iqbal's thought. In fact, once Iqbal fully absorbed the spirit of Islam he unfhinchingly advocated Islamic Internationalism. Like Afghani, he believed that unless the Muslims realized the value of Muslim Universalism they would remain socially and politically backward. A writer K.A. Wadud has also said that among modern Muslim thinkers, Iqbal is indebted most to AI-Afghani who tried hard to drive home the message of scientific outlook and political resurgence in the Muslim society.\(^{162}\)

Iqbal himself tirelessly advocated the cause of Muslim Universalism. His non-Muslim critics used the term 'Pan-Islamism' for him in a derogatory sense. But he himself was convinced that the universality of Islam was vital to the faith and the Ummah.\(^{163}\) He believed that if the Muslim nations were to survive in the contemporary competitive world, they must again link themselves together as one compact entity. In a short address, which he delivered at the Muhammaden Educational Conference in 1911, Iqbal openly declared that it was his conviction that Muslim Ummah as a simple entity has a glorious future.\(^{164}\)

Again in a lecture, which was reproduced in the report in the Census for India 1911, Vol-XIV, Iqbal further elaborated, that Islam abhores all material limitations. It bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea. He further said


\(^{164}\) B.A. Dar, Letters and Writings of Iqbal, Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1967, p. 57.
that, in its essence, Islam was non-temporal and non-spatial. Iqbal's zest for 'Pan-Islamic' society was not just an ideal, as according to Iqbal himself the ideal and the real are not two opposing forces. Idealism does not mean a complete break with realism. In fact, it was his perpetual endeavour to bring the ideal closer to the real. In his opinion, Islam as a religion is the simplest of all religions because it only expects from its believers a belief in the unity of God, and the finality of the mission of the Prophet (SAS). A belief in these principles is sufficient to eliminate all distinctions of caste, colour, creed and race and by the foundations of equality and universality for the Muslim Ummah. He further believed that by eliminating all distinctions and discriminations, Islam gave each individual a sense of personal security and power.

In reply to Sir Fazal Hussain's statement that the political "Pan-Islamism" never existed, Islam as a society does not recognize the barrier of race, nationality or geographical frontiers. In this humanitarian idea 'Pan-Islamism'—if one likes to call it for simple expression 'Islam'—does and has always existed. This gives a clear picture of Iqbal's thoughts about Muslim Universalism.

Another point that emerges from Iqbal's philosophy is that Ummah and Muslim Universalism means the same thing. While elaborating this point he further said that Islamic outlook on nationalism is different from other nations. Nationalism in Islam is not based on the unity of languages, oneness of territory or economic affinities. Its basis is the simple unity, the Ummah, founded by the Holy Prophet (SAS) and its membership rests on common belief about God and His creation and the historical traditions which we all share together.

After establishing the fact that belief in the Universal sovereignty of Allah is an integral part of the Muslim faith Iqbal could not reconcile himself with the idea that the Muslim world should be divided into antagonistic territorial nation states.

---

165 Also S.M. Ashraf, (ed.) Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah Lahore, 1956, p. 204.
In Payam-i-Mashriq, while referring to an incidence pertaining to Tariq, the conquerer of Spain, Iqbal says that love for one's place of birth to the extent that it becomes a barrier to the spread of Islam, is an alien concept. A Muslim is expected to believe that since the entire world belongs to God, no Muslim can ever be an alien in any land and the whole world belongs to him.  

"On the shore of Spain, when Tariq set fire to his fleet;
the action is against the dictates of reason
They said.
Far away from our country, how shall we get back there?
When is the destruction of means permissible in religion?
He smiled, drew his hand to his sword and said:
every country is our country that is our god's country."  

During an interview Iqbal said that the term "Pan-Islamism" was invented by a French journalist "whose name I cannot recall" and in the sense in which he used the terms "Pan-Islamism" existed nowhere except in his own imagination. Later the expression "Pan-Islamism" was taken to mean a kind of intrigue, the centre of which was Constantinople. But, late Professor Brown of the Cambridge University conclusively proved that 'Pan-Islamism' in that sense never existed in Constantinople or anywhere else.

Iqbal further said, that there is however, another sense in which Jamal al-Din AL-Afghani used it, i.e. he advised Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey to

166 M. Iqbal, "Millat-i-Baiza Par Aïk, Imrani Nazar", in Maqalat-i-Iqbal Lahore, 1988, p. 154-183.

167 Payam-i-Mashriq. See Kuliyat, op. cit., p. 28C. 5.7. M. Sadiq, op.,Itr., p. 408.

168 Iqbal's Interview, The Bombay Chronicle, 1931.
unite against the aggression of Europe, which was purely a detensive measure and as such, Iqbal fully endorses this view of AL-Afghani.

According to Iqbal, there is yet another sense in which the word should be used i.e. not as a political project but as a social experiment. (He further says that, Islam does not recognize caste, race or colour. In fact, according to him Islam is the only out-look on life which has really solved the colour question, at least in the Muslim World, a question which modern European civilization with all its achievements in science and philosophy has not been able to solve. This kind of 'Pan-Islamism' which was taught by the Prophet (SAS) will live for ever. In this sense 'Pan-Islamism' is only 'Pan-Humanism". In Iqbal's view, in this sense every Muslim is a Pan-Islamist and ought to be so. He further said, that the word 'Pan' ought to be dropped from the phrase "Pan-Islamism", for Islamism is an expression which completely covers his stated views on "Pan-Islamism:169

To conclude, the origin of Pan-Islamism can be traced back to the rise of Islam itself, (though the word was coined by a French journalist). Pan-Islamism arose when the new religion demolished all discriminations based on caste, colour, creed and territory. However, in the recent past, Syed Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani proved to be a great stalwart of the movement. Afghani's 'Pan-Islamism' was based on the doctrine of unity of the Muslim World and constitutionalism. His main aim was to emancipate Muslim lands from the Western imperialism and to re-kindle among the Muslims a love for the Islamic ideals of unity, purity and progress.

As a politician, Iqbal's participation in practical politics was confined only to the last ten years of his life. Both in his poetry and prose, Iqbal laid great stress on unity amongst Muslims. He believed that the Ummah is a compact universal entity and any attempt to divide it into sections and parochial entities was against the mission of the Holy Prophet (SAS), who instructed the Muslims to he united forever in the bond of interminable unity.

169 Ibid.
CONTOURS OF AMBIVALENCE: IQBAL AND IBN ARABI: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(Part-iii)

Muhammad Suheyl Umar

(Continued from the October 1993 issue)

Resume of Parts I & II Published in Iqbal Review, April, 1993 and October, 1993.

The author has tried to elucidate, through analyzing the material available about the various phases of Iqbal's life and thought, the question of shifting positions of Iqbal vis-a-vis Ibn 'Arabi. Till 1910, Iqbal appears as a great admirer of Ibn 'Arabi. After the publication of Asrar-i-Khudi a shift in his position is discerned whereby he emerged as a critic of several ideas which were regarded to be of Akbariام origin. A list of twenty important objections raised by Iqbal was given in the previous parts which were then analyzed and compared with the teachings of Ibn 'Arabi as reflected in his original works, especially, al-Futuhat al-Makkiyah. The findings of the author indicate that in most of the cases, the ideas and statements criticized could not be traced back to Ibn 'Arabi himself whose intellectual position appears quite different from the received body of thought and praxis which was, infact, the target of Iqbal's criticism. Part three continues the analysis of the remaining two objections which pertain to the questions of the detrimental effects of the Persian poets and the concept of fana (annihilation). This concludes the second phase of Iqbal's relationship with Ibn 'Arabi's ideas. Rest of the article would deal with Iqbal's attitude towards Ibn 'Arabi in the last and final phase of his life which spans from 1920 to 1938.

Objection No. 3 & IC

The question of the Persian poets and their detrimental influence on the masses is a complex and detailed problem. A few general observations would
only be possible within the confines of this article. First of all e have to consider that the process of decadence, to which they are seen as the chief contributors, had equally overwhelmed the non-Persian peoples who could not have, possibly, received the negative influence of the "pantheistic" ideas borne by the wings of their poetry. Therefore we can surmise that the Muslim community was, as a whole, subject to more universal and profound causes of decline and decadence in which the Persian mystic poets had no special contribution.

Moreover, this matter of an exceedingly complex nature may not he treated in a hasty and summary fashion as Iqbal seemed to have done, perhaps, in the fury of the raging debate. That he had second thoughts about it is testified by his recantation of his verses about Hafiz; this is an action which cannot be attributed to an attitude of capitulation on his part in the face of a growing and menacing opposition. Iqbal being a man of principles, it seems hardly possible that he decided to expunge the verses on account of the objections raised against these verses. It is more likely that it had to do with his later deliberations on the problem.

We had occasion to touch upon the primary concern which Iqbal hall for the decadent state of the Muslim Ummah, causes of its decline and their possible remedies. A careful analysis of his prose and poetical works reveals that it is, inf.-let, the permanent leitmotif which appears not only in all of his' poetical works but also in his philosophical prose works and, like an invisible thread, binds them together in a unified whole and provides them a common direction of thought, a sense of purpose, aims and objectives,' motivation and underpinning.


171 "but the sharp reactions of many admirers of classical Persian poetry to his verdict later made him delete the most critical verses from the Secrets of the self." This is how prof. Anameri Schimmel views the problem and her views reflect an opinion that is commonly held by many Iqbal scholars. See A. Schimmel, "Iqbal's Persian Poetry" in Persian Literature, Bibliotheca Persica, Albany, 1988, p. 423. Also see the first part of our article that appeared in Iqbal Review, April and October 1993.

172 See part one of the article, op. cit.
His background and the situation in which he was born were entirely different from that of Rumi and Hafiz and this partly explains the difference of emphasis these poets respectively put on various elements in their poetical works. Apart from quite general and ever-needed reminders against the recurrent human tendencies of gaflah\textsuperscript{173} (heedlessness towards the essential, spiritual vocation of human beings) Hafiz had no immediate or urgent need for that kind of a message or worldly dynamism that Iqbal required to 'jolt out' his audience from its indolent state of torpor and spiritual apathy Hafiz had a different task to accomplish and he did it in such a remarkable manner that ever since his poetic excellence has never surely been surpassed if seldom equaled, by any of the Persian poets. If there had been such a need in the epoch in which Hafiz lived and sang his lyrics he could have used his medium of expression and his skill to convey the new ideas, more suitable to his age, as Iqbal successfully did by taking over the images, the idiom and diction of the Persian poetic tradition, of Hafiz and others, and made use of it for a different and, in a sense, more immediate purpose by filling inherited forms and images with a new spirit through a shift of-emphasis.

Emphasis on the practical consequences and concern for the redress is as much a result of his particular bent of mind as it is an outcome of his milieu which was different from that of 'Hafiz. The times in which Hafiz lived were of great political and social upheavals\textsuperscript{174} but the fabric of his society was still intact and the disturbed conditions of his age were still an internal' matter of the Muslim Ummah. They were yet free from being subjugated and enslaved by an alien civilization whose tenets and world view were completely contrasted with their own. To bring out the singinificance of this difference we quote from a contemporary historian.

"Up to Harun's time, and that of his sons, the story of the caliphate was at least to some extent the story of Islam and had its influence upon the shaping of the religion. The point

\textsuperscript{173} Gaflah is the Qur'anic term indicating the centrifugal tendencies that draw people away, from God towards an excessive concern with the affairs of the here-below as against the here-after.

\textsuperscript{174} All standard works on Islamic history record details of his times in a similar manner.
had now come when the divorce between dynastic and political history on the one hand and the life of the Ummah on the other was made absolute. Sunni Islam had crystallized in a definitive pattern, and the legal and social framework within which the community lived, generation after generation, changed very little in the next thousand years. The full implications of the Qur'an and of the Hadith had been worked out by men who laboured quietly, indifferent to what happened at Court. The Ummah had taken on a life of its own and had become spiritually and socially self-sustaining.\[175\] If the entire structure of government and administration were to disappear overnight in any occidental country, chaos would ensue; if this were to happen—even today—in any reasonably typical Muslim country, we might find that it made very little difference to the life of the people, and in earlier times the only contact most citizens are likely to have had with government was in the person of the local tax-collector. They went one way, their 'rulers' another.\[176\]

The objections that we listed in the first part of our study\[177\] are, in one way or the other, related to this primary concern. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that Iqbal is not concerned, at least directly, with a philosophical critique of these issues. His attention is focused on the practical consequences and inherent dangers of these tendencies. Readers familiar with Iqbal's rather pragmatic approach in such matters would see that he has analyzed this issue, like many others, from a concrete, practical point of view;

\[175\] 'For a long time, in fact since the ninth century, mainly despotic rulers were obeyed but kept at a safe distance, partly because Muslims had developed a comfortable social order based on an intricate network of personal and group loyalties and obligations.' The rulers may have been usurpers: 'what counted, however, is that the social order was legitimate because it was governed by the law of God.' P.J. Vatikiotis in Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East (Croom Helm. 1948).


\[177\] See part one, op. cit., p. 32.
instead of using the theoretical criterion of correct and incorrect or less correct, he looked at the issues at stake from the angle of their being usefull and harmful, or conducive or detrimental to the overall well being of the Muslim Ummah. In rejecting or accepting an idea or a trend he would give precedence to the prevalent and more pervasive aspect of it rather than its original meaning and intent or its exact position with regard to its metaphysical, philosophical or religious content.\(^\text{178}\)

One is reminded here of his similar criticism of the great teacher of morals, Shaykh Sa' di of Shiraz. Sa' di had advised:\(^\text{179}\)

زمانہ با توانہ سازد تو با زمانہ بساز

Iqbal rejected his advice in an apparently disparaging tone.\(^\text{180}\)

حدث ہے خبر ا نست ' با زمانہ بساز' 
زمانہ با توانسازد تو زمانہ ستمسز

From the times of Sa' di to Iqbal there is a historic span of several centuries which casts its shadow on the meaning and connotations of the phrase 'times' used commonly by both Iqbal and Sa' di but with divergent or rather cross intentions and purposes. 'Times' held out a different shade of meaning for Iqbal from that it conveyed in Sa' di. If the one advocated a change and adaptation in the readers to become 'in tune' with the time, the other invited and incited them for a struggle against time which was 'out of joint'

Secondly, the matter takes on a perplexing, rather ironic, turn when we consider the events occuring in the contemporary world as well as few of those which happened in the recent past.

\(^{178}\) We are indebted to Mr. Ahmad Javid for inviting our attention to this point of considerable importance.

\(^{179}\) Sa'di Shirazi, Kulliyat.

\(^{180}\) Iqbal, Kulliyat (Persian) Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 1989.
Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al Jaza'iri (1222/1807-1300-1883) was, to borrow the expression of J.W. Morris, "in many ways a sort of Ibn 'Arabi reborn". Apart from being a freedom fighter, an activist in the current meaning of the term, and the leader of the Algerian resistance movement between 1832-1947 he was also an extraordinary sufi writer and teacher who could be regarded responsible for reviving the teachings of al-Shaykh al-Akbar. He was the one who financed the first publication (in Cairo) of the complete al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah. His lifelong adherence to sufism, more particularly to the 'school' of Ibn 'Arabi, and his teaching and spiritual activity revolving around the 'central transforming insight into the transcendent Unity of Being (Wahdat al-Wujud) could not turn him into a 'passive' entity!

Mir Sayyid 'Ali Hamadani (714/1314-786/1385) a Kubrawi sufi who played an important role in the establishment of Islam in general, and sufism in particular, in Kashmir, 'spiritedly supported Wahdat al Wujud, translated and commented on Fusus al-Hikam, in Persian and wrote many treatises.

---

For biographical details and accounts of his life by French contemporaries, see GMTAve DUGAT (tr.), Le Livre d' Abdul Kader, Editions Boustamia, Tunis, nd. and Reve R. Khawani, Lettere aux Fransais:... Paris: Phebus, 1977 both being the translations of ' Abd al-Qadir's letter written to Societe asiatique in 1855. The mystical and spiritual side of his personality is carefully explained in Michel chodkiewicz's remarkable introduction to his selection of shorter chapters from Kitab al-Mawaqif (the treatise on spiritual halts), Paris, Editions du seuil, 1982, cf. Morris, op. cit.

Morris, "Ibn 'Arabi and his Interpreters ...", op. cit. p. 117.


See S.A.A. Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, Delhi, 1986 (rpt.) p. 293.

See Osman Yahya, Histoire et classification de l' oeuvre d' Ibn Arabi, I, p. 252; Mss. in Sir Salar Jang Museum, Hyderabad, Tasawwuf, p. 780, Risalah Wujudiyyah, Raza library,
on Ibn 'Arabi's teachings. In 'avid Namah Mir Sayyid 'Ali Hamadani appears as a paragon of mystical insights as well as a guide and mentor in the affairs of this world; a saintly figure belonging to the folk of Allah who bequeathed both dhikr and fikr (remembrance of God and contemplation) to Ghazali when he turned to the Path and a man who could untie a hundred knots in a single 'look'" and for whom Iqbal was advised by his companion and guide Rumi "let your heart open to his arrow".  

Here, as in the case of Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, we observe a perfect compatibility between a faithful adherence to the teachings of Ibn 'Arabi or even to wahdat al-wujud, a teaching usually ascribed to him, and a dynamism, appreciated by Iqbal and, in fact, required to fulfill the duties of our human vocation.

To take into consideration an example of a different order we draw the attention of our readers to a significant set of circumstances that deserve our attention since they have a direct bearing on the question we are discussing at present. The imperial patronage of the Ottoman Turks was accorded to the shaykh al-Akbar and his school early in history. It appeared with Sultan Salim the First and continued till the end of the dynasty.

The popular and prevalent sufi order among the Turks and the Turkish races had been, and still to a large extent, is the Naqshbandiyah order.  

Upto the time of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, the Mujaddid (d 1034/1624) the

---

186 M. Iqbal, Kulliyat (Persian) op. cit., p. 63-40

187 Concerning the problems that arise by as ascribing this doctrine to Ibn 'Arabi without qualification, see W.C. Chittick. "Rumi and Wahdat al-Wujud", The Heritage of Rumi. Ed. Banani and Sabagh, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 70-111. We have previously touched upon this point briefly in the earlier part of our study.

188 Iqbal's views about the Naqshbandiyah order are well known.
Naqshbandiyah order, like other turuq, was devoted to the teachings of Ibn 'Arabi and his school.\(^{189}\) Being a "crystallization of the particular traditions of Khurasanian Sufism"\(^{190}\), Khurasan and Transoxiana being penetrated by the works and teachings\(^{191}\) of Ibn 'Arabi by the 8th /14th century, the period that coincides with the genesis of the Naqshbandiyah order in that area. What is of particular interest here is that not only its early figures like Khwaja Muhammad Parsa were among the enthusiastic and celebrated devotees of Ibn 'Arabi but along with a long list of Naqshbandi saints, Mullah 'Abdullah Ilahi (d.896/1496), the first major propagator of the Naqshbandiyah order, was greatly influenced by Ibn 'Arabi. Activities of Mullah Ilahi did not only surface in the spread of the Naqshbandiyah order among the Turks. This trilingual author and poet were also responsible for the cultivation of wajudi poetry.

This brings us to the next point that we intend to mention regarding the use and influence of poetry that winged the ideas of wahdat al-wujud. Hafiz and Bedil are the most popular poets among the Afghan Mujahidin who recite their verses, in their trenches and battle spots. Armed resistance to the hegemony of a super power go hand in hand with the influence of a poetry which could have turned them into a "passive collectivity"! It may also he remembered that the dominant sufi order among the Afghans is still the Naqshbandiyah.

Apart from this reference to the interaction of these teachings with two of the 'martial' races of the Muslim lands let us also consider the evidence afforded by the school of Deoband which, according to its own official statement, is "an heir to the legacy of Ibn 'Arabi and Hallaj" but which, nevertheless, has not been prevented by this intellectual commitment to provide the best and largest group of 'activists' in every walk of life.

---


\(^{190}\) Ibid., p. 46.

\(^{191}\) Jandi and Farghani both came from these areas.
From the Malay archipeligo, Shaykh Yusuf of Macassar (d.1699) provides yet another striking example of the same phenomenon. A prolific writer and a commentator on Ibn 'Arabi's teachings, he waged a life long struggle against the Dutch colonial power, until his exile, while at the same time propagating the ideas of the Shaykh al-Akbar. Even during his days of exile in the Cape of Good Hope he introduced, like Mir 'Ali Hamadani, the local populace to Islam.

Ibn 'Arabi's own life also provides an excellent example of social and religious responsibility --- an exact opposite to the apathy and antinomianism to which Iqbal objected------- wedded to the most sublime and sophisticated metaphysical teachings, We cannot enter here into the details of his life which include an enormous and almost super human literary output along with extensive travels, teachings and training of disciples, spiritual practices and. interaction with political and religious authorities. However, we would like to conclude our remarks on the question of 'inactivity' and wahdat al-wujud by drawing the attention of our readers to a few pertinent points regarding the issue.

The Indian distinction between wahdat al-wujud and- wahdat al-shuhud was taken up by several orientalists, including Massignon, Anawati and Gardet who were responsible for not only reading this distinction back into Islamic history but attributing certain elements to Ibn 'Arabi which could have hardly been assigned to his age and milieu except on very questionable grounds. Massignon had a well known personal preference for Hallaj (love-mysticism) and a deep aversion to Ibn 'Arabi's approach. He and those who followed him presented the popular image of Wahdat al-Wujud as "static existential monism" as contrasted to Whadat al-Shuhud which was in a sense "patronized" since it not only, supposedly, accorded more with "orthodoxy" but also because it represented "dynamic testimonial monism". Criticizing


Massignon on this point, Dr. William Chittick made some very perceptive remarks. He says:

Massignon's attribution of a "static" mysticism to those who supported wahdat al-wujud illustrates the typical sort of over simplification indulged in by those who place labels on Ibn al-'Arabi, thus mutilating a highly complex doctrinal thesis.

No. one paints a more dynamic picture of creation and the human relationship to God than Ibn al-'Arabi. For example, when he explains the similarity demanded by God's self disclosure (tajalli), Ibn al- 'Arabi constantly quotes the axiom, "Self- disclosure never repeats itself" (la takrar fi l-tajalli), which is the principle behind his well-known doctrine of the "renewal of creation at each instant" (tajdid al-khalq ma'a l-anat). One of the names that Ibn al-'Arabi gives to the highest stage of spiritual realization, where the human receptacle becomes the full manifestation of the all-comprehensive divine name Allah, is "bewilderment" (hayra), since within this station the perfect human being constantly witnesses (shuhud) the infinite expanse of the divine wujud through never-repeating and ever-changing revelations of light and awareness. Thus, he writes in the Fusus, 'Guidance is to be led to bewilderment. Then you will know that the whole affair is bewilderment, that bewilderment is agitation and movement, and that movement is life. There is no rest, no death, only existence -- nothing of nonexistence". 194

Moreover, the ideas of inactivity and action should also be defined with more precision. Merely an absence of outward action (physical, political, social etc.) capable of producing immediate, palpable and tangible results, is no proof of the non-existence of an inward activity which is often more important and, in most of the cases, precedes and determines outward action. This is all too obvious but it is often lost sight of in similar discussions in Iqbal studies, identifying all action with the most outward, feverish agitation.

194 See Chittick, "Rumi and Wahdat al-Wujud" op. cit.
The presumption that underlies these discussions must also be analyzed. According to its logic, Islam is an exception to the universal process of decline and its rules governing the unfolding of history. It is not because Islam is the youngest of the world religions and can consider itself from its vantage point of a comparatively young religion. It is regarded to be immune to the universal causes. Had it not been for various extraneous influences working on it and there is hardly any agreement on their true nature Islam would have completely escaped the inevitable process of decline. Rest of the job is quite easy. You name the causes and hang those responsible for it!

Attributing the rise and fall of the Ummah to an influence of "pantheism" of a supposedly Akbarian origin would mean that we glide silently over the more profound and pervasive elements of this universal process of decline to, which human collectivities are subject and from which Islam is not exempted, albeit in the sense of being the youngest and least affected of religions.

Dr Schimmel has pointed out a very pertinent reason for this incomprehension or, to be more precise, an ill-comprehension evident in both the Eastern and Western interpretations of Hafiz. We may conclude this discussion with her explanation.

"Hafiz is not a romantic poet; rather, it is the clear-cut, polished quality of his verse that is so fascinating, and at the same time so difficult to assess for a Western reader who is used, at least from the eighteenth century, to Erlebnis-lyrik that is, the poetry that translates a real experience of the writer into verse --- and who no longer understands the "learned", and intellectual character of most of Persian poetry in which many sentiments are filtered, as it were, through the mind until one perfect line contains their quintessence."195

As far as the personal piety and moral uprightness of Hafiz is concerned even Iqbal himself acknowledged it in one of his letters. Mention was also made of a Persian work written by a contemporary of Hafiz which provided first hand account of the life and spiritual station of Hafiz. Later Iqbal scholarship has time and again relied on this important piece of evidence to argue in favour of Hafiz. But this is beside the point. Given that, on the basis of whatever little evidence we came unearth about Hafiz's life and works (apart from the Diwan), he could be absolved of the charges of antinomianism or anacreontism, the question of his literary influence and subsequent interpretation remains to be analyzed as this is, precisely, the main issue that Iqbal has taken up with Hafiz.

The question of Iqbal's sources that he used for interpreting and understanding Hafiz hardly arises as long as we take for granted the direct exposure to the works of Hafiz which Iqbal's literary background and his training with Mawlvi Mir Hasan presuppose. The reason that we now try to discuss this point is provided by an interesting piece of information that has lately come to our notice. Prof. Annemarie Schimmel, in her illuminating article "The Genius of Shiraz: Sadi and Hafiz", briefly elucidated the background of Hafiz's reception in German literature in the following words:

---


197 See his letter to Siraj al-Din Pal, Iqbal Namah op. cit. vol. I, p. 43. Though Iqbal has not given the title of the work but it can be identified easily as Lataif-i-Ashrafi, Nusrat al-Matabi', Delhi. 1880, since the other extant work of Ashraf Jahangir Simnani i.e. Maktubat-i-Ashrafi is still in manuscript form (Dept. of History, Ali Garh Muslim University). See Dr. Nazir Ahmad, "Hafiz Shirazi' Ke do Qadim Tarin Ma'khadh", Fikr-o-Nazar, Ali Garh, January, 1960, Also see Yusuf Hussain Khan, Hafiz our Iqbal, Delhi, 1976, p. 63, 64, 115, 116, where he mentions Hafiz's piety, his interest in Quran Studies and Arabic language. Hafiz wrote glosses on the famous Tafsir al-Kbashshaf -- and his spiritual station by quoting Simnani and other contemporary sources. Simnani says, "I stayed with him is Shiraz for a long time. Though I had seen a lot of those who were attracted by God (Majdhuban) and those who were loved by God, I found him (Hafiz) to be of a very high spiritual station". Other commentators also mention of his Quran lessons, fatawa etc. Ashraf Ali Thamwi, whom Iqbal regarded in very high esteem quotes an anecdote in one of his sermons which testifies, to the religious standing of Hafiz.

198 See note 162.
"Likewise, the real meaning of Hafez's verse has been a matter of dispute. Some commentators have understood him to be a perfect Anacreontic, praising wine and love without inhibition, and cursing the narrow-minded ascetics and theologians. The Turkish commentator Sudi belongs to this group, which strongly influenced the early European critics, especially those who became acquainted with Hafez through the Turkish tradition. Here, Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall is the leading figure; he translated the entire divan of Hafez, which appeared in two volumes in 1812-13 and inspired Goethe to compose his West-östlicher Divan of 1819. Following Hammer-Purgstall's rather mundane interpretation of Hafez, a considerable number of mediocre German poets of the nineteenth century adopted his name as a trade-mark for their drinking poems and love songs, and especially for their attacks against the clergy.\(^\text{199}\)"

Here is a representative sample of Sudi's commentary on Hafiz taken from the very first ghazal of his diwan which many, if not all the readers know quite well. In his usual manner, after giving the linguistic break-up and an analysis of the grammatical structure of each of the verses, he provides the quintessence of its meaning under the suggestive sub-heading mahsul-i-Bayat.

The hopeless lover who cannot endure the turning away of the beloved from him sometimes indulges in wine-drinking and at other occasions in opium and qahwah in order to find solace for his inward torments so that his maddening heart may find a little peace in it.\(^\text{200}\)"

Readers acquainted with Islamic religious and mystical poetry can immediately discern the motif of plaints about the temporary "absences" or "abandonment" (fatrah) of the Beloved in the overall frame work of the divine presence. It is one of the major themes of Sufi poetry and one can go on quoting, almost endlessly, examples of sorrow at interruptions of the state of possession.

---

\(^{199}\) Schimmel "The Genius ..." op. cit. p. 221-2.

\(^{200}\) See 'Ismat Sattarzadah, (tr.) Sharh Sudi bar Hafiz, Intisharat-i-Zarrin, Tehran, 1366 p. 4-5. For the original Turkish commentary see Muhammad Afendi Sudi Bosnawi, Sharh Sudi, Bullaq, 1250 h.
of union or an absence of divine graces. Hafiz has employed this age old expression in the verse that we have quoted. Moreover, this is how Ashraf 'Ali Thanwi, one of the most outstanding religious scholars of Iqbal's times, interpreted this verse.\textsuperscript{201} Sudi's interpretation, as the readers might have observed, goes completely wide the mark and relegates the symbolic poetry of Hafiz to such a mundane level that it does not remain something worth paying attention to.

Iqbal mentioned Sudi in one of his letters\textsuperscript{202} which dates back to the days of controversial debates on Asrar-i-Khudi. After referring to Clarke's\textsuperscript{203} translation, Browne's History and Encyclopaedia of Islam, he wrote, "Sudi had also been translated into German. If I could find a copy here, I would help you to read it".\textsuperscript{204}

In view of the foregoing facts, are we justified to feel ourselves inclined to find here traces of an unconcious influence of J.Von Hammer_Purgstall\textsuperscript{205} at work, carried over from his stay in Germany? It is hard to believe but there remains the possibility of these background influences that might have surfaced during his quest for identifying the causes of our decline in a concrete manner.

While on the point concerning the interpretation of Hafiz's verse, we would like to quote from Prof. Schimmel another illuminating comment made by her in her remarks on Goethe.

---


\textsuperscript{202} To Siraj al-Din Pal, Iqbal Namah, op. cit. vol, I, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{203} It is interesting to note that Clarke's translation was again based on the German edition, much later than Purgastall, of Hemann Brockhaus (3 vols., Leipzig, 1854-56), cf. Persian Literature, op. cit. p. 501. Clarke, obviously knowing little Persian, had produced an idiosyncratic English version in literal and markedly artificial prose.- Iqbal has referred to it repeatedly in his letters. See Iqbal Namah, Vol. I, p. 39,41.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. p. 42.

\textsuperscript{205} Joseph von Hammer-Purgastal, Der Diwan von Mohammed Schemseddin Hafiz, 2 VOIs., Stultgart and Tubingen (Colta) 1812-13.
"Goethe understood Hafez perfectly well. A great poet and thinker himself, he knew that the word qua word has a mystical quality and that a verse can convey something far beyond its external meaning, can point to a transcendental truth without being in need of an allegorical interpretation that puts, as it were, heavy chains of metaphysics around the wings of a butterfly. The true poetical word reveals and hides at the same time; it enables the reader to sense things that transcend the simple statements found in a verse. That holds true for most poetic masterpieces."

The real meanings of Hafiz's verse have endlessly been debated not only in Persian but other Islamic languages and, lately, among the Western scholarship as well. We cannot even give a sampling of this vast literature here. What, nevertheless, transpires from this debate is that readers in different climes and different intellectual and social milieus can interpret Hafiz according to their own levels of knowledge, or of wisdom. An overall decline and, especially, an impoverished academic background coupled with a perverted taste for this worldly and the mundane resulted in the prevalent views about Hafiz. Moreover, poetry by definition and by its place in the Islamic civilization has always been something of an elitist nature, addressed to, and presuming, a cultural sophistication and refinement of learning. When it filters down to the masses it, inevitably, takes on a simplified and often misleading character. But this is not the fate of poetry alone. Religion and human thought generally share this destiny. As things move away from their origin, process of decadence sets in.

This leads us to say, with a certain embarrassment indeed, that it is difficult to agree with Iqbal on this point. We do not deny that the phenomenon of decline or passivity towards the demands of the Creator manifested in the Ummah; in fact we would come to it again shortly when we discuss, in the context of Iqbal's objections, the tendencies and misunderstandings that gave rise to this phenomenon. The point of disagreement lies in that whether Persian poetry, and the teachings of wahdat al-wujud which it vehicled, could be singled out as the chief culprit. In our view, causes of decline are numerous and they mostly lie in different directions.

206 Schimmel, op. cit., p. 222.
To conclude our remarks about the question of Iqbal's criticism of Hafiz and the Persian poets in general, we may add that Iqbal scholars, in the half century or more -that has passed since Iqbal made his initial comments, have not taken his statements at their face value. One observes that the majority of Iqbal scholars dealing with these topics are inclined towards seeing an element of opportuneness at work in these comments. The real brunt of Iqbal's criticism, in their view, falls on the interpretation which a decadent readership imposes on these symbols and the meaning it reads into an otherwise quite different and independent frame of reference. To illustrate our point we quote three outstanding Iqbal scholars from three different parts of the world. First, the doyen in this field, in the West, Prof. Annemarie Schimmel.207

Mystical poetry, on the other hand, has tried to sing in many words the ineffable mystery of Union, and there exist mystical poems of unsurpassable beauty in all Islamic languages. However even in this field the formal element wins whereas genuine religiosity fades away, and there remains nothing but a spiritual play, "das Geistreiche" as Goethe has put it. The blending of mystical and profane meaning, the willfully used ambiguity of symbols, the stress on the pessimistic aspects of life which was in vogue in classical Persian and Urdu literature, the endless expression of the languish, the hopeless sighs, of the frustrated lover all these were features of poetry (and in a wider meaning also of music) which appeared to a prophetically minded spirit like Iqbal extremely dangerous. He wanted literature to be optimistic (M II 56, 1918). This is also the reason for his criticism of Hafiz whose poetical art—if taken only as art—he highly admired but who did not sharpen the sword of the Self (ZK 127.)

The same struggle which he launched against the favorite poet of Persian-speaking peoples in the first period of his work, he continued later on against what he regarded as denervating power of European lifeless civilization and education (ZK 155 and others).……………………………

It is interesting to note that Iqbal, as long as he talks about poets and poetry, acts like a prophet pouring his wrath over the useless devastators of individuals and peoples whereas, when preaching his religious ideals, he uses the classical literary forms, and expresses his thoughts in most sublime poetry, using the traditional symbols of his predecessors whom he otherwise so strongly attacked.

(To be continued)
The economic backwardness and political weaknesses of the Muslims particularly from the times of their direct or indirect subjugation by the Western colonial powers in the 18th century, have spurred many Muslim political and intellectual leaders to clamor for internal changes to close the humiliating gap between them and the West. Various ideas have been put forward and institutions established causing myriads of changes in the religious views and understanding of the Muslims that have left most of them baffled and weakened. For almost three decades Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas\textsuperscript{208} has consistently argued that the most fundamental and basic reason for this condition is the problem of education which is rooted in confusion of knowledge concerning, among other important matters, the religion of Islam and its basic key terms and components. He has therefore suggested and demonstrated that the only way to escape from this quagmire is through a process of education, especially at the tertiary or university level. Here we shall discuss the outline of the metaphysics of Islam as understood and espoused by Prof. al-Attas. Fortunately he is one of the very few contemporary Muslim thinkers who have systematically presented a restatement of Islamic metaphysics upon which conception of education and other important matters could be developed. In this regard his contributions are original and comprehensive.

THE METAPHYSICS OF AL-ATTAS

Metaphysics is generally accepted as a branch of philosophy, concerned with the nature of ultimate reality. In the Islamic sense, metaphysics which includes of course its original concern, theology, is the most important

\footnote{208}{For an elaboration of the biographical and educational background of Prof. al-Attas, as well as an analysis of his contributions to contemporary Muslim thinking, see my "Introduction". Commemorative Volume on the Conferment of the al-Ghazali Chair of Islamic Thought (K.L: ISTAC, 1994).}
because it influences the Muslim conception of the universe, human psychology, epistemology, epistemology, ethics and even logic.

The metaphysics of Islam as understood and espoused by Prof. Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas is a synthesis of ideas and theories that have been traditionally upheld by Muslim theologians (mutakallimun), philosophers (hukama') and sufis (sufiyyah or ahl at-tasawwuf). The elements and elaborations of this metaphysics are found scattered in his definitive commentaries on the two of the greatest scholars of the Malay world, Hamzah Fansuri (fl. circa. 1550-1600) and Nur al-Din al-Raniri (d. 1658) and in his Islam and Secularism. However he has systematised these ideas and elements in a series of monographs Islam: the Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality, Islam and the Philosophy of Science, The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul, The Intuition of Existence, Quiddity and Essence, and finally in the forthcoming, The Degrees of Existence. The metaphysics of Prof. Al-Attas, in fact all his articulations about Islam, are based on his interpretation of the Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH) and the teachings of what Iqbal calls the "more genuine schools of sufism" or the higher sufis. His interpretation of the former two basic sources of Islam is based on the traditional methods of tafsir and ta'wil. Tafsir of the Qur'an is precise and is not subject to error because it deals with the clear verses (muhkamat) whose interpretations must be based on other clear verses of the Qur'an and the hadith of the Holy Prophet. Many of the Qur'anic commentaries carried out by Muslims in these last two centuries, according to al-Attas, are not really tafasir (pl. of tafsir).

---

209 The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansuri (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1970); Hereafter cited as MI-1F.


211 (Kuala Lumpur: The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1978). Hereafter will be cited as IS.

precisely because they do not strictly adhere to the stated criterion. Even though ta'wil seeks to interpret the ambiguous (mutashabihat) verses, still it must consider the relevant clear ones for support. Furthermore these methods can be effectively applied and relied upon because they are rooted in the scientific nature of the Arabic language, by which he means that Arabic has a system of roots with a set of interrelated basic meanings which protects its words and ideas from subjective interpretations and societal changes. The rise of Islam saw the Islamization of the Arabic language. Even then Islam did not change the basic meanings imbedded in the roots of words but it caused a rearrangement, and in some cases radical transformation, of the semantic field of the key words or concepts to accord with the Islamic world view. The new Islamized Arabic is exemplified in the Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet. It is this Islamized Arabic, which is scientific, for it conveyed an absolute and objective truth.

According to al-Attas the metaphysics of Islam as correctly expounded by the higher sufis has been widely misunderstood. Although he acknowledges Ibn Khaldun's insight into the psychology of the Sufis, al-Attas criticises the latter for not differentiating between the doctrines of the different levels of sufi groups i.e. between the pseudo-Sufis, the ignorant and the higher ones:

"But in spite of that (i.e. his insights into sufi psychology) his(i.e. Ibn Khaldun's) explanation of the philosophical theology and metaphysics doctrines of the Sufis is apparently confused and hence misleading, and apart from his own the confusion was possibly due to that inherent in the source

213 On his extensive use of semantic field analysis, Prof. al-Attas acknowledges his indebtedness to Prof. T. Izutsu. See, MHS, p. 142 note no. 2


or sources from which he obtained his information regarding these matters....In our estimation, however, this sort of belief applies only to the pseudo-Sufis of various kinds who affirmed either a dualism, or a monism, or a pantheism as their various positions on the relationship between God and the world...."216

Al-Attas on the other hand constantly distinguishes between the ideas and teachings of the pseudo-Sufis such as the Sophists (sufasta' iyyah) and the deviating wujudiyyah (wujudiyyah mulhidah) or ignorant and popular Sufis whose doctrines are grossly erroneous, from the higher Sufis. The ideas and practices of this latter group are firmly rooted in knowledge which is based ultimately on intuitive experience.217 The pseudo and the ignorant Sufis uphold, among their major doctrines, that God is one or identical with, or incarnated in His creatures. They also uphold that the external world, including man, is illusory, that the various particular-forms in existence are merely subjective and mental, and that nothing exists except God Himself. They also believe in reincarnation and the transmigration of souls. It follows epistemologically, that they do not believe in the possibility of knowledge of the realities of things. Some of them also reject religious laws, from which they claim that they are exempted. Therefore, they for example, reject prayers and contend -that contemplation is sufficient instead. They likewise emulate laziness as a way of life, encouraging begging and soliciting alms and charity.218

The higher Sufis are such scholars as al-junayd (d. 1063/4 or 1071/2), Abu'l-Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 1072), al-Ghazali (d.1111), Ibn al-'Arabi (d.1240), Sadr al Din al-Qunyawi (d. 1263), Dawud al-Qaysari (1350), 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili (d. 1403) 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jami (d. 1492), Hamzah Fansuri (d, circa 1600), Mulla Sadra (d. 1640), Nur al-Din al-Raniri (d. 1658) and

216 Commentary, p. 344.


218 Commentary, pp. 186-191; 206-208; 213-217; 344-345. For al-Raniri's position, see for example, his Huijat al-Siddiq, para XII-XIV, XIX in Commentary, pp.90-91; 97-98.
Sabzawari (d. 1878), In terms of intellectual training they had good understanding of other Islamic disciplines such Qur'anic sciences, law, theology and philosophy prior to embarking upon the study and practice of sufism, therefore, their position and arguments on many matters often reflect the proper integration of these disciplines. Sufism or tasawwuf, according to al-Attas, is defined as "the practice of Shari'ah at the station (maqam) of ihsan." 219 By ihsan, he meant the highest stage of religion, above and inclusive of those of Islam and Iman, as conveyed by the famous hadith narrated by 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab and transmitted by Abu Hurayrah and Muslim, in which the Prophet said of ihsan "that you should worship God as if you saw Him...." 220 In the concluding paragraph of his commentary on the Hujjat al-Siddiq of Nur al-Din al-Raniri, al-Attas states that Islamic metaphysics, which is for him the philosophical Sufism, is a unified system that discloses the ultimate nature of Reality in positive terms; for it integrates reason and Experience with other higher orders in the suprarational and transempirical level of human consciousness. 221 He asserts that "...no formulation of a philosophy of education and a philosophy of science along Islamic lines can be developed by ignoring the great contributions of the Sufi masters on the ultimate nature of reality." Moreover, he added, "intellectual Sufism can effect a reconciliation between Muslim theology and philosophy just as it has achieved a great measure of understanding and unity between Sunnism and Sh'ism." 222

219 IS, p. 155; idem, PAT, p. 1; Commentary, p. 184.

220 cited in PAT, p. 1; Commentary, p. 184.


The quest to grasp the true nature of reality has preoccupied serious individuals such as Tholes (d. circa 600 B.C.) and the pre-Socratic philosophers from the earliest recorded history, all the way until Martin Heidegger and many others in our present day. The perpetual quest has given rise to many mutually opposing schools of thought in the Western philosophical tradition, such as the idealist, the realist and their various stains. Al-Attas stresses in his Saturday Night Lectures at ISTAC that there are only two schools in Islamic intellectual tradition, namely the Essentialist as represented by all the philosophers and some theologians, and the Existentialists, represented by the higher Sufis. The fundamental principles of Sufi theology and metaphysics, are rooted in the primary principle of the fundamental reality of existence (wujud) as opposed to that of quiddity (mahiyah), as held by Muslim philosophers and theologians. This fundamental difference, al-Attas notes, is not merely a matter of semantics or logic, but pertains to the true meaning and nature of reality. This certainty of the Sufis is based no merely on rational analysis or discursive reasoning but on their direct intuitive experience. The view of reality based on ordinary sense and rational experience "has undoubtedly led philosophical and scientific speculations to the preoccupation with things and their 'essences' at the expense of existence itself", making thereby the study of nature as an end in itself. Islamic metaphysics admits the real distinction between essence and existence only at the mental sphere; whereas in the extra-mental reality itself, "it is Existence (wujud) that is the real 'essences of things; and what is mentally or conceptually posited as 'essences of things; and what is mentally or conceptually posited as 'essences' or quiddities (mahiyat) are in reality accidents (a'rad) of existence." This reality is Absolute Existence, and it is

223 See also Alparslan Acikgenc, (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1994), p. 1


225 EQ, pp. 17-18.

none other than the Truth (al-Hagg), an aspect or mode (wajh) of God Almighty.\textsuperscript{228} Al-Attas clarifies that:

"When the Sufis say that the Truth, which is one of the Names of God, is the reality of existence, they are speaking in metaphysical terms referring to the Absolute as it manifests itself in all the planes of existence. They are not implying thereby that God has no individuality, or that He is a vast, vague, pervasive and dynamic Being, contrary to the theological God of religion. On the contrary, they affirm individuality of God, for it is not inconsistent for the Absolute to have an individuation as God in the way that He has described Himself according to His Beautiful Names and Sublime Attributes. This individuation is at the plane of the Divine Oneness, whose self-revealing aspect is characterized by names and attributes of divinity."\textsuperscript{229}

The true school of wahdatu'l-wujud, or unity of existence, to which he clearly belongs, upholds that the Ultimate Reality is God only. However unlike the pseudo-sufis, al-Attas affirms that the various particular phenomena are nevertheless real, not mere imaginary figments of the mind; only that their life-duration does not last two atoms of time because they are constantly perishing (fana'). The reality of particular phenomenon is perceived as enduring because of God's continuous dynamic and constant activity of re-creating not the same but a similar thing after its every annihilation.\textsuperscript{230} This characteristic is diametrically opposed to that of the Real Existence Who is eternal (qadim) and everlasting (baqa')

The process of creation or bringing into existence and -annihilation or returning to non-existence, and recreation of similes is a dynamic existential movement. This is articulated in terms of expansion (bast) when creating,

\textsuperscript{227} IE, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{228} IPS, pp. 20-21, EQ, pp. 2 and 24.
\textsuperscript{229} Commentary, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{230} Commentary, p. 233, EQ, pp. 26-27, 28 and 31.
and contraction (qabd) when annihilating, in a systematically ambiguous manner (tashkik) producing the various levels and grades of ontological expression from the world of the permanent archetypes ('alam al-a yan al-thabithah), or the world of Divine Ideas ('alam-al-mithal) in the interior of Divine Consciousness, to the world of spirits ('alam al-arwah), down all the way to the world of sense and sensible experience ('alam al-shahadah). It is ambiguous because the all-pervasive nature of existence is such that it is both a principle of unity and diversity in creation.\(^{231}\) He reiterates that:

"The multiplicity of existents that results is not in the one reality of existence, but in the manifold aspects of the recipients of existence in the various degrees, each according to its strength or weakness, perfection or imperfection, and priority or posteriority. Thus the multiplicity of existents does not impair the unity of existence, for ontological status."\(^{232}\)

The essence (dhat) which is the reality (haqiqah) of God is identical to His Existence.\(^{233}\) In its own level of existence, that is as He is in Himself, the essence is absolutely transcendent and is unknown and unknowable, except to Himself.\(^{234}\) The essence or reality of things, however, which is defined as the being-existent (mawjud) of the entity ('ayn), or the individuality (huwiyyah) or quiddity (mahiyyah), the very self (nafs) of the thing consists of a mode existence (wujud) providing its permanent aspect, and quiddity, endowing it with its changing qualities.\(^{235}\)

The Names (asma') of God are infinite and each one of them has a double nature, one identical with the Essence and with each other, and the other distinct from the Essence and from each other. Each Divine Name

---

\(^{231}\) EQ, pp. 26-29; 32-36; 52-53

\(^{232}\) EQ, p. 33.

\(^{233}\) EQ, p. 26.

\(^{234}\) Commentary, p. 455, EQ, p. 24-26, also note 36 on p. 25.

\(^{235}\) EQ, pp. 22-23 ff.
when considered independently of the Divine Essence is an Attribute (sifat) whose number and dual nature resemble those of the Name. From the Divine Name of the Knower (al-'Alim) for example, considered by itself as an independent reality specifying a mode or particular aspect of the Essence, an attribute of knowing becomes a reality, which possesses a characteristic difference from other attributes deriving from other Names. Notwithstanding this, all Divine Names, when they refer to the Essence (al-Dhat), are in reality identical with It. Because of this dual aspect the Names and attributes are neither being nor non-being, but occupies a metaphysical category identified by the Sufis as the Realm of the Fixed Archetypes (a'yan thabitah). The archetypal realities are fixed entities capable of receiving Divine diffusion (al-fayd al-muqaddas) resulting from the existential movement, containing primordial potentialities or "preparedness" (isti'dadat). These "preparedness" refer to distinct essential properties which will determine the ultimate nature and destiny of each archetype and later forming each and every ontological reality in the external world. Nevertheless, the archetypes themselves never become externalized; they always remain in the interior condition of Divine Consciousness (butun). Like other realities they undergo the process of perpetual creation and annihilation, but unlike the others, they are being recreated the same thereby giving them the important element of unity and identity which they transmit to the consequent realities in the external world.

The evolvement and repercussions of the archetypes in the forms of empirical things reflect their sources of origin in the Names and Attributes by manifesting a dual nature i.e. they are both the active and passive principles of existence. On the one hand when considered purely as archetypes (a'yan), the permanent archetypes play the part of active principle in relation to the next stage of ontological 'descent' (tanazzul) of the Absolute

---

236 Commentary, p. 45; EQ, pp. 40-41.

237 EQ, pp. 42-43.

238 Commentary, p. 37; EQ, p. 39.

239 EQ, pp. 28-29.
Being to what is 'below' them, or to their exterior aspect, the exterior archetypes which assume the role of passive principle. On the other hand when considered as realities (qa'a'iq); the permanent archetypes are the active principle in relation to the realities of the existential principle, that is, the 'holy effusion' (al fayd al-muaqddas).²⁴⁰

As already stated above, the certainty of the higher Sufis vis-a-vis their metaphysics, is not based merely on discursive reason, but on a higher form of reason or spiritual experience in which the whole reality is intuited. The fana'-baqa' experiential structure of the intuition of existence has two stages:

At the first stage, it is characterized by a partial experience at the first separation (al farq al-awwal) and the second and complete experience at the second separation (al farq al-thani). The first stage is when they experience the passing away of their subjective consciousness where they can witness the passing away of the world of multiplicity to a gathering together (jam') into a single unified Reality. This experience is accompanied by an inner turmoil and if ceases at this stage due to limitations in spiritual capacity or preparedness—Where thers would regain their Phenomenal consciousness, they might then, erroneously believe that the world of multiplicity is a mere figment of human imagination, and that everything is in reality God in the pantheistic or monistic sense. Not all persons who experience such an incomplete vision become involved in error and heresy. While they tend to stress the oneness aspect of reality only, they nevertheless recognize and acknowledge all the teachings of Islam and accept the authority and experience of the higher Sufi as a truer and higher degree than theirs. Their experience of fana' is followed by fana' al fana'—passing away of the passing away—where they experience their own complete annihilation. When they regain their subjective consciousness, they realize their utter dependence on God. These are the 'elect' (khawass) among God's servants and are His saints or 'friends' (awliya').²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ EQ, p. 46.

²⁴¹ Commentary, pp. 134-139.
The second stage is experienced by the highest class in the classification of mankind known as the 'super-elect' (khawass al-Khawass). They are those whose spiritual condition is perfect and mature, and are under God's guidance (hidayah) and recipient of His aid (tawfiq). They would ascend to another stage the final experience of fana' where they witness, even before regaining their normal consciousness, after stage of passing away of the passing away (fana' al fana,) in which they would not even be conscious of their fana'. There they witness the Unity (wandah) individuates Itself into Multiplicity (kathrah) without impairing Its original Unity. At this stage; they realize their true Selfhood and 'subsist' in God (baqa'). Their subsistence in God however does not make them think that man shares divinity with God for even at this stage the distinction between God, the Reality and man, the created reality, still remains. When God grants them to regain their subjective consciousness, they would see the world of multiplicity as it truly is, as Modes or Aspects of Unity of the Absolute Existence. Although their experience of the vision is transitory and fragmentary; yet their knowledge about the reality is permanent, This is the stage of second separation.242 It is clear that the position of the higher Sufis, is not what the supporters of Muslim modernists accused them of, that the former "overlook the essential disparity of God and man taught by the Qur'an".243 Intuition, thus involves both the psychological and the ontological realms of existence. The true vision of the Ultimate Reality accessible to man is based on the second stage of the intuition of existence, which affirms both God's transcendence and His immanence in relation to them.244

As stated above, the fundamental nature of reality, can be known by a higher level of experience or intuition. Al-Attas affirms that all knowledge of reality and truth, including the intelligible ones, and the projection of a true

---

242 Ibid, pp. 139-141; For another clear version of the ditternet experience of according to various grades of spiritual attainment, see also Izutsu, "Structure", pp. 53-63.


244 Ibid, p. 456.
vision of the ultimate nature of things are originally acquired through
intuition. It is by accepting the possibility and the validity of this experience
that many other kinds of knowledge are vouchsafed, such as the knowledge
of revelation, of prophethood, of the human soul or self, and the spiritual
beings such as the angels and Satan, as well as the creative processes of
human intellect.

In al-Attas' metaphysics, the reality and concept of God carries
profound implications for the world view of Islam and, ultimately, for the
concept, the contents and methods of Islamic education and human
development. The knowledge about God based on one's intuitive experience
and awareness of one's self and of the external world of creation, is therefore
not merely propositional or cognitive but also more importantly experiential.
It is for this reason that God says in hadith qudsi that "one who knows
himself knows God." The same intention is also converged when God
commands in the Holy Book that "we shall show to you our signs in the
horizons and in yourselves..." Prof. al-Attas like the true Sufis before him,
derlines that that knowledge of God is specifically known as ma'rifah
(gnosis or spiritual illumination) and not 'ilm (scientific or knowledge by
inference), and that that God who is known is not really Allah as He is in
Himself, the highest manifestation of the Essence (dhat) and the sum of all
Names (asma') and Attributes (sifat), it is rather Allah conceived as the Lord
(Al-Rabb) Who is worshiped (Tuhan in Malay). This is important to be
stressed because as evidenced from the teachings of the Prophet, our highest
duty and capacity is to know God only as Rabb. Since God as the Absolute
Existence is the fundamental Reality, Islamic education must, as one of its

245 IE, p. 1; IPS, pp. 10-13; Commentary, p. 130.

246 For an outline of thing, see my work, "An outline of the Educational Philosophy and

247 See Fussilat 41:53.

248 NHF, pp. 98-99. al-Attas puotes in note 194, ahadith saying: 'Glory to Thee! we cannot
really know thee".
most important aims and objectives, strive to inculcate the true and proper understanding and awareness of the human self out soul and of God. This will then naturally become the bedrock of all religious and ethical goals and activities.

God then is the basis and the creator of everything there is and that will be Who omnisciently unfolds His Will in a perpetual act of creation, annihilation and re-creation manifesting and individuation the infinite inner possibilities inherent in His Names and Attributes. Because of this nature of God's Being and activity, all aspects of the phenomenal world are endowed with both dimensions of change and permanence. Unfortunately because change is easily perceptible while permanence is an underlying reality the awareness of which is achieved through intuition and intellectual contemplation, permanence as the underlying principle of change is conveniently regarded as merely conceptual, not objectively real. Change then has been erroneously regrade by modern philosophy and science as the ultimate reality, hence the popular remark: "Everything changes except change itself." It is a characteristic feature of Western civilization to affirm the evanescent (fana') aspect of reality, and base its values on the secular, material, and physical realities of existence, Because of this it "is constantly changing and 'becoming' without ever achieving 'being', except that its 'being' is and always has been a 'becoming'." Educationally, for example, many institutions are directing valuable resources to train their personnel and students to be able to adopt to the inevitability of change, to manage change. Reality, according to Islamic metaphysics as espoused by al-Attar is both permanence and change. As indicated in the earlier part of this article, the Primordial Potentialities in World of Fixed Essences in the interior condition of God's knowledge, are realities that provide for the underlying permanent aspect of the external world, which is perpetually undergoing change.

The existence of God and of his Unity can be arrive at through human reason and intellectual effort but, Prof. al-Attas asserts several times in his weekly Saturday Night Lectures at ISTAC, that the proper understanding

\[250\] cf. IPS, p. 32; also Risalah, para. 9, p. 27.

\[251\] IS, p. 87.
concerning the attributes of God and His relationship to His creatures and vice versa can only be known through religion. That is why none of the Greek thinkers, despite their profound grasp of other matters could attain the correct and certain knowledge about God and His relationship with His creation.\textsuperscript{252} Through these metaphysical principles of Divine Unity and the reality of Existence, and the cognitively valid nature of intuitive experience, other principles pertaining to the nature and destiny old man, the nature of the universe, the meaning, purposes and hierarchy of knowledge and the various valid ways of the attainment of knowledge and all the interrelated educational matters, are naturally derived. These matters will be discussed in their proper places. We shall begin with the nature of man and the world external to him.

**MAN AND HIS PSYCHOLOGY**

Man as human being in his terrestrial existence is endowed with a dual nature, He is both body (badan) and soul (nafs) and at once a physical and a spiritual being. He is neither pure soul nor pure body but a mysterious composite of these two, a third entity which is his very self.\textsuperscript{253} The underlying reality and the unifying principle of what defines man is not his constantly changing physical aspect, but the spiritual one. The human soul is created yet immortal, conscious of itself, the locus of intelligibles and equipped with a faculty variously called the soul (rub), self (nafs), heart qalb) and intellect ('aqi). Each of these terms has two meanings, one that refers to the physical or animal aspect, and another to the spiritual aspect.\textsuperscript{254} Al-Attas stresses the different modes of this unity:

\textsuperscript{252} Saturday Night Lecture, 18th July 1992; also from a private discussion in his Office at ISTAC, 20th July 1992. Saturday Night Lectures became an important aspect of ISTAC's extra curricular academic program which started on Nov., 1st. 1991, attended regularly by academics and students as well as professionals form all walks of life. In MI-F, although he accepts the similarity between Plato's permanent and archetypal Ideas and illusory shadows in the cave with the sufi's conception of the universe in relation to the Fixed Essences (pp.. 74-75), he rejects the allegations that the Sufi's concept of divine manifestations (tajalliyat) could have been indetical to that of the Neo-Platonic system of emanation (pp. 72-73).

Thus when it is involved in intellection and apprehension it is called 'intellect'; when it governs the body it is called 'soul'; when it is engaged in receiving intuitive illumination it is called 'heart'; and when it reverts to its own world of abstract entities it is caned 'spirit'. Indeed, it is in reality always engaged in manifesting itself in all these states.\(^{255}\)

Since the self is intimately interacting with the dual aspects of body and the soul, it is therefore described as the animal soul (al-nafs al-hayawaniyyah) on the one hand, and on the other, as the rational soul (al-nafs al-natiqah).\(^{256}\) Its destiny in this world and ultimately in the hereafter depends upon which of the two aspects that the self gives leading priority. Because man is created, annihilated and recreated, where his existence does not even last two atoms of time, he, like all creatures, owes his very existence to his Creator. He therefore cannot regrade either his soul, or biological life or body as his own in on unqualified manner, and thereby to dispense it howsoever he wishes. He is given knowledge (al-'ilm) primarily of the accidents and attributes of sensible things and intelligible matters, and knowledge about (ma'rifat) God. About the knowledge of the essence or the inmost ground of certain objects such as the spirit (al-ruh), he is given only aittle.\(^{257}\) He is by nature -forgetful which causes him to be disobedient and thereby "inclines him towards injustice (zulm) and ignorance (jahl)".\(^{258}\)

The starting point in the Islamic concept of religion, and the dominant element according to Al-Attas, as in all other related Islamic concepts such as those of freedom and responsibility, of justice, of knowledge, of virtue, of brotherhood and of the role and character of the individual and the society

\(^{254}\) al-Attas, The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul, hereafter cited as NMPHS (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1990), pp. 7; See also PAT, p.4.

\(^{255}\) NMPHS, p. 8.


\(^{257}\) IS, p. 132; al-Isra', (17):85.

\(^{258}\) IS, p. 133; He refers to al-Abzab (33):72.
goes back to the spiritual realm of the Pre-Seperation in the Interior Condition of God's Consciousness, before man were created as external creature. All these are profoundly contained in his interpretation of the Qur'anic verse of Covenant: "When thy Lord drew forth form the Children of Adam—from their loins—their descendents, and made them testify concerning themselves (saying): "AM I not your lord?"—they said: "yea" we do testify!". Man's raison d'être as God's servant and Khalifah on earth, is thus organically related to this verse. But man's ruling is not merely limited to the socio-political sense but more fundamentally to the rule of one's self by itself, to do justice, and to avoid injustice to itself. This is possible because, the reality of man, according to Islam epitomizes the microcosmic ('alam saghir) aspects of the larger macrocosmic ('alam kabir) Universe. According to al-Attas, the concept of man as a microcosmic representation of the macrocosm:

"is most important in relation to knowledge—which is his most paramount attribute responsible for the effective establishment of the just order in his self, his being and existence—and to the organization, instruction, inculcation and dissemination of knowledge in his education, specifically with reference to the university..."

Man's existence in the primordial world which makes possible these universal characteristics and his sojourn on Earth as a temporary on, after which he will be returned to God. Prof. al-Attas has taught that the ultimate aim of religion (din) is for man to return to that Primordial state which involves the quest for this identity and transcendent destiny through true knowledge and right conduct. This knowledge involves also the

259 Al-A'raf (7):172; IS, pp. 52, 65-90 contains detailed explanation of the meaning of this verse of Covenant; see also PAT, pp. 4-5; and Commentary, pp. 132-133.

260 IS, pp. 62, 71-74; also NMPHS, p. 4.

261 IS, p. 64.

understanding of God's signs and symbols in the phenomenal world by means of sound senses and sound reason. This is what this worldly life is all about: a continuous journey returning to the Lord. The purpose of good character based on true knowledge guided by religion, it to attain lasting happiness (sa'adah) in this world and in the hereafter. Although it recognizes the importance of the changing and ephemeral happiness of the bodily and emotional aspects—attained when ether respective needs, guided again by religion are fulfilled—Islam regards the more abiding is spiritual happiness which is attainable even in this world, that is the -love of God. This is a preparation to the true and everlasting happiness in the hereafter, which is the vision of God.264

The rational aspect of the soul which is also known as the rational soul, is entrusted with the duty of governing its animal aspects to realize its mission is this worldly existence, It is pervasive and intimate not like the analogy given by some scholars comparing it with the rider and the chariot. Rather it is more analogous to the way God governs the Universe.265

The metaphysical vision of Islam regards man not only as subject but also an object of knowledge;266 Education of man involves educating his physical and spiritual faculties, which naturally made man into an object of knowledge. But al-Attas also mentions that, the study of man, of mind and of the self by the modern secular science is restricted to the psychological, biological and anthropological methods which are methodological extensions of the restrictions of reasons to the physical reality.267 In several private discussions al-Attas asserted that since modern psychology no longer is the

---

263 Al-Attas has given a very detailed semantic analysis of the concept of religion in Islam (din) in Chap. 3, of IS.

264 Happiness, pp. 2, 6-8; 19-21.

265 IS, pp. 64, 68.


267 Ibid, p. 17.
study of the soul, which is manifested in its very name in Greek—psyche—then it should operate under a different name.

Contrary to the positions of some of the Greek philosophers such as Socrates and Plato, and the Medieval Christian scholars, the Islamic emphasis on the spiritual reality of man does not mean that his body—which is the source of animal powers—into important or that it is to be regrade as a hindrance to man's spiritual development.\(^{268}\) Al-Attas has elucidated that, on the contrary, the body has significant contribution for man's spiritual development for it is through the bodily faculties that the soul can acquire particular information and data concerning the world of sense and sensible experience. The soul, through its various faculties will then develop these sense-data into general principles, ideas and beliefs. Further the soul, through its faculties of imagination and estimation, can make distinction between genus and differentia of their various attributes and abstract their general and particular meanings from material connections and relations. In this way it can attain to the knowledge of the individual sensibles and their nonsensible meanings such as love and hate. The soul can also make comparison between single universals by negation and affirmation of relations and ratios. Through analogous and repeated observations and experience, the soul can acquire empirical premises, with which it can verify the veracity or falsity of reports upon which true beliefs are based.\(^{269}\) In short the body and its sound faculties are indispensable for the acquisition and verification of empirical knowledge and experience, the possibility of which is a part of the Islamic creed.

According to al-Attas, based on his interpretation of the Holy Qur'an and on the clear empirical evidences which many modernists conveniently choose to ignore, every man, is not created equal. Indeed each man is different in terms of his intellectual and spiritual abilities as well as ethical capabilities.\(^{270}\) The Qur'an teaches that God does not burden a soul more than what he can bear, and it has asked man to pray so that God will not

---

\(^{268}\) NMPHS, p. 5.

\(^{269}\) Ibid, pp. 12, 28-29

burden them with what they cannot bear, both conveying the meaning that souls have different capacities and responsibilities. It is clear to al-Attas, that the highest moral value is not the struggle to attain equality; but to attain justice which requires knowledge and wisdom. In fact if all things are equal or are at the same place, such a condition will breed only confusion, for recognition of essential relation and specific difference would perish, thereby making meaning and consequently knowledge, truth and justice impossible.

Justice "a condition of being in right and proper place" is a paramount concept in al-Attas' thinking because it is a value that man should strive to attain not merely in relation to this fellow man and the natural world, but more importantly towards his own self, God, and intellectual realities like knowledge and language. In the same manner, injustice—a condition where things are not in their right and proper places—is a bete noire in Islam. Al-Attas points out that both justice and injustice in Islam do not operate only within two-person relation or dual-party relation but more fundamentally they both begin and end with the self. One can be just or unjust not only towards others but towards oneself. It is quite apparent now that these concepts would exert powerful influence on the purpose, content and methods of education.

HUMAN FREEDOM AND DESTINY

The metaphysics of existence naturally has implications for the problem of freedom, morality and our interpretation of evil. He would accept the credal position of the orthodox Muslims, ahl Sunnah wa 'l-Jama'ah, that:

"Allah...is the Creator of all the actions of His servants whether of unbelief or of belief, of obedience or of

271 al-Baqarah (2): 286

272 CEII, 15-16; PAT, pp. 5-6; IPS, pp. 15-17, 21-22.


274 IS, pp. 71-72.
disobedience; all of them are by the desire of Allah... As to His servants they have in them the actions of choice (ikhtiyar) for which they are rewarded or punished. The good in them is by the good pleasure of Allah and the evil in them is not by His good pleasure. 275

Like some of the higher Sufis before him, Prof. a1=Attas holds that a proper understanding of the role of the Primordial Potentialities (isti'dadat asliyyat) in the Fixed Essences where the inner possibilities and destiny of each reality are determined, can explain the problem of determinism and human destiny. 276 Similarly he would return the fundamental verse in the world of Pre-Similarly—when mankind collectively testified affirmatively the Lordship of God in surah al-‘raf(7): 172 cited above—to underline that their collective answer ("yea! We testify!") presupposes that each one of them was already given its respective unique individuality. 277 His commentary on Hamzah Fansuri's conception of human destiny may reflect his own position on the subject:

"A man is good or evil according to whether his Primordial Potentiality Proceeds from the Divine Attributes of Beauty (jamal) or Majesty (jalal) respectively. From the point of view of reality, however, there is no such things as absolute evil since the real nature of everything is not distinct from God, and God is good and inclines to goodness. The question of moral responsibility in this world and of future reward and punishment is very closely connected with belief in the possibility of human freedom as faith (iman), and this faith, apart from assuming that man has the capacity to obey or disobey the Divine Command embodied in the religious law (shari'ah), means also faith in the existence of the afterlife as


276 Commentary, p. 45.

277 Private discussion at ISTAC 23 Jan 1993.
revealed in the religious law. Inspite of knowing that this world and the next possess no real existence in relation to God, man must still have faith in their existence, for this is the basis of morality. "278

Al-Attas would agree with Hamzah that in this matter, since evil and hell are particularizations of the Attributes of Divine Majesty (Jalal), while good and heaven are from the Attributes of Beauty, the returning of evil or good soul to hell or heaven respectively is a matter of returning to one's original place. It is in conformity with justice, for God does not change their respective destiny.279 The Sufis affirm that God's Will is not an unrestricted blind desire. He does not do as He pleases even if He has the Power to do so; rather He acts in cooperation (muwafaqat) with the Primordial Potentialities280 in His Knowledge. This cooperation however does not make His Will and Power meaningless because the things willed are not empty nothing, they are in fact realities variously known as the Primordial Potentialities (isti'dad ash), or Divine Ideas, the Universal Intellect (al-'aqlu'lkulli). It is argued that since existence is the object of universal desire, it is therefore good. Therefore it entails that Absolute Existence is absolutely good. If further follows from his that evil, is never absolute, "but only relative, partial, and negative..."281

Notwithstanding the fact that the destiny of each man has already been determined in the Primordial Potentiality, education which presupposes the following two points, is no only integral to Islamic creed but also obligatory for every Muslims. First it is that the latent potentialities naturally endowed, to every human being must be brought froth through effective and creative educational process; secondly that whatever the present individual capacity or incapacity is, again, through effective and creative education, it can be

278 MHF, p. 109.


280 MHF, pp. 131-132.

281 Rahman, Mulla Sadra, p. 36; also MHF, p. 109.
corrected and perfected. Having faith in the predetermined destiny (taqdir) does not negate the need to educate nor the need to strive to improve one's present spiritual, ethical and material conditions in life, for an individual does not know his destiny until he meets his Lord. Hence the eternal wisdom of the famous commandments of the Prophet: "The seeking of knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim man and woman"\textsuperscript{282} and "Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave."\textsuperscript{283}

In relation to the above al-Attas contends man's quest for a true religious life is a returning to his original nature, fitrah. Willing and knowing submission to God is what constitutes real freedom of man.\textsuperscript{284} He suggests that the proper term for freedom in Islam is best conveyed by the theological term ikhtiyar. The term ikhtiyar as used in Islamic theology does not refer to the modern idea of freedom, for the former, the root meaning of which is khair or good, means "the choice for the better", and that any different act will not be a choice by the self, but an injustice (zulm) to it. A choice for the better is truly an exercise of freedom which prerequires knowledge of good and evil. Conversely a choice for the worse is based on ignorance and instigated by blameworthy aspects of the animal soul.\textsuperscript{285} Following ibn al-Arabi, al-Attas considers that while man is given the capacity to obey or disobey God's Command (amr) as stipulated by religious Laws (Shari'ah), man cannot ever disobey God's Will (rnashi'sh). True freedom is achieved when man has attained spiritual illumination or gnosis (ma'rifah) when he has


\textsuperscript{283} cited from Ahmad Shalaby, History Muslim Education (Beirut: Dar al-Kashshaf, 1954) p. 162.

\textsuperscript{284} Is, pp. 57-58.

\textsuperscript{285} 'Aqa'id, Appendix VI, "ikhtiyar", p. 90; NMPHS, note 16, 3-4; also Happiness,, p. 7d. al-Hujwiri, Kashf p. 388.
succeeded in effacing his sensual self to gain to a higher selfhood.\textsuperscript{286} Even at this level he is still bound by servitude to God (\textquote{ubudiyyah}).\textsuperscript{287}

THE UNIVERSE

Islamic worldview affirms that there are many worlds besides the phenomenal universe. As stated in the first section of this chapter they are the world of Permanent Archetypes, the world of Spirits and our phenomenal world of Sense and Sensible Experience.\textsuperscript{288}

It is interesting that modern man has concentrated only upon the sensible world and has spent billions to explore the extra-terrestrial universe hoping thereby to ultimately understand origin and destiny of man and the universe. One influential philosopher writes that "Nature itself constitutes the sum total of reality, that matter-energy...is the foundation-stuff of the universe, and that supernatural entities simply do not exists".\textsuperscript{289} However the continuous discoveries of modern astronomy have made modern Western secular man more special of his special destiny as problematically defined by Judeo-Christian religious tradition.\textsuperscript{290} One the contrary Islam seeks the answers to these questions not in the physical but in the spiritual realm. The universe or the phenomenal world including man and external world _ exists in reality, but its reality is perceived and understood differently

\textsuperscript{286} MHF, p. 109, also note 235 on the same page;


\textsuperscript{288} For a description of their different names, see MHF, p. 156, note 50. Cf. al-Hujwiri, who reports that the term 'alam is understood as "the collective mass of created things." He stresses that the Sufi interpret 'alam as the "collective mass of spirits and souls." Kashf, pp. 385-386.


\textsuperscript{290} Ibid, pp. 89-96, and 122-157; see also IS, chaps. 1 and 2.
according to the perceptor's level of intellectual and spiritual state and preparedness. To the common man ('awamm), the world appears to him as composed of different forms and categories of objects, each appearing as an independent reality or essence. At this level, the world is seen as a multiplicity, and all cognitive processes occur within the framework of subject dichotomy.\textsuperscript{291} This phenomenal world, including the human condition in it, is like the ice, the mirage and the waves in relation to their respective sources viz. the water, the hot desert, and the sea. The ice, the mirage and the waves are real only when considered in relation to the water, hot desert and the sea respectively; but without them i.e. water, hot desert, or the sea, neither the ice, nor the mirage nor the waves would be possible. The ontological status of the latter group vis-a-vis the former, is analogous to that of the worlds of creation vis-a-vis God.\textsuperscript{292} If the Qur'an consists of verses referred to as ayat or signs, the entirety of phenomenal creation, is also a book of signs, the purpose of which is to point to God. To al-Attas, the world of nature is another form of the Divine Revelation analogous to the Qur'an itself. The only difference is only that the great open book of nature is something created; it presents itself in multiple and diverse forms that partake the symbolic existence by virtue of being continually articulated by the creative word of God.\textsuperscript{293}

The realities of the external world are "modes and aspects of a single and dynamic all-encompassing Reality."\textsuperscript{294} In another place he asserts that the processes of phenomenal world or the laws of nature is nothing but God's "Customary way of acting" (sunnat Allah). Seen from the dynamic nature of existence being an aspect of God who is the Infinite, "these laws are no longer seen as rigid because they are now open to infinite possibilities."\textsuperscript{295}

\textsuperscript{291} Commentary, pp. 131, 133; IE, pp. 2, 5.

\textsuperscript{292} al-Attas in his discussions, likes' to give this metaphor to underline his points. See also examples in MHF, pp. 70-76; for examples of other metaphors used, see Izutsu, "Structure", pp. 65-68.

\textsuperscript{293} IPS, p. 27; see also CEII, p. 7; EQ, pp. 27 ff..

\textsuperscript{294} CEII, p. 31.
Yet, because of variegated multiplicity, the phenomenal world often became a veil (hijab) covering its underlying unity and purpose.\(^{296}\) Al-, in many of his lectures, characteristically portrays a compelling example to depict how the world distracts man from his true destiny: If a traveller in a dark rainy night sees a simple road sign—a piece of metal board with white paint on a black or green background—pointing clearly the distance and direction, the traveller would proceed ahead to his destination without any trouble. However if there are many sign—posts made of shiny expensive marble equipped with will-decorated hands with many fingers bejewelled with gold and silver rings pointing to many directions, then the traveller will most probably stop his vehicle, and came down to inspect and be captivated by the attractive sign-posts. In this case, the sign-posts no longer serve the traveller but themselves. The traveller will never reach his true destination. Yet certain individuals who have experienced a spiritual transformation such as the prophets and to a lesser degree, men of true knowledge and spiritual discernment are able to transcend the world of multiplicity and witness (shuhud) or taste (dhawq) the unity of existence through the mediacy spiritual unveiling (kashf). At this level of higher experience, the rational has merged with the intellectual, and the empirical with the authentic spiritual experiences, where knowledge is a union (tawhid) between the knower an the meaning of the known.\(^{297}\) But even at this level, the phenomenal world is neither a figment of the human imagination nor even a part of God or Go Himself; but actually an aspect of God or Unity:

individuating Itself into Multiplicity without impairing Its original Unity, and yet 'connecting' or 'relating' the Multiplicity with Itself in such wise that although the Unity takes on the forms of Multiplicity, it still distinguishes Itself from the latter and remains always in Its original nature...

\(^{295}\) Ibid, p. 21.

\(^{296}\) EQ, pp. 26-27.

\(^{297}\) Commentary, p. 135; PAT, p. 8; IE, pp. 7-9, 28-32
The process of inner articulations) ... which goes on in a continuous operation.\(^{298}\)

Al-Attas, like all the Sufis of higher order before him, such as, al-Raniri have severely repudiated the misguided peoples and religions who adhered to the erroneous and dangerous notion that Nature is either God or a part of God.\(^{299}\) Every aspect of God's creation is endowed with various degrees of spiritual or divine element, depending upon its place in the hierarchic (order of ontological descent, and accordingly is in a state of worshiping Him. In a more restricted sense of the term, for the angels, humankind an the jinn, this is done through prayer (al-salat) consisting of intention (niyyat), standing (al-qiyam), bending the body from an upright position (al-ruku'), supplication (al-dua'), and glorification (al-tasbih); for birds, reptiles an insects, and the non-living creation, it is through glorifying Hum (tasbih).\(^{300}\) In relation to the fact that even the animal, plant and mineral kingdoms are expressions of various degrees of divine self-revelation, it follows that our relation to, and dealing with them should be with justice.

Like the traveller captivated by the sign-post, modern science too is captivated by phenomenal world as an opaque object of study. Al-Attas thus assails at modern science which has reduced the study of the phenomenal world as an end itself, to see things as mere things.\(^{301}\) While this endeavour has produced many useful things for the material betterment of man nevertheless it infinitely pragmatic activity has likewise elicited uncontrollable and unsatiable propensity to destroy nature itself. The study and utilization of nature without a higher spiritual end "is devoid of real purpose, and the pursuit of knowledge becomes a deviation from the truth, which necessarily puts into question the becomes a deviation from the truth, which necessarily puts into question the validity of such knowledge"\(^{302}\) which

\(^{298}\) 1E, pp. 17-18.

\(^{299}\) Commentary, pp. 136-137; PAT, pp. 9-10.

\(^{300}\) Commentary, pp. 365-366.

\(^{301}\) IPS, p. 28.
has consequently turned man into thinking that they are gods or His copartners.\footnote{303}

The study and utility of nature for higher spiritual end, on the other hand, will produce a more responsible attitude. But the interpretation of natural phenomenon is more difficult because its signs are more vague and not easily apprehended. In Risalah, al-Attas makes a compelling comparison between interpreting a written document and interpreting Nature as the Open Book of God which is, wherein he underlines that the real purpose for reading both books is to understand the meanings (makna in Malay; ma'na in Arabic) of the sings symbolized by words in one case, and by natural phenomena in the other. If one's efforts are focussed on the physical aspects of the book such as the ink, individual letters, words and paper forgetting what the words, sentences and the whole book means, then the purpose of reading the-book is lost, for no knowledge can be derived from such activity. Similarly, the natural world is a book containing knowledge; but that knowledge is not evident merely from the physical phenomena; for these are nothing but signs the meaning of which can be understood by those who are equipped with proper knowledge, wisdom and spiritual discernment.\footnote{304} Our understanding and interpretation of these signs in the external world must be based, according to al-Attas, on the same method of valid interpretation and understanding of the written words of the Qur'an, i.e. through tafsir or direct interpretation and ta 'wil or deeper and allegorical interpretation based on the clear and direct ones.\footnote{305} Ultimately, al-Attas considers science as "a kind of ta'wil or allegorical interpretation of the empirical things that constitute the world of nature."\footnote{306} The true sufis also attested that religion is likewise constituted by established (i.e. shari'ah) and ambiguous (haqiqah) aspects of

\footnote{302} PAT, p. 6.
\footnote{303} IS, p. 36.
\footnote{304} Risalah, para. 48, pp. 158-160; Commentary, p. 456.
\footnote{305} CEII, pp. 17-19; cf. PAT, pp. 5-7, 13,
\footnote{306} IPS, p. 31.
the same reality and truth, and that the reality of the latter is based upon the established truth of the former.307

The ephemeral nature of the world according to Islam does not, as already alluded to above, denigrate its status as unimportant or evil. It is a sign of God, and a manifestation of His Infinite Wisdom and Power. Al-Attas underlines that "it would be blasphemous to derogate the world and nature knowing them in their true purpose."308 Similarly although the life in this world (hayat al-dunya) is regrade as "nothing but goods and chattels of deception" (ilâ mata'u'll-ghurûr)309 "a play and amusement" (la'ib wa lahâw)310 etc, these are intended as warnings of its distractive nature.311 Prophet Adam was sent to this world not as punishment but as a natural process for the actualization of the purpose of his existence, about which God had earlier on informed the angels: "Behold, thy Lord said to the angles, "I will create a vicegerent on earth."312 This life is meant as a period wherein one actualizes one's potentiality as God's servant and vicegerent. Because of the intimate relationship between this world ('âlam) and knowledge ('âlm) both of which are positively upheld by Islam, al-Attas does not like the term secularism, a negative value in Islam, to be translated into Arabic as 'almaniyyah.313

Al-Attas's metaphysics, being a synthesis, includes those aspects above, as well as psychology, epistemology and ethics which have implications for

307 Commentary, pp. 183, and 456; for an eg. of Hamzah Fansuri's position see, MHF, pp. 180-182

308 IS, p. 38.


311 Ibid, p. 38. Even another alternative translation for secularism, la diniyyah, expresses one aspect. Analysing its original meaning in Latin, saeculum, denoting a spirit of here and now, al-Attas suggestes that secularism should better be translated as al-huna'l-aniyyah.

312 Surah al-Baqarah (2): 30.

this educational philosophy and methodology, It is clear then, that Islamic
metaphysics affirms only one Reality and Truth which determines the
worldview of the Muslims. All Islamic values pertain ultimately to it alone,
so that to the Muslims, individually and collectively, all endeavour towards
change and development and progress and perfection is invariably
determined by the worldview. However the One Reality has different
modes that cause other diverse and multiple and evanescent realities. He
affirmation of existence of and distinction between the One Reality i.e. Being
(wujud) or God and external Existence (maujud); between Unity (wahdah)
and Multiplicity (kathrah); between Subsistence (baqa') and Evanescence
(fana') does not mean a dualistic worldview for the two are not of equal
metaphysical and ontological status. Rather, one is independent and
subsistent while the other is dependent upon it; the one is absolute and the
other relative; the one is real and the other a manifestation of that reality.

Because of this understanding, Prof. al-Attas observes that knowledgeable
Muslims have been able to live their lives without suffering any fundamental
change that would disrupt the harmony of Islam and of their own selves by
the devastating touch of time and the vicissitudes of worldly existence.

Despite great personal or community crises, unlike in the West that produces
atheism and agnosticism. Similarly Muslims who are not infected with the
diseases of the West are quite sure of the place and function of the spiritual
vis-a-vis the natural, this world vis-a-vis the next, of man vis-a-vis woman in
religion and society, of individual and collective responsibility. Such Muslims
have dealt, and can continue to deal with the issues of permanence and
change in religious, personal and societal affairs; with the issues of
intellectual, linguistic, cultural and religious pluralism; with real tolerance and
justice, while maintaining their values, UN weakened by relativism.

314 IS, p. 48.

315 Ibid, pp. 81, 84.

316 IS, pp. 84-85.
SENSE — MIND RELATIONSHIP IN GHAZALI'S EPISTEMOLOGY

(Part I)

Muhammad Zaidi Bin Isma'il

To write on a specific topic selected from the vast treasure of an encyclopedic scholar is not an easy task. All the more if the subject-matter is scattered in various parts of his works, each discussed and elaborated within a different context, though not essentially disconnected from the rest. These are a few challenges facing the author of this essay in the course of his survey on al-Ghazali's treatment of epistemology. Moreover, we must explain at the outset that we do not intend to make an exhaustive treatment of Al-Ghazali's views about epistemology. Through clarifying his ideas on the perennial epistemic question of sense-mind relationship our primary object is to pave the way for a conducive systematization and reformulation of al-Ghazali's broader system of knowledge which is in fact distributed here and there in his various treatises and writings.

Here are some notes concerning the methods used in presenting his findings and researches;

1. His method is mainly descriptive. Therefore in many parts of this article, quotations from al-Ghazali's original expressions are provided so as to enable the readers to see their concordance with the author's inference and conclusion. However, due to various limitations, only some of al-Ghazali's works are consulted for the purpose of this study.

2. This paper mainly tries to discuss certain aspects of his epistemology by taking a point of reference with which his expositions in other works are compared, and more importantly, to which more will be added and accordingly
which will be modified and synthesized. The fundamental structure of our presentation would, however, be based on Ghazali's expositions of the question as given in his Mi' yar al-'Ilm.  

3. Having decided that Mi' yar will be our point of reference, we have translated some portions of the original Arabic text that have a direct bearing on the subject namely, the sense-mind relationship. Altogether, we have identified four relevant parts in which al-Ghazali's exposition of the topic is apparent. All these parts will be included in Section A of this article. Accordingly, other explanations as given in the rest of his writings will be used so as to provide the background information, underpinning and the commentary, all of which further explain some relevant parts of the translated quotation. Such an analysis constitutes the content of Section B of this article.

4. Dealing with such an epistemological analysis it was also inevitable to delve, from time to time, into other related areas of discussion, mainly ontology, or to be more specific, the levels or degrees of existence, and psychology. But this necessary divergence and intersection is mainly due to the fact that, in a system, a rigid partial analysis amounts to a mere reduction and distortion of the overall picture. Moreover, it is rather difficult even to choose the proper subject into which this sense-mind relationship could be included; it can be psychological from one angle or epistemological if viewed from another perspective or even ontological in some respects:

Section A: THE SENSE-MIND RELATIONSHIP IN HIS Mi'YAR

---

317 So far, no serious attempt has been made at translating this important book of al-Ghazali into English except for a very limited part of it by M.E. Marmura; see his "Ghazali on Ethical Premises and "Premises That are Not Certain and Unusable in Demonstrations" in The Philosophical Forum, Boston: Boston University, 1969, Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 393-403
Quotation 1:

In pages 33 up to 43 of Mi'yar al-Ilm, al-Ghazali states that.

It is possible that you O the one who is deceived by his own possession of the intellectual sciences (al-'ulum al-dhihniyyah) and who blindly succumbed to that which is forwarded to him by intellectual demonstration (al-barahin al'- aqliyyah) might say, 'What is the purpose of this [tendency of] greatly honoring and respecting [the art of logic] and what is really the need of those who possess the intellect of this yardstick (mi' ar) and balance (mizan) for the intellect is the just balance (al-qistas al-mustaqim) and the established yardstick (al-mi'yar al-qawim). Therefore, the possessor of it does not need _ after its perfection _ any kind of guidance (tasdid) and strengthening (taqwim). [The answer] Thus, [you must] act deliberately and proceed in caution in [your] belittling of that which is among the dangers (ghaw'il) of the intellectual ways (al-turuq al-aqliyyah), and be further convinced and certain _ before anything else _ that there exist in you the sensory judge (hakiman hissiyyan), the imaginative_ estimative judge (hakiman Wahmiyyan), and the intellectual judge. The soul in the beginning of its natural development depends greatly on the sensory and imaginative_ estimative judges. Because these two [judges] preceded [the intellect] in presenting themselves to the soul in that early [stage of the] natural development of the soul and disclose it to the fact that they rule over it. [i.e. the soul]. For this reason it is familiar and is pleased with those two judges before the intellectual judge overtakes it in which case its [i.e. the soul's] weaning from its familiarity and its bond to that which is as if an outsider to its nature becomes stronger. Therefore, it will not stop to contradict the

---

318 Mi'yar al-Ilm fi Fann al-Mantiq, Bey rut: Dar al-Audalus, 1964. Henceforth identified as MIFM. For the purpose of the present study, several portions of this text are translated and each will then he denoted by the bold letter Q together with its lumber. Words in parentheses "[ ]" are added by the translator, whereas those in parentheses "( )" are the transliterated Arabic words used in the original edition of the text.
judge of the intellect and to falsify it and to agree with the judge of the senses and imagination estimation and to affirm their truthfulness in accordance with the trick which we will explain later in this book.

And if you want to know the truthfulness of our claim concerning the deception of these two judges and their unsoundness, [you have to] pay attention to the sensory judge [as to] how it judges the sun whenever you observe it that it is [a tiny thing] in the width of the galaxy; and the stars, that they are scattered diamonds on a dark blue carpet; and the shadow reflected on the earth of the vertically standing individuals, that it is stationary and the shape of the child in the very early stage of his development [i.e. his childhood], that he is also stagnant. [See also] who the intellect knows the demonstrations (barahim) which the senses are not capable of disputing, that the round shape of the sun is—several times bigger than the earthly globe, and likewise, those stars [that they are much bigger that this earth], and how could we be guided to understand that the shadow which we saw as if it is stationary, is [in reality] in a constant motion, and that the height of the child in the period of his early childhood is also not stagnant, on the contrary, it grows continuously and progresses additively in a hidden step-by-step growth which in not perceptible to the senses but which the mind witnesses [such a progress].

And the errors of the senses of this kind are numerous and you cannot hope to thoroughly examine [all of] them. Therefore be content with this simple example from among the stories [of its weaknesses] so that you can bring it to its own temptations. As for the imaginative-estimative judge, do not forget about its denying an existent which has no indication of its dimension; and its disputing that which does not resemble the earthly bodies in both decomposition and composition, and which is neither qualified as being inside nor outside the universe. And if it were not due to the
protection of the intellect from the evil of the imagination in
this kind of misguidance, [it will surely be] that the disruptive
beliefs concerning the Creator of the earth and the heaven
will be firmly fixed in the soul of the scholars [of religion] as
they are firmly fixed in the heart of the masses and the
ignorant. And we do not need such an extensive discussion
so as to depict its deception and mere imagination-estimation.
For it also deceives concerning that which is very intimate to
the sense-perception (al-mahsusat) that we have mentioned
before. Because if you were to demonstrate to it a single body
in which there are motion, taste, color and smell, and that you
suggest that it affirms the existence of such qualities in a
single substratum by way of [their] gathering [together] (‘ala
sabil al-ijtima), it will [Surely] be reluctant to accept it and will
also imagine that some of those qualities will be the opposite
of the other and [at the same time] adjacent to it. It will be
capable of sticking each of that with the others as in the case
of a thin veil being appended to another veil, but it will never
be able by its nature to grasp such varieties except by
supposing the variation of space. Because the imagination-
estimation whenever it takes [something] from the senses-and
the sense in its utmost performance [only] perceives variation
and difference as the space and time differ - and whenever
these two factors are taken out of the consideration, then it
will be difficult for it to affirm quantities which are different
in quality and in essence being a condition [or a state] in that
which is in a same realm [or pace] (al-tasdiq bi a’dad
mutaghayirah bi al-sifah wa al-haqqah halah fi ma huwa fi
haya wahid). And this particular case together with the other
similar errors of the imagination-estimation goes beyond the
scope of enumeration and specification. And Allah the Most
High is worthy of praise for whatever that has endowed to
the intellect [in avoiding] from the error, and the One Who
saves from the darkness of ignorance, and Who saves with
the light of demonstration from the darkness and satanic
temptation.
If you need additional unveiling with regard to the precaution concerning the betrayal of these two judges, Beware and induce from whatever that has been mentioned in the Law (Shari) regarding [God's] attributing these [particular] distortions to the Satans and naming them as temptations (waswas) and assigning them to it [the Satan], and [His] naming the light of the intellect as guidance and light, and linking it to Allah the Most High and also to His Angels in His verse: 'Allah is the Light of the Heavens and the Earth.' Since the locus (mazinnah) of thee estimation and the imagination (al-wahm wa al-khayal) is the brain and both are the two sources of temptation. Abu Bakr_May God's Blessing be upon him says to the one who carries out the punishment upon the perpetrator: 'Strike on the head for the Satan is in the head', The imaginative and estimative temptations (al-wisaw is al-khayaliyyah wa al-wahmiyyah) are closely attached to the faculty of thinking (al-quwwah al-mufakkirah) to such an extent that only few [people] are capable of really escaping from it so much so that that situation resembles the mixture of blood with our flesh and organs. The Prophet peace be upon him-says, 'Indeed the Satan moves in the body of the descendant of Adam as the movement of the blood'. And if you reflect with the eye of the intellect concerning these secret about which we have already informed you, then you will certainly know that you really need to think well about ways by which you can be saved from the error of these two judges.

And if you said, 'What is to be done concerning with whatever that you have described. Then, thing about the delicateness (luttf) of the intellectual maneuvers (hiyal) in that case as the intellect leads gradually the senses (al-hiss) and the imagination-estimation (al-wahm) to those matters regarding which both the senses and the imagination-estimation help it to perceive from among the phenomena observed which are in agreement with the imagined-estimated (al-mawhum) and the intelligible (al-ma' qul). It then takes from them [i.e. those
matters] premisses (muqaddamat), regarding which the imagination helps the intellect. Therewith, the intellect arranges them in such a manner that the imagination will not challenge it, and concludes from them by necessity a conclusion which the imagination-estimation (al-wahm) is not able to deny. For the conclusion is derived from matters with which both the imagination-estimation and the intellect do not dispute in judging. Those matters are the knowledge in which the people do not dispute such as the necessary propositions (al-daruriyyat) and the sense-perceptions (al-hissiyyat). The intellect yields them from the senses and the imagination-estimation and it receives this knowledge from both of them. Therefore, both the senses and the imagination-estimation affirm that the necessary conclusion of these matters is real truth (sadiqah haqiaiyah). The intellect then transmits those very matters in their offer to that which the imagination-estimation disputed, and derives from them [further] conclusions.

And whenever the imagination-estimation denies it [i.e. the conclusion] and is reluctant to accept it, then it becomes easy for the intellect to sustain it. Because the premises which the intellect holds, the imagination-estimation testifies their truth according to the order that the imagination-estimation arranges so as to produce the conclusion as if the imagination-estimation has [already] accepted the necessity of the conclusion of the premises. Thus, it becomes clear to the observer that the refusal of the imagination-estimation from accepting the conclusion after testifying the truthfulness of the premises, and after affirming the validity of the order that is effective [of producing the conclusion] is due to the falling short of its nature in grasping this conclusion, and not because of the conclusion being wrong, since the order of the premises are transmitted from such a location that helps the imagination-estimation to testify them. Thus, our purpose in this book is to take from the natural sense-perceptions and the natural primary-necessary premises (al-mahsusat wa'l-
daruriyyat al-jabaliyyah) a standard for the study so much so that if we transmit it to the obscurity we will not be in doubt concerning the truthfulness of whatever that is necessarily derivable from them. It might be that you will now say, 'And if whatever that you have been mentioning for the study has been perfected, then why do they disagree concerning the intelligible (ma' qulat), and why not they agree upon them [the intelligible] as they agree upon the geometrical and arithmetical theories in which the imagination-estimation helps the intellect?' And the answer for you can be from two angles:

One of these, [is that] whatever that we have mentioned is only a part of the dangerous points [or causes] of the errors and not all of them. And beyond this in the study concerning the intellectual sciences (al-' aqliyyat) there are many dangerous obstacles which become strong in those who possess reason - the one who surpasses them [i.e. the obstacles] will be saved. And when you have become acquainted with the whole conditions of demonstration (shurut al-burhan) which are effective in producing certainty (al-yaqin), you will not regard as unlikely [the possibility of] the incapability of the faculty of majority of human beings in perceiving the essences of the hidden intelligibles (haqa'iq al-ma' qulat al-khafiyyah).

Second, the imaginative-estimative propositions (al-qadaya al-wahmiyyah) whenever they are divided into that which are true and into that which are false, [it is the fact that] the false one has a strong resemblance with the true one. It will then appear in them such propositions concerning which it becomes difficult for the soul to distinguish from the false, and he has no power over them except he who is helped by Allah with His Guidance and he whom Allah has honored with following the method of the truth by means of His Way. And the intellectual sciences (al-' aqliyyat) are [further] divided into that which are easily perceived by the majority of
people and into that which is hardly perceived by the mind of
the majority except by the extraordinary one i.e. the friends of
Allah (Awliya' Allah) - the Most High - who are helped by
means of the light of the Truth and whom the passage of
time does not permit the existence of a group of them, let
alone the great number of the people.

And [you must] know that the purport of this book is to
teach the method of moving from the form [or image]
produced in your mind to those matters which are abstruse
for you. This movement has conditions and order. Whenever
they are satisfied, they will lead [you] to the object of search,
[but] if not, you will fall short of the object of search. And the
one of its true conditions and order has a strong resemblance
with that which is not true. Therefore the content of this
science [i.e. logic] in general is this [i.e. the movement and its
conditions]. As for its content in detail, it is that the object of
search is the knowledge, and the knowledge is classified into
the knowledge of the essences of the things (al-' ilm bi
dhawat al-ashya') ... and this knowledge is known as concepts
(tasawwar); and into the knowledge of the relation of some of
these conceptualized essences with the other some whether
by means of negation or by way of affirmation (salb or ijab) ...
and this is named assent (tasdiq) because affirmation (at-
tasdiq) and falsification (takdhib) are attached to it.319

Quotation 2:

In pages 50 up to 52, that is to say, the section discussing the rank (or
position) of terms in the hierarchical degrees of existence (rutbat al-alfaz min
maratib al-wujud), al Ghazali says,

[And] Know that the degrees under discussion are four, and
the term (al-lafz) is [only] in the third level. Because for
everything, there is an existence [of it] in the external world

319 Hereinafter cited as Q1.
(al-a'yān), then in the mind (al-adhān), and then in the terms (al-alfāz), then in the writing (al-kitābah). The writing points to (dallāh ʿāla) the term; the term [likewise] points to the meaning (al-maʿānī) which is in the soul (al-nafs); and that which is in the soul is the resemblance (mithal) of the existent in the external world (al-mawjud fi al-a'yān). And [whenever] there is no fixation (thubūt) of a thing in itself [namely, its external existence], then, its resemblance (mithaluhu) will not be formed in the soul. And whenever its resemblance is formed in the soul then it [i.e. that resemblance] is the knowledge concerning it [i.e. the thing or object]. For there is no meaning for knowledge except as a resemblance produced in the mind in accordance with that which it [that is to say, the resemblance or image or impression] is the replica of it [i.e. the thing] in the senses and this [object] is the known (wa mahma ittasama fi'l-nafs mithaluhu fa ḥuwa al-'ilm bihi idh la ma' na ilm illa mithal yahsulu fi'l-nafs mutabiq li ma ḥuwa mithal lahu fi'l-hiss wa ḥuwa al ma'lum). And when this image (al-athr) is not clear in the soul, then a term by means of which that image is pointed to cannot be composed. And when the term in which the sounds and alphabet are ordered is not composed, then the writing for pointing to it [i.e. the term] cannot be formed. And the existence [at the level] of external world and in the mind does not vary from one country to another, and from a nation to the other although the terms and the writings do differ as both [of the latter] point to the place [or custom] and the terminology (dallatan di'l-wad' wa al-istilah).

At this point, we say, 'Whoever thinks that the singular term (al-ism al-mufrad) does not necessitate the complete absorption (al-istighraq), he [that person] thinks that that simple term is a subject in opposite to the existent in the

---

320 Here, al-Ghazali is referring to the dispute which is discussed in the section just preceding the present quotation.-
external world.\textsuperscript{321} since [for him] this external world (al-a' yan) consists of specific individuals (ashkhas mu' ayyanah) and the existent dinar is a specific individual, so when all the individuals are gathered, they are called Danair [the plural of dinar], [In fact] he does not know that from the physical individual dinar (al-dinar al-shakhsi al-mu' ayyan) is formed in the soul an image which is its [the dinar] resemblance, and which is the knowledge of it (al-' ilm bihi), and which is also a concept of it (tasawwur lahu). And this image conforms with that individual [dinar] and the rest of [actual] existent individual dinars and possible existent individual dinars. Therefore, the affirmed [or fixed] form (al-surah al-thabitah) in the soul form the point of its concordance with every dinar presumes universal (kulliyyah) and not individual (shakhsiyah) form. And if you believe that the name 'dinar' points to the impression (al-athr) in the soul and not to the impressior (al-mu'thir) and that that impression is universal, then [it necessarily follows that] the name [i.e. the singular term] is universal without doubt. And whatever of the order (tartib) that we have put forward [it will] inform you that the terms point to that which is in the soul, and that which is in the soul is a resemblance of that which in the external world (anna al-alfaz laha dalalat ala ma fi'l-mufus wa mafi'l mufus mithal li ma fi'l a' yan)...\textsuperscript{322}

**Quotation 3:**

Moreover, in page 63 up to 66, which is the section on the existing terminologies of meanings (mufradat al-ma'ani al-mawjudah) and the relation of some of them to the others, especially in the first subsection, concerning the relation of the existent things to our mental faculties [or intellectual discernment] (nisbat al-mawjudat ila mudrakina), al-Ghazali asserts that,

---

\textsuperscript{321} What is meant by al-Ghazali here is that each singular term is in a one-to-one correspondence with a physical thing.

\textsuperscript{322} Hereinafter cited as Q2.
If we were to concentrate on analyzing the existents and their realities (al-nawjudat wa haqa'iqiha) [we will find that] they are divided into the sensed one (mahsusah) and that which is known through inference [or reasoning or proofs] (ma' lumah bi'l-istidlal) whose essence is not immediately perceived by any of the senses. And the sense-perceptions (mahsusat) are the perceptions by means of the five senses (al-hawass al-khams) such as colours, and it follows from that the knowledge of the shapes and measures and all these are [perceived] through the sense of sight; sounds by means of hearing; tastes through the sense of tasting; odour by the sense of smelling; and also that of roughness and smoothness, and softness and hardness, and coldness and hotness, and wetness and dryness by means of the sense of touching. All of these matters and their adjuncts attend to the sense. In other words, the faculty of perception of the senses becomes essentially in contact with them (tata' allaq biha al-quwwah al-mudrikah mina'l-hawass fi dharih a). From among them is that [thing] whose existence is known and is proven through its impression (athar) and which is neither perceived nor acquired by the five senses, namely the hearing, the sight, the smelling, the taste and the touch. Its example is those senses themselves for the meaning of any one of them is the faculty of perception and that this perceptive faculty is neither sensed by means of the sensing of the senses nor perceived by the imaginative faculty (al-khayal).

Similarly, the capacity (al-qudrah) and the knowledge (al-'ilm) and the will (al-iradah) and even fright, embarrassment, love and anger; we certainly know all of these qualities from something other than [or different from] us by means of a kind of inference and not through the contact of any of our senses with them. And whoever writes in front of us, we know certainly his capability, his knowledge of a kind of writing, and his will by inferring from his action, and our certainty concerning the existence of such meanings [or ideas] (al-ma'ani) is as our certainty of the perceived movements of
his hand and the ordering of the darkness of the letters on the white [paper] regardless of the fact that these [movements] are observable whereas those meanings are not observable. In fact, many of the existents are known through inference of them by way of their impacts [or impressions] (athar) and are not sensed. Therefore, it is unnecessary that the senses become [so] great to you; that you believe the certain knowledge (al-'ilm al-muhaqqaq) to be the sense-data an the imagination (al-ihsas wa'l takhayyul); and that which is not imaginable (layatakhayyal) is not real (la haqiqah lahu). Because of you were to ask yourself to search for the essence (dhat) of capability and knowledge you will find that the imagination disposes freely over it by virtue of forming, coloring and measuring; and that you [surely] know that the disposal of the imagination is wrong for the essence (haqiqah) of capability, which is proven by means of the action, is a matter free from [any] form, valor, space and measure. Therefore, it is not necessary that you reject the proof of the intellect concerning those matters which are denied by the imagination.

And we will make clear to you, now, the cause of this confusion; [You must] Contemplate that the human's first perceptive faculty in the beginning of his natural development is his senses and they overwhelm him. The dominant one of all of them is the sight which perceives the colors by first intention, and the forms by way of consequence [or entailment] (yadruk al-alwan bi'l-qasd al-awwal wa'l-ashkal 'ala sabil al-istikla'). Therewith, the imagination disposes over the sense-perception (al-mahsusat) and many of its disposal is over the observation (al-mubsirat), and it composes form the sights different froms whose units are the [single or individual] sight. [In fact] the composition is among its function. For' you are able to imagine (tatakhayyal) a horse which has a human head and a bird which has a horse head, but it is definitely impossible for you to imagine units other than whatever that you have observed so much so that if you
wish to imagine a fruit that you have never had a sight of it, you will not be able to do so. For your intention is to take something from whatever that you have seen and then you alter its colour, such as, for an example, a black apple because you had seen the form of the apple and [the colour] black, you combine both of them, or such as a big fruit, for instance, a water melon. You will not cease to compose form the units of those that you saw because the imagination follows the sights but it is capable only of composing (al-tarkib) and discomposing (al-tafsil). The imagination will keep in combining and separating, mastering over you through that. Whenever the information (ma'lum) through inference (bi al-istiddlal) appears to you, the imagination is caused to fix its glance on the information, seeking its essence (haqiqah) employing a standard which, according the imagination, is the essence of things (haqiqat al-ashya') [Indeed] there is no essence on its behalf but colour or [physical] form. Therefore, it seeks the form and the colour, and they are those which are perceived by the eye from among the existents so much so that if you were to contemplate on the essence (dhat) of odour with an imaginative contemplation, the imagination [for sure] will require for the odour a form, a color, a place and a measurement deceiving in its and in accordance with the requirement of its natural disposition.

And it is rather surprising that if you contemplate on a colorful shape, the imagination will not require from it its taste, and its smell and both of them are the property of the smell and the taste, whereas, if you contemplate on the essence of the taste and the smell, the imagination will ask for the property of the sight and it is the color and the shape. Although the imagination acts freely in the whole perceptions of the five senses since its intimacy with the perceptions of the sight is the strongest and the most dominant it becomes the case that its search for the property of the sight is the most dominant and prevalent. And if you were to subject
your knowledge concerning the Creator of the universe that He exists without qualification of dimension under the critical examination of yourself, the imagination will require for Him a color, and attribute to Him measure [such as] nearness and fairness; attachment with and separation form the universe; and any other quality from the colorful shapes which the imagination saw. It will not require for Him taste and smell. And there is no difference between the taste, and the smell, and the color and the shape, for all of them are the perceptions of the senses. And if you know the classification of the existent things into the sense-perceptions (mahsusat) and into that which is known through intellect and is not perceivable to the senses and the imagination, therefore turn away immediately from the imagination and depend on the requirement of the intellect concerning it, for it has become clear to you the classification of the existent into sense-perception (mahsus) and other than that.\textsuperscript{323}

\textbf{Quotation 4:}

In another part of his Mi' yar, that is to say, in the "Book of the Syllogism; the Second View", pages 138 up to 139, concerning the matter of the syllogism (Maddat al-Qiyas), he states,

\begin{quote}
We have mentioned [previously] that every composition is composed of [o. consists of] two elements [or things]: One of them is its matter such as the relation of the wood to the bed. The second [one] is its form as the relation of the form [or structure] of the bed to the bed.

We have also satisfactorily discussed the form of the syllogism and its compositions, and the aspects of its composition. And [now] we are going to discuss its matter, and its matter is the knowledge [or sciences] (al-ulum), but not every knowledge, on the contrary, only the affirmative-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{323} Hereinafter cited as Q3.
relational knowledge (al-'ilm al-tasdiqi) exclusive of the conceptual knowledge (al-'ilm al-tasawwuri). For this latter knowledge is the matter of the definition (maddat al-hadd). The affirmative-relational knowledge is the knowledge concerning the relation of the essences of the realities (dhawat al-haqa'iq) some of them to the other some [whether] in terms of affirmation (hi al-ijab) or negation (al-salb); and not [even] every relational affirmation, but only the essentially true relational affirmation (al-tasdiqi al-sadiq fi nafsihi); and not even all truth but only the certain truth (al-sadiq al-yaqini). For it is possible that a matter [or thing] in itself is true according to God but it is not certain in the eye of the observer. Therefore, it is not allowable that that matter be, for him, the matter of the syllogism by which he seeks conclusive certainty (istintaj al-yaqin); and not even every certainty but only universal certainty (al-yaqini al-kulli), [and what] I mean [by this] is that it is so in every situation. Whenever we said that the matters of the syllogism are the premisses, from one aspect, this [statement or claim] is so [only] metaphorically (majazan). For the premiss is an expression of the speech (nutq) through the medium of the tongue [(bi'l-lisan): that is to say, the verbal speech] which covers [both] a predicate (mahmul) and a subject (mawdu'); and the matter of the syllogism is the knowledge (al-' din) to which the terms that constitute 'the subject' and the predicate' (lafz al-mawdu' wa'l-mahmul) point, and not to the terms [themselves]. On the contrary, the subject and the predicate are the affirmed [or the certain or fixed] knowledge (al-ulum al-thabitah) in the soul (al-nafs) exclusive of the terms. Nevertheless, the understanding (al-tafhim) is not possible except through [verbal or written] terms.

And the real matter (al-maddah al-haqiaiyyah) is that which is the point led to in the fourth level (al-darajah al-rabi'ah) [which is only attained] after three envelopes [or stages] (qushur):
The first envelope is the forms imprinted by means of the writing (al-suwar al-marqumah bi'l-kitabah)

The second is the speech (al-nutq), and is the sounds ordered [or arranged] which is [both] the object of writing (madlul al-kitabah) and the proof of the conversation or speech [occurring] in the soul. (dallah 'ala'l-hadith alladhi fi'l-nafs).

And the third [one] is the soul's conversation [or speech] (hadith al-nafs) which is the knowledge of the ordering of letters and the arrangement of the speech, whether verbally or written, ('ilm bi tartib al-huruf wa nazm al-kalam imma mantuqan bihi wa imma maktuban)

And the fourth [one] is the mind (al-lubab) and it is the fixed knowledge in the soul (al'-ilm al-qā'īm bi'l-nafs) whose reality [or essence] refers to the soul's extraction of the resemblance [or replica or image] that is in accordance with the known [i.e. the thing]. (intiqash al-nafs bi mithal mutabiq li'lma'lum). Thus this knowledge [or sciences] (al'-ulum) are the matters of the syllogism and it is difficult to single out (tajrid) them [i.e. their existence] in the soul without arranging [at the same time] the terms by means of the speech of the soul.

It must not come to your imagination the unity [or identity] (al-ittihad) of the knowledge (al' ilm) and the speech (al-hadith) because even the writer [himself] faces difficulty in conceptualizing a meaning except by the resemblance of the imprints of the writing which point to the thing_of it [that meaning] (tasawwur ma' na ilia an yatamaththal lahu ruqum al-kitabah al-dallah 'ala'l-shay'), so much so that if he thinks of the wall (al-jidar) the term 'al-jidar' appears [simultaneously] to him in a written form.

However, since the knowledge of 'al-jidar'is not dependent on the knowledge of the origin [or principle] of writing (ma' rifah ash al-kitabah), it will not be dubious for him [to understand] that this [i.e. the term 'jidar'] is necessary connection
(muqaran lazim) to the knowledge; and not essentially the knowledge itself (li'il' ilm al' aynihi). Similarly, he can conceptualize [a case in which] a human being knows many sciences but that person does not know the languages, therefore the soul's speech will not occur in him, I mean [by this]; occupation with the arrangement of the terms. Thus the affirmative-relational true [or real] knowledge (al-' ulum al-haqaiyyah al-tasdiqiyah) are the matters of the syllogism. If they are present in the mind (dhihn) according to a specific order, they help the soul because [already] inherent in them are the knowledge of the conclusion from God the Most High, and therefore whenever we say, "the matters of the syllogism are the certain premisses (al-muqaddamat al-yaqiniyyah)\(^\text{324}\), you must not understand from such a saying except whatever that we have mentioned.

From all the above-qouted portions of Mi'yar, we can at least identify three important aspects of the sense-mind relationship, namely, the levels of the process of abstraction-extraction, the stages of the development of human perceptive faculties, and the limitations or weaknesses of the non-intellectual judges in comparison with the intellectual perceptions. In the following lines of this paper, these three aspects will he elaborately analyzed and comparatively discussed relying mainly on al-Ghazali's other writings.

Section B: ANALYSIS OF AL-GHAZALI'S CONCEPTION OF SENSE-MIND RELATIONSHIP

Al-Ghazali, as the other traditional Muslim scholars, holds the view that there are numerous paths in the search for knowledge which, in fact has many divisions.\(^\text{325}\) Generally speaking, there are two methods in acquiring knowledge; the intuitive channel and the way of abstraction-extraction.\(^\text{326}\) Although these two

\(^{324}\) Hereinafter cited as Q3.

methods are not totally disconnected, in this section we are mainly focussing on that latter aspect.

In accordance with such a discussion, it is deemed necessary to also deal with the levels of existence from among which the knowledge is derived or abstracted or to which the knowledge is related or referred, either directly or indirectly. With regard to the degrees of existence, al-Ghazali's explanation is not always the same though this difference need not be interpreted as reflecting his incoherency and inconsistency. Rather, it is more because of the contextual determinants underlying and framing such elaborations. In Mi'yar, as appears in the above second translated quotation (Q2), al-Ghazali seems to classify existence into four categories, namely, real-external existence, mental existence, terminological or verbal existence and the writer' existence. This view seems to be the result of a linguistic-epistemological analysis focussing mainly on the relation of the term to the object of knowledge. Similarly, the same outlook is adopted in the fourth quotation (Q4) though the resulting classification is somewhat different from the former. Here the focus is no more on the object of knowledge and its relation to the term, instead, it is more of the term-knowledge relationship, resulting in four categories, i.e. the written existence, the external verbal existence, the internal verbal existence and the mental existence. Two of the latter are the hidden operation occuring in the soul.

He has also discussed the same subject-matter in his Faysal. There, he identifies five types or degrees of existence, namely, the essential (dhati,), the sensible (hissi), the imaginary (khayali,), the analogous (shibhi) existences. Even though this

---

326 There are altogether four different but interrelated methods of classifying knowledge as adopted by this particular scholar. For a detailed analysis on al-Ghazali's classification of knowledge, refer to Osman Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam, Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Policy Research, 1992, pp. 194-196 and Chapter 9; henceforth cited as CKI. What is referred to here is his classification of knowledge into "presential" (huduri) and "attained" (husuli). Nevertheless, I have decided to change slightly the term used for the latter in order to suit the terminology used throughout this essay.

last approach is still carried out within the linguistic-epistemological analysis, it lays more emphasis on the modes or points of reference of existence. Furthermore, in his Maqasad, when elaborating on the definition and reality of the name [or the term], he only enumerates three types of existence, namely, the individual-essential-external existence (wujud fi'l a'yan), the linguistic-verbal existence (wujud fi'l lisan) and the mental existence (wujud fi'l adhhan). On another occasion, namely in Sharh Kitab 'aja'ib al-Qalb of his celebrated Ihya' Ulum al-Din he lists down four levels of existence, that is to say, the existence in the Preserved Tablet (al-Lawh al-Mahfuz), the physical existence (wujuduhu al jismani or wujuduhu al-haqiai), the imaginative [or imaginary] existence and the mental existence. From the above-mentioned varieties of exposition, we can possibly conclude that in al-Ghazali's understanding, when the total picture of degrees of existence is formulated, there are altogether nine levels of existence, namely:

1. Existence in al-Lawh al-Mahfuz;
2. Real-external-individual-physical existence;
3. Sensible existence;
4. Imaginary existence;

---

328 See al-Ghazali's al-Maqsa al-Asna fi Sharh Ma'ani Asma Allah al-Husan; partially translated as Appendix IV in the above-mentioned McCarthy's Freedom and Fulfillment., p. 336; hereinafter designated as A4. For the Arabic text, see teh one published in (Limassol: al-Jaffan and al-Jabi, 1987), p. 25; will be after this cited as MQA. It should also be noted here that a full English annotated translation of this book is now made available for the first time under the title The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, trans. David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts SOciety, 1992.


330 For another reasonably detailed study of al-Ghazali's conception of reality, see Abdul Haq Ansari, the Doctrine of Divine Command: A Study in the Developmet of Ghazali's view of reality" in Islamic Studies, Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1982, XXI, no 3, pp. 1.47; hereinafter abbreviated as DDC.
5. Mental existence;
6. Internal verbal existence;
7. External-linguistic-verbal existence;
8. Written existence, and;
9. Analogous existence

Insofar as this particular aspect of his epistemological outlook is concerned, only levels 1 to 5 are directly related, whereas levels 6 to 9 are only mere products or consequences of the preceding degrees. It is the time now to consider briefly each level of existence in order to elucidate its relation with the subsequent discussion of al-Ghazali's conception of sense-mind relationship.

1. Existence in al-Lawh al-Mahfuz

According to al-Ghazali, the essences or realities of things (haqaqiq al-ashya) are imprinted in the al-Lawh al-Mahfuz this is also known as the heart of the Closest Angels (al-mala'ikah al-muqarrabun), and sometimes as the Universal Soul.\(^ {331} \) He gives the analogy of an engineer or an architect who first of all draws his plan on a sheet of white paper before transferring it into construction, namely, the concrete external existence. Similarly, the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth draws the plan of the Universe from its beginning to its end on that Preserved Tablet and after that externalized it into concrete physical sensible existence according to that plan.\(^ {332} \)

2. Realexternal•individual physical existence

For him, this level of existence is modelled according to the previous level.\(^ {333} \) This existence is real and stable, that is to say, the existence outsi of

\(^ {331} \) See RL, p. 197 and p. 367.

\(^ {332} \) KH, p. 48; SAQ, pp. 22-23.
sensation and intellection (al-wujud al-haqiqi al-thabit kharîj al-hiss wa'l-'aql). Nevertheless sensation and intellection take from it an image (surah) and this "taking" is called "perception" (idrak).\textsuperscript{334} This kind of existence is al characterized by individuality and particularity. In Maqṣad, he considers ti level as the basic-real existence (al-wujud al-asli al-haqiqi). For an example, cites the existence of the heavens and the earth.\textsuperscript{335} The relation between 1 and 2 is further clarified in his Mushkat al-Anwar, where he conveys to us the fact that,

\begin{quote}
"... the world of sense is one of the effects (athr min athar) of yonder world of cause, resulting from it just as the shadow results from a body, or as fruit from that which fructuates, or as the effect from a cause (al-musabbab bil-idafah ila'l sabab). Now the key to this knowledge of the effects is sought and found in the cause (wa mafatih malrifat al-musabbabat la tujad ilia mina'l-asbab). And for this reason the World of Sense is a type of the World of the Realm Celestial (kana 'alam al-shahadah mithalan li 'a/am al-malakut)...\textsuperscript{336}
\end{quote}

Moveover, in al-Ghazali's understanding, there are different though interrelated expressions—merely because of the viewpoints—attributed to these two worlds and their relation to each other;

(1) Regarding the two worlds in themselves (anfusihima), one is a Spiritual World (Ruhání) and the other is a Material World (Jismaní);

\textsuperscript{333} KH, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{334} Al, p. 151; FT, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{335} A4, p. 336; MQA, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{336} See al-Ghazali's Mishkat al-Anwar translated into English by W. H. T. Gairdner under the title of The Niche of Lights, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1952, p. 96; hereinafter cited ul MA. For the Arabic text, see the one edited by Abu 'Ala 'Afifi, Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah 1964, p. 51, and cf. p. 67; will be after this abbreviated as AR..
(2) Regarding the organ which apprehends them (al-idafah ila'l ayn al-Mudrikah lahumā), the former is known as a World Intelligential ('Aqli) and the latter as a World Sensual (Hiss);

(3) Regarding their mutual relationship (idafah ahadihima ila'l akhar), the first is considered as a World Supernal (' Ulwi) and the second as a World Inferior (Sufli).

He goes further to elaborate that the visible world or the World Sensual is the starting-point of ascension (mirqah) to the world of the Realm Supernal. He also emphasizes the point that he should not be misunderstood and misinterpreted—from such a belief in symbolism—as promoting ignorance and annulment of the outward and visible forms for, for him, the extreme of ignoring the outward-visible sign is the tenet of the Batiniyyah and, similarly, the rejection of the inward and invisible meaning is the very rudiment of the Materialists (Hashawiyyah). Both groups are considered by him as having a one-sided view of the world and being grossly ignorant of the balance between the two worlds. In his further explanation of the verse "The Putting-off of the Shoes" (hadith al-na'lâyın), he states that for every real thing, there is its corresponding real truth. The outward symbol is, for him, a real thing and its application to the inward meaning is a real truth (Fa 'l-mithal fi'l-zahir haqq wa ada 'uhu ila'l-sirr al-batin haqiqah).

### 3. Sensible existence

This is already a stage in the process of knowledge abstraction-accumulation. This level, if taken as a whole, might refer to the existence as perceived by the external senses. Nevertheless, al-Ghazali only limits himself to the visual power in explaining this particular level of existence. In his view, as for the existence in the

---

337 MA, pp. 122-123; AR, p. 65. There are also other names for these two worlds: if the former is known as 'alam al-ghayb wa'l-malakut, the latter, alam al-mulk wa'l-shahadab (p. 65); and if the former, al-alam al-nurani, the latter, al-alam al-zulmani (p. 50). In addition, the former is alit called alam al-quds (p.66).

338 Ibid., pp. 66-67; and MA, pp. 123-126

339 Ibid., pp. 136-137; AR, p. 73.

340 Ibid., pp. 74; and MA, pp. 140-141.
external world, each is so only at a point of time whereas the perception of senses apprehends such an existence as continuing throughout a period of time. The existence at this level is also marked by its subjectivity for nobody can share exactly the same image perceived by the sensing subject. Al-Ghazali says in a direct and clear manner that,

Sensible existence is that which is imaged [represented yatamatththal] in the visual power of the eye and which has no [such] existence outside the eye. Thus it is existent in the sensing [sensation], and it is peculiar to the man sensing and unshared by any other. An example of that is what the dreamer sees, or even what the waking sick man sees. For there may be represented to him a form [an image] which has no existence outside his sensing in such fashion that he sees it just as he sees all the other things existing outside his sensing.... If you do not believe it, then believe your own eye. For if you take from a fire a live coal like a single point, then you move it rapidly with a straight motion, you see it as a line of fire; and if you move it with a circular motion you see it as a circle of fire. The circle and the line are seen and are existing in your sensing, not outside of your sensing, because what exists outside is at every moment a point. It becomes a line only in points of time succeeding one another. So the line is not existing at one moment, yet in your vision it is stationary at one moment.\(^{341}\)

Only in his Faysal does he consider it as an independent level of existence. Otherwise, he merely treats it either when explaining the external existence from which the process of abstraction of data starts or while elaborating on the imaginary existence which is a subsequent higher level of abstraction.

4. Imaginary existence

In his Maqsad, he does not clearly distinguish between the imaginary existence and the fifth level of existence, namely, the mental existence. Without taking into

---

\(^{341}\) Al, 151-152; and FT, pp. 130-131.
consideration his other works, readers might mistake understand him to refer as knowledge to those images represented in t imaginary existence for he says,

The heaven [as-sama] has an existence in its essence and itself; then it has an existence in our minds (adhhan) and our souls (nufus), because the representation [form] (surab) of the heaven is impressed in our eyes [sights] and then in our imagination [khayal], so that, were the heaven to cease to exist and we were to continue [existing], the representation of the heaven would be present in our imagination. And representation is what we express by 'knowledge' [cognition] (al-'ilm), and it is the likeness of the cognoscible (al-ma'lum), for it imitates the cognoscible and corresponds to it, and it is like the form impressed in the mirror, for it imitates the form outside and confronting it.  

Nevertheless, in Faysal, he makes it clearer when he explains to us that,

Imaginative existence is the image [form] of such sensible objects when the latter are absent from [not present to] your sensing. For you can originate in your imagination an image of an elephant and of a horse, even though you have your eyes shut, so that you see it and it exists with the perfection of its form in your brain, not outside.  

Thus, the distinctive point regarding this specific level of existence is that it is the representation or the image of the object after it is already out of our sensory perception, especially the sight.

5. Mental existence

---

342 A4, p. 336; and MQA, p. 25.

343 Al, p. 152; and FT, p. 131.

344 cf. KH, p. 49.
Here, only the meaning of the thing remains. It is considered by him as the reality or spirit of the object. In other words, the material form or materiality of the thing as it appears in sensible, imaginary and external existences has already been abstracted and put aside. In Faysal, he says,

Mental existence consists in the thing's having a 'spirit' (rub) and a reality (haqiqah: essence) and a meaning: then the intellect acquires its abstract meaning without its image remaining in imagination or sensing or outside, as, for example, 'the hand.' For the latter has a sensible and imaginable form, and it also has a meaning which is its reality, viz. 'the power to strike' — and 'the power to strike' is the mental [intellectual, intelligible] hand. The pen also has an image [form], but its reality is 'that by which cognitions are written,' and it is this which the mind receives without its being linked with a form of cane and wood and other imaginative and sensible forms.  

In short, it is the cognitional, formal existence (al-wujud al-' ilmi al-suri).  

6. Internal verbal existence

This is the speech of the soul as explained by al-Ghazali. It seems to be more of the mental pre-arrangement of the verbal and written forms denoting those in the fifth level of existence.

7. External verbal existence

For him, this is the ordinary level of speech, namely, linguistics and languages. In al-Maqsad, it is termed the verbal, indicative existence (alwujud al-lafzi al-dalili).

---

345 Al, p. 152.

346 A4, p. 336; and MQA, p. 25.

347 04.

348 Ibid., and also 02.
8. **Written existence**

This clearly refers to any ordinary writings.\(^{350}\)

It is thus clear that the sixth, seventh and eighth degrees of existence are merely the degrees of "human" communication whose existence is made possible only when the preceding five degrees exist. This fact has been repeatedly emphasized by al-Ghazali. For instance, he conveys to us in his Maqsad that,

> The existence in the tongue is ... an indication of what is in the mind, and what is in the mind is a representation of what is in [individual] existence and is conformed to it. If there were no existence in individuals, no form [image, representation] would be impressed in minds, and if it were not impressed in the form [image] of the minds and a man were una\(^{351}\)ware of it, he would not express it by the tongue. So the word and the cognition and the cognoscible are three different things. but they are mutually corresponding and comparable...\(^{352}\)

But what about the analogous existence which is also indicated by him at least in Faysal? This existence, as explained by him, is the one in which the thing itself does not exist in the previous levels of existence, namely, levels 2 up to 5, on the contrary, only the resemblance of it in one of its qualities or properties exists and this resemblance in itself is something else other than that thing. It appears that the one under consideration in this level of existence, is a thing by itself, and that it has at least a level of existence in the above range of levels 2 to 5, but it is in some aspects compared with another thing which also has an existence at least in one of the range of levels stated above. Therefore, when considered in itself, it can be included in the degrees 2 to 5.

\(^{349}\) MQA, p. 25; and A4, p. 336.

\(^{350}\) 02, and also 04.

\(^{351}\) A4, pp. 336-337; cf. 02 and 04

\(^{352}\) A1, p. 152
Book Review

Estimate of Iqbal as a Philosopher in

Majid Fakhry's
A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

Dr. Muhammad Riaz

Prof. Majid Fakhry is an Arab who has taught philosophy at the American University of Beirut and is presently teaching this subject at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He writes in Arabic as well as in English and his works on Arabic thought, Aristotle, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Bajjah etc. have been widely acclaimed. In 1970, he published A History of Islamic Philosophy in New York. A second edition came out in 1983. This work traces the history of Islamic Philosophy and theology from the earliest times to the present day. The author sheds light on the profound Muslim culture and analyses the impact of varied currents of thought and philosophy upon it. The writer is justified in depending on the Arabic sources, though he has referred to sources in English, Persian and a few other Western languages as well. So well printed and costly a book is not free from typical errors and the author's own mistakes are also understandable. Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan was given the title of 'Khan Bahadur'. Prof. Majid Fakhry thinks of 'Bahadur' (pages 335, 347 etc.) to be a place in the Indian Sub-Continent. The subject-matter, is quite satisfying and has been arranged well. The author also places the views of others before us but he never fails to offer adequate criticism in each case. It is but natural that he should have attended mostly to the Arab philosophers. He acquaints us with the life, works and thought of a few contemporary Arab thinkers too, in the closing pages of this work. This useful introduction is devoted to Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad al-Bahi, Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, Shibli Shumayyil, Zaki Nagih Mahmud, Qasim Amin, Faroh Antun, Yaqub Surruf, Salmah Musa, Sadiq J-al-Azam, H. Muruwah and Laroui etc.

A History of Islamic Philosophy is a novel work if not quite original. The author writes in his preface:

.... there historical narratives ... appeared in very recent years, M. Cruz Hernandez, Filosofia hispano-Muslimana (1957), though primarily concerned with Spanish - Muslim Philosophy, Contains extensive and callable account of the major "Eastern" Philosophers and schools, W. Montgomery
Watt's Islamic Philosophy and Theology (1962), which is part of a series entitled "Islamic Surveys", is weighted in favour of theology and therefore does not add much to our knowledge of Islamic Philosophy. Henry Corbin's Histoire de la Philosophie islamique (1964), though very valuable, does not recognize the organic character of Islamic thought and tends to over-emphasize the Shiite and particularly Ismalili element in the history of this thought. M. M. Shard's History of Muslim Philosophy is a symposium by a score of writers and lacks for this reason the unity of conception and plan that should characterize a genuine historical survey (p. ix).

Author's introduction concludes with the following lines:

....Islamic philosophy can be said to have followed a distinctive line of development which gave it that unity of form which is a characteristic of the great intellectual movements in history. We should, however, guard against the illusion that the course of its development was perfectly straight. Some of the most fascinating Muslim thinkers, such as al-Nazzam (d. 845), al-Razi (d. 925) and al-Ma'arri (d. 105), fall outside the mainstream of thought in Islam. Their dissident voices lend a discordant note to an otherwise monotonous symphony. The difficulty of expounding their thought with any degree of completeness is bound up with its every nonconformist character. Islam did generate such dissentient and solitary souls, but it could not tolerate or accept them in the end. The historian of Islamic thought cannot overlook them, however, without distorting the total picture" (p. XXIV).

Even a layman will learn much about Islamic history, polity, philosophy, theology and mysticism or sufism etc. from this handy work entitled 'A History of Islamic Philosophy'.

Prof. Majid Fakhry has commented upon the views of the Muslim philosophers and has included Iqbal also in his purview. He may not have read the translations of Iqbal's works since he has not referred to any of the
translations of his poetic works, nor even to any anthology of Iqbal's English writings. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia has been enlisted in the reference works though any citation from it is not seen in the text. A few philosophical ideas of Iqbal have been seen only in the light of The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam though the author erroneously calls this book of seven chapters 'Six Lectures' (p. 350) the 1930 edition of the book in fact had six lectures only. The author is spellbound to realize the vastness and depth of Iqbal's thought (p. 354). The only criticism on Iqbal is that of liberalism (p. 354), In Fakhry's view, like other liberals of the India sub-continent, Iqbal interprets the Holy Qur'an (koran) without reference to the historical circumstances in which the quoted verses were revealed. The author, however, forgets the fact that the Qur'an is an eternal and living book; a guide for all times. Hence, the meanings of its verses cannot remain bound in 'asbab-e-nuzul', alone and 'Allama Iqbal has referred to this point frequently, more particularly in his poetry.

Iqbal has been mentioned in part (ii) of the last (12th) chapter of the hook. Apart from random references here and there in the course of the hook he has been mentioned, more particularly at pages 349 to 355 which are being appended below, the main currents of Iqbal's thought, as these manifest in the Reconstruction\textsuperscript{353} have been highlighted. Hereunder is the extract:

The most significant, if not the only, attempt to interpret Islam in modern philosophical terms is that of another important Indian thinker, Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), a poet of profound sensibility and a scholar of vast philosophical culture. Rather than draw on history, in his attempt to restate the Islamic world-view in modern terms, as Ameer Ali had done, he draws upon the philosophical heritage of the West without reservation. His aim, it is true, is not to demonstrate the validity of the Western outlook, but rather its essential conformity with the koranic Weltanschauung. Thus the synthesis he attempts in his Reconstruction of Religious

\textsuperscript{353} Majid Fakhry has used the earlier unedited/annotated edition of the Reconstruction (see p. 373 of the book) which, in some cases, makes a considerable difference in the understanding of the text
Thought in Islam may be compared in its magnitude to the synthesis attempted .1 millennium earlier by al-Ghazali in his Revival of the Religious Sciences ('Al ihya). In substance it is more analogous, however, to the syntheses attempted by al-Kindi and Ibn Rushd, who set out to harmonize the philosophical world view of the Greeks and the religious world-view of Islam. The fundamental difference between them is that, whereas the philosophical categories employed by al-Kindi and Ibn Rushd were drawn from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, those employed by Iqbal are drawn from those of Hegel, Whitehead, and Bergson. The masters have changed, but the problem remains essentially the same, namely, the attempt to bridge the fulf between speculative thought and religion.

Born in Sialkot in the Punjab in 1878, Iqbal received his early education in Sialkot and Lahore. In 1905 he went to England and Germany, where he pursued his philosophical studies; he returned to India three years later to practice law. As Wilfrid C. Smith has put it, three things impressed him most about Europe: the vitality and dynamism of European life, the immense possibilities open to man, and the dehumanizing influence that capitalist society had on the European soul. The last circumstance strengthened his faith in the superiority of Islam as a moral and spiritual ideal, and he consequently dedicated himself to the defense and development of this ideal. The six lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam that he delivered in Madras in 1928-1929 were his major contribution to the task of reawakening his coreligionists in India and to the rethinking of Islam in modern, dynamic categories, derived primarily from nineteenth-and twentieth-century European thought.

Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 102.
Iqbal's concept of religion is that of a complex, partly rational, partly ethical, and partly spiritual experience. Religion, he writes, "is neither mere thought nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man." Hence it is not in opposition to Philosophy, but is rather an important feature of that total experience of reality upon which philosophy must reflect. This is clearly borne out by the central position which the Koran assigns to knowledge and reflection. Historically, it was the Ash'arite theologians who exploited to the full the dialectical processes of Greek thought in the defense and the definition of orthodoxy. The Mu'tazilah and Ibn Rush went too far in their reliance on reason, and consequently they failed to recognize that in the domain of scientific and religious knowledge disassociation from "concrete experience" is a fatal error. Al-Ghazali, on the other hand, jeopardized the structure of religion by basing it upon the precarious foundation of philosophic skepticism, rooted in the contention that finite thought cannot apprehend the Infinite.

If thought, so narrowly conceived, is unable to apprehend the Infinite, it is because (1) it mistakes the nature of this Infinite as an immanent reality of whose several manifestations the multitude of finite concepts are no more than particular moments or phases, and (2) it misconceives the dynamic character of thought as it unfolds itself in time through a "series of definite specifications," whose embodiment is designated by the Koran as the "Preserved Tablet."

The concept of the concrete world embodied in the Koran is essentially one of a created reality in which the actual and the ideal merge and intertwine and which exhibits a distinct rational pattern. But it is not, for that reason, a "block


356 Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 4 f.
universe" or finished product, which God has completed, but rather a universe that continually realizes itself across the vast expanses of space and time. Man, as the most dynamic force in this universe, is the principal agent, or coworker with God, in the process of realizing the infinite potentialities of reality.\textsuperscript{357}

It is in religions experience that man apprehends the complex aspect of this dynamic reality which is in the process of continual unfolding. This experience has an outward or empirical character as well as an inward or mystical one. The test of its genuineness is not exclusively pragmatic; it is philosophical or speculative as well, since such an experience is not without cognitive content. After criticizing the three traditional arguments for the existence of God, either on the grounds that they demonstrate the existence of a Being who though supposedly infinite is really finite, or on the grounds that they presuppose an unbridgeable gulf between being and though which renders the process of proof entirely futile, Iqbal asserts the unity of thought and being; and upon this as a premise he proceeds to demonstrate the existence of God. "The clue to his demonstration is provided by the koranic conception of God as the First and the Last, the Visible and the Invisible,"\textsuperscript{358} But instead of exploiting this clue directly, Iqbal follows a circuitous philosophical path leading through Berkeley to Whitehead, Russell, Einstein, Bergson. What all those philosophers deny, according to him, is the "hypothesis of pure materiality" rendered untenable by recent developments in relativity physics and the metaphysical concepts of process and creative evolution.

None of those concepts, however, is accepted by Iqbal without reservation. Thus the creative evolution of Bergson is

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., p. II.

\textsuperscript{358} The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 30.
open to the charge that it rejects teleology, which it mistakenly identifies with rigid determinism. Teleology, however, need not be "conceived as closed. In the Koran, for instance, the universe is conceived as being liable to continuous development, but the pattern of this development is not fixed or static. "To my mind," he writes, "nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a preconceived plan." BERGSCHON'S concept of pure duration gives us, however, a "direct revelation of the ultimate nature of Reality" as a spiritual principle or ego continually realizing itself, not in serial time, but in the in-word movement of dynamic growth or duration. The scene upon which the creative drama of God's boundless self-Manifestation, or the uniform pattern of behavior appropriate to him as Absolute Ego, is enacted, is nature. Hence "nature is to the Divine Self what character is to the human self." Not only Bergson, but Goethe also, has given expression to the same dynamic concept of the unceasing realization of God's creative possibilities.

Apart from modern scientific and philosophical theories, Iqbal finds parallels for this dynamic concept of God as Creative Will or the Ash'arite. the world is not a fixed system of substantial entities, similar to Aristotle's, but rather a stream of continually created atoms, conjoined to a stream of positive or negative accidents upon which the nature of created entities in the world depends.

To. insure its conformity with the spirit of Islam, Iqbal reinterprets the atomism of the Ash'arites m terms of a

359 Ibid., p. 52.

360 Ibid., p. 54.

361 Ibid., pp. 66 f.; cf. supra, pp. 242 f.
"monadology" or spiritual pluralism, in which every particle or element of reality is spiritual, i.e., an ego or a self. The higher the selfhood or consciousness, the greater the reality of the entity in question and the closer it is to God. The Ash'arite concept of the self ai-najis) as an accident is rejected as inadequate, and in its stead in upheld the concept of a spiritual ego as a simple, indivisible, and immutable soul substance, serving as the center of man's mental states or emotions. The chief exponent of this view in Islam, according to him, is al-Ghazahli. In this view the artificial dualism of soul and body is overcome and the finite ego is shown to be an aspect of an Ultimate Ego immanent in nature and referred to by the Koran as the First and the Last, the Visible and the Invisible."362 The great mystics, al_Hallaj, al_Bastami, and Rumi, gave graphic expression to this truth in their extravagant utterances identifying their finite egos with the Infinite Ego."363

In Iqbal's opinion, Muslim thought had, in its reaction against Greek philosophy, reasserted the koranic sense of the concreteness of reality, both in its empirical and spiritual aspects. In this sense, the birth of Islam marks the birth of the "inductive intellect, which made possible the rise of a scientific culture of the modern type. The reactions of numerous theologians, such as Ibn Hazm and Ibn Taymiyah, against Aristotelian logic set the stage for the rise of the inductive logic of J.S. Mill and the empiricism of modern scientific thought. Roger Bacon is generally credited by European historians with the interaction of the new spirit of scientific inquiry, but "where did Roger Bacon receive his scientific training?" Iqbal asks. "in the Muslim universities of Spain," he hastens to reply.364 This proves conclusively,

362 The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 67, 95 f.

363 Ibid., p.; 104; cf. supra, p. 272.
according to him, that the contention that Greek philosophy determined the character of Muslim culture is entirely unfounded. For, whereas Greek thought was primarily interested in abstractions, Muslim thought turns primarily on the concrete; and, whereas the ideal of Greek thought was proportion, that of Muslim culture in its speculative and mystical aspects was the possession and enjoyment of the Infinite.\textsuperscript{365}

We will not dwell much longer on Iqbal's general characterization of Muslim culture and the Islamic concept of reality. Very often he reads into classic Islamic themes purely Hegelian or Bergsonian concepts. The relationship between such concepts and the koranic verses cited in their support is often very tenuous. Like other liberal interpreters of the Koran, particularly in India, the chief fault of his exegetical method lies in its disregard for the contextual character of Koranic revelation, of what the commentators normally refer to as asbab al-nuzul, the historical circumstances in which the revelation was made.

Be this as it may, the reader of Iqbal's Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam is overwhelmed with the vastness of his learning and the scope of his metaphysical and religious speculation. His versatility and eclecticism, however, are often exasperating. For one thing, he often rambles from one theme to another and provides only the most tenuous links. For another, he frequently invokes the authority of illustrious philosophers and scientists in support of his own major themes, only to turn on them later and show their inadequacy or incoherence. Very often the multiplication of authorities, ancient or modern, Western or Islamic, is done at such a pace that the reader is left breathless. In the scope of six pages, for instances, the following names are cited: Berkeley, Whitehead,

\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., p. 123. He quotes as his authority Briffault, The Making of Humanity.

\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., p. 125.
Einstein, Russell, Zeno, Newton, al-Ash'ari, Ibn Hazm, Bergson, Cantor, and Ouspensky - to mention only the principal figures or authorities.\textsuperscript{366}

Despite these shortcomings, it cannot be denied that Iqbal has made a more impressive and conscientious attempt than any other twentieth-century thinker to rethink the basic problems of Islam in modern categories. It need not surprise us that in the process he tended to lose sight of the premises of this rethinking and has unwittingly turned over to a strange assortment of modern philosophers and scientists, from Berkeley to Einstein, the task of interpreting the Koran. Almost all Islamic modernists and liberals have committed the unforgivable sin of ignoring and underrating the historical dimension of Islam. Very often in their appeal to the authority of the Loran in support of theological or metaphysical claims of which the ancients never dreamed, they quite naturally draw on the hidden meaning of Koranic passages. The sufis, the Isma'iliis, and many others were particularly skilled at this art, but traditional Islam has always frowned upon this unorthodox procedure. Today this art can be practiced in the name of rationalism or progress only in

\textsuperscript{366} The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 31-37.Dr. Javid Iqbal has also expressed a similar opinion about the Reconstruction.

*Reconstruction is a difficult book. It carries more than 150 references to the statements of philosopher, scientists, scholars-and jurists of the East and the West, both modern and ancient. Iqbal expects from his readers that they should be acquainted with the life, times and thoughts to these personalities of which some are known while others are not. Moreover his style, in his Reconstruction, is extremely complicated. Several issues are often initiated during a single discussion or a different problem is broached while in the tracks of the earlier discussion to which he returns after expressing his views on the newly inaugurated issue. New terminology is employed to elucidate certain ideas and his arraignment of words in these terms creates difficulties in their understanding. At times his arguments are incomprehensible in English and its meanings do not become clear even after repeated attempts.

moderation; otherwise it threatens to destroy the very foundations of the cult and replace it with the fantasies of dreamers or visionaries.

Finally, by wedding the Islamic or Koranic view of man and the world to the current phase of scientific development, as Iqbal particularly has done, the modernists make their second most dangerous error, since they stake the religious truth of Islam on the doubtful truth of a scientific phase. And if there is anything the history of scientific discovery teaches us, it is the ephemeral character of such scientific phases, whether associated with the venerable names of Aristotle or Ptolemy or modern pioneers such as Newton, Eddington, or Einstein.

Book Review
A Young Muslim's Guide to the Modern World

by

Seyyed Hossein Nasr.

Muhammad Suheyl Umar


This is a recent publication. But it speaks to a need which is almost as old as the encounter of the Islamic world itself with the civilization of the modern West. Ever since the Muslim lands came into contact with the western civilization and the Muslim youth started making their educational sojourns to the various centres of learning in the West a need was increasingly felt; a need to understand an alien civilization and its worldview which challenged the very tenets of Islam and which imposed itself on the Islamic world and its peoples. Responses varied, from traditionalist quietism to different brands of modernism to slavish imitation. Occidentalists (who could study the West from an Islamic point of view) were few and far between. Muslim youth, more or less, modelled its responses and approaches to the West according to these paradigms available to it.

As the time went by, there arose an other need no less important than the earlier one. Since, for a variety of reasons, the Muslim youth had been estranged from its own tradition, especially from the intellectual heritage of its own civilization, the need to understand the West was coupled with an equally imperative requirement to explain and present the Islamic civilization to them in a manner that would enable them to really appreciate its sacred character and intellectual richness and profundity.

A Young Muslim's Guide to the Modern World fulfils both these requirements in a simple and straightforward manner. S. Hossein Nasr is one of the few occidentalists that we have. At the same time he is an outstanding scholar of Islamic philosophy, Islamic Science and religion. He has, designed
the book, in three parts, on such a pattern that could meet both the aforementioned needs. The first part, entitled "The Message of Islam", consists of seven chapters, each dealing with one of the important aspects of the Islamic tradition. The first chapter, introduces the concept of revelation and the meaning of religion before opening onto a discussion of the last revelation, the Noble Quran its character and its message;

The Quran constitutes the alpha and omega of the Islamic religion in the sense that all that is Islamic, whether it be its laws, its thoughts, its spiritual and ethical teachings and even its artistic manifestations, have their roots in the explicit or implicit teachings of the sacred Test (p.15)

There is a unity which runs through the whole of Allah's created order and through human society if that society is to be Islamic. There must be unity in human life; there must be unity in the relationship between man and the world of nature; there must be unity in human thought: there must be unity in what man makes, in the art, the architecture and the cities which he creates. All of these forms of unity reflect the Wisdom and Will of Allah in our world, the Will which is embodied most concretely in the Divine Law of the Shari'ah and which should also be expressed in every authentic facet of the Muslim's life. (p. 21)

The importance of Hadith and Sunnah, as the exemplary and elucidator of the Quran, make up the rest of the chapter.

The Hadith literature ranges all the way from discussions of the creation of the world, the hierarchy of angels and of light, the questions of the Will of Allah and of how He rules over the universe, and how both freedom and determinism are intertwined in human life, to human, political, economic and social questions, and practical problems of everyday life dealing with one's family, neighbors and friends, The Ifadith deals also directly and indirectly with questions relating to the ambience in which the Muslim should live, hence with cleanliness, beauty and propriety. There are hadiths which,
along with the Noble Quran, have had a very important role to play in the formation of Islamic art, architecture, city-planning and in fact the whole physical ambience which should reflect the meaning, spirit, and genius of the Islamic revelation. (p. 19-20)

Every authentic religion has sought to reveal different aspects of the infinite Reality of God. "Islamic revelation might he said to be the unveiling of the complete and total doctrine of the nature of God." (p.23)

This is how the author approaches the most central concern of Islam, namely, Tawhid, which underlies the concept of man (male and female), the universe, eschatology and the allied questions and lead them back to its unifying vision. These concepts are the subject of the second chapter. Regarding the concepts of male and female,

It is important to understand that in contrast to modern movements within the Western world and especially America, which try to equate man and woman in a quantitative way as if there were no differences between them. Islam views men and women as complementary beings. At the same time Islam sees them equal in the fundamental or ultimate sense of having an immortal soul and therefore, having the possibility of gaining paradisal felicity after death or being punished in the infernal states for having disobeyed Allah's Will. (p. 33)

Muslim writers, most often under the influence of Western science and technology, have tried to interpret the traditional sources in such a manner that could accommodate the typically Western and secular approach towards exploiting the world of nature, while turning -a blind eye to the devastating results that such an attitude of 'rape of nature' has brought about. The author alerts the young minds to this danger in the following words.

The Quran, while giving man the power to rule over all things through the fact that Allah taught Adam the names of all things, also gives man the responsibility of custodianship over the created order. The taskhir or subjugation of nature does not mean a selfish and blind conquest and domination of
nature. It means living in harmony with nature, seeing in nature Allah's Wisdom and making use of natural bounties wisely in accordance with man's final end which is to live as a good Muslim and to return to the Creator. The moral laws of Islam in a sense extend beyond human society to embrace the animals, plants, minerals and in fact, the whole of the inanimate world. To live as a good Muslim in this world is to see the Wisdom of Allah everywhere and to care for His creation as He cares for us and that creation Himself. (p. 38)

Teachings about eschatology are usually put aside, not only by ordinary Muslims as the author points out, but also by many a modernist thinker and even those who design the curriculum of Islamic studies in the Muslim countries as well as in the West. The author has given a brief but effective account of Islamic teachings on eschatology to bring out their ultimate significance.

Human life is constituted in such a way that the actions which we perform in this world here and now have consequences not only beyond that moment, not only beyond the immediate confines of this action but even beyond this world because they affect our immortal soul. Man possesses an immortal soul and does not cease to exist at the moment of death for his soul continues to survive in various states in accordance with the way he or she has lived and also of course according to the Mercy of Allah. Here again one sees an interplay between the justice and Mercy of Allah which one cannot reduce to simple bookkeeping and accounting. (p. 39-40)

The greatest material achievements, not only of the individual but also of whole civilizations, can and in fact do wither away, It is only the eschatological realities which bring into focus the permanent, abiding and eternal consequences of human actions precisely because human beings are beings created for immortality and the eternal world. (p. 44)
Third chapter is devoted to "The Shari'ah", its contents and its application to the society; morality and rights, transactions, family, economics, politics etc.

The Shari'ah is contained in principle in the Noble Quran and in the Noble Quran alone, but this is in principle. In order for it to be manifested, there was need first of all, of course, for the Hadith literature and the Sunnah of the Prophet. The Prophet through his practices and sayings made the Will of God known to the Islamic community and therefore his Sunnah and his Hadith are the second fundamental source of Islamic Law along with the Quran.

The early Islamic community lived in the presence of these two realities. The Quran was ever present and the practices of the Prophet, which were copied and imitated by the Companions and the first generation after them, were so well known that the whole community was in a sense immersed in them. During the early period there were still no codified schools of law. The different interpretations of Shari'ah and the Shari'ah itself had not been codified and formulated in books of jurisprudence as we find later on, but the reality was present. How people lived and acted, how they were judged, what punishment or rewards were given, how transactions were carried out, not to speak of the part of the Shari'ah dealing with religious practices, all of these were present in these earliest generations and served as models for later centuries of Islamic history. In fact, it was the danger of the gradual distancing of the later generations from the source of Islamic revelation and the gradual forgetting of the dazzling example of the Prophet as the perfect embodiment of Islam and the perfect practitioner and promulgator of the Divine Law that caused the great jurists or scholars of Islamic Law to codify the Shari'ah according to various schools. (p. 45-46)

Chapter four, "Islamic Spirituality and Thought" presents an overview of the whole spectrum of Islamic intellectual life displayed in the form of various schools of thought, ranging from the spiritual disciplines to various
schools of theology (Kalam) and philosophy (Falsafah as well as Hikmah) as well as their interaction and cross fertilization through out history. The message it brings home to the young Muslim is,

That various schools of Islamic thought have created a vast treasury of thought which is able to answer the challenges that Western thought poses for Muslims today. Whether it be a question of philosophy of science, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, or the relationship between man and God, freewill and determinism, causality or other philosophic questions with which various European and American philosophers have been struggling for the last few centuries, the vast intellectual tradition of Islam has provided answers of enduring validity. (p.84)

Similarly, chapter 5 gives us an overview of "Islamic Science" which is closely wedded to the intellectual life of the Islamic community. The vast panorama of Islamic science is presented through a concise, yet cogent, description of the Muslim achievements in its various branches, i.e. mathematics, astronomy, geology and geography, physics, natural history, alchemy and chemistry, medicine etc. Though Dr. Nasr talks about the influence of the Islamic Sciences at the end, it is refreshing, and significant indeed, to note that the essential message of this chapter is not to buttress or enhance a false sense of pride in our scientific heritage which we bequeathed to the West. The message, which is different from the usual stock answers, is the following.

The significance of the vast Islamic scientific tradition is not only that it gives (to the youth) a sense of pride in their own civilization because of the prestige that science has in the present day world. It is further more a testament to the way Islam was able to cultivate various sciences extensively without becoming alienated from the Islamic world view and without creating a science whose application would destroy the world of nature and the harmony that must exist between man and the natural environment. The Islamic sciences are not only important from the point of view of science understood in its current Western sense, but they also have a
spiritual and intellectual significance. Their study and understanding is important in order to create a bridge in the mind of young Muslims between Western science, which many of them are studying, and the tenets of Islam to which they must remain faithful. The great achievement of the Muslim men of science was that they had the most rigorous standards of critical thought and were scientists of integrity without at the same time losing their faith or becoming alienated from the Islamic view of the universe within which all of the Islamic sciences were cultivated. (p. 101)

Next chapter briefly describes the arts and literatures of the Islamic peoples and tries to bring out their significance and importance for the human ambiance through calligraphy, different genres of sacred and profane literature, architecture, poetry, plastic arts, crafts of various forms, music and chanting of the Quran.

The chanting of the Quran is in a sense the protu-musical experience for the Muslim soul and it is the origin of the ethos of the classical schools of music as they developed over the centuries as the text of the Quran is the origin of the literatures of the Islamic people. In the same manner, the Quran contains in a subtle way the principles, and is the origin of the spirit of the visual arts of Islam whether they be calligraphy, which was originally directly related to text of the Quran, or architecture, that creates spaces in which the Muslim throughout his life hears the celestial beauty of the Word of Allah echoing from the mihrab throughout the spaces of the mosque, and from the minaret throughout the spaces comprising the Islamic urban environment. (p. 115)

Chapter seven, which concludes the first part, deals with the issues related to the different responses of the Islamic world to the West in the modern times. The author has provided us a brief but extremely perceptive analysis of these responses which he terms as the modernist, revivalist or fundamentalist, millenialist and traditionalist. (p. 127) The comments which the author has made about one of these trends, a trend which is much
discussed and debated in the present day scholarship, namely, fundamentalism is worth quoting here in full.

The whole phenomenon of revivalism or so-called fundamentalism is a very complicated one and covers a spectrum ranging from moderate forms which go back to the puritanical and revivalist movements of the thirteenth and fourteenth Islamic century reformers to types of movements which, while trying to reassert the primacy of the Shari'ah, also use a great deal of the language and ideas of nineteenth century European revolutionary and ideological thought. It is not, therefore, possible here to give a general description which would cover every aspect of all of these phenomena known under the rubric of revivalism or "fundamentalism."

Nevertheless, it can be asserted that most of these movements share together on the one hand a concern for the preservation and revival of the Shari'ah the political and social independence of Muslims and opposition to Western social norms, and on the other hand, a passive attitude and indifference to the penetration of Western science and technology and various kinds of Western managerial and administrative institutions and ways of thinking which accompany the adoption of technology. Also, nearly all these movements share in the fact that they ignore the significance of Islamic art, architecture and city planning and are impervious to the need for the preservation of the artistic and aesthetic environment of Islam and for its protection from intrusion by Western norms. This attitude also holds true for the Islamic intellectual tradition which they usually neglect except for that concerns directly the faith, juridical matters and ritual practice. In fact none of these movements has led to a flowering of Islamic thought or art, philosophy or literature. (p. 126)

All these chapters provide a wealth of objectively presented historical information combined with a profound intellectual insight which enable the
reader to create the most needed, indispensable bridge between himself and his religion.

The responses mentioned above concern the Western civilization. But what is that itself? Part two, again divided into seven chapters, provides an answer to the reader through a series of penetrating analyses of "Religion in the Modern West" (ch.8), "Modern Western Philosophy and Schools of Thought" (ch.9) "Modern Science and Technology" (ch.10), "Political, Social and Economic life of the Modern World." (ch.11), "Modern Education Its History, Theories and Philosophies" (ch.12), "Art in the Modern West" (ch.13) and "The Modern Life Style" (ch.14).

The author has given the rationale for an introduction and study of the West in the following words.

Most of the Islamic world still suffers from the lack of a profound knowledge of the West while it is being deeply affected by the ideas, products, external manifestations and activities of the Western world ranging from cars to computers, from the cinema to literature, from philosophical ideas to economics. Western ideas and values continue to flood the Islamic world through the mass media and other means for the transfer of information from one side of the world to the other. What is lacking is not information about the West or Muslims who have contact with the west, but a knowledge from the Islamic point of view of the roots of the culture and ideas of the Western world, a knowledge which alone can provide Muslims with the means necessary to confront the challenges of the modern West and to provide an Islamic response to them.

It is precisely with his need in mind that we turn in the next section of this book to an analysis of Western civilization that gave rise to the modern world which in turn has left the imprint of its ideas and points of view upon the Islamic world during the last few centuries. It is hoped that the young Muslim, who must carry the responsibility and the burden for the future of the Islamic world upon his or her shoulders, will
be able to carry out this responsibility more successfully by gaining a more profound knowledge of the West. Such a knowledge will not only enable that person to navigate more successfully upon the very dangerous and stormy sea of the modern world and to protect his or her faith against all of the dangers lurking at every corner, it will also help to formulate, with the help of Allah, the necessary Islamic responses which would guarantee for those young Muslims and for the Islamic world as a whole, for which young educated Muslims will of necessity become leaders, a safe future, and will also safeguard the continuation of a civilization impregnated by the message of the Quran. But more important than that, such a knowledge will help to defend the religion at the heart of that civilization, a religion which has continued to echo over the ages and is still the vehicle for the truths revealed in the Noble Quran through the Blessed Prophet of Allah who was destined to bring the final plenary message from Heaven to present day humanity. (p. 131)

Chapter eight traces the history and significance of religion in the West, down to the modern times, and not only helps the reader to form an idea of the role of religion which it has had historically in the West, but also provides keys to understand the growth of anti-religious modernism which now threatens Islam.

Two diametrically opposed points of view concerning religion in the West are to be seen among Muslims. Some consider all Westerners to be Christians, with the small Jewish minority being of course an exception, and often refer to Westerners as "those Christians" as if the West were the West of the Middle Ages when the Crusades were carried out and Western civilization lived in what has been called the Age of Faith. Another group of Muslims hold the opposite view that all Westerners are materialists or agnostics and skeptics and in fact there is no religion among the Westerners.

Now it is essential to insist that both of these views are false. On the one hand, the West since the seventeenth century and
even before that since the Renaissance has been moving in the direction of secularization and the dilution of religion in the everyday life of man.- As a result, there are numerous Westerners who are no longer technically speaking Christians or Jews although they are inheritors of Christianity and Judaism. And yet there are still a fairly large number of people who practice Christianity and also Judaism within a civilization which itself can no longer be called a Christian civilization. It is very important for Muslims to understand the exact situation as far as the role of religion in the West is concerned and to avoid the extreme views currently held by so many people in the Islamic world. A young Muslim will never be able to understand the modern world without understanding the role of religion and also its eclipse in the West during the incubation, birth, growth and spread of the modern world in Europe and America and its later spread to other lands. (p. 136)

However in the West, in contrast to Islam, opposition began to be created against the authority of religion and against Catholicism in particular as a result of very complicated internal factors. These factors included the gradual loss of certain aspects of the inner teachings of Christianity, the excessive use of consolations and relics, the gradual rationalization of Christian religious thought and the skepticism inherent in late medieval nomalist theology.

This opposition took several different forms during, what has come to be known as the Renaissance. During this period, one can see, on the one hand, the rise of humanism and individualism which were to become later hallmarks of modern civilization and which opposed the domination of religion in general and the religious civilization of the Middle Ages in particular. On the other hand, there was a religious reaction resulting in the rise of Protestantism and the Reformation, which sought to go back to early Christianity rooted in the Bible and especially the Gospels, hence the term
Evangelicalism, which became associated with this movement. (p. 137)

The author, then, traces the history of the rise of different branches of Christianity, their interfaith struggles and dissensions, and what is more important from the point of view of the present work, their influence on various Western societies and political units resulting in a myriad of religious phenomenon and tendencies which, in turn, shaped the events in the West, through a lengthy process of secularization. Counter currents of thought as well as reactions to these tendencies are also described briefly since they explain the some what perplexing and ambiguous phenomenon manifested in the rejection of religion while at the same time an increasing interest in the revival and rediscovery of religion which expresses itself in the wide usage of term "spirituality" or the seeking of "meaningful life styles" (p.147) The author also observes that,

The role of religion is, however, far from being negligible in the modern West. In fact, many of the tendencies of Westerners, even those who do not consider themselves to be religious, have a religious foundation. Also the role of religion has been important in the recent downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe and within the former Soviet Union. The young Muslim who first comes to the West should not at all misunderstand the role of religion as being totally negligible on the basis of the fact that he sees so much promiscuity and laxity in sexual morality or observes so many people who are against religious teachings and who display so much indifference to the practice of religion. Today in fact there is a greater interest in religion in the West than there was a few decades ago, mostly due to the breakdown of many Western ideologies and idols of the mind which had grown out of eighteenth and nineteenth century European thought and which had taken the place of religion. These ideologies have gradually fallen aside and their danger and power of destruction have become manifest as never before. Today religion in the West is attracting a large number of intelligent people to its study and also to some extent to its fold more
than perhaps at any time since the secularization of the religious civilization of the West several centuries ago.................

It is in the matrix of these complicated forces and pattern that the role of religion in the West must be understood today. And it is also in the light of both the secularization of traditional religion and the quest for meaning and the rediscovery of religion as the foundation of human life in the West that one must understand the role of Islam in the West today. (p. 147)

Chapter nine focuses on modern western Philosophy and its schools of thought which served as the second most influential element in the history of the western mind-set.

The author alludes to this important factor in the following quote:

It is very important for the Muslims who wish to know the West to realize the significance of the philosophical ideas which have come into being during the last few centuries in the modern world, ideas which are not derived from a supra-individual source as is the case of traditional philosophy. Rather, modern philosophies are usually borne of the attempts of individual philosophers who seek, through the use of reason or empirical data, to create an all encompassing system which is then soon faced with the criticism by another philosopher who destroys the older mental construct to replace it with another.

Nevertheless, the ideas which have issued forth from the various figures and schools of philosophy in the West during the past centuries must be known because of their great importance in the political, social, economic, ethical, aesthetic and other realms. They infect have created for the most part and define to this day what constitutes modernism and world
view of the modern world. Many a person from the East, including Muslims, is not able to understand modern Western civilization precisely because he or she only looks at its surface aspects without paying attention to the philosophical ideas which underlie that world. At this particular juncture of human history critical understanding and study of the ideas and history of western thought, (which is also to a great extent the history of modern thought) from the Islamic point of view is absolutely essential. (p.179)

In order to give the reader an idea of it, Dr. Nasr has briefly introduced about thirty notable philosophers/schools of thought from the West, medieval as well as modern, indicating their influence on the western world view on the one hand and, on the other hand, drawing the attention of the reader to an entirely different role that philosophy played in the West which was, moreover, quite different from its role and position in the Islamic civilization where it was always closely allied to religion.

From among the philosophers of the medieval period which have been introduced in this chapter are St. Augustine, J. Scotus Erigena, St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas. Names of modern philosophers include Fransis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, Hegel and German Idealism, Schopenhauer, Keirkegaard, Marx, Bergson, Neitzsche, Husserl, Freud and Psychoanalysis, A.N. Whitehead, Russel, Heidegger and J.P. Sartre.

The various figures and schools of modern thought have followed upon the wake of one another starting with the rebellion of reason against both the intellect and revelation, leading to the development of critical philosophy trying to curtail the powers of reason and the rise of ideologies and system building in the thirteenth/nineteenth century, followed by the criticism of Hegelian and other types of systematic philosophy by existentialism. One can observe during this century the division of philosophy in the West into phenomenology and existentialism on the one hand, the latter based upon the anguish of individual existence and the like, and positivism based upon the use of logic closely related
to experimental science and neglect of other problems and issues especially of a metaphysical nature on the other. (p. 177-8)

Tenth chapter discusses the central role played by modern science and its application in the form of technology in the modern world and analyzes few of the extremely influential concepts which have reached the Islamic World as well, like evolutionism, scientism, reductionism etc. Modern technology, blindly followed and applied in most parts of the Islamic world, also receives adequate treatment here by way of a critique of its negative aspects threatening the human environment and even the whole chain of life on earth.

The author has also highlighted the basic difference between Islamic science and the concept and method of science understood in its modern western sense

In contrast, Western science is based on considering the natural world as a reality which is separate from both Allah and the higher levels of being. At best, Allah is accepted as the creator of the world, as a mason who has built a house which now stands on its own. His intrusion into the running of the world and His continuous sustenance of it are not accepted in the modern scientific worldview. There are in fact very profound differences between the worldview of Western science and that of Islamic science. To consider Western science simply as a continuation of Islamic science is, therefore, to misunderstand completely both the epistemological foundations of the two sciences and the relationship that each has to the world of faith and revelation. It is also to misunderstand the metaphysical and philosophical backgrounds of the two sciences. Islamic science always relates lower levels of being to the higher and considers the physical world to be simply the lowest plane in the hierarchic reality of the universe reflecting Allah's Wisdom, while modern science considers the physical world to be an independent reality which can be studied and known
in an ultimate sense without any reference to a higher level of reality. (p. 182)

Subsequent chapters deal with the historical roots, evolution of institutions and imminent crises attendant on political, social and economical life, modern education, arts and modern life style. These chapters also describe the impact these aspects of the Western civilization had on the Islamic world and explain why a Muslim cannot understand the modern world and cannot continue to live as a Muslim in the modern World without understanding, in depth, these aspects of the West.

Today, Western education is in a great crisis even in seeking successfully to achieve the distorted goals of the secularization of knowledge, material domination, cultivation of individualism and all of the other elements which the Islamic worldview rejects. This system is doubly dangerous for Muslims both because it is in a state of crisis within itself and also because even if it were not to be in conflict within itself, it would be in discord with the Islamic perspective and the values which Islam cherishes most dearly. It is therefore, very critical at a time when Muslims must learn various Western disciplines, including not only science and technology but other disciplines as well, in order to be able to provide their own answers and master their own destinies in a world in which they are faced with vast challenges, that they become fully cognizant of the meaning, role and function of education and educational institutions, including especially the philosophies which underlie them. In this way, they may become able to learn to the extent possible what they wish to learn of Western disciplines without becoming excessively contaminated in an unconscious way by forces which could distort their religious perspective, uproot them spiritually and intellectually, alienate them from their own traditional background and simply add another potent element contributing to disorder and chaos within Islamic society itself. (p. 216)
A young Muslim cannot understand the modern world and cannot continue to live as a Muslim in the modern world without understanding, in depth, not only the various aspects of the modern lifestyle in its ever changing kaleidoscopic nature, but also the impact that this lifestyle has, often unconsciously, upon Muslims who may not be fully prepared to respond to the challenges which it poses for themselves as individuals and most of all for them as Muslims who have dedicated themselves to Allah and have surrendered themselves to the Divine Will. Needless to say, it is this Will which has the last say because Allah's Will is always triumphant. But in our contemporary world the very presence of this lifestyle poses a challenge of the utmost importance, complementing the philosophical, scientific and theological challenges of modernism, and, in fact, presents a more powerful current against which the Muslim youth, whether they are in the Islamic world or studying in the West, must learn to swim and presents challenges for which Muslims of different ages, whether parents or the younger generation, must learn to provide authentic Islamic answers. (p. 235)

Third part, comprising of one chapter entitled "The Young Muslim and the Islamic Response to the Modern World", suggests the ways a genuine Islamic response could be modelled by the youth in four categories; religious, spiritual and intellectual—social, economic and political—artistic, and lifestyle in order to draw a "map" which can guide Muslims, especially the young, through this bewildering world of contending and opposing forces and anti-religious elements which make up the modern scene.

We may add at the end that Dr. Nasr's work is not only useful for the Muslim youth but for those teachers as well who are engaged in the training and education of the Muslim youth.