

Discourses of Iqbal



Compiled and Edited by
SHAHID

To

Mr. Herbert Baker

1000 Pennsylvania Ave

Washington D.C.

22-8-1929



DISCOURSES
OF
IQBAL

To
Mr. Robert B. Baker
1111 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C.
25-8-1988



THE
DISCOURSES
OF
JOHN


Discourses of Iqbal

Compiled and Edited by
SHAHID HUSSAIN RAZZAQI

Publishers :

Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons
LAHORE — PAKISTAN

181.07
I649.
1979
Copyright 1979 by Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons



First Edition : 1979





Publishers :

SH. GHULAM ALI & SONS

Adbi Market - Chowk Anarkali - Lahore

Printed by Sh. Niaz Ahmed at Ilmi Printing Press,
17 - Hospital Road - Lahore





DEDICATION
TO THE MEMORY OF
DR. KHALIFA ABDUL HAKIM
A GREAT SCHOLAR AND ADMIRER OF IQBAL

DEDICATION
TO THE MEMORY OF
MR. KHAILA ABDUL HAKIM
A GREAT SCHOLAR AND ADMIRER OF ISLAM

CONTENTS

Iqbal—the Philosopher of Muslim Renaissance *Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah*

Preface xv—xx

PART ONE

Political Treatises

Pages

Political Thought in Islam 3—19

Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal 20—40

Islam's Peculiar Conception of Nationalism .. 41—45

Divine Right to Rule 46—51

PART TWO

Presidential Addresses

Presidential Address to the All-India Muslim League 55—82

Presidential Address to the All-India Muslim Conference 83—102

	<i>Pages</i>
Presidential Address to the Indian Oriental Conference	103—113

PART THREE

Islamic Studies

The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded by Abdul Karim al-Jili	117—138
Corporeal Resurrection After Death.. ..	139—142
Some Thoughts on Islamic Studies	143—148
Introduction to the Study of Islam	149—153

PART FOUR

Contributions to the New Era

Our Prophet's Criticism of Contemporary Arabian Poetry	157—159
Islam and Mysticism	160—163
Muslim Democracy	164
Nietzsche and Jalal-ud-Din Rumi	165—166
Touch of Hegelianism in Lisan-ul-Asr Akber.. ..	167—168
Stray Thoughts	169—174

PART FIVE

Philosophy of the Self

Self in the Light of Relativity	177—182
---------------------------------------	---------

	<i>Pages</i>
Basic Philosophy of the Asrar-i-Khudi	... 183—188
In Defence of the Self	... 189—196
An Exposition of the Self	... 197—203
McTaggart's Philosophy	... 204—214

PART SIX

Islam and Qadianism

Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims	... 217—223
Separation of Qadianis from the Muslim Community	... 224—227
Truth Behind Qadianism	... 228—229
Islam and Ahmadism	... 230—256

PART SEVEN

Miscellaneous

The Inner Synthesis of Life	... 259
Khush-hal Khan Khattak	... 260—272
Position of Women in the East	... 273—276
Javid Nama	... 277—280
Foreword—A History of Persian Navigation	... 281
Foreward—Muraqqa-i-Chughtai	... 282—284
Foreward—Afghanistan—a Brief Survey	... 285—288



MOUNT PLEASANT ROAD,

MALABAR HILL

State Guest House

Hyderabad Dn

9th August 1941

Every great movement has a philosopher and Iqbal was the philosopher of the National Renaissance of Muslim India. He in his works has left an exhaustive and most valuable legacy behind him and a message not only for the Musalmans but for all other nations of the world.

Iqbal was a poet who inspired Muslims with the spirit and determination to restore to Islam its former glory and although he is no more with us, his memory will grow younger and younger with the progress and development of Muslim India.

His works should therefore, be read and digested by every Musalman to create solidarity, and we should all try to organise the Muslims throughout India economically, educationally, socially and politically.

Shahid Hossain Razzaki

Shahid Hossain Razzaki Esq.
Ghazipura,
Gulbarga-Deccan

PREFACE

Dr. Sir Mohammed Iqbal, the National Philosopher of Pakistan, is one of the greatest poets and thinkers of the world. His poetic works are well known, but his prose writings have remained buried in old journals, no longer available to us. Even in the Pre-partition India they were difficult to obtain as they were scattered all over the country and their location and dates were almost untraceable. Why these writings of the great seer should have been so neglected, is not easily understandable, for had he not written a single line in verse, his prose works alone would have ensured him a position of eminence in the literary world.

Among the prose works of Iqbal, his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is fairly well known and academic circles are more or less familiar with his other works *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* and *Ilm-ul-Iqtisaad*, a book on political economy. Besides these books some of his articles, speeches, statements and letters have also been published in book form, but no serious effort has yet been made to compile, edit and publish a complete collection of his treatises both in English and Urdu and to translate them in various important languages.

Iqbal was not one of those celebrities who take particular care of their own publicity. On the contrary he was extremely indifferent to it. He did not care even to preserve the clippings and copies of the addresses and articles which were published in different journals or read by him at various conferences. Nor were Iqbal's numerous admirers altogether mindful of their obligation and none of them cared to give his prose writings the publicity which they merited. The result of such negligence was that these important writings were published neither during the Allama's lifetime nor during the quarter of a century that elapsed after this death.

When I decided upon collecting these works, I found myself faced with a task the magnitude of which I had not foreseen. There were many difficulties in the way. Among these writings some were those whose copies could be obtained with some effort, but the greater part of them was such which, although familiar, could not be traced without research. While yet there were other writings about which there was no certainty that they were in existence, although reference to them is made in some known works. I began collecting Allama Iqbal's writings in Urdu and English in 1941 and first of all solicited the assistance of Qaid-e-Millat Bahadur Yar Jung and Maulana Hasrat Mohani. Just about this time Qaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah visited Hyderabad-Deccan and I requested him to write down for me his impressions of Iqbal. He very graciously agreed and the result of my initial effort was encouraging. I then searched for the buried works in several private and public libraries in Hyderabad-Deccan, Bombay, Delhi, Aligarh, Lucknow, Patna, Cawnpur, Amritsar and Lahore. By the end of 1946 I had collected enough material to hand over a collection of Allama Iqbal's speeches and addresses to a publisher, while two volumes of his writings in Urdu and English were being arranged for the press.

Then, in 1947 conditions changed and I had to leave my literary pursuits to devote myself entirely to political

activities, and when at the end of this period of political upheaval I adopted Pakistan as my country, I did not have a single page of that material. It was not till seven or eight years had passed that it was again possible for me to pick up the threads. I found some very useful material in Lahore and somehow managed to secure certain portion of my old collection from India. In this way the present collection was compiled again. This collection should have been published in the early sixties, but I was kept in delusion by the director of a well known academy in which I had placed great hopes of assistance. All my efforts in this connection proved futile. Extreme lethargy was demonstrated where acute deligence was called for and it was not without difficulty that I got back my manuscript after five years. However all that is over and the collection is now being published by Messrs. Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, Lahore.

In the present collection are included Allama Iqbal's prose works from 1900 to 1936. The earliest of these writings is a detailed commentary on Abdul Karim al-Jili's *Insan-al-Kamil*, followed by several articles on political, social and moral conception of Islam. The first article in this series was published in 1908, in the *Sociological Review, London* and was reproduced by the *Hindustan Review* of Allahabad under the title *Political Thought in Islcm*. This article was translated into Urdu by Chaudhri Mohommed Hussain under the title of *Khilafat-e-Islamia*.

On these subjects one of Iqbal's treatises, which was read at the Muslim University, Aligarh, is of particular importance. This valuable article on the social and religious condition of the Muslims was written in 1910. Its Urdu translation by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan is available, but I could not find the English original even in Aligarh. It is probably not extant. I have been able to secure only some important excerpts from it, published in the Census of India Report for 1911.

A journal, *New Era*, used to be published from Lucknow. Raja Ghulam Hussain was its editor. The particular importance of this paper lay in that Allama Iqbal was a regular contributor to it, and under the caption *Stray Thoughts*, expressed himself in highly interesting and thought provoking discourses. He also wrote some brief articles for the *New Era* which are of supreme interest to his readers. These articles will be found in this collection.

In 1920 Dr. Nicholson published an English translation of Iqbal's *Asraar-e-Khudi*, in which European academic circles, specially orientalisists, evinced deep interest. Some critics who were unable to appreciate Iqbal's philosophy of *the Self*, reviewed the translation in unfavourable terms. To remove the misunderstandings Iqbal tried to explain his thought, and in a long letter to Dr. Nicholson gave a logical answer to the criticism. He also dealt in detail with Nietzsche and his philosophy so that any misunderstanding that his philosophy was based on that of Nietzsche may be removed. In some of his articles, published in different journals, Iqbal has thoroughly explained various aspects of his doctrine of the Self. These articles and the letter mentioned above are of supreme interest and importance to his readers and have been included here.

Besides the above, there are in this collection some articles in which Iqbal has expressed his views on mysticism, philosophy, political ideologies and Islamic studies, and has thrown considerable light on the academic and cultural achievements of the Muslims.

In the last phase of his writings, Allama Iqbal gave expression to his views on the Qadiani movement started by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian. These writings are of singular importance. The Allama looked upon this movement as a great danger to the religious unity and national solidarity of the Muslims, and considered it necessary to warn them of the possibility of disruption

in their religious, social and political life and to propose ways and means by which they could keep themselves secure against its harmful activities. He has dealt with the various aspects of this problem in great detail and his answer to objections raised by Jawahar Lal Nehru in an article, is so valuable that it will always remain a landmark in the history of modern religious thought.

In this collection have also been included two presidential addresses which Allama Iqbal read in 1930 and 1932 at the annual meetings of the All India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. This was a critical period for the Muslims of India, and the problems he dealt with in his addresses, and the suggestions he made to solve them, are a proof of his political sagacity. Here he has refuted the hypothesis of a united India and the One Nation theory, which was inspired by the Western thought and propagated by the British Imperialism, and has proposed, on the basis of the Separate nationality of the Muslims, the establishment of a Muslim State. Within ten years Allama Iqbal's proposal became the ideal and objective of the All-India Muslim League, and within the next decade the Muslims of India under the guidance of Qaid-e-Azam Mohommed Ali Jinnah, translated that ideal into a glorious reality.

When the annual meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference was held at Lahore in 1932, the political future of India was being discussed at the Round Table Conference held in London. Iqbal too had attended this Conference and played a very prominent part in the activities of the Muslim Delegation. Being well acquainted with the tactics of the British Government and the nefarious objective of the Hindu leaders, Iqbal warned the Muslims of the dangers which threatened them because of the anti-Muslim sectarianism of the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi. These presidential addresses contain sound arguments which are essential for a thorough study of Iqbal's political views.

In November, 1928, the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference was held at Lahore, and Allama Iqbal was one of its Sectional Presidents——Arabic, Persian and Zend Section. In his presidential address he dwelt on the academic achievements of the Muslims and pleaded for a deeper study of Muslim Scientists. The substance of this important address will also be found in the present collection.

In spite of all possible effort I have not been able to include in this collection a series of articles on some important aspects of Islam, references to which are found in the Allama's letters and certain biographies. These valuable articles, published in different British journals, are the substance of Allama Iqbal's lectures delivered under the auspices of the Pan-Islamic Society of London. It is quite possible that all the articles may be found in England if an effort is made to secure them.

The present collection is being published with the object that Allama Iqbal's prose writings may be brought before the public in a suitable book form, so that the people in general may benefit from them. I fully realise that the collection is wanting in parts, but it is being presented in the hope that it may prove an incentive to Scholars and admirers of Iqbal who may be encouraged to make similar efforts and finally bring out complete collections containing all the available prose written by the great poet-philosopher of Islam. Each and every paragraph of his prose must be traced out and placed on record without further loss of time.

I must express my deep gratitude to Dr. Javid Iqbal who very kindly accorded permission to publish this collection. I am also grateful to Mr. Sheikh Niaz Ahmed who has willingly agreed to publish this book, not to make money, but to serve a good and great purpose.

Lahore

S.H.R.

PART ONE

POLITICAL TREATISES

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ISLAM

In the early phase of his literary career Allama Iqbal wrote several articles on the political, social and moral philosophy of Islam. The first article in this series dealing with the idea of Caliphate in Islam, was published in 1908 in the Socialological Review, London, and reproduced by the Hindustan Review of Allahabad in its issues for December, 1910 and January, 1911, under the title Political Thought in Islam.

Pre-Islamic Arabia was divided into various tribes continually at war with one another. Each tribe had its own chief, its own god and its own poet, whose tribal patriotism manifested itself chiefly in the glorification of the virtues of his own tribe. Though these primitive social groups recognised, to a certain extent, their kinship with one another, yet it was mainly the authority of Muhammad and the cosmopolitan character of his teaching which shattered the aristocratic ideals of individual tribes, and welded the dwellers of tents into one common ever-expanding nationality. For our purpose, however, it is necessary to notice, at the outset, the features of the Arabian system of tribal succession, and the procedure followed by the members of the tribe on the death of their chief.

When the Chief or Shaikh of an Arab tribe died all the elders of the tribe met together, and, sitting in a circle, discussed the matter of succession. Any member of the tribe could hold the chieftainship if he were unanimously elected by the elders and heads of great families. The idea of hereditary monarchy, as Von Kremer has pointed out, was quite foreign to the Arab mind, though the principle of seniority which, since Ahmad I, has received legal recognition in the constitution of modern Turkey, did certainly influence the election. When the tribe was equally divided between two leaders, the rival sections separated from each other until one of the candidates relinquished his claim; otherwise the sword was appealed to. The Chief thus elected could be deposed by the tribe if his conduct necessitated deposition. With the expansion of the Arab conquest, and the consequent enlargement of mental outlook, this primitive custom gradually developed into a Political Theory carefully constructed, as we shall see, by the constitutional lawyers of Islam through reflective criticism on the revelations of political experience.

True to this custom, the Prophet of Arabia left no instructions with regard to the matter of his succession. There is a tradition that the old Amir, son of Tufail, came to the Prophet and said, "If I embrace Islam what would my rank be? Willst thou give me the command after thee?" "It does not belong to me," said the Prophet, to dispose of the command after me." Abu Bakr the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his chief companions—therefore, in consequence of the danger of internal disruption, was rather hurriedly and irregularly elected. He then rose and addressed the people thus :

"Oh people! Now I am ruler over you, albeit not the best amongst you. If I do well, support me; if ill, then set me right. Follow the true wherein is faithfulness, eschew the false wherein is treachery. The weaker amongst you shall be as the stronger; with me, until, that I shall have redressed his wrong and the stronger shall be as the weaker until, if the

Lord will, I shall have taken from him that which he hath wrested. Leave not off to fight in the ways of the Lord; whosoever leaveth off, him verily shall the Lord abase. Obey me as I obey the Lord and his Prophet, wherein I disobey, obey me not."

Omar, however, afterwards held that the hurried election of Abu Bakr, though very happy in its consequences and justified by the need of the time, should not form a precedent in Islam; for, as he is reported to have said (Dozy, I P. 121), an election which is only a partial expression of the people's will is null and void. It was, therefore, early understood that political Sovereignty *defacto* resides in the people; and that the electorate by their free act of unanimous choice embody it in a determinate personality in which the collective will is, so to speak, individualised, without investing this concrete seat of power with any privilege in the eye of the law except legal control over the individual wills of which it is an expression. The idea of universal agreement is, in fact, the fundamental principle of Muslim constitutional theory. "What the Muslim community considers good," says the Prophet, "God also considers good". It is probably on the authority of this saying of the Prophet that Al-Ash'ari developed his political dogma—"That error is impossible in the united deliberations of the whole community". After the death of Abu Bakr, Omar, who acted as Chief Judge during his predecessor's Caliphate, was universally elected by the people. In 644 A.D. he was mortally wounded by a Persian Slave, and committed his trust, before he died to seven electors—one of them being his own son—to nominate his successor, with the condition that their choice must be unanimous, and that none of them must stand as a candidate for the Caliphate. It will be seen, from Omar's exclusion of his own son from the candidature how remote was the idea of hereditary monarchy from the Arabian political consciousness. The choice of this council, however, fell upon one of the councillors, Uthman, who was consequently nominated, and the nomination afterwards confirmed by the people. The

caliphate of Uthman is really the source of the three great religio-political parties with their respective political theories which each party, finding itself in power, attempted to realise in one or other of the provinces of the Arab Empire. Before, however, I proceed to describe these theories, I want to draw attention to the following two points :

(1) That the Muslim Commonwealth is based on the absolute equality of all Muslims in the eye of the law. There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. In his latter days the Prophet once ascended the pulpit and said to the people :

“Muslims ! If I have struck any one of you, here is my back that he may strike me. If anyone has been wronged by me let him return injury for injury. If I have taken anybody’s goods, all that I have is at his disposal.” A man arose and claimed a debt of three dirhams (about three shillings), “I would rather,” said the Prophet, “have this shame in this world than in the next.” And he paid him on the spot.

The law of Islam does not recognise the apparently natural differences of race, not the historical differences of nationality. The political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities. Nationality, with Islam, is not the highest limit of political development; for the general principles of the law of Islam rest on human nature, not on the peculiarities of a particular people. The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic unity, not in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious and political ideal; or, in the psychological fact of “like-mindedness,” as St. Paul would say. The membership of this nation, consequently, would not be determined by birth, marriage, domicile or naturalisation. It would be determined by a public declaration of “like-mindedness” and would terminate when the individual has ceased to be like-minded with others. The ideal territory for such a

nation would be the whole earth. The Arabs, like the Greeks and the Romans endeavoured to create such a nation or the world-state by conquest, but failed to actualise their ideal. The realisation of this ideal, however, is not impossible; for the ideal nation does already exist in germ. The life of modern political communities finds expression, to a great extent, in common institutions, Law and Government; and the various sociological circles, so to speak, are continually expanding to touch one another. Further, it is not incompatible with the sovereignty of individual States, since its structure will be determined, not by physical force, but by the spiritual force of a common ideal.

(2) That according to the law of Islam there is no distinction between the Church and the State. The State with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is unity in which no such distinction exists. The Caliph is not necessarily the high priest of Islam; he is not the representative of God on earth. He is fallible like other men, and is subject, like every Muslim, to the impersonal authority of the same law. The Prophet himself is not regarded as absolutely infallible by many Muhammadan theologians (e.g., Abu Ishaq, Tabari). In fact, the idea of personal authority is quite contrary to the spirit of Islam. The Prophet of Arabia succeeded in commanding the absolute submission of an entire people; yet no man has depreciated his own authority more than he. "I am," he says, "a man like you; like you my forgiveness also depends on the mercy of God." Once in a moment of spiritual exaltation, he is reported to have said to one of his companions, "Go and tell the people—he who says there is only one God—will enter the paradise", studiously omitting the second half of the Muslim creed— "And Muhammad is his prophet". The ethical importance of this attitude is great. The whole system of Islamic ethics is based on the idea of individuality; anything which tends to repress the healthy development of individuality is quite inconsistent with the spirit of Islamic law and ethics. A Muslim is free to do anything he likes,

provided he does not violate the law. The general principles of this law are believed to have been revealed, the details, in order to cover the relatively secular cases, are left to the interpretation of professional lawyers. It is, therefore, true to say that the entire fabric of Islamic law, actually administered, is really judge-made law, so that the lawyer performs the legislative function in the Muslim constitution. If, however, an absolutely new case arise which is not provided for in the law of Islam, the will of the whole Muslim community becomes a further source of law. But I do not know whether a general council of the whole Muslim community was ever held for this purpose.

I shall now describe the three great political theories to which I have alluded above. I shall first take up the Sunni view.

I. ELECTIVE MONARCHY

A. The Caliph and the People

During the days of the early Caliphate things were extremely simple. The Caliphs were like private individuals, sometimes doing the work of an ordinary constable. In obedience to the Quranic verse—"and consult them in all matters"—they always consulted the more influential companions of the Prophet, in judicial and executive matters, but no formal ministers existed to assist the Caliph in his administrative work. It was not until the time of the House of Abbas that the Caliphate became the subject of scientific treatment. In my description of the Sunni view I shall mainly follow Al-Mawardy—the earliest Muslim constitutional lawyer who flourished during the reign of the Abbasi Caliph Al-Qadir. Al-Mawardy divides the whole Muslim community into two classes—(1) the electors, (2) the candidates for election. The qualifications absolutely

necessary for a candidate are thus enumerated by him:

- (1) Spotless character.
- (2) Freedom from physical and mental infirmity. (The predecessor of the present Sultan of Turkey was deposed under this condition.)
- (3) Necessary legal and theological knowledge in order to be able to decide various cases. This is true in theory; in practice the power of the Caliph, especially in later times, was divided.
- (4) Insight necessary for a ruler.
- (5) Courage to defend the empire.
- (6) Relationship with the family of the Quraish. This qualification is not regarded as indispensable by modern sunni lawyers, on the ground that the prophet never nominated any person as his successor.
- (7) Full age (Al-Ghazali). (It was on this ground that the chief judge refused to elect Al-Muqtadir).
- (8) Male sex (Al-Baidawi). This is denied by the Khawarij who hold that woman can be elected as Caliph.

If the candidate satisfies these conditions, the representatives of all influential families, doctors of law, high officials of the state and commanders of the army, meet together and nominate him to the Caliphate. The whole assembly then proceeds to the mosque where the nomination is duly confirmed by the people. In distant places representatives of the elected Caliph are permitted to receive homage on behalf of the Caliph. In the matter of election the people of the capital, however, have no precedence over other people though, in practice, they have a certain amount of precedence, since they are

naturally the first to hear of Caliph's death. After the election, the Caliph usually makes a speech, promising to rule according to the law of Islam. Most of these speeches are preserved. It will be seen that the principle of representation is, to a certain extent, permitted in practical politics; in the law of property, however, it is expressly denied. For instance, if B dies in the lifetimes of his father. A and his brother C, leaving issue, the whole property of A goes to C. The children of B have no claim; they cannot represent their father, or "stand in his shoes".

From a legal standpoint, the Caliph does not occupy any privileged position. In theory, he is like other members of the Commonwealth. He can be directly sued in an ordinary law court. The second Caliph was once accused of appropriating a larger share in the spoils of war, and he had to clear his conduct before the people, by production of evidence according to the law of Islam. In his judicial capacity he is open to the criticism of every Muslim. Omar I was severely reprimanded by an old woman who pointed out to him that his interpretation of a certain Quranic verse was absolutely wrong. The Caliph listened to her argument, and decided the case according to her views.

The Caliph may indicate his successor who may be his son; but the nomination is invalid until confirmed by the people. Out of the fourteen Caliphs of the House of Umayya only four succeeded in securing their sons as their successors. The Caliph cannot secure the election of his successor during his own lifetime. Ibn Athir tells us that Abdul Malik—the Umayya Caliph—endeavoured to do so, but Ibn Musayyib, the great Mekkan Lawyer, strongly protested against the Caliph's behaviour. The Abbasi Caliph Hadi, however, succeeded in securing the election of his son Jaffar, but after his death the majority declared for Harun. In such a case, when the people declare for another Caliph, the one previously elected, must, on penalty of death, immediately renounce his right in public.

If the Caliph does not rule according to the law of Islam, or suffers from physical or mental infirmity, the Caliphate is forfeited. Usually one influential Muhammadan stands up in the mosque after the prayer and speaks to the congregation giving reasons for the proposed deposition. He declares deposition to be in the interest of Islam, and ends his speech by throwing away his finger-ring with the remark—"I reject the Caliph as I throw away this ring". The people then signify their assent in various ways, and the deposition is complete.

The question whether two or more rival Caliphates can exist simultaneously is discussed by Muslim lawyers. Ibn Jama holds that only one Caliphate is possible. Ibn Khaldun holds that there is nothing illegal in the co-existence of two or more Caliphates, provided they are in different countries. Ibn Khaldun's view is certainly contrary to the old Arabian idea, yet in so far as the Muslim Commonwealth is governed by an impersonal authority, *i.e.*, law, his position seems to me to be quite a tenable one. Moreover, as a matter of fact, two rival Caliphates have existed in Islam for a long time.

Just as a candidate for the Caliphate must have certain qualifications, so, according to Al-Mawardy, the elector also must be qualified. He must possess ;

- (1) Good reputation as an honest man.
- (2) Necessary knowledge of State affairs.
- (3) Necessary insight and judgment.

In theory all Muslim, men and women, possess the right of election. There is no property qualification. In practice, however, women and slaves did not exercise this right. Some of the early lawyers seem to have recognised the danger of mass-elections as they endeavour to show that the right of election resides only in the tribe of the prophet. Whether the exclusion of women grew

up in order to make women incapable of exercising a right which in theory could not be denied to them, I cannot say.

The elector has the right to demand the deposition of the Caliph, or the dismissal of his officials if he can show that their conduct is not in accordance with the law of Islam. He can, on the subject address the Muslim congregation in the mosque after the prayer. The mosque, it must be remembered, is the Muslim Forum, & the institution of daily prayer is closely connected with the political life of Muslim communities. Apart from its spiritual and social functions, the institution is meant to serve as a ready means of constant criticism on the state. If, however, the elector does not intend to address the congregation, he can issue a injudicial inquiry concerning the conduct of any State official, or any other matter which affects the community as a whole. The judicial inquiry as a rule, does not mention the name of any individual. I quote an illustration in order to give an idea of this procedure :

“In the name of God, most Merciful and Clement, What is the opinion of the doctors of law, the guides of the people, on the encouragement of the Zimmis, and on the assistance we can demand from them, whether as clerks to the Amirs entrusted with the administration of the country, or as collectors of taxes? Explain the above by solid proofs, establish the orthodox belief by sound arguments, and give your reasons. God will reward you.”

Such judicial inquiries are issued by the State as well, and when the lawyers give conflicting decisions, the majority prevails. Forced election is quite illegal. Ibn Jama, an Egyptian lawyer, however, holds that forced election is legal in times of political unrest. This opportunist view has no support in the law of Islam; though, undoubtedly, it is based on historical facts. Tartushi, a Spanish lawyer would probably hold the same view, for

he says : "Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy."

Let, us now consider the relation between the elected and the elector. Al-Mawardy defines this relation as "Aqd"—binding together, contract. The State therefore is a contractual organism, and implies rights and duties. He does not mean, like Rousseau, to explain the origin of society by an original social contract; he holds that the actual fact of election is a contract in consequence of which the Caliph has to do certain duties, e.g., to defend the religion, to enforce the law of Islam, to levy customs and taxes according to the law of Islam, to pay annual salaries and properly to direct the State treasury. If he fulfils these conditions, the people have mainly two duties in relation to him, viz., to obey him, and to assist him in his work. Apart from this contract, however, Muslim lawyers have also enumerated certain cases in which obedience to the Caliph is not necessary.

The origin of the State then, according to Al-Mawardy, is not force, but free consent of individuals who unite to form a brotherhood, based upon legal equality, in order that each member of the brotherhood may work out the potentialities of his individuality under the law of Islam. Government, with him, is an artificial arrangement, and is divine only in the sense that the law of Islam—believed to have been revealed—demands peace and security.

B. Ministers and other Officials

The Caliph, after his election, appoints the principal officials of the State, or confirms those previously in office. The following are the principal State officials with their duties defined by the law :

(1) *The Wazir,—The Prime Minister—either with limited or unlimited powers—The Wazir with unlimited*

powers must possess the same qualifications as the Caliph, except that, according to Al-Mawardy, he need not necessarily belong to the Quraish tribe. He must be thoroughly educated especially in Mathematics, History, and Art of speaking. He can perform all the functions of the the Caliph, except that he cannot nominate the Caliph's successor. He can, without previous sanction of the Caliph, appoint officers of the various departments of the State. The Wazir with limited powers cannot do so. The dismissal of the Wazir with unlimited powers means the dismissal of all officials appointed by him; while the dismissal of the Wazir with limited powers does not lead to the dismissal of the officials appointed by him. More than one Wazir with unlimited powers cannot be appointed. The Governors of various provinces can appoint their own Wazirs. A non-Muhammadan may be appointed Wazir with limited powers. The Shiah dynasty of the Obaidies appointed a Jew to this position. An Egyptian poet expresses his sentiments as follows :

“The Jews of our time have reached the goal of their ambition—Theirs is all honour, theirs is all gold—O people of Egypt I advise you to become Jews; God himself has become a Jew”.

(2) **The Governors**—Next to the Wazir the most important executive officers of the State were governors of various provinces. They were appointed by the Caliph with limited or unlimited powers. The governor with unlimited powers could appoint sub-governors to adjoining smaller provinces. For instance, the sub-governor of Sicily was appointed by the Governor of Spain and that of Scind by the Governor of Bassora. This was really an attempt to create self-governing Muslim colonies. The officer in charge was, so to speak, a miniature caliph of his province; he appointed his own Wazir, Chief Judge and other state officers. Where Special commander of the provincial army was not appointed, the Governor, *ex-officio*, acted as the com

mander. This, however, was an error, since the governors become gradually powerful and frequently asserted their independence. But in his capacity of the commander, the governor had no right to raise the salaries of his soldiers except in very special circumstances. It was his duty to send all the money to the central treasury after defraying the necessary State expenses. If the provincial income fell short of the expenses, he could claim a contribution from the central treasury. If he is appointed by the Caliph, the death of the latter is not followed by his dismissal, but if he is appointed by the Wazir, the death of the Wazir means the dismissal of all governors appointed by him, provided they are not newly confirmed in their respective posts.

The governor with limited powers was a purely executive officer. He had nothing to do with judicial matters, and in criminal matters too his authority was very much limited.

Muslim lawyers, however, recognise a third kind of governorship, *i.e.*, by usurpation. But the usurper must fulfil certain conditions before his claim is legally justified.

(3) **Commanders of armies.**—Here too the distinction of limited and unlimited powers is made, and the duties of commanders, subordinate officers, and soldiers are clearly defined.

(4) **The Chief Judge.**—The Chief Judge could be appointed by the Caliph or the Wazir. According to Abu Hanifa in some cases, and according to Abu Jafir Tabary, a non-Muslim can be appointed to administer the law of his co-religionists. The Chief Judge, as representative of the Law of Islam, can depose the Caliph—he can kill his own creator. His death means the dismissal of his staff; but the death of the sovereign is not followed by the dismissal of the judges appointed by him. During in interregnum a judge can be elected

"The nation," they said to Ali, "calls us to the book of God; you call us to the sword". Shahrastani divides them into twenty-four sects, differing slightly from one another in legal and constitutional opinion, *e.g.*, that the ignorance of the law is a valid excuse; that the adulterer should not be stoned, for the Quran nowhere mentions this punishment; that the hiding of one's religious opinions is illegal; that the Caliph should not be called the Commander of the faithful, that there is nothing illegal in having two or more Caliphs in one and the same time. In East Africa and Mazab—South Algeria—they still maintain the simplicity of their republican ideal. Broadly, speaking the Khawarij can be divided into three classes :

- (1) Those who hold that there must be an elected Caliph but it is not necessary that he should belong to a particular family or tribe. A woman or even slave could be elected as Caliph provided he or she is a good Muslim ruler. Whenever they found themselves in power, they purposely elected their Caliph from among the socially lowest members of their community.
- (2) Those who hold that there is no need of a Caliph, the Muslim congregation can govern them selves.
- (3) Those who do not believe in Government at all—the anarchists of Islam. To them Caliph Ali is reported to have said: "You do not believe any Government, but there must be some Government, good or bad".

Such are, briefly, the main lines of Political Thought in Islam. It is clear that the fundamental principle laid down in the Quran is the principle of election; the details or rather the translation of this principle into a workable scheme of Government is left to be determined by other considerations. Unfortunately, however, the idea of

election did not develop on strictly democratic lines, and the Muslim conquerors consequently failed to do anything for the political improvement of Asia. The form of election was certainly maintained in Baghdad and Spain, but no regular political institutions could grow to vitalise the people at large. It seems to me that there were principally two reasons for this want of political activity in Muslim countries :

- (1) In the first place the idea of election was not at all suited to the genius of the Persians and the Mongols—the two principal races which accepted Islam as their religion. Dozy tells us that the Persians were even determined to worship the Caliph as a divinity, and on being told that worship belonged to God alone they attempted to rebel against the Caliph who would not be the centre of religious emotion.
- (2) The life of early Muslims was a life of conquest. Their whole energy was devoted to political expansion which tends to concentrate political power in fewer hands, and thus serves as an unconscious handmaid of despotism. Democracy does not seem to be quite willing to get on with Empire—a lesson which the modern English Imperialist might well take to heart.

In modern times—thanks to the influence of Western political ideas Muslim countries have exhibited signs of political life. England has vitalised Egypt; Persia has received a constitution from the Shah, and the Young Turkish Party too have been struggling, scheming and plotting to achieve their object. But it is absolutely necessary for these political reformers to make a thorough study of Islamic constitutional principles, and not to shock the naturally suspicious conservatism of their people by appearing as prophets of a new culture. They would certainly impress them more if they could show that their seemingly borrowed ideal of political freedom is really the ideal of Islam, and is as such the rightful demand of free Muslim conscience.

ISLAM AS A MORAL AND POLITICAL IDEAL

This paper was read by Allama Iqbal at the anniversary celebration of the Anjuman Himayat-e-Islam, Lahore. It was first published in the Observer of Lahore, in April 1909 and was fully reproduced in the Hindustan Review of Allahabad in its issues for July and December 1909.

There are three points of view from which a religious system can be approached—the standpoint of the teacher, that of the expounder, and that of the critical student. I do not pretend to be a teacher whose thought and action are, or ought to be, in perfect harmony in so far as he endeavours to work out, in his own life, the ideals which he places before others, and thus influences his audience more by example than by precept. Nor do I claim the high office of an expounder who brings to bear a subtle intellect upon his task, endeavours to explain all the various aspects of the principles he expounds and works with certain pre-suppositions, the truth of which he never questions. The attitude of mind which characterises a critical student is fundamentally different from that of the teacher and the expounder. He approaches the subject of his inquiry free from all pre-suppositions, and tries to understand the organic structure of a religious system, just as a biologist would study a

form of life or a geologist a piece of mineral. His object is to apply methods of a scientific research to religions, with a view to discover how the various elements in a given structure fit in with one another, how each factor functions individually, and how their relation with one another determines the functional value of the whole. He looks at the subject from the standpoint of history and raises certain fundamental questions with regard to the origin, growth and formation of the system he proposes to understand. What are the historical forces, the operation of which evoked, as a necessary consequence, the phenomenon of a particular system? Why should a particular religious system be produced by a people? What is the real significance of a religious system in the history of the people who produced it, and in the history of mankind as a whole? Are there any geographical causes which determine the original locality of a religion? How far does it reveal the in-most soul of a people, their social, moral and political aspirations? What transformation, if any, has it worked in them? How far has it contributed towards the realization of the ultimate purpose revealed in the history of man? These are some of the questions which the critical student of religion endeavours to answer, in order to comprehend its structure and to estimate its ultimate worth as a civilising agency among the forces of historical evolution

I propose of look at Islam from the standpoint of the critical student. But I may state at the outset that I shall avoid the use of expressions current in popular Revelation Theology; since my method is essentially scientific and consequently necessitates the use of terms which can be interpreted in the light of every-day human experience. For instance, when I say that the religion of a people is the sum-total of their life-experience finding a definite expression through the medium of a great personality, I am only translating the fact of Revelation into the language of science. Similarly, inter-action between individual and universal energy is only another expression for the feeling of prayer, which ought to be so described for purposes of scientific accuracy. It is

because I want to approach my subject from a thoroughly human standpoint, and not because I doubt the fact of Divine Revelation as the final basis of all religion, that I prefer to employ expressions of a more scientific content. Islam is, moreover, the youngest of all religions, the last creation of humanity. Its founder stands out clear before us; he is truly a personage of history and lends himself freely even to the most searching criticism. Ingenious legend has weaved no screens round his figure; he is born in the broad day-light of history we can thoroughly understand the inner spring of his actions; we can subject his mind to a keen psychological analysis. Let us then, for the time being, eliminate the supernatural element and try to understand the structure of Islam as we find it.

I have just indicated the way in which a critical student of religion approaches his subject. Now it is not possible for me, in the short space at my disposal, to answer, with regard to Islam, all the questions which as a critical student of religion I ought to raise and answer in order to reveal the real meaning of this religious system. I shall not raise the question of the origin and the development of Islam. Nor shall I try to analyse the various currents of thought in the pre-Islamic Arabian society, which found a final focus in the utterances of the Prophet of Islam. I shall confine my attention to the Islamic ideal in its ethical and political aspects only.

To begin with, we have to recognise that every great religious system starts with certain proposition concerning the nature of man and the universe. The psychological implication of Buddhism, for instance, is the central fact of pain as a dominating element in the constitution of the universe. Man, regarded as an individuality, is helpless against the forces of pain, according to the teachings of Buddhism. There is an indissoluble relation between pain and the individual consciousness which, as such, is nothing but a constant possibility of pain. Freedom from pain means freedom from individuality. Starting from the fact of pain,

Buddhism is quite consistent in placing before man the ideal of self-destruction. Of the two terms of this relation, pain and the sense of personality, one (*i.e.* pain) is ultimate; the other is a delusion from which it is possible to emancipate ourselves by ceasing to act on those lines of activity, which have a tendency to intensify the sense of personality. Salvation, then, according to Buddhism, is inaction; renunciation of self and unworldliness are the principal virtues. Similarly, Christianity as a religious system, is based on the fact of sin. The world is regarded as evil and the taint of sin is regarded as hereditary to man, who, as an individuality is insufficient and stands in need of some supernatural personality to intervene between him and his Creator. Christianity, unlike Buddhism, regards human personality as something real, but agrees with Buddhism in holding that man, as a force against sin, is insufficient. There is, however, a subtle difference in the agreement. We can, according to Christianity, get rid of sin by depending upon a Redeemer; we can free ourselves from pain, according to Buddhism, by letting this insufficient force dissipate or lose itself in the universal energy of nature. Both agree in the fact of insufficiency and both agree in holding that this insufficiency is an evil; but while the one makes up the deficiency by bringing in the force of a redeeming personality, the other prescribes its gradual reduction until it is annihilated altogether. Again, Zoroastrianism looks upon nature as a scene of endless struggle between the powers of evil and the powers of good, and recognises in man the power to choose any course of action he likes. The universe, according to Zoroastrianism, is partly evil, partly good; man is neither wholly good nor wholly evil, but a combination of the two principles—light and darkness continually fighting against each other for universal supremacy. We see then that the fundamental pre-suppositions, with regard to the nature of the universe and man, in Buddhism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, respectively, are the following :

- (1) There is pain in nature and man regarded as an individual is evil (Buddhism).

- (2) There is sin in nature and the taint of sin is fatal to man (Christianity).
- (3) There is struggle in nature; man is a mixture of the struggling forces and is free to range himself on the side of the powers of good, which will eventually prevail (Zoroastrianism).

The question now is, what is the Muslim view of the universe and man? What is the central idea in Islam which determines the structure of the entire system? We know that sin, pain and sorrow are constantly mentioned in the Quran. The truth is that Islam looks upon the universe as a reality and consequently recognises as reality all that is in it. Sin, pain, sorrow, struggle are certainly real, but Islam teaches that evil is not essential to the universe; the universe can be reformed; the elements of sin and evil can be gradually eliminated. All that is in the universe is God's, and the seemingly destructive forces of nature become sources of life, if properly controlled by man, who is endowed with the power to understand and to control them.

These and other similar teachings of the Quran, combined with the Quranic recognition of the reality of sin and sorrow, indicate that the Islamic view of the universe is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Modern psychometry has given the final answer to the psychological implications of Buddhism. Pain is not an essential factor in the constitution of the universe, and pessimism is only a product of a hostile social environment. Islam believes in the efficacy of well-directed action; hence the standpoint of Islam must be described as melioristic—the ultimate pre-supposition and justification of all human effort at scientific discovery and social progress. Although Islam recognises the fact of pain, sin and struggle in nature, yet the principal fact which stands in the way of man's ethical progress is, according to Islam, neither pain, nor sin, nor struggle. It is fear, to which man is a victim owing to his ignorance of the nature of his environment and want of absolute faith in God.

The highest stage of man's ethical progress is reached when he becomes absolutely free from fear and grief.

The central proposition which regulates the structure of Islam, then, is that there is fear in nature, and the object of Islam is to free man from fear. This view of the universe indicates also the Islamic view of the metaphysical nature of man. If fear is the force which dominates man and counteracts his ethical progress, man must be regarded as a unit of force, an energy, a will, a germ of infinite power, the gradual unfoldment of which must be the object of all human activity. The essential nature of man, then, consists in will, not intellect or understanding.

With regard to the ethical nature of man too the teaching of Islam is different from those of other religious systems. And when God said to the angel "I am going to make a Viceroy on the earth", they said: Art Thou creating one who spills blood and disturbs the peace of the earth, and we glorify Thee and sing Thy praises"? God answered: "I know what you do not know". This verse of the Quran, read in the light of the famous tradition that every child is born a Muslim - peaceful, indicates that according to the tenets of Islam man is essentially good and peaceful—a view explained and defended, in our own times, by Rousseau—the great father of modern political thought. The opposite view, the doctrine of the depravity of man held by the Church of Rome, leads to the most pernicious religious and political consequences. Since if man is elementally wicked, he must not be permitted to have his own way; his entire life must be controlled by external authority. This means priesthood in religion and autocracy in politics. The Middle Ages in the history of Europe drove this dogma of Romanism to its political and religious consequences, and the result was a form of society which required terrible revolutions to destroy it and to upset the basic presuppositions of its structure. Luther, the enemy of despotism in religion, and Rousseau, the enemy of despotism in politics, must always be regarded as the

emancipators of European humanity from the heavy fetters of popedom and absolutism, and their religious and political thought must be understood as a virtual denial of the Church dogma of human depravity. The possibility of the elimination of sin and pain from the evolutionary process and faith in the natural goodness of man are the basic propositions of Islam, as of modern European civilisation which has, almost unconsciously, recognised the truth of these propositions in spite of the religious system with which it is associated. Ethically speaking, therefore, man is naturally good and peaceful. Metaphysically speaking, he is a unit of energy, which cannot bring out its dormant possibilities owing to its misconception of the nature of its environment. The ethical ideal of Islam is to disenthral man from fear, and thus to give him a sense of his personality, to make him conscious of himself as a source of power. This idea of man as an individuality of infinite power determines, according to the teachings of Islam, the worth of all human action. That which intensifies the sense of individuality in man is good, that which enfeebles it is bad. Virtue is power, force, strength; evil is weakness. Give man a keen sense of respect for his own personality, let him move fearless and free in the immensity of God's earth, and he will respect the personalities of others and become perfectly virtuous. It is not possible for me to show in the course of this paper, how all the principal forms of vice can be reduced to fear. But we will now see the reason why certain forms of human activity, *e.g.*, self-renunciation, poverty, slavish obedience which sometimes conceals itself under the beautiful name of humility and unworldliness—modes of activity which tend to weaken the force of human individuality—are regarded as virtues by Buddhism and Christianity, and altogether ignored by Islam. While the early Christians glorified in poverty and unworldliness, Islam looks upon poverty as a vice, and says: "Do not forget thy share in the World." The highest virtue from the standpoint of Islam is righteousness, which is defined by the Quran in the following manner:

"It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces in prayers towards east and west, but righteousness is of him who believeth in God and the last day and the angels and the scriptures and the Prophets, who give the money for God's sake unto his kindred and unto orphans and the needy and to strangers and to those who ask and for the redemption of captives; of those who are constant at prayer, and of those who perform their covenant when they have covenanted, and behave themselves patiently in adversity and in times of violence."

It is, therefore, evident that Islam, so to speak, transmutes the moral values of the ancient world, and declares the preservation, intensification of the sense of human personality, to be the ultimate ground of all ethical activity. Man is a free responsible being, he is the maker of his own destiny, his salvation is his own business. There is no mediator between God and man. God is the birthright of every man. The Quran, therefore, while it looks upon Jesus Christ as the spirit of God, strongly protests against the Christian doctrine of Redemption, as well as the doctrine of an infallible visible head of the Church—doctrines which proceed upon the assumption of the insufficiency of human personality and tend to create, in man a sense of dependence, which is regarded by Islam as a force obstructing the ethical progress of man. The law of Islam is almost unwilling to recognise illegitimacy, since the stigma of illegitimacy is a great blow to the healthy development of independence in man. Similarly, in order to give man an early sense of individuality the law of Islam has laid down that a child is an absolutely free human being at the age of fifteen.

To this view of Muslim ethics, however, there can be one objection. If the development of human individuality is the principal concern of Islam, why should it tolerate the institution of slavery? The idea of free labour was foreign to the economic consciousness of the ancient world. Aristotle looks upon it as a necessary factor in

006034

human society. The Prophet of Islam being a link between the ancient and the modern world, declared the principle of equality and though, like every wise reformer, he slightly conceded to the social conditions around him in retaining the name slavery, he quietly took away the whole spirit of this institution. That slaves had equal opportunity with other Muhammadans, is evidenced by the fact that some of the greatest Muslim warriors, kings, premiers, scholars, and jurists were slaves. During the days of the early Caliphs slavery by purchase was quite unknown; part of public revenue was set apart for purposes of manumission, and prisoners of war were either freely dismissed or freed on the payment of ransom. Omar set all slaves at liberty after his conquest of Jerusalem. Slaves were also set at liberty as a penalty for culpable homicide and in expiation of a false oath taken by mistake. The Prophet's own treatment of slaves was extraordinarily liberal. The proud aristocratic Arab could not tolerate the social elevation of a slave, even when he was manumitted. The democratic ideal of perfect equality, which had found the most uncompromising expression in the Prophet's life, could only be brought home to an extremely aristocratic people by a very cautious handling of the situation. He brought about a marriage between an emancipated slave and a free Qureish woman, a relative of his own. This marriage was a blow to the aristocratic pride of this free Arab woman; she could not get on with her husband, and the result was a divorce, which made her the more helpless, since no respectable Arab would marry the divorced wife of a slave. The ever-watchful Prophet availed himself of this situation and turned it to account in his efforts at social reform. He married the woman himself, indicating thereby that not only a slave could marry a free woman, but also a woman divorced by him could become the wife of a man no less than the greatest Prophet of God. The significance of this marriage in the history of social reform in Arabia is, indeed, great. Whether prejudice, ignorance or want of insight has blinded European critics of Islam to the real meaning of this union, it is difficult to guess.

In order to show the treatment of slaves by modern Muhammadans, I quote a passage from the English translation of the autobiography of the late Amir Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan :

“For instance”, says the Amir, “Framurz Khan, a Chitrali slave, is my most trusted Commander-in-Chief at Herat, Nazir Muhammad Safar Khan, another Chitrali slave, is the most trusted official of my Court; he keeps my seal in his hand to put to any document and to my food and diet; in short, he has the full confidence of my life, as well as my kingdom is in his hands. Parwana Khan, the late Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Jan Muhammad Khan, the late Lord of Treasury, two of the highest officials of the kingdom in their lifetime, were both of them my slaves.”

The truth is that the institution of slavery is a mere name in Islam, and the idea of individuality reveals itself as a guiding principle in the entire system of Muhammadan law and ethics.

Briefly speaking, then, a strong will in a strong body is the ethical ideal of Islam. But let me stop here for a moment, and see whether we, Indian Muslamans, are true to this ideal. Does the Indian Muslim possess a strong will in a strong body? Has he got the will to live? Has he got sufficient strength of character to oppose those forces which tend to disintegrate the social organism to which he belongs? I regret to answer my questions in the negative. The reader will understand, that in the great struggle for existence it is not principally number which makes a social organism survive. Character is the ultimate equipment of man, not only in his efforts against a hostile natural environment, but also in his contest with kindred competitors after a fuller, richer, ampler life. The life-force of the Indian Muhammadan, however, has become woefully enfeebled. The decay of the religious spirit, combined with other causes of a political nature over which he had no control, has developed in him a habit of self-dwarfing, a sense of depen-

dence and, above all, that laziness of spirit, which an enervated people call by the dignified name of 'contentment' in order to conceal their own enfeeblement. Owing to his indifferent commercial morality he fails in economic enterprise; for want of a true conception of national interest and a right appreciation of the present situation of his community among the communities of this country, he is working in his private as well as public capacity, on lines which, I am afraid, must lead him to ruin. How often do we see that he shrinks from advocating a cause, the significance of which is truly national, simply because his standing aloof pleases an influential Hindu, through whose agency he hopes to secure a personal distinction? I unhesitatingly declare that I have greater respect for an illiterate shopkeeper, who earns his honest bread and has sufficient force in his arms to defend his wife and children in times of trouble, than the brainy graduate of high culture, whose low, timid voice betokens the dearth of soul in his body, who takes pride in his submissiveness, eats sparingly, complains of sleepless nights and produces unhealthy children for his community, if he does produce any at all. I hope I shall not be offending the reader, when I say that I have a certain amount of admiration for the devil. By refusing to prostrate himself before Adam whom he honestly believed to be his inferior, he revealed a high sense of self-respect, a trait of character, which in my opinion, ought to redeem him from his spiritual deformity, just as the beautiful eyes of the toad redeem him from his physical repulsiveness. And I believe God punished him not because he refused to make himself bow before the progenitor of an enfeebled humanity, but because he declined to give absolute obedience to the will of the Almighty Ruler of the Universe.

The ideal of our educated young men is mostly service, and service begets, specially in a country like India, that sense of dependence which undermines the force of human individuality. The poor among us have, of course, no capital; the middle class people cannot undertake joint economic enterprise owing to

mutual mistrust; and the rich look upon trade as an occupation beneath their dignity. Truly economic dependence is the prolific mother of all the various forms of vice. Even the vices of the Indian Muhammadan indicate the weakness of life-force in him. Physically too he has undergone dreadful deterioration. If one sees the pale, faded faces of Muhammadan boys in schools and colleges, one will find the painful verification of my statement. Power, energy, force, strength, yes physical strength, is the law of life. A strong man may rob others when he has got nothing in his own pocket; but a feeble person, he must die the death of a mean thing in the world's awful scene of continual warfare.

But how to improve this undesirable state of things? Education, we are told, will work the required transformation. I may say at once that I do not put much faith in education as a mean of ethical training—I mean education as understood in this country. The ethical training of humanity is really the work of great personalities, who appear, from time to time, during the course of human history. Unfortunately, our present social environment is not favourable to the birth and growth of such personalities of ethical magnetism. An attempt to discover the reason of this dearth of personalities among us will necessitate a subtle analysis of all the visible and invisible forces which are now determining the course of our social evolution—an enquiry which I cannot undertake in this paper. But all unbiassed persons will easily admit that such personalities are now rare among us.

This being the case, education is the only thing to fall back upon. But what sort of education? There is no absolute truth in education, as there is none in philosophy or science. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is a maxim of fools. Do we ever find a person rolling in his mind the undulatory theory of light simply because it is a fact of science? Education, like other things, ought to be determined by the needs of the learner. A form of education which has no direct bearing on the particular

type of character which you want to develop is absolutely worthless. I grant that the present system of education in India gives us bread and butter. We manufacture a number of graduates and then we have to send titled mendicants to Government to beg appointments for them. Well, if we succeed in securing a few appointments in the higher branches of service, what then? It is the masses who constitute the backbone of the nation; they ought to be better fed, better housed and properly educated.

Life is not bread and butter alone; it is something more; it is a healthy character reflecting the national ideal in all its aspects. And for a truly national character you ought to have a truly national education. Can you expect free Muslim character in a young boy who is brought up in an aided school and in complete ignorance of his social and historical tradition? You administer to him doses of Cromwell's history; it is idle to expect that he will turn out a truly Muslim character. Then knowledge of Cromwell's history will certainly create in him a great deal of admiration for that Puritan revolutionary; but it cannot create that healthy pride in his soul which is the very life-blood of a truly national character. Our educated young man knows all about Wellington and Gladstone, Voltaire and Luther. He will tell you that Lord Roberts worked in the South African war like a common soldier at the age of eighteen but how many of us know that Muhammad II conquered Constantinople at the age of twenty-two? How many of us have even the faintest notion of the influence of our Muslim civilisation over the civilisation of modern Europe? How many of us are familiar with the wonderful historical productions of Ibn Khaldun or the extraordinarily noble character of the great Amir Abdul Qadir of Algeria? A living nation is living because it never forgets its dead. I venture to say, that the present system of education in this country is not at all suited to us as a people. It is not true to our genius as a nation, it tends to produce an un-Muslim type of character, it is not determined by our national requirements, it breaks

entirely with our past, and appears to proceed on the false assumption that the ideal of education is the training of human intellect rather than human will. Nor is this superficial system true to the genius of the Hindus. Among them it appears to have produced a number of political idealists, whose false reading of history drives them to the upsetting of all conditions of political order and social peace. We spend an immense amount of money every year on the education of our children. Well, thanks to the King Emperor, India is a free country; every body is free to entertain any opinion he likes—I look upon as a waste. In order to be truly ourselves, we ought to have our own schools, our own colleges, and our own universities, keeping alive our social and historical traditions, making us good and peaceful citizens and creating in us that free but law-abiding spirit which evolves out of itself the noblest types of political virtue. I am quite sensible of the difficulties that lie in our way, all that I can say is that if we cannot get over our difficulties, the world will soon get rid of us.

II

Having discussed the ethical ideals of Islam, I now proceed to say a few words on the political aspect of the Islamic Ideal. Before, however, I come to the subject, I wish to meet an objection against Islam so often brought forward by our European critics. It has been said that Islam is a religion which implies a state of war and can thrive only in a state of war. Now, there can be no denying that war is an expression of the energy of a nation; a nation which cannot fight cannot hold its own in the strain and stress of selective competition, which constitutes an indispensable condition of all human progress. Defensive war is certainly permitted by the Quran; but the doctrine of aggressive war against unbelievers is wholly unauthorized by the Holy Book of Islam. Here are the words of the Quran :

“Summon them to the way of the Lord with wisdom and kindly warning, dispute them in the kindest manner. Say to those who have been given the book and to the ignorant. Do you accept Islam?

Then, if they accept Islam thy are guided aright; but if they turn away, then thy duty is only preaching; and God's eye is on His servants."

All the wars undertaken during the life-time of the Prophet were defensive. His war against the Roman Empire in 626 A.D. began by a fatal breach of international law on the part of the Government at Constantinople. who killed the innocent Arab envoy sent to their Court. Even in defensive war he forbids wanton cruelty to the vanquished. I quote here the touching words which he addressed to his followers when they were starting for a fight :

"In avenging the injuries inflicted upon us, disturb not the harmless votaries of domestic seclusion, spare the weakness of the female sex, injure not the infant at the breast, or those who are ill in bed. Abstain from demolishing the dwellings of the unresisting inhabitants, destroy not the means of their subsistence, nor their fruit trees, and touch not the palm."

The history of Islam tells us that the expansion of Islam as a religion is in no way related to the political power of its followers. The greatest spiritual conquests of Islam were made during the days of our political decrepitude. When the rude barbarians of Mongolia drowned in blood the civilization of Bagdad in 1258 A.D." when the Muslim power fell in Spain and the followers of Islam were mercilessly killed or driven out of Cordova by Ferdinand in 1236, Islam had just secured a footing in Sumatra and was about to work the peaceful conversion of the Malay Archipelago.

"In the hours of its political degradation," says Professor Arnold, "Islam has achieved some of its most brilliant conquests. On two great historical occasions, infidal barbarians have set their foot on the necks of the followers of the Prophet, the Seljuk Turks in the eleventh and the Mongols in the thirteenth century, and in each case the conquerors have accepted the religion of the

conquered." "We undoubtedly find," says the same learned scholar elsewhere, "that Islam gained its greatest and most lasting missionary triumphs in times and places in which its political power has been weakest, as in South India and Eastern Bengal".

The truth is that Islam is essentially a religion of peace. All forms of political and social disturbance are condemned by the Quran in the most uncompromising terms. I quote a few verses from the Quran :

"Eat and drink from what God has given you and run not on the face of the earth in the matter of rebels."

"And disturb not the peace of the earth after it has been reformed; this is good for you if you are believers."

"And do good to others as God has done good to thee, and seek not the violation of peace in the earth, for God does not love those who break the peace. That is the home in the next world which we build for those who do not mean rebellion and disturbance in the earth, and the end is for those who fear God."

"Those who rebelled in cities and enhanced disorder in them, God visited them with His whip of punishment."

One sees from these verses how severely all forms of political and social disorder are denounced by the Quran. But the Quran is not satisfied with mere denunciation of the evil of *fesad*. It goes to the very root of this evil. We know that both in ancient and modern times, secret meetings have been a constant source of political and social unrest. Here is what the Quran says about such conferences. "O believers, if you converse secretly that is to say, hold secret conference, converse not for purpose of sin and rebellion". The ideal of Islam is to secure social peace at any cost. All methods of violent change

in society are condemned in the most unmistakable language. Tartushi—a Muslim lawyer of Spain—is quite true to the spirit of Islam when he says: "Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy".

"Listen to him and obey him," says the Prophet of God in a tradition mentioned by Bukharee," even if a negro slave is appointed to rule over you." Muslim mentions another important tradition of the Prophet on the authority of Arfaja, who says—"I heard the Prophet of God say, when you have agreed to follow one man then if another man comes forward intending to break your stick (weaken your strength) or to make you disperse in disunion, kill him".

Those among us who make it their business to differ from the general body of Musalmans in political views ought to read this tradition carefully, and if they have any respect for the words of the Prophet, it is their duty to dissuade themselves from this mean traffic in political opinion which, though perhaps it brings a little personal gain to them, is exceedingly harmful to the interests of the community. My object, in citing these verses and traditions is to educate political opinion on strictly Islamic lines. In this country we are living under a Christian Government. We must always keep before our eyes the example of those early Muhammadians who, persecuted by their own countrymen, had to leave their home and to settle in the Christian State of Abyssinia. How they behaved in that land must be our guiding principle in this country where an overdose of Western ideas has taught people to criticise the existing Government with a dangerous lack of historical perspective. And our relation with the Christians are determined for us by the Quran, which says :"

"And thou wilt find nearer to the friendship of the believers those men who call themselves Christians. This is because among them there are learned men and hermits, and they are never vain."

Having thus established that Islam is a religion of peace, I now proceed to consider the purely political aspect of the Islamic ideal—the ideal of Islam as entertained by a corporate individuality. Given a settled society, what does Islam expect from its followers regarded as a community? What principle sought to guide them in the management of communal affairs? What must be their ultimate object and how is it to be achieved? We know that Islam is something more than a creed, it is also a community, a nation. The membership of Islam as a community is not determined by birth, locality or naturalisation; it consists in the identity of belief. The expression 'Indian Muhammadan', however convenient it may be, is a contradiction in terms; since Islam in its essence is above all conditions of time and space. Nationality with us is a pure idea; it has no geographical basis. But in as much as the average man demands a material centre of nationality, the Muslim looks for it in the holy town of Mecca, so that the basis of Muslim nationality combines the real and the ideal, the concrete and the abstract. When, therefore, it is said that the interests of Islam are superior to those of the Muslim, it is meant that the interest of the individuals as a unit are subordinate to the interests of the community as an external symbol of the Islamic principle. This is the only principle which limits the liberty of the individual, who is otherwise absolutely free.

The best form of Government for such a community would be democracy, the ideal of which is to let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable. The Caliph of Islam is not an infallible being; like other Muslims he is subject to the same law; he is elected by the people and is deposed by them if he goes contrary to the law. An ancestor of the present Sultan of Turkey was sued in an ordinary law court by a mason, who succeeded in getting him fined by the town Qazi. Democracy, then, is the most important aspect of Islam regarded as a political ideal. It must however, be confessed that the Muslims, with their ideal of individual freedom, could do nothing for the political

improvement of Asia. Their democracy lasted only 30 years and disappeared with their political expansion. Though the principle of election was not quite original in Asia (since the ancient Parthian Government was based on the same principle) yet somehow or other it was not suited to the nations of Asia in the early days of Islam. It was, however, reserved for a Western nation politically to vitalize the countries of Asia. Democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times, and English statesmen have boldly carried this principle to countries which have been, for centuries, groaning under the most atrocious forms of despotism. The British Empire is a vast political organism, the vitality of which consists in the gradual working out of this principle. The permanence of the British Empire as a civilising factor in the political evolution of mankind is one of our greatest interests. This vast Empire has our fullest sympathy and respect, since it is one aspect of our own political ideal that is being slowly worked out in it. England, in fact, is doing one of our own great duties, which unfavourable circumstances did not permit us to perform. It is not the number of Muhammadans which it protects, but the spirit of the British Empire that makes it the greatest Muhammadan Empire in the world.

To return now to the political constitution of the Muslim society. Just as there are two basic propositions underlying Muslim ethics, so there are two basic propositions underlying Muslim political constitution :

(1) The law of God is absolutely supreme. Authority, except as an interpreter of the law, has no place in the social structure of Islam. Islam has a horror of personal authority. We regard it as inimical to the unfoldment of human individuality. The Shias, of course, differ from the Sunnis in this respect. They hold that the Caliph or Imam is appointed by God and his interpretation of the Law is final; he is infallible and his authority, therefore, is absolutely supreme. There is certainly a grain of truth in this view; since the principle

of absolute authority, has functioned usefully in the course of the history of mankind. But it must be admitted that the idea works well in the case of primitive societies and reveals its deficiency when applied to higher stages of civilisation. Peoples grow out of it, as recent events have revealed in Persia, which is a Shia country, yet demands a fundamental structural change in her Government by the introduction of the principle of election.

(2) The absolute equality of all the members of the community. There is no aristocracy in Islam. "The noblest among you," says the Prophet, "are those who fear God most." There is no privileged class, no caste system. Islam is a unity in which there is no distinction, and this unity is secured by making men believe in the two simple propositions—the unity of God and the mission of the Prophet—propositions which are certainly of a supernatural character, but which, based as they are on the general religious experience of mankind, are intensely true on the average human nature. Now, this principle of the equality of all believers made early Musalmans the greatest political power in the world. Islam worked as a levelling force, it gave the individual a sense of his inward power; it elevated those who were socially low. The elevation of the down-trodden was the chief secret of the Muslim political power in India. The result of the British rule in this country has been exactly the same; and if England continues true to this principle it will ever remain a source of strength to her as it was to her predecessors.

But are we Indian Musalmans true to this principle in our social economy? Is the organic unity of Islam intact in this land? Religious adventurers set up different sects and fraternities, ever quarrelling with one another; and then there are castes and sub-castes like the Hindus! Surely we have out-Hindued the Hindu himself; we are suffering from a double caste system—the religious caste system, sectarianism, and the social caste system, which we have either learned or inherited from

the Hindus. This is one of the quiet ways in which conquered nations revenge themselves on their conquerors. I condemn this accursed religious and social sectarianism; I condemn this accursed religious and social sectarianism; I condemn it in the name of God, in the name of humanity, in the name of Moses, in the name of Jesus Christ, and in the name of him—a thrill of emotion passes through the very fibre of my soul when I think of that exalted name—yes, in the name of him who brought the final message of freedom and equality to man kind. Islam is one and indivisible; it brooks no distinctions in it. There are no Wahabies, Shias, or Sunnies in Islam. Fight not for the interpretations of the truth, when the truth itself is in danger. It is foolish to complain of stumbling when you walk in the darkness of night. Let all come forward and contribute their respective shares in the great toil of the nation. Let the idols of class-distinctions and sectarianism be smashed for ever; let the Muslammans of the country be once more united into a great vital whole. How can we, in the presence of violent internal disputes, expect to succeed in persuading others to our way of thinking? The work of freeing humanity from superstition—the ultimate ideal of Islam as a community, for the realisation of which we have done so little in this great land of myth and superstition—will ever remain undone if the emancipators themselves are becoming gradually enchained in the very fetters, from which it is their mission to set others free.

ISLAM'S PECULIAR CONCEPTION OF NATIONALISM

In 1910 Allama Iqbal read a paper at the Muslim University, Aligarh, dealing with some important aspects of Muslim society. This paper was in English and is probably not extant today. Some important extracts from it, published in the Census of India Report (Punjab Part I) for 1911, and reproduced in the Pakistan Times, Lahore, dated October 13, 1963, are given below:

The essential difference between the Muslim community and other communities of the world consists in our peculiar conception of nationality. It is not the unity of language or of country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the Universe, and participate in the same historical tradition that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam.

Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life-principles on the character and genius of a particular people; in true its sence, it is nontemporal, non-spatial....

In the case of no community, the words of Augustus Comte¹ are so completely true, as in the case of our own. "Since religion" says he "embraces all our existence, its history must be an epitome of the whole history of our development".

It may, however, be asked that if mere belief in certain propositions of a metaphysical importance is the only thing that ultimately determines the structure of the Muslim community, is it not an extremely unsafe basis, especially before the advance of modern knowledge, with its habits of rationalism and criticism ?

This is what the French Orientalist Renan² thought; and entertained a veiled hope that Islam would one day lose the high intellectual and moral direction of an important part of the Universe.

Nations, the basic principle of whose collective life is territorial, need not be afraid of rationalism; to us it is a dangerous foe, since it aims at the very principle which gives us communal life, and alone makes our collective existence intelligible.

Islam is our Homeland

Rationalism is essentially analysis and consequently threatens to disintegrate the communal synthesis achieved by the force of the religious idea. It is undoubtedly true that we can meet rationalism, on its own ground. But the point which I wish to impress on you is that the dogma (*i.e.*, the universal agreement on which our communal solidarity depends) has essentially a national rather than intellectual significance for us.

(1) Auguste Isidore Marie Francois Comte, French positivist Philosopher 1798-1857.

(2) Joseph Ernest Renan, French Historian and Philologist 1823-1892. He was debunked in a historic debate, on the same point by Syed Jamaluddin Afghani during his stay in France.

To try to convert religion into 'a system of speculative knowledge' is, in my opinion, absolutely useless and even absurd, since the objection of religion is not "thinking about life"; its main purpose is "to build up a coherent social whole", for the gradual elevation of life.

Religion is itself a metaphysics, in so far as it calls up into being a new universe, with a view to suggest a new type of character, tending to universalise itself, in proportion to the force of the personality in which it originally embodies itself.

The point that I have tried to bring out in the above remarks is that Islam has a far deeper significance for us than merely religious; it has a peculiarly national meaning so that our communal life is unthinkable without a firm grasp of the Islamic principle. The idea of Islam, is, so to speak, our Eternal Home or Country, wherein we live, move and have our being. To us it is above everything else as England is above all to the Englishman, and 'Deutschland unber alles' to the German.

Muslim Culture

The unity of religious belief on which our communal life depends is supplemented by the uniformity of Muslim culture. Mere belief in the Islamic principle, though exceedingly important, is not sufficient. In order to participate in the life of the communal self, the individual mind must undergo a complete transformation. Just as the Muslim community does not recognise any ethnical differences, and aims at the subsumption of all races under the universal idea of humanity, so our culture is relatively universal and is not indebted for its life and growth to the genius of one particular people.

In order to become a living member of the Muslim community, the individual besides having an unconditional belief in the religious principle, must thoroughly

assimilate the culture of Islam. The objection of this assimilation is to create a uniform mental outlook, a peculiar way of looking at the world, a certain definite standpoint from which to judge the value of things, which sharply define our community and transform it into a Corporate Individual, giving it a definite purpose and ideal of its own.

Muslim Type of Character

"In primitive societies, where life struggle for existence is extremely keen, and draws more upon man's physical rather than intellectual qualities, it is the valiant man who becomes an object of universal admiration and imitation. When, however, the struggle relaxes and the peril is over, the valorous type is displaced—though not altogether—by what Giddings¹ calls "the connival type", which takes a due share in all the pleasures of life and combines in itself the virtues of liberality, generosity and good fellowship.

But these two types of character have a tendency to become reckless; and by way of reaction against them appears the third great type which holds up the ideal of self-control and is dominated by a more serious view of life.

In so far as the evolution of the Muslim community in India is concerned: Timur represented the first type, Babar combined the first and the second: Jehangir embodied pre-eminently the second; while the third was foreshadowed in Alamgir, whose life and activity forms, in my opinion, the starting point in the growth of Muslim nationality in India.

To me the ideal of character foreshadowed by Alamgir is essentially the Muslim type of character, and

1 (Henry Franklin Giddings American Sociologist and Educationist, 1955-1961.

it must be the object of all our education to develop that type.

If it is our aim to secure a continuous life of the community, we must produce a type of character which, at all costs, holds fast to its own and while it readily assimilates all that is good in other types, it carefully excludes from its life all that is hostile to its cherished traditions and institutions. A careful observation of the Muslim community in India reveals the point on which the various lines of the moral experience of the community are now tending to converge.

DIVINE RIGHT TO RULE

In the following article Allama Iqbal has discussed the controvertial theory of the Divine Right of Kings and has shown in a most convincing way that the Holy Prophet of Islam is the only man in human history whose rule over man may justly be called a rule by divine right. It was published in the weekly Light, Lahore, dated August 30, 1928.

The theory of the divine right of kings is as old as the institution of kingship itself. In the East as well as the West the king, according to this principle, has been regarded as deriving his authority from God direct. It appears to have been a creed of Eastern origin, imported to the West with the advent of Christianity. As logical corollaries from this follow two other most important principles. Firstly, the king being a representative of God on earth, is free from all responsibility to his people. His word is law and he may do whatever his sweet will may dictate without being called to account for it. The English saying "The King can do no wrong" seems to be a relic of the same divine sanctity attached to the king's person, Secondly, kingship must descend into the same family which is considered sacred.

It was in keeping with this sacrosanct conception of kingship that in the middle ages in Christendom, kings were duly anointed by the Church at the time of coro-

nation. Shakespeare puts the following words in the mouth of Richard II. "Not all the water in the rough rude sea can wash the balm off from the anointed king." Students of History know what amount of blood-shed was caused during the Civil war in the 17th century in England, in consequences of political controversies due to this principle. The Royalists held that all Christian kings, princes and governors derived their authority from God. The Parliamentarians contended that ultimate power lay in the people. The execution of Charles I was the victory of this latter principle. The sentiment of the divine right of kings was finally smashed by the French Revolution, though among a small section of royalists in every Western country it still persists.

The question to consider, however, is how far has such a claim on the part of kings or belief on the part of people been justified, and what were their credentials to such a title? On the very face of it, there was nothing divine about them. They employed the common human ways and means to maintain their authority. They had their police and their jails to gag the voice of freedom. They had their fabulous riches with which to purchase friends and supporters.

It was with these and similar material means that they managed to rule over men; and any man, given all these advantages, can do the same. Where does divinity come in? Any man without the least vestige of divinity in him with just a bit of commonsense can make as good a king as any that was ever encircled by credulity with a halo of sanctity, provided he has an army, a treasury and the rest of the regal paraphernalia. It was, in fact, not by divine right but by the right of might that they ruled over their fellowmen.

Over and above these material means, these kings also resorted to psychological methods to keep the people in awe. For instance like God of whom they posed to be vicars, they made themselves as scarce as possible. They made it a point to keep out of the gaze

of the populace. The Moghal kings would only show their faces through small openings in the palace to let the people have a look at them. This had a great psychological effect. Even to day, some kings do not mix freely with the people but make their appearance from the balcony. This is an attempt in the same direction *viz.*, to clothe themselves with a certain amount of awe and veneration. They employ the common psychological method of keeping them at a respectful distance. Where is the divinity in this? Any knave who get the opportunity and the means may do the same and perhaps much better. These are but artificial human methods open to all, without any reference to Divine agency.

Divine right to rule must be above all such material or psychological props. It must want neither gold nor bayonets to uphold it. Nor must it fall back on such psychological tricks as to infuse a superstitious awe in others. It must be a rule without any army, without a treasury, without a jail and without a police. Such a ruler alone can justly claim to be a ruler who had the divine right to rule over men.

The Prophet of Islam had no standing army to win over the populace to his cause. He was but an orphan boy and arose single handed to combat the forces of corruption let loose on all sides. Rather than having an army of his own to subjugate people, he had an army drawn up against him. A whole nation was up in arms against him, bent on his extirpation. And yet these very people were ultimately brought under his rule. That indeed was divine right to rule over men.

Nor had the Prophet of Islam any treasury with which to attract people to his fold. He was but a poor man who had at times gone even without food for days together. Even as the ruler of Arabia he slept on a stiff matting till the palm leaves imprinted their stripes on his back. From a persecuted and exiled man, he rose to be king of the peninsula and yet he knew no such things

as a jail or police. This indeed was the ruler who can rightly be called to have ruled by a right super human, for the obvious reason that he employed not one method used by the commonality of kings to maintain this authority—no standing army to protect his kingdom, no body-guard, no treasury, no police, no jail, nothing of the sort.

Rather than make any attempt to hypnotize his people into superstitious adoration of himself, the Prophet did everything in his power to dispel any possible doubt on that point. In the midst of a people who bowed even before a rough unhewn piece of stone and clothed it with divinity, it would have been the easiest thing on earth to pass even for God himself. But the Prophet Muhammed was far above such tactics. "I am but a man like unto you" he proclaimed to his people who would have fain taken him for a god. Unlike earthly kings who left no stone unturned to hoodwink their people into the belief as to their superhuman status, the Prophet tried every method to impress upon his people that he was just human, and no more than that human. He purposely made it a part and parcel of the Kalma that "Muhammed is an Apostle of God" as a safeguard for all times to come lest in their enthusiasm, his followers in times to come, might raise him to the Divine pedestal as did Christians in the case of Jesus. He plainly disillusioned the people of every possible shadow of a doubt as to his own powers and personality. "I do not tell you," he told them, "that I possess any treasures or any knowledge of the future." When at the death of his son there happened to be a solar eclipse, and people interpreted it as Divine mourning, the Prophet at once removed the superstitious tendency by telling them that these phenomena of nature had nothing to do with the life or death of man. The Quran is replete with verses how the Prophet took great pains to drive the point home to the people that there was nothing super-human about him. When an old man came to him, and he showed some indifference to him, there came the Divine rebuke. Rather than conceal it, he perpetuated

it for all time to come by incorporating it in the Quran. No earthly potentate would thus advertise such a thing against himself, however, insignificant it might be.

The Prophet mixed as freely with the people as any one of them. There was nothing about his person to give him an air of superiority so much so that when a stranger would call at an assembly of Muslims at the Mosque he had to ask, "which of you is Muhammed," so thoroughly had he merged himself into the people. He did not consider it as anything beneath his dignity as king to stitch his own clothes, patch up his own shoes, milk his own goats, clean his own house, and even help his household in domestic work. On one occasion a party of Muslims, including the Prophet was out on a journey, and when at meal times every one took some part in the cooking, the Prophet began to collect fuel as his part of the work. When his followers implored that he need not trouble himself, he simply replied that he must do his own work.

Such was this most mighty monarch the world has ever seen—the monarch who ruled not only the bodies, but also the hearts of his people; the monarch without an army, without a palace, without a treasury, without any of the numerous instruments with which earthly monarchs keep their people in due subjection. He was as free with the people as any one of them and did everything to divest his personality of all possible halo that superstition might envelop it with. And yet he was the monarch who was loved by his people as never was a monarch loved. One of his followers, when he heard of the incident to the Prophet's teeth at a battle, knocked all of his own teeth out. When after a battle, a woman of Medina enquired as to the Prophet's safety, she was informed that her husband had fallen on the field. Without heeding that great calamity she repeated the question, whether the Prophet was safe. The reply was that her son was also slain in the battle. She repeated her question again to get an answer that her brother had also been killed. "What about the Prophet?" She

insisted and when she was told that all was well with him, she uttered a sigh of relief and said, "Then all griefs are but light."

History knows but one monarch whose rule over man may justly be called a rule by divine right and that one man was the Prophet of Islam. And yet, though the ruler of men by divine right he never claimed to be a ruler. "I am but man like unto you." was the grand message of this greatest of kings to an adoring humanity.

...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him

...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him

...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him

...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him
...and I was well with him

PART TWO

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

PART TWO

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

In 1930 Allama Iqbal was elected President of the All-India Muslim League and he delivered the following Presidential Address at the annual session of the League held at Allahabad on December 29, 1930. This address has assumed great historical importance because in it originated the demand for a Muslim Homeland which became a Word of Faith with the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent and successfully culminated in the establishment of Pakistan in 1947.

Gentlemen, I am deeply grateful to you for the honour you have conferred upon me in inviting me to preside over the deliberations of the All-India Muslim League at one of the most critical moments in the history of Muslim political thought and activity in India. I have no doubt that in this great assembly there are men whose political experience is far more extensive than mine, and for whose knowledge of affairs I have the highest respect. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on my part to claim to guide an assembly of such men in the political decisions which they are called upon to make today. I lead no party; I follow no leader. I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history and its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds itself in time, has, I think, given me a kind of insight into its significance as a world-fact. It is in the light of this insight whatever

its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit of Islam, I propose, not to guide you in your decisions but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions.

It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity—by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal—has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere, the structure of Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity was understood to be a purely monastic order which gradually developed into a vast church-organisation. The protest of Luther was directed against this church-organisation, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And Luther was perfectly justified in rising in revolt against this organisation; though, I think, he

did not realise that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe, his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into mutually ill-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation, such as the notion of country and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved on national lines, *i.e.*, on lines which recognise territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realising itself in space and time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter probably from Manichaeic thought. Her best thinkers are realising this initial mistake today, but her statesmen are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestionable dogma. It is then, this mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal which has largely influenced European religious and political thought and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European states. The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted states dominated by interests not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted states after trampling over the morals and convictions of Christianity, are today feeling the need of a federated

Europe, *i.e.*, the need of a unity which Christian church-organisation originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ's mission of human brotherhood, they considered it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam however is an impossible phenomenon; for here there is no church-organisation similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages inviting a destroyer. In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose structure owing to our legists' want of contact with modern world, stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of different spirit, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea, is hard to predict. Professor Wensinck of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day: "It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christianity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Christianity, still less what it will be for Islam." At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam.

I hope you will pardon me for this apparently academic discussion. To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states,

and finally who believes that Islam is itself destiny and will not suffer a destiny. Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your future as a distinct cultural unit in India. Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it today. It is open to a people to modify, reinterpret or reject the foundational principles of their social structure, but it is absolutely necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way in which I am approaching this important problem lead anybody to think that I intend to quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Muslim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirit and ideal of Islam. My sole desire, therefore, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone it is possible for me to illuminate, according to my light, the avenues of your political action.

What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national polities, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of

spirit led, by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experiment and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. "Man," says Renan, "is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his religion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation." Such a formation is quite possible, though it involves the long and arduous process of practically remaking men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in India if the teaching of Kabir and the Divine Faith of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste-units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statemanship cannot ignore facts,

however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognise facts as they are and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual good-will to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.

It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-lands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled

to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty according to the teaching of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship if need be. Yet I love the communal group, which is the source of my life and behaviour and which has formed me what I am, by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby recreating its whole past as a living operative factor in my present consciousness. Even the authors of the Nehru Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say : "To say from the larger view-point of nationalism that no communal provinces should be created, is, in a way, equivalent to saying from the still wider international view-point that there should be no separate nations. Both these statements have a measure of truth in them. But the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create the international State. *So also without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation.*"

Communalism in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand

for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this House will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied in it. *I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.* The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy state. This is true in so far as the area is concerned; in point of population the state contemplated by the proposal would be much less than some of the present Indian provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated State to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area. The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam, as cultural force, in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India, whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of

India, the North-West India Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be the invasion one of ideas or of bayonets. The Punjab with 56 per cent Muslim population supplies 54 per cent of the total combatant troops in the Indian army, and if the 19,000 Gurkhas recruited from the independent state of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to 62 per cent of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into account nearly 6,000 combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of North-West India Muslims in regard to the defence of India against foreign aggression. The Right Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim states along the north-west border is actuated by a desire "to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India." I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to securing permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.

Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states. I have already indicated to you the meaning of the word religion as applied to Islam. The truth is that Islam is not a church. It is a State conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of social mechanism, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism and the character of a Muslim State can be judged from what the *Times of India* pointed out

some time ago in a leader on the Indian Banking Enquiry Committee. "In ancient India," the paper points out, "the satate framed laws regulating the rates of interest, but in Muslim times, although Islam clearly forbids the realization of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim states imposed no restrictions on such rates." I, therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.

Thus it is clear that in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous states based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India. The conception of federation underlying the Simon Report necessitates the abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly as a popular assembly, and makes it an assembly of the representatives of federal states. It further demands a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated. And the Report does recommend both. I give my whole-hearted support to this view of the matter and venture to suggest that the redistribution recommended in the Simon Report must fulfil two conditions. It must precede the introduction of the new constitution and must be so devised as finally to solve the communal problem. Proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India. It is the present structure of the provinces that is largely responsible for this controversy. The Hindu thinks that separate electorates are contrary to the spirit of

nationalism, because he understands the word 'nation' to mean a kind of universal amalgamation in which no communal entity ought to retain its private individuality. Such a state of things, however, does not exist. Nor is it desirable that it should exist. India is a land of racial and religious variety. Add to this the general economic inferiority of the Muslims, their enormous debt, especially in the Punjab, and their insufficient majorities in some of the provinces as at present constituted, and you will begin to see clearly the meaning of our anxiety to retain separate electorates. In such a country and in such circumstances territorial electorate cannot secure adequate representation of all interests and must inevitably lead to the creation of an oligarchy. The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates if provinces are so demarcated as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity.

But in so far as the question of the powers of the Central Federal State is concerned, there is a subtle difference of motive in the constitutions proposed by the pundits of India and the pundits of England. The pundits of India do not disturb the Central authority as it stands at present. All that they desire is that this authority should become fully responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain intact and where their majority will become further reinforced on the nominated element ceasing to exist. The pundits of England, on the other hand, realising that democracy in the Centre tends to work contrary to their interests and is likely to absorb the whole power now in their hands, in case a further advance is made towards responsible government, have shifted the experience of democracy from the Centre to the provinces. No doubt, they introduce the principle of federation and appear to have made a beginning by making certain proposals; yet their evaluation of this principle is determined by considera-

tions wholly different to those which determine its value in the eyes of Muslim India. The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, *i.e.*, the communal problem. The Royal Commissioner's view of federation, though sound in principle, does not seem to aim at responsible government of federal states. Indeed, it does not go beyond providing means of escape from the situation which the introduction of democracy in India has created for the British, and wholly disregards the communal problem by leaving it where it was.

Thus, it is clear that, in so far as real federation is concerned, the Simon Report virtually negatives the principle of federation in its true significance. The Nehru Report realising Hindu majority in the Central Assembly reaches a unitary form of government because such an institution secures Hindu dominance throughout India; the Simon Report retains the present British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are naturally unwilling to part with the power they have so long wielded and partly because it is possible for them, in the absence of an inter-communal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the retention of that power in their own hands. To my mind a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. What is called 'residuary powers' must be left entirely to self-governing states, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal states. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation or fails to recognise them as a distinct political entity.

The necessity for a structural change in the Central Government was seen probably long before the

British discovered the most effective means for introducing this change. That is why at rather a late stage it was announced that the participation of the Indian Princes in the Round Table Conference was essential. It was a kind of surprise to the people of India, particularly the minorities, to see the Indian Princes dramatically expressing their willingness at the Round Table Conference to join an all-India federation and as a result of their declaration. Hindu delegates uncompromising advocates of a unitary form of government—quietly agreeing to the evolution of a federal scheme. Even Mr. Sastri who, only a few days before, had severely criticised Sir John for recommending a federal scheme for India, suddenly became a convert and admitted his conversion in the plenary session of the Conference—thus offering the Prime Minister of England an occasion for one of his wittiest observations in his concluding speech. All this has a meaning both for the British who have sought the participation of the Indian Princes, and for the Hindus who have unhesitatingly accepted the evolution of an all-India federation. The truth is that the participation of the Indian Princes, among whom only a few are Muslims, in a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it serves as an all-important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is; on the other hand, it gives overwhelming majority to the Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly. It appears to me that the Hindu-Muslim differences regarding the ultimate form of Central Government are being cleverly exploited by British politicians through the agency of the Princes who see in the scheme prospects of better security for their despotic rule. If the Muslims silently agree to any such scheme it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India. The policy of the Indian federation, thus created, will be practically controlled by Hindu Princes forming the largest group in the Central Federal Assembly. They will always lend their support to the Crown in matters of Imperial concern;

and in so far as internal administration of the country is concerned, they will help in maintaining and strengthening the supremacy of the Hindus. In other words, the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British Imperialism—you perpetuate me in India and I, in return, give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection. If, therefore, the British Indian provinces are not transformed into really autonomous states, the Princes' participation in a scheme of Indian federation will be interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned—Muslims with the word federation, Hindus with a majority in the Centre, the British Imperialists—whether Tory or Labourite—with the *substance* of real power.

The number of Hindu states in India is far greater than that of Muslim states; and it remains to be seen how the Muslim demand for 33 per cent seats in the Central Federal Assembly is to be met within a house or houses constituted of representatives taken from British India as well as Indian states. I hope the Muslim delegates are fully aware of the implications of the federal scheme as discussed in the Round Table Conference. The question of Muslim representation in the proposed all-India federation has not yet been discussed. "The interim report," says Reuter's summary, "contemplates two chambers in the federal legislature, each containing representatives both of British India and states, the proportion of which will be a matter of subsequent consideration under the heads which have not yet been referred to the Sub-Committee." In my opinion the question of proportion is of the utmost importance and ought to have been considered simultaneously with the main question of the structure of the Assembly.

The best course, I think, would have been to start with a British India federation only. A federal scheme born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such a unitary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority community in British India and to the Indian Princes; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims, unless they get majority rights in five out of the eleven Indian provinces with full residuary powers, and one-third share of seats in the total house of the Federal Assembly. In so far as the attainment of sovereign powers by the British Indian provinces is concerned, the position of His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal, Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Jinnah is unassailable. In view, however, of the participation of the Princes in the Indian federation we must now see our demand for representation in the British Indian Assembly in a new light. The question is not one of Muslim share in a British Indian Assembly, but one which relates to representation of British Indian Muslims in an All-India Federal Assembly. Our demand for 33 per cent must now be taken as a demand for the same proportion in the All-India Federal Assembly exclusive of the share allotted to the Muslim states entering the federation.

The other difficult problem which confronts the successful working of a federal system in India is the problem of India's defence. In their discussion of this problem the Royal Commissioners have marshalled all the deficiencies of India in order to make out a case for Imperial administration of the army. "India and Britain," say the Commissioners, "are so related that India's defence cannot *now or in any future which is within sight* be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army must rest in the hands of agents of Imperial Government." Now does it necessarily

follow from this that further progress towards the realisation of responsible government in British India is barred until the work of defence can be adequately discharged without the help of British officers and British troops? As things are, there is a block on the line of constitutional advance. All hopes of evolution in the Central Government towards the ultimate goal prescribed in the declaration of 20th August, 1917, are in danger of being indefinitely frustrated, if the attitude illustrated by the Nehru Report is maintained that any future change involves the putting of the administration of the army under the authority of an elected Indian Legislature. Further to fortify their argument they emphasise the fact of competing religions and rival races of widely different capacity, and try to make the problem look insoluble by remarking that "the obvious fact that India is not in the ordinary and natural sense a single nation is nowhere made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest." These features of the question have been emphasised in order to demonstrate that the British are only keeping India secure from foreign menace but are also the "neutral guardians" of internal security. However, in federated India, as I understand federation, the problem will have only one aspect, *i.e.*, external defence. Apart from provincial armies necessary for maintaining internal peace, the Indian Federal Congress can maintain, on the north-west frontier, a strong Indian Frontier Army, composed of units recruited from all provinces and officered by efficient and experienced military men taken from all communities. I know that India is not in possession of efficient military officers and this fact is exploited by the Royal Commissioners in the interest of an argument for Imperial administration. On this point I cannot but quote another passage from the Report which to my mind furnishes the best argument against the position taken up by the Commissioners. "At the present moment", says the Report, "no Indian holding the King's Commission is of higher army rank than a captain,

There are, we believe, 39 captains of whom 25 are in ordinary regimental employ. Some of them are of an age which would prevent their attaining much higher rank, even if they passed the necessary examination before retirement. Most of these have not been through Sandhurst, but got their Commissions during the Great War. Now, however genuine may be the desire, and however earnest the endeavour to work for this transformation, overriding conditions have been so forcibly expressed by the Skeen Committee (whose members, apart from the Chairman and the Army Secretary, were Indians) in these words : "Progress must be contingent upon success being secured at each stage and upon military efficiency being maintained, though it must, in any case, render such development measured and slow. A higher command cannot be evolved at short notice out of existing cadres of Indian officers, all of junior rank and limited experience. Not until the slender trickle of suitable Indian recruits for the officer class—and we earnestly desire an increase in their numbers—flows in much greater volume, not until sufficient Indians have attained the experience and training requisite to provide all the officers for, at any rate, some Indian regiments, not until such units have stood the only test which can possibly determine their efficiency, and not until Indian officers have qualified by a successful army career for the high command, will it be possible to develop the policy of Indianisation to a point which will bring a completely Indianised army within sight. Even then years must elapse before the process could be completed."

Now I venture to ask who is responsible for the present state of things? Is it due to some inherent incapacity of our martial races, or to the slowness of the process of military training? The military capacity of our martial races is undeniable. The process of military training may be slow as compared to other processes of human training. I am no military expert to judge this matter. But as a layman I feel that the

argument; as stated, assumes the process to be practically endless. This means perpetual bondage for India, and makes it all the more necessary that the Frontier Army as suggested by the Nehru Report, be entrusted to the charge of a committee of defence, the personnel of which may be settled by mutual understanding.

Again, it is significant that the Simon Report has given extraordinary importance to the question of India's land frontier, but has made only passing reference to its naval position. India has doubtless had to face invasions from her land frontier; but it is obvious that her present masters took possession of her on account of her defenceless sea coast. A self-governing and free India will, in these days, have to take greater care of her sea coast than land frontiers.

I have no doubt that if a federal government is established, Muslim federal state will willingly agree, for purposes of India's defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and naval forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India was a reality in the days of Mughal rule. Indeed in the time of Akbar the Indian frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme for a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspicion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of an invasion.

I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought, in my opinion, to look at the two most important constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslim demand of a territorial solution of the communal problem is ignored, then I support as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All-India Muslim League

and the All-India Muslim Conference. The Muslims of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which affect their majority rights, to be secured by separate electorates in the Punjab and Bengal, or fail to guarantee them 33 per cent representation in any Central legislature. There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism and deprived the Muslims of India of chances of acquiring any political power in India. The second is the narrow-visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the interests of what may be called Punjab ruralism resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.

The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the Muslim stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint electorates. The despatch of the Government of India on the Simon Report admits that, since the publication of that document, the Muslim community has not expressed its willingness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The despatch recognises that it may be a legitimate grievance to deprive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the councils in proportion to their population merely because of weightage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the despatch of the Government of India fails to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned—and this is the most crucial point—it endorses the so-called ‘carefully balanced scheme’ worked out by the official members of the Punjab Government which gives the Punjab Muslims a majority of two over Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 per cent of the house as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a

clear majority in the total house. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognise that the justification for communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless and until by the extension of franchise their voting strength more correctly reflects their population; and further unless a two-thirds majority of the Muslim members in a provincial council unanimously agree to surrender the right of separate representation. I cannot, however, understand why the Government of India, having recognised the legitimacy of the Muslim grievance, have not had the courage to recommend a statutory majority for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal.

Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes which fail to create at least Sind as a separate province and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilization the Royal Commissioners find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim Geographer Mas'udi noticed this kinship long ago when he said : "Sind is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam" The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt : "Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia." With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back towards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis of India I think it unwise to keep her attached to a presidency which, though friendly today, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any definite authoritative pronouncement on the matter. But assuming there are any such

difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary financial help to a promising province in her struggle for independent progress.

As to the North-West Frontier Province it is painful to note that the Royal Commissioners have practically denied that the people of this province have any right to reforms. They fall far short of the Bray Committee and the council recommended by them is merely a screen to hide the authority of the Chief Commissioner. The inherent right of the Afghan to light a cigarette is curtailed merely because he happens to be living in a powder house. The Royal Commissioners' epigrammatic argument is pleasant enough, but far from convincing. Political reform is light, not fire; and to light every human being is entitled whether he happens to live in a powder house or a coal mine. Brave, shrewd and determined to suffer for his legitimate aspirations, the Afghan is sure to resent any attempt to deprive him of opportunities of self-development. To keep such a people contented is in the best interests of both England and India. What has recently happened in that unfortunate province is the result of a step-motherly treatment shown to the people since the introduction of the principle of self-government in the rest of India. I only hope that British statesmanship will not obscure its view of the situation by hoodwinking itself into the belief that the present unrest in the province is due to any extraneous causes.

The recommendation for the introduction of a measure of reform in the North-West Frontier Province made in Government of India's despatch is also unsatisfactory. No doubt, the despatch goes farther than the Simon Report in recommending a sort of representative council and a semi-representative cabinet, but it fails to treat this important Muslim province on an equal footing with other Indian provinces. Indeed the Afghan is by instinct more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India.

I think I am now called upon to make a few observations on the Round Table Conference. Personally I do not feel optimistic as to the results of this Conference. It was hoped that away from the actual scene of communal strife and in a changed atmosphere, better counsels would prevail and a genuine settlement of differences between the two major communities of India would bring India's freedom within sight. Actual events, however, tell a different tale. Indeed, the discussion of the communal question in London has demonstrated more clearly than ever the essential disparity between the great cultural units of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. He is reported to have said that "his Government would find it difficult to submit to Parliament proposals for the maintenance of separate electorates since joint electorates were much more in accordance with British democratic sentiments." Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution of the problem. Nor is the Minorities Sub-Committee likely to reach a satisfactory settlement. The whole question will have to go before the British Parliament; and we can only hope that the keen-sighted representatives of British nation, unlike most of our Indian politicians will be able to pierce through the surface of things and see clearly the true fundamentals of peace and security in a country like India. To base a constitution on the concept of a homogeneous India or to apply to India principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war. As far as I can see, there will be no peace in the country until the various peoples that constitute India are given opportunities of free self-development on modern lines without abruptly breaking with their past.

I am glad to be able to say that your Muslim

delegates fully realise the importance of a proper solution of what I call Indian international problem. They are perfectly justified in pressing for a solution of the communal question before the question of responsibility in the Central Government is finally settled. No Muslim politician should be sensitive to the taunt embodied in that propaganda word—communalism—expressly devised to exploit what the Prime Minister calls British democratic sentiments and to mislead England into assuming a state of things which does not really exist in India. Great interests are at stake. We are 70 millions and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are anxious to become a nation, but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of travail, and, in the case of Hindu India involves a complete overhauling of her social structure. Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but placid arguments that Turkey and Iran and other Muslim countries are progressing on national *i.e.*, territorial lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population. The minorities there belong, in the language of the Quran, to the "people of the Book". There are no social barriers between Muslims and the "people of the Book." A Jew or a Christian or a Zoroastrian does not pollute the food of a Muslim by touching it, and the law of Islam allows intermarriage with the "people of the Book." Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realization of a final combination of humanity was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran declares : "O people of the Book ! Come,

let us join together on the word (Unity of God) that is common to us all." The wars of Islam and Christianity, and later, European aggression in its various forms, could not allow the infinite meaning of this verse to work itself out in the world of Islam. Today it is being gradually realized in the countries of Islam in the shape of what is called Muslim Nationalism.

It is hardly necessary for me to add that the sole test of the success of our delegates is the extent to which they are able to get the non-Muslim delegates of the Conference to agree to our demands as embodied in the Delhi Resolution. If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of a very great and far-reaching importance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for an independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your ideals and aspirations, you must be ready for such an action. Our leading men have done a good deal of political thinking and their thought has certainly made us, more or less, sensitive to the forces which are now shaping the destinies of peoples in India and outside India. But I ask, has this thinking prepared us for the kind of action demanded by the situation which may arise in the near future? Let me tell you frankly that, at the present moment, the Muslims of India are suffering from two evils. The first is the want of personalities. Sir Malcolm Hailey and Lord Irwin were perfectly correct in their diagnosis when they told the Aligarh University that the community had failed to produce leaders. By leaders I mean men who, by divine gift or experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, alongwith an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history. Such men are really the driving forces of a people, but they are God's gift and cannot be made to order. The second evil from which the Muslims of India are suffering is that the community is fast losing what is called the herd instinct. This makes it possible for individuals and groups to start independent careers without contri-

buting to the general thought and activity of the community. We are doing today in the domain of politics what we have been doing for centuries in the domain of religion. But sectional bickerings in religion do not do much harm to our solidarity. They, at least, indicate an interest in what makes the sole principle of our structure as a people. Moreover, this principle is so broadly conceived that it is almost impossible for a group to become rebellious to the extent of wholly detaching itself from the general body of Islam. But diversity in political action, at a moment when concerted action is needed in the best interests of the very life of our people, may prove fatal. Now shall we, then, remedy these two evils? The remedy of the first evil is not in our hands. As to the second evil, I think it is possible to discover a remedy. I have got definite views on the subject; but I think it is proper to postpone their expression till the apprehended situation actually arises. In case it does arise, leading Muslims of all shades of opinion will have to meet together, not to pass resolutions but finally to determine the Muslim attitude and to show the path to tangible achievement. In this address I mention this alternative only, because I wish that you may keep it in mind and give some serious thought to it in the meantime.

Gentlemen, I have finished. In conclusion I cannot but impress upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organisation and unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interest as a community, and in the interest of India as a whole. The political bondage of India has been and is a source of infinite misery to the whole of Asia. It has suppressed the spirit of the East and wholly deprived her of that joy of self-expression which once made her the creator of a great and glorious culture. We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die. We have a duty towards Asia, especially Muslim Asia. And since 70 millions of Muslims in a single country constitute a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia

put together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim point of view but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally performed without an organised will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own interest, as a political entity among other political entities of India, such an equipment is an absolute necessity. Our disorganised condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the community. I am not hopeless of an intercommunal understanding, but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalised by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will? Yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions, and learn to determine the value of your individual and collective action, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity; spirit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not *vice versa*. If today you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever-vitalising idea embodied in it, you will be only reassembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of the profoundest verses in the Holy Qur'an teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth and rebirth of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual? I do not wish to mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be. The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you

have achieved a real collective ego to look at them. In the words of the Qur'an, "Hold fast to yourself; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are well guided." (5 : 105).

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM CONFERENCE

In 1932 Allama Iqbal was elected President of the All-India Muslim Conference and he delivered the following Presidential Address at the annual session of the Conference held at Lahore on March 21, 1932.

Gentlemen, the Muslims of India have listened to so many addresses from their political platforms that the more impatient of them have already begun to suspect our deliberations which, they think, tend to enfeeble, and eventually kill, the spirit of action that lies dormant in the heart of Islam. "The present situation in the country", said one of them, "whets our appetite for action; and if our leaders fail to point to a definite course of action suitable to the peculiar position.

I am grateful to you for the confidence you have placed in me at this critical moment; but I certainly cannot congratulate you on your choice of a man who is nothing more than a visionary idealist. Perhaps you think you need a visionary at this juncture; for where there is no vision the people perish. Perhaps you think I am better equipped for the presidential chair of this assembly after my experiences at the London Conference. To reveal an ideal freed from its temporal limitations is one function; to show the way how ideals can be transformed into living actualities is quite another. If a man is temperamentally fit for the former function

his task is comparatively easy, for it involves a clean jump over temporal limitations which waylay the practical politician at every step. The man who has got the courage to migrate from the former to the latter function has constantly to take stock of, and often yield to, the force of those very limitations which he has been in the habit of ignoring. Such a man has the misfortune of living in the midst of perpetual mental conflict and can be easily accused of self-contradiction. However, I gladly accept the difficult position in which you have placed me, not because I consider myself fit for that position, but because the issues have fortunately become so clear that the whole thing now depends not so much on the guidance of one particular individual as on the force of all the individual wills focussed on a single purpose.

Greatest Danger to Modern Humanity

Politics have their roots in the spiritual life of man. It is my belief that Islam is not a matter of private opinion. It is a society, or if you like, a civic church. It is because present-day political ideals, as they appear to be shaping themselves in India, may affect its original structure and character that I find myself interested in politics. I am opposed to nationalism as it is understood in Europe, not because, if it is allowed to develop in India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims. I am opposed to it because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity. Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man. Yet that which really matters is a man's faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the things which, in my eyes, are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated. In view of the visible and invisible points of contact between the various communities of India I do believe in the possibility of constructing a harmonious whole

whose unity cannot be disturbed by the rich diversity which it must carry within its bosom. The problem of ancient Indian thought was how the one became many without sacrificing its oneness. Today this problem has come down from its ethical heights to the grosser plane of our political life, and we have to solve it in its reversed form, *i.e.*, how the many can become one without sacrificing its plural character. In so far then as the fundamentals of our policy are concerned, I have got nothing fresh to offer. Regarding these I have already expressed my views in my address to the All-India Muslim League. In the present address I propose, among other things, to help you, in the first place, in arriving at a correct view of the situation as it emerged from a rather hesitating behaviour of our delegation at the final stages of the deliberations of the Round Table Conference. In the second place, I shall try, according to my lights, to show how far it is desirable to construct a fresh policy now that the Premier's announcement at the last London Conference has again necessitated a careful survey of the whole situation. Let me begin with a brief history of the work of our delegation.

The Communal Problem

The first two meetings of the Minorities Committee were held on the 28th of September and the 1st of October 1931, respectively. On both occasions the meeting was adjourned for a private settlement of the communal problem. Mahatma Gandhi first told the Muslim delegation that matters could not proceed until the Muslim delegation had lifted the embargo on Dr. Ansari. Failing in this, he gave the Muslim delegation to understand that he would personally agree to Muslim demands and would try to persuade the Congress, the Hindus and the Sikhs to agree to them, provided the Muslims agreed to three things : (i) adult suffrage; (ii) no special representation for the Untouchables; and (iii) Congress demand for complete independence. The Mahatma declined to refer the matter to the Congress

and failed in his efforts to get the Hindus and the Sikhs to agree to this arrangement. On the 7th of October, two prominent Hindu leaders proposed that the whole matter might be referred to a board of seven arbitrators. This too was rejected by Hindu and Sikh representatives. On the 8th the Minorities Committee met for the third time. In this meeting Mahatma Gandhi set to the account of the British Government his failure to bring about a communal settlement, since, according to him, they had deliberately chosen for the British Indian delegation men who, as he said, had no representative character. On behalf of the Muslim delegation, the late Sir Mohammad Shafi refuted the Mahatma's uncalled for remarks questioning the representative character of the various delegations, and opposed the proposals put forward by him. The meeting came to an end, and, owing to the British general elections, could not meet till the 12th of November. In the meantime, private conversations recommenced on the 15th October. A prominent feature of these conversations was Sir Geoffrey Corbett's scheme relating to the Punjab. This scheme, very similar to the one I had suggested in my address to the All-India Muslim League, proposed the adoption of joint electorate with the exclusion of the Ambala Division from the Punjab. It, too, was rejected by Sikh and Hindu representatives who could not tolerate a Muslim majority in the Punjab even with a system of joint electorates. These conversations also remaining fruitless, the representatives of the Indian minorities which constitute nearly half of India, began to consult one another on the possibility of an Indian Minorities Pact. On the 12th of November all these minorities with the exception of Sikhs, signed a pact, which was formally handed over to the British Premier in the last meeting of the Minorities Committee held on the 18th of November. This brief account of our informal conversations speaks for itself. It is obvious that our delegates did their best to arrive at a communal settlement.

Provincial Autonomy and the Moderates

The only thing which is a mystery to me, and which will perhaps ever remain a mystery, is the declaration made on the 26th of November by our spokesmen in the Federal Structure Committee to the effect that they agreed to the simultaneous introduction of provincial autonomy and central responsibility. Whether this was due to their anxiety for conciliation and political advance of the country, or to some conflicting influences which operated on their minds, I cannot say. On the 15th of November, the day on which I dissociated from our delegation, Muslim delegates had decided not to participate in the discussions of the Federal Structure Committee. Why did they participate then in these discussions contrary to their own decision? Were our spokesmen on the Federal Structure Committee authorised to make the declaration of 26th November? I am not in a position to answer these questions. All that I can say is that the Muslim community considers the declaration a very grave error and I have no doubt that this Conference will give an emphatic expression to their views on this important matter. In my address to the All-India Muslim League I raised my voice against the idea of an All-India Federation. Subsequent events have shown that it is working only as a drag on the political advance of India. If the introduction of central responsibility is dependent on the completion of an All-India Federation, which I fear will take a fairly long time, then the Government should immediately introduce responsible Government in the British Indian provinces, so that the foundation thus delineated may, till the coming of central responsibility, fully prepare itself by experience to bear the weight of the federal superstructure. A great deal of spade work is needed before we can have a really modern federal state.

I have reason to believe, and had suspected this some days before I dissociated myself from our delegation, that our spokesmen were badly advised by certain

English politicians in rejecting the immediate introduction of responsible Government in the provinces of British India. Recently Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy has expressed the same view. He says: "I understand that the moderate leaders in London were badly advised on this matter by certain English politicians, that they listened too readily to their advice and rejected the great instalment of provincial autonomy. And the curious thing is that the Mahatma was apparently ready to consider this instalment sympathetically." Who are the moderate leaders alluded to by the Lieutenant-Commander? In view of the attitude taken up by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru in London and now in the Consultative Committee regarding the immediate introduction of Provincial autonomy, it is obvious that the writer of the passage quoted could not have meant Hindu Liberals. I think he probably means Muslim moderate leaders whose declaration in the Federal Structure Committee on the 26th of November seems to me to be really responsible for the British Premier's announcement regarding the simultaneous introduction of central and provincial responsibility. And since immediate introduction of responsible Government in the provinces would have involved a definite announcement regarding the demands of our community as to majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal, we must not forget while judging the present situation, that the conduct of our own leaders is mainly responsible for the British Premier's silence which has raised all sorts of suspicions in the mind of the Muslim Community.

Basic Demands of the Muslim Community

The next question is to explore the possibilities of shaping, if necessary, a new policy after the disappointing announcement made by the British Premier at the close of the last London Conference. Muslims have naturally grown apprehensive of Government's attitude towards the problem of communal settlement. They suspect that the Government will purchase Congress

co-operation at any cost, and that its delay in conceding Muslim demands is only a cover for the possibility of finding some basis for negotiations with that body. The policy of trusting the Government in regard to political issues seems to be rapidly losing its hold on the mind of the community. The Franchise Committee has postponed consideration of matters relating to the formation of constituencies. As for the promised provisional settlement, it is obvious that no communal settlement, provisional or permanent, can satisfy the Muslim community, which does not recognise, as its basic principle, the right of the community to enjoy majority rights in provinces where it happens to be in actual majority. The continuance of separate electorates and the status of the Frontier Province are no doubt assured, but complete provincial autonomy, transfer of power from Parliament to Indian provinces, equality of federal units, classification of subjects not into federal, central and provincial, but into federal and provincial, only, majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal unconditional separation of Sind, and one-third share in the centre, constitute no less essential elements of our demand. The Premier's silence on these points has only resulted in the unsound policy of war with the Congress and no peace with the rest of the country.

Muslims and the Congress

Shall we then join the Congress in their present campaign? My answer without a moment's hesitation is "No". A careful reading of the underlying motives of this movement will make it perfectly clear.

To my mind this movement has its roots in fear and resentment. The Congress leaders claim that they are the sole representatives of the peoples of India. The last Round Table Conference made it abundantly clear that were not. This they naturally resent. They know that the British people and the rest of the world now fully realise the importance of communal settlement

in India. They further know that the minorities of India have arrived at a pact, and that the British Government have given a notice to enforce a provisional settlement of their own, in case the Indians themselves failed to arrive at one. The Congress leaders fear that the British Government in their provisional settlement of the communal problem may concede to the minorities what they demand. They have, therefore, started the present campaign to bolster up a claim which has no foundation in fact, to defeat a pact which, they fear, may find a place in the coming constitution, and to force the Government to settle the matter of minorities with the Congress alone. The Congress resolution in pursuance of which the civil disobedience campaign was launched made it perfectly clear that since Government had refused to regard Mahatma Gandhi as the sole representative of the country, the Congress decided on civil disobedience. How can then a minority join a campaign which is directed as much against itself as against Government?

In the circumstances, therefore, to join the Congress in their present campaign is simply out of the question. But there is no denying that at the moment you are called upon to make important decisions.

British Government's Attitude

I am sure you are fully aware of the present state of the community's mind. Government's delay in conceding Muslim demands and the treatment meted out to our brave Frontier brethren on the eve of the constitutional reform in their province are making Indian Muslims suspicious of British methods; and most people are already asking the question whether the power of a third party in India does constitute a real safeguard for the Muslim minority against a politically hostile and economically exploiting majority in India. There seems to be a deeper reason also. The rapid movement of events, and often sudden changes of situation in the political world, cannot permit an Imperial democracy,

especially in the case of Party Government, to adhere for any long periods of time to definite policies. Lack of imagination is a virtue rather than a fault in a modern politician. And owing to this lack of imagination which is incapable of synthesising permanence and change in a higher political concept, modern politics is driven to live from hand to mouth. In the case of a subject country like India, therefore, co-operating communities are naturally led to think that the firmness of their political attitude in difficult times for the Government may be of little or no value in the eyes of this or that political party which may come to power at any time in England. Whatever may be the character and ideals of political parties in England, you must base your policy on enlightened self-interest and conceive it in a spirit calculated to impress the whole British nation. It is folly to fight a battle in which there is likelihood of the fruits of victory going to those who are either hostile to, or have no sympathy with, our legitimate political aspirations. The present circumstances are such that in thinking out a line of policy with a view to get over the immediate difficulties of the community, it is your duty to see that the likelihood I apprehend is eliminated, and the benefit of the action advised by you finally accrues to your community.

Let me state the position as plainly as possible. The British undertook to give a provisional decision of the communal problem in case the communities of India did not arrive at a mutual settlement after their representatives had returned from the second Round Table Conference. This undertaking was thoroughly consistent with the claim and the policy of the British as a third party holding the balance between the contending communities of India. The British Government's present attitude, however, would show that they do not mean to function as an impartial holder of balance in India, and are indirectly driving the Indian communities, which are mainly Hindus and Muslims, to a kind of civil war. We tried the majority community and found them unwilling

to recognise the safeguards which we can forego at the risk of complete extinction as a nation determined to live its own life. The alternative was to hope for justice from the British who, ever since they took the country from the Muslims, have claimed, as I have said above, to function as an impartial holder of balance in India. In their case, too, we find that the old British courage and straightforwardness are replaced by a constantly shifting policy which can inspire no confidence and seems to be calculated only to facilitate their own position in India. The Muslim community is thus brought to face the question whether it is in the interest of the community that their present policy which has so far oviated British difficulties and brought no gain to the community shall continue for any further period of time. This is a question for the open Conference to decide. All that I can say at the present stage is that, if you decide to discontinue this policy, your immediate duty is to prepare the whole community for the kind of selfsacrifice without which no self-respecting people can live an honourable life. The most critical moment in the history of the Indian Muslims has arrived. Do your duty or cease to exist.

Political Status of N.-W.F.P.

Gentlemen, I now request you to turn for a moment to two matters of gravest concern to the Muslims of India—I mean the Frontier Province and Kashmir which, I have no doubt, are uppermost in your mind.

It is indeed gratifying to see that Government have at least conceded our demand regarding the political status of North-West Frontier Province though it remains to be seen what this status means in the actual administration of that province. Newspaper reports show that in the matter of franchise, Government rules have been more liberal than in other provinces. The reform machinery will, it is understood, be set in full working order from the next month. What, however,

has taken grace out of the whole affair is the simultaneous launching of a campaign of repression which is not essentially different from martial law. The consideration shown in the matter of constitutional issue has been more than neutralized by the severity and short-sightedness shown in the case of the administrative issue. Government may have reasons for counteracting extremist activities of certain people in that part of the country, but it has surely not been able to defend a policy of wholesale repression. During this struggle in other parts of India Britain's dealing with the situation has not been entirely devoid of restraint. In the Frontier Province alone repression has assumed forms unworthy of a civilized Government. If oral reports are true then the heart of the British official in the Frontier Province stands in need of a reform far greater in importance for the British Empire than the constitutional reform sought to be introduced into that province. There is no definite and final information about the number of arrests and persecutions; but as it is roughly mentioned in newspapers, thousands have been arrested and convicted or interned. It is for the Government to consider whether the incongruent policies of concession and repression will result in the pacification of a proud race like the Afghans. Abdul Ghaffar Khan certainly commands a great deal of influence among the young border Afghans, but what has extended the sphere of his influence to the farthest ends of the territory and to the ignorant folk of the Frontier villages, is the present thoughtless policy of repression. Government cannot be unaware of the fact that the all-India policy of the Indian Muslims was, at this juncture, effectively keeping in check the tendencies of the Muslims of that province to join hands with those who were for an unconditional alliance with the Congress. Perhaps there have been difficulties from the Government point of view; yet I think a little different handling of the administrative action could have saved the whole situation. The political situation in the Frontier, it appears, was allowed to deteriorate during the period when a policy of

relaxation was the order of the day, and attempts to deal with it in a repressive manner have been made at a time when the real remedy of the disease had been prescribed. The sooner the Government withdraws all repressive measures from the province the better for the province and the Government itself. The situation has caused deep concern to the whole Muslim community in India, and it is hardly wise for the Government not to allay Muslim feeling in this respect.

The Kashmir Question

As to Kashmir it is hardly necessary for me to describe the historical background of events which have recently happened in that country. The apparently sudden resurrection of a people in whom the ego-flame had been almost extinguished ought to be, in spite of the suffering which it has necessarily involved, a matter of rejoicing to all those who possess an insight into the inner struggle of modern Asiatic peoples. The cause of the people of Kashmir is absolutely just, and I have no doubt that the rebirth of this sense of reality of their own personality in an intelligent and skilful people will eventually prove a source of strength not only to the State but also to the people of India as a whole. What, however, is most deplorable is that the communal ill-feeling existing in India, and the perfectly natural sympathy of the Indian Muslims with their Kashmir brethren, led to a kind of counter-agitation among the Hindus, which in its despair, sought to portect a barbarous administration by attributing its inevitable consequences to such wild fancies as Pan-Islamic plots and conspiracies for British occupation of Kashmir. Such agitation and the communal colour thereby given to the Kashmir question could have led only to one thing—resort to violent repression leading to prolonged lawlessness in the State. In parts of the Jammu Province, as newspaper reports tell us, the administration has completely broken down and it is only the presence of British troops which is keeping things in control at

least in places where they are present. Oral reports of a most violent and shameful repression practised by State authorities in many places are still pouring in. Nor can commissions of enquiry be of any help in such a state of things. The Middleton Report which admits important facts and fails to draw legitimate conclusions therefrom has already failed to satisfy Muslims. The truth is that the matter has passed the stage in which enquiries can lead to effective results. The growing sense of self-consciousness in the people all over the world is now demanding recognition in the shape of a desire for an increasing share in the administration which governs them. Political tutelage is good for a primitive people but it is in the best interests of an administration itself not to shirk from radical reform when a change in the outlook of a people demands it. Among other things which have probably arisen from the peculiar conditions obtaining in Kashmir, the people of that country demand some kind of a popular assembly. Let us hope that the ruler of the State and the Government of India will consider the people's demand as favourably as they possibly can. I have no doubt that the new Prime Minister, with characteristic British administrative acuteness, will see into the heart of the matter, and provide scope for the activity of a fine but down-trodden people who gave some of the best intellects to ancient India, and later added a real charm to Mughal culture. There may be difficulties in the way of constitutional reform in Kashmir as in the case of our own country but the interests of permanent peace and order demand that these difficulties must be speedily overcome. If the meaning of the present upheaval is not properly understood and its causes are sought in directions where they cannot be found, the Kashmir Government, I fear, will have made its problem much more complicated.

It is obvious, therefore, that the attitude of the British Government towards our demands and the gravity of the situation in the Frontier Province and Kashmir claim our immediate attention. But what claims our

immediate attention is not our only concern. We must have clear perception of the forces which are silently moulding the future, and place a relatively permanent programme of work before the community in view of the probable direction of events in the country. The present struggle in India is some-times described as India's revolt against the West. I do not think it is revolt against the West; for the people of India are demanding the very institutions which the West stands for. Whether the gamble of elections, retinues of party leaders and hollow pageants of parliaments will suit a country of peasants to whom the money-economy of modern democracy is absolutely incomprehensible, is a different question altogether. Educated urban India demands democracy. The minorities, feeling themselves as distinct cultural units and fearing that their very existence is at stake, demand safeguards, which the majority community, for obvious reasons, refuses to concede. The majority community pretends to believe in a nationalism theoretically correct, if we start from Western premises, belied by facts, if we look to India. Thus the real parties to the present struggle in India are not England and India, but the majority community and the minorities of India which can ill-afford to accept the principle of Western democracy until it is properly modified to suit the actual conditions of life in India.

Nor do Mahatma Gandhi's political methods signify a revolt in the psychological sense. These methods arise out of a contact of two opposing types of world-consciousness, Western and Eastern. The Western Man's mental texture is chronological in character. He lives and moves and his being is in time. The Eastern man's world-consciousness is non-historical. To the Western man things gradually become; they have a past, present, and future. To the Eastern man they are immediately rounded off, timeless, purely present. That is why Islam which sees in the time-movement a symbol of reality appeared as an intruder in the static world-pictures of Asia. They British as a Western people

cannot but conceive political reform in India as a systematic process of gradual evolution. Mahatma Gandhi as an Eastern man sees in this attitude nothing more than an ill-conceived unwillingness to part with power and tries all sorts of destructive negations to achieve immediate attainment. Both are elementally incapable of understanding each other. The result is the appearance of a revolt.

Be Hard and Work Hard

These phenomena, however, are merely premonitions of a coming storm, which is likely to sweep over the whole of India and the rest of Asia. This is the inevitable outcome of a wholly political civilization which has looked upon man as a thing to be exploited and not as a personality to be developed and enlarged by purely cultural forces. The peoples of Asia are bound to rise against the acquisitive economy which the West has developed and imposed on the nations of the East. Asia cannot comprehend modern Western capitalism with its undisciplined individualism. The faith which you represent recognises the worth of the individual, and disciplines him to give away his all to the service of God and man. Its possibilities are not yet exhausted. It can still create a new world where the social rank of man is not determined by this caste or colour or the amount of divided he earns, but by the kind of life he lives; where the poor tax the rich, where human society is founded not on the equality of stomachs but on the equality of spirits, where an Untouchable can marry the daughter of a king, where private ownership is a trust and where capital cannot be allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the real producer of wealth. This superb idealism of your faith, however, needs emancipation from the medieval fancies of theologians and legists. Spiritually we are living in a prison-house of thoughts and emotions which during the course of centuries we have woven round ourselves. And be it further said to the shame of us—men of older generation—that we have failed to equip the younger generation

for the economic, political and even religious crises that the present age is likely to bring. The whole community needs a complete overhauling of its present mentality in order that it may again become capable of feeling the urge of fresh desires and ideals. The Indian Muslims has long ceased to explore the depths of his own inner life. The result is that he has ceased to live in the full glow and colour of life, and is consequently in danger of an unmanly compromise with forces which, he is made to think, he cannot vanquish in open conflict. He who desires to change an unfavourable environment must undergo a complete transformation of his inner being. God changeth not the condition of a people until they themselves take the initiative to change their condition by constantly illuminating the zone of their daily activity in the light of a definite ideal. Nothing can be achieved without a firm faith in the independence of one's own inner life. This faith alone keeps a people's eyes fixed on their goal and saves them from perpetual vacillation. The lesson that past experience has brought to you must be taken to heart. Expect nothing from any side. Concentrate your whole ego on your self alone, and ripen your clay into real manhood if you wish to see your aspirations realized. Musolini's maxim was : "He who has steel has bread." I venture to modify it a bit and sat : "He who is steel has everything." Be hard and work hard. This is the whole secret of individual and collective life. Our ideal is well defined. It is to win in the coming constitution a position for Islam which may bring her opportunities to fulfil her destiny in this country. It is necessary in the light of this ideal to rouse the progressive forces of the community and to organise their hitherto dormant energies. The flame of life cannot be borrowed from others : it must be kindled in the temple of one's own soul. This requires earnest preparation and a relatively permanent programme.

Few Suggestions for a Future Programme

What then shall be our future programme? I am

inclined to think that it should be partly political, partly cultural. I venture to offer a few suggestions for your consideration.

First, we must frankly admit that there is yet a sort of chaos in the political thought of those who are supposed to guide the activities of the Indian Muslims in the present-day political struggle. The community, however, is not to blame for this state of things. The Muslim masses are not at all lacking in the spirit of self-sacrifice when the question of their ultimate destiny in the country is involved. Recent history bears ample testimony to what I say. The fault is ours, not theirs. The guidance offered to the community is not always independently conceived, and the result is ruptures, sometimes at critical moments, within our political organisations. Thus these organisations cannot properly develop the kind of discipline which is so absolutely essential to the life and power of political bodies. To remedy this evil I suggest that the Indian Muslims should have only one political organisation with provincial and district branches all over the country. Call it whatever you like. What is essential is that its constitution must be such as to make it possible for any school of political thought to come into power and to guide the community according to its own ideas and methods. In my opinion this is the only way to make ruptures impossible, and to re-integrate and discipline our scattered forces to the best interests of Islam in India.

Secondly, I suggest that this central organisation should immediately raise a national fund of at least 50 lakhs of rupees. No doubt we are living in hard times but you may rest assured that Muslims of India will not fail to respond to your call if a genuine effort is made to impress upon them the gravity of the present situation.

Thirdly, I suggest the formation of youth leagues and well-equipped volunteer corps throughout the

country under the control and guidance of the central organisation. They must specially devote themselves to social service, custom reform, commercial organisation of the community and economic propaganda in towns and villages specially in the Punjab where enormous indebtedness of Muslim agriculturists cannot be allowed to wait for the drastic remedies provided by agrarian upheavals. Things appear to have reached the breaking point as in China in 1925 when peasant leagues came into being in that country. The Simon Report admits that the peasant pays a 'substantial portion' of his means to the State. The State, no doubt, gives him in return peace and security, trade and communication. But the net result of these blessings has been only a kind of scientific exactitude in taxation, destruction of village economy by machine-made goods and the commercialisation of crops which makes the peasant almost always fall a prey to money-lenders and commercial agents. This is a very serious matter especially in the Punjab. I want the proposed youth leagues to specialise in propaganda work in this connection, and thus to help the peasantry in escaping from its present bondage. The future of Islam in India largely depends, in my opinion, on the freedom of Muslim peasants in the Punjab. Let then the fire of youth mingle with the fire of faith in order to enhance the glow of life and to create a new world of actions for our future generations. A community is not merely a purely present and numerable whole of men and women. Indeed its life and activity as a living reality cannot be fully understood without a reference to that unborn infinity which lies asleep in the depths of its inner being.

Fourthly, I suggest the establishment of male and female cultural institutes in all the big towns of India. These institutes as such should be to mobilise the dormant energy of the younger generation by giving them a clear grasp of what Islam has already achieved and what it has still to achieve in the religious and cultural history of mankind. The progressive forces of a people can be

roused only by placing before them a new task calculated to enlarge the individual, to make them comprehend and experience the community, not as a heap of isolated fragments of life, but as a well-defined whole possessing inner cohesion and solidarity. And when once these forces are roused they bring fresh vigour for new conflicts, and that sense of inner freedom which enjoys resistance and holds out the promise of a new self. These institutes must keep in close touch with our educational institutions—old and new—with a view to secure the ultimate convergence of all the lines of our educational endeavour on a single purpose. One practical suggestion I can immediately make. The Hartog Committee's Interim Report now apparently forgotten in the rush of other political problems, makes the following recommendation which I consider of the utmost importance for the Muslims of India :

"There can be no doubt that if in provinces where the educational progress of the Muhammadan Community is impeded by religious difficulties, such arrangements for religious instruction can be made as will induce that community to send its children to ordinary schools; the public system will gain both in economy and efficiency and much will be done to free the community from the handicap and the reproach of educational backwardness."

"We are fully aware that such arrangements are not easy to make and that in other countries they have given rise to much controversy.... But in our opinion the time is ripe and more than ripe for a determined effort to devise practical plans."
(pages 204-205).

And again on page 206 while discussing reservations the Report says :

"If therefore special arrangements inside the public system were made now, and possibly for some time to come, to enable the Muhammadan Community to take its full share in the life and in the advance of

the nation this would not, in our opinion, be inconsistent either with sound democratic or sound educational principles. We wish we could say that no reservations are necessary and we should certainly wish that they should be as small as possible. As complications of an educational system they are undesirable in themselves, but since, in our belief, they represent a necessary alternative to leaving the Muhammadan Community in its present backward state, and leaving it to take the poor chances afforded by a system of segregate institutions, we have no hesitation in embracing that alternative as justifiable on broad grounds of national policy."

The proposed cultural institutes or till their establishment the All-India Muslim Conference must see that these recommendations, based as they are on a clear, perception of the present handicaps of our community, are carried into effect.

Fifthly, I suggest the formation of an assembly of Ulama which must include Muslim lawyers who have received education in modern jurisprudence. The idea is to protect, expand and, if necessary, to reinterpret the law of Islam in the light of modern consitions, while keeping close to the spirit embodied in its fundamental principles. This body must receive constitutional recognition so that no bill affecting the personal law of Muslims may be put on the legislative anvil before it has passed through the crucible of this assembly. Apart from the purely practical value of this proposal for the Muslims of India, we must remember that the modern world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, has yet to discover the infinite value of the legal literature of Islam and its significance for a capitalistic world whose ethical standards have long abdicated from the control of man's economic conduct. The formation of the kind of assembly I propose will, I am sure, bring a deeper understanding of the usual principles of Islam at least in this country.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE INDIAN ORIENTAL CONFERENCE

The Fifth Indian Oriental Conference was held at Lahore in November, 1928, and Allama Iqbal was one of its sectional presidents—Arabic, Persian and Zend Section. Following is the substance of his address delivered before the conference. It was published in the Islamic Culture, Hyderabad-Deccan, in its issue for April, 1929, under the title "A Plea for Deeper Study of Muslim Scientists."

Sometime ago various questions arose in my mind regarding the culture of Islam as embodying the world-feeling of a specific group of mankind. Is Modern Science purely Western in origin? Why did the Muslims devote themselves to architecture as a mode of self-expression; and why did they comparatively ignore music and painting? What light, if any, do their mathematics and their decorative art throw on their intellectual and emotional attitude towards the concepts of space and time? Are there any psychological conditions which determined the rise and final acceptance, as an orthodox religious dogma, of a boldly conceived Atomic theory wholly unlike the Greek theory? What is the psychological meaning of Mi'raj in the cultural history of Islam? Professor MacDonald has recently tried to prove the existence of Buddhistic influence on the rise and growth of Atomism in Islam. But the cultural problem which I have ventured to raise is far more important than the purely historical question answered by Professor MacDonald. Similarly Professor Bevan has given us valuable historical discussion of the story of the Mi'raj.

To my mind, however, what is, culturally speaking, more important is the intense appeal that the story has always made to the average Muslim, and the manner in which Muslim thought and imagination have worked on it. It must be something more than a mere religious dogma, for it appealed to the great mind of Dante, and, through Muhyiuddin Iban-ul-'Arabi furnished a model for the sublimest part of the Divine Comedy which symbolises the culture of medieval Europe. The historian may rest satisfied with the conclusion that the Muslim belief in the Prophet's Ascension finds no justification in the Qur'an; yet the Psychologist who aims at a deeper view of Islamic culture cannot ignore the fact that the outlook given by the Qur'an to its followers does demand the story as a formative element in the world-picture of Islam. The truth is that it is absolutely necessary to answer all such questions, and mutually to adjust their answers into a systematic whole of thought and emotion. Without this it is impossible to discover the ruling concepts of a given culture, and to appreciate the spirit that permeates it. However, a comprehensive view of the culture of Islam, as an expression of the spiritual life of its followers, is easy of achievement.

The culture of Islam is the youngest of all Asiatic cultures. For us moderns it is far more easy to grasp the spirit of this culture than to imagine the world-picture of those ancient cultures whose intellectual and emotional attitude it is extremely difficult to express in a modern language.

The difficulty of the historian of Muslim culture is mainly due to the almost total lack of Arabic scholars trained in special sciences. European scholars have done good work in the domain of Muslim history, philology, religion and literature. Muslim Philosophy too has had a share of their attention; but I am afraid the work done in Philosophy is, on the whole, of a superficial kind, and often betrays ignorance of both Muslim and European thought. It is in Art as well, as

in the concepts of special sciences and Philosophy that the true spirit of a culture is revealed. But, for the reason mentioned above, the student of Muslim culture is yet very far from understanding the spirit of that culture.

Briffault, in his *Making of Humanity*—a book which every student of the history of culture ought to read—tells us that “neither Roger Bacon nor his later namesake has any title to be credited with having introduced the experimental method.” And further that “the experimental method of the Arabs was by Bacon’s time widespread and eagerly cultivated throughout Europe.” Now, I have reasons to believe that the origin of Descartes’ Method and Bacon’s *Novum Organum* goes back to Muslim critics of Greek logic, e.g., Ibn Taimiyya, Ghazzali, Razi and Shahab-uddin Shurawardi Maqtul. But it is obvious that the existing material which would prove this thesis can be handled only by these Arabic scholars who have made a special study of Greek, Muslim and European logic.

Again, our ignorance of the concepts of Muslim science sometimes leads to erroneous views of modern culture. An instance of this I find in Spengler’s extremely learned work, *Untergang des Abendlandes*, in which he has developed a new theory of the birth and growth of cultures. While discussing the concept of number in the classical, Arabian and modern cultures, and contrasting the Greek notion of magnitude with the Arabian indeterminateness of number, he says :

“Number as pure magnitude inherent in the material presentness of things is paralleled by number as pure relation, and if we may characterize the classical “World”, the cosmos, as being based on a deep need of visible limits and composed accordingly as a sum of material things, so we may say that our world-picture is an actualising of an infinite space in which things visible appear very nearly as realities of a lower order, limited in the presence of the illimitable. *The symbol of*

the West is an idea of which no other culture gives even a hint, the idea of function. The function is anything rather than an expansion of, it is complete emancipation from, any pre-existent idea of number. With the function, not only the Euclidean Geometry but also the Archimedean arithmetic ceased to have any value for the really significant mathematic of Western Europe."

The last three sentences in this passage are in fact the foundation-stone on which the superstructure of Spengler's theory largely rests. Unfortunately, the thesis that no other culture gives even a hint of the idea of function is incorrect. I had a vague recollection of the idea of function in Al-Beruni, and, not being a mathematician, I sought the help of Dr. Zia-ud-Din of Aligarh who very kindly gave me an English translation of Al-Beruni's passage, and wrote to me an interesting letter from which I quote the following :

"Al-Beruni in his book, Qanun-i-Mas'udi, used Newton's formula of Interpolation for valuing the various intermediary angles of Trigonometry functions from his tables which were calculated for every increase of fifteen minutes. He gave Geometrical proof of Interpolation formula. In the end he wrote a paragraph saying that this proof can be applied to any function whatsoever whether it may be increasing or diminishing with the increase of arguments. He did not use the word function, but he expressed the idea of function in generalising the formula of Interpolation from Trigonometrical function to any function whatsoever. I may add here that I drew the attention of Prof: Schwartzschild—Professor of Astronomy in the Cottingen University—to this passage, and he was so much surprised that he took Prof: Andrews with him to the library, and got the whole passage translated three times before he began to believe it."

It is not possible for me here to discuss Spengler's theory, and to show how materially his oversight affects

his view of history. Suffice it to say that a genetic view of the cultures associated with the two great Semitic religions reveals their spiritual relationship which tends to falsify Spengler's thesis that cultures, as organic structures, are completely alien to one another. But this brief reference to one of the most important concepts of modern mathematics remains me of : غاية الامكان في : (The extent of possibility in the science of Space) of 'Iraqi.

During my correspondence with Maulvi Syed Anwar Shah, one of the most learned traditionists in the Muslim world of today, regarding the meaning of the word 'Dahr' (time), occurring in the well known tradition لا تسبوا الدهر ان الدهر هو الله Deal not in invective against Time (with Time's vicissitudes) Lo! Time (with Time's vicissitudes) is Allah the Maulvi Sahib referred to this manuscript; and later, at my request, very kindly sent me a copy of it.

I consider it necessary to give you an account of the contents of this valuable document, partly because it will furnish additional reason for dissatisfaction with Spengler's theory, but mainly because I mean thereby to impress upon you the need of Oriental research in the concepts of special sciences as developed in the world of Islam. Moreover it is likely that this small manuscript of great value may lead to the opening up of a fresh field of inquiry about the origins of our concepts of space and time, the importance of which has only recently been realised by modern Physics.

There is, however, some doubt about the authorship of the booklet. Hajji Khalifah attributes it to one Sh. Mahmud whom I have not been able to trace. About the middle of the text the following sentence occurs :

این مخدرة غیبی چون بمشاطگنی بیان این بنده ضعیف
باخر زمانیان جلوه کند امید وارم تشنگان جرعه حقیقت در
ایام آخر الزمان از دست این ساقی عراقی جال زلال شیرین
مشاهده نمایند -

Personally I am inclined to think that in this manuscript we are in a more intimate touch with the Persian Sufi 'Iraqi whose freedom of thought and action brought on him the odium of the orthodox both in Egypt and India. However the reason why he was led to reduce his thoughts to writing is thus explained :

و بایستی که این اسرار عزیز در صمیم جان و سویدائے دل
مکنون و مخزون داشته نه از راه بخل ، بل از راه عزت و
نفاست ، ولیکن عذر در جلوه کردن این مخدرة عذرا آنست که
وقتی در اثنائے سخن و گرمی دل بر زبان لفظ مکان رفت ،
و چون لفظ مکان شنیدند از سر تعصب و حسد و عناد و وجود
این حکم را دست آویز ساختند و بزنجافیدن ما میان بستند و
رقم تشبیه بر ما کشیدند و بتکفیر ما قیوائے نوشتند - پس ناچار
از بهر یرات ساخت دل خود از غبار تشبیه این مخدرة عذرا از
اهدان عالمیان عالم طبیعت عرض بابسته کردن و این یوسف
با جمال بآن کوران جلوه بایستی داد - تا رفع ظن ایشان بوده
باشد - اگرچه معلوم بود که درد تعصب و حسد درمان نمی
پذیرد - چنانچه باران که ماده حیات است مردار اجز تباهی نمی
افزاید - ان الزین حقت علیهم کلمه ربک لا یومنون ولو جاء
نهم کل آية حتی یر والعذاب الالیم -

Assuming, then, that the writer is Fakhr-ud-Din 'Iraqi, it is significant to note that he was a contemporary of Nasir-ud-Din Tusi. Tusi's work on Euclid was printed in Rome in 1594, and John Wallis introduced it to the University of Oxford about the middle of the 17th century. It is Tusi's effort to improve the parallel postulate of Euclid that is believed to have furnished a basis in Europe for the problem of space which eventually led to the theories of Gauss and Reimann. 'Iraqi, however, was not a mathematician, though his view of space and time appears to me to be several centuries

ahead of Tusi. This necessitates a very careful inquiry into the progress of mathematical thought in Islam with a view to discover whether 'Iraqi's conclusions were ever reached through a purely mathematical channel.

I will now proceed to summarise the substance of 'Iraqi's discussion of time and space mainly in his own words. The secret of time and space is the greatest of secrets. To know it is to know the secret of the being and attributes of God. The existence of some kind of space in relation to God is clear from the following verses of the Qur'an :

"Dost thou not see that God knoweth all that is in the Heavens and all that is in the Earth? Three persons speak not privately together, but He is their fourth; nor five, but He is their sixth; nor fewer nor more, but wherever they be He is with them" (58.8).

"Ye shall not be employed in affairs, nor shall ye read a text out of the Qu'ran, nor shall ye work any work, but we will be witness over you when you are engaged therein; and the weight of an atom on Earth or in Heaven escapeth not thy Lord; nor is there weight that is less than this or greater but it is in the Perspicuous Book." (10.62).

"We created man: and we know what his soul whispereth to him, and we are closer to him than his neckvein" (50.15).

But we must not forget that the words proximity, contact and mutual separation, which apply to material bodies, do not apply to God. Divine life is in touch with the whole Universe on the analogy of the soul's contact with the body. The soul is neither inside nor outside the body, neither proximate to nor separate from it. Yet its contact with every atom of the body is real, and it is impossible to conceive this contact except by positing some kind of space which befits the subtleness of the soul. The existence of space in relation to

the life of God, therefore, cannot be denied; only we should carefully define the kind of space which may be predicated of the Absoluteness of God.

Now there are three kinds of space—the space of material bodies, the space of immaterial beings, and the space of God. The space of material bodies is further divided into three kinds :

First, the space of gross bodies of which we predicate roominess. In this space movement takes time, bodies occupy their respective places and resist displacement.

Secondly, the space of subtle bodies, *e.g.*, air and sound. In this space two bodies resist each other and their movement is measurable in terms of time which, however, appears to be different to the time of gross bodies. The air in a tube must be displaced before other air can enter into it; and the time of sound-waves is practically nothing compared to the time of gross bodies.

Thirdly, we have the space of light. The light of the Sun instantly reaches the farthest limits of the Earth. Thus in the velocity of light and sound time is reduced almost to zero. It is, therefore, clear that the space of light is different to the space of air and sound.

There is, however, a more effective argument than this. The light of a candle spreads in all directions in a room without displacing the air in the room; and this shows that the space of light is more subtle than the space of air which has no entry into the space of light. In view of the close proximity of these spaces, however, it is not possible to distinguish the one from the other except by purely intellectual analysis and spiritual experience. Again, in the hot water the two opposites—fire and water—which appear to interpenetrate each other cannot, in view of their respective natures, exist in the same space. The fact cannot be explained except on the supposition that the spaces of the two substances,

though closely proximate to each other are nevertheless distinct. But while the element of distance is not entirely absent, there is no possibility of mutual resistance in the space of light. The light of candle reaches up to a certain point only and the lights of a hundred candles intermingle in the same room without displacing one another.

Having thus described the spaces of physical bodies, possessing various degrees of substleness, 'Iraqi proceeds briefly to describe the main varieties of space operated upon by the various classes of immaterial beings, *e.g.*, angels. The element of distance is not entirely absent from these spaces; for immaterial beings, while they can easily pass through stone walls, cannot altogether dispense with motion which, according to 'Iraqi, is evidence of imperfection in spirituality. The highest point in the scale of spatial freedom is reached by the human soul which, in its unique essence, is neither at rest nor in motion. Thus passing through the infinite varieties of space we reach the Divine space which is absolutely free from all dimensions, and constitutes the meeting point of all infinities.

In a similar manner 'Iraqi deals with time. There are infinite varieties of time relative to the varying grades of being intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The time of gross bodies which arises from the revolutions of the heavens is divisible into past, present, and future; and its nature is such that as long as one day does not pass away the succeeding day does not come. The time of immaterial beings is also serial in character; but its passage is such that a whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of immaterial beings. Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach the nation of Divine Time which is absolutely free from the quality of 'passage', and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity; it has

neither beginning nor end. The 'eye' of God sees all the visibles and His 'ear' hears all the audibles in one indivisible act of perception. The priority of God is not due to the priority of time; on the other hand the priority of time is due to God's priority. Thus Divine Time, is what the Qur'an describes as the 'Mother of Books' in which the whole of history, freed from the net of casual sequence is gathered up in a single super-eternal 'now'.

From this summary of 'Iraqi's view you will see how a cultured Muslim Sufi intellectually interpreted his spiritual experience of time and space in an age which had no idea of the theories and concepts of modern mathematics and physics. In fact his theory of a plural space may be taken as a primitive stage in the modern hyperspace movement which originated in Nasir-ud-Din Tusi's efforts to improve the parallel postulate of Euclid. In modern times it was Kant who first definitely suggested the idea of different spaces as you will see from the following passage which I quote from his Prolegomena :

"That complete space (which is itself no longer the boundary of another space) has three dimensions; and that space in general cannot have more, is based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one point....That we can require a line to be drawn to infinity, a series of changes to be continued (for example, spaces passed through by motion) in indefinitum, presupposes a representation of space and time which can only attach to intuition."

But Kant was not a mathematician. It was left for professional mathematicians of the 18th and the 19th centuries finally to reach the concept of space as a dynamic appearance, and, as such, generable and finite. 'Iraqi's mind seems to be vaguely struggling with the concept of space as an infinite continuum; yet he was unable to see the full implications of his thought partly because he was not a mathematician and partly because

of his natural prejudice in favour of the traditional Aristotelian idea of a fixed Universe. If he had been able to raise the question whether dimensionality is a property of the world or a property of knowledge of the world, he would have felt the necessity of a searching examination of his own consciousness, and this would have opened up to him a line of thought much more in keeping with his *sufistic* standpoint. Again the interpenetration of the superspatial 'here' and the supereternal 'now' in the ultimate Reality suggests the modern notion of space-time which Prof. Alexander, in his lectures on 'Space, Time and Deity', regards as the matrix of all things. A keener insight into the nature of time would have led 'Iraqi to see that time is the more fundamental of the two; and that it is not a mere metaphor to say, as Prof. Alexander does say, that time is the mind of space. 'Iraqi conceives God's relation to the Universe on the analogy of the relation of the human soul to the body but, instead of philosophically reaching this position through a criticism of the spatial and temporal aspects of experience, he simply postulates it on the basis of his spiritual experience. It is not sufficient merely to reduce space and time to a vanishing point-instant. The philosophical path that leads to God as the *Omnipsyche* of the universe lies through the discovery of Living Thought as the ultimate principle of space-time. 'Iraqi's mind, no doubt moved in the right direction; but his Aristotelian prejudice coupled with a lack of Psychological analysis blocked his progress. With his view that Divine Time is utterly devoid of change—a view obviously based on an inadequate analysis of conscious experience—it was not possible for him to discover the relation between Divine Time and serial time, and to reach, through this discovery, the essentially Islamic idea of continuous creation which means a growing universe.

THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE UNITY AS FOUNDED BY ABUL KARIEM AKBARI

PART THREE

ISLAMIC STUDIES

ISLAMIC STUDIES
PART THREE

THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE UNITY AS EXPOUNDED BY ABDUL KARIM AL-JILI

This article was published in the Indian Antiquary of Bombay in its issue for September, 1900. It is a comprehensive statement of Islamic Metaphysical Mysticism as represented by Shaikh Abdul Karim Al-Jili in his famous work Al-Insan Al-Kamil.

While European scholars have investigated ancient Hindu philosophy with an unflagging enthusiasm, they have as a rule looked upon Muslim philosophy as only an unprogressive repetition of Aristotle and Plato. Although during recent years some attention has been paid to this art of Arabic literature, yet the work achieved by reapers in this field bears no proportion to the harvest that may yet be reaped. This comparatively indifferent attitude towards Arabic philosophy was, perhaps due, to a great extent, to the fascination that Indian speculation has exercised over the mind of Europe ever since the discovery of Sanskrit literature. We admit the superiority of the Hindu in point of philosophical acumen, yet this admission need not lead us to ignore the intellectual independence of the Muslim thinkers. The post-Islamic history of the Arabs is a long series of glorious military exploits, which compelled them to adopt a mode of life leaving but little time for gentler conquests in the great field of science and philosophy. They did not and could not produce men like Kapila and Sankaracharya, but they zealously rebuilt

the mouldering edifice of Science, and even attempted to add fresh stories to it. Their originality does not appear at once because the unscientific condition of the age led them to write in the spirit of expositors rather than that of independent thinkers. We wish here to illustrate their originality by considering that portion of the Islamic philosophy which has been generally condemned under the contemptuous name of mysticism. We believe, however, that mysticism is but metaphysics hidden under the veil of religious phraseology and that the superstructure of mysticism is impossible without a system of metaphysics serving as its foundation. It is, in our opinion, essentially a system of verification—a spiritual method by which the ego realises as fact what intellect has understood as theory. We know much in theory and our belief in this kind of knowledge depends on the force and the number of the arguments advanced in its support. The detection of some logical flaw in our argument or the force of the arguments in favour of opposite view may at once induce us to abandon our theory; but if the ego has realised the theory, if the theory, in question, has been spiritual experience on our part, no argument, however forcible, no logical flaw, can dispose as to abandon our position. Hence mysticism appeals to a standard higher than intellect itself. This standard, waiving the question of its objective existence, is, according to the mystic, Qalb (قلب) or heart, the meaning of which will be explained later on. I shall not here swell upon the scientific necessity of mysticism for the solution of the human enigma¹, but shall content myself with a brief statement of the Islamic Metaphysical Mysticism as represented by Shaikh Abdul Karam al Jili in his famous work *Al-Insanu-i-Kamal* (The Perfect Man).

This deep thinker was born at Jilo in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Sheikh Muhiud-Din

(1) Dr. Pich, in his *Philosophy of Mysticism*, shows with great force and clearness that an examination of Mysticism is necessary for a complete solution of the human enigma.

Ibn 'Arabi² whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and philosophical genius, but his poetry is not more than a vehicle for his mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a commentary on Shaikh Muhiud-Din Ibn 'Arabi's *Fatuhatal-Makkiyah*, a commentary on *Bismillah*, and *Al-Insan-ul-Kamil* which we propose to consider here.

This famous work comprises two volumes; the first may be looked upon as a treatise on his metaphysical opinions while the second attempts explanations of terms current in popular Muhammadan Theology. In order to make his doctrine easy of understanding he enters into certain preliminary explanations and declares that in speaking of the ultimate realities we must come down to popular language—a vehicle quite insufficient for the purpose. He avows that the enigma of existence is too high for common phraseology and that his statements must necessarily be “borken lights” of the great truth. After this brief spology he goes on to relate a personal anecdote showing how he once felt intense thirst for truth and how at last he learnt it from a person endowed with “all the attributes of spiritual glory”. The introduction ends with a condensed statement of his doctrine which he puts in this way :

Divine Nature soars upwards; human nature sinks down-wards; hence perfect human nature must stand midway between the two, it must share both the Divine and the human attributes—in one word the perfect man must be the god-man.

In the first chapter the author explains the meanings of the word *Zaat* (ذات) or Essence. Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and attributes are given, whether it is existent or non-existent like

-
- (2) Sheikh Muhiud-Din Ibn 'Arabi—the greatest of the Muhammadan Sufis was an astonishingly voluminous writer. He believed in the solution of the earth round the sun, as well as the existence of a world beyond ocean (468-548 A. H.).

unaqa (عناء) The existent is of two species :

- (1) The existent in absoluteness or pure existence—Pure Being—God.
- (2) The existence joined with non-existence—the Creation—Nature.

The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can express it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The intellect flying through fathomless empty space pierces through the veil of names and attributes, traverses the airy sphere of time, enters the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to be an existence which is non-existence—a sum of contradictions.³ It is interesting to compare this passage with Hegel whose speculations have exercised such a vast influence on the methods of modern scientific investigations. It will appear how strikingly he anticipates the conclusions of modern German philosophy without seeking the help of the Hegelian method—a fact which makes his teaching appear rather dogmatic.

After this confession of ignorance the author goes on to say that *Pure Being* has two *ardh* (عرض) (accident) eternal life in all past time and eternal life in all future time. It has two *wasf* (وصف) (qualities); God and Creation. It has two *lught* (لغت) (definitions); uncreatableness and creatableness. It has *asmaa* (اسماء) (two names) God and Man. It has *wajhaan* (وجهان) (two faces); the manifested (this world) and the unmanifested (the next world). It has *hukmaan* (حکمان) (two effects); necessity and possibility. It has *istibaraan* (استباران) (two points of view); from the first it is non-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the second it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not itself. With these bits of Hegelianism the author closes this difficult speculation and begins his second chapter on the name.

Name, he says, fixes the names in the understanding, picture it is in the mind, presents it in the imagination and

keeps it in the memory. It is the outside or the husk, as it were, of the names, while the names is the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in name only—as *unqaa* (عنقاء) (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which does not exist in reality. Just as *unqaa* is absolutely non-existent, so God is absolutely present although it cannot be touched and seen. The *unqaa* exists only in idea while the object of the name *Allah* (الله) exists in reality and can be known like only through its names and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees Himself.

In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three stages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by the author in his chapter on the Illuminations of the Essence. There he propounds that the Absolute existence of Pure Being when it leaves its absoluteness undergoes three stages :

- (1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3) I-ness.

In the first stage there is absence of all attributes and relations yet is called one and therefore oneness marks one step away from the absoluteness. In the second stage the Pure Being is yet free from all manifestation while the third Stage I-ness is nothing but an external manifestation of the He-ness or, as Hegel would say, it is the self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name *Allah* (الله) ; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature come to the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that the name *Allah* is the stuff of all perfections of the different Phases of Divinity and in the second stage of the progress of Pure Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which God reflected Himself and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the gloom of the Absolute Being.

In correspondence with these three stages of the Absolute Development the perfect man has three stages, of spiritual training, but in his case the process of development must be thereverse, because his is the process of ascent while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute and in the third stage he enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the god-man; his eye becomes the eye of God; his word the word of God and his life the life of God—participates in the general life of Nature and “sees into the life of things”. It will appear at once how strikingly the author has anticipated the chief phase of the Hegelian Dialectic and how greatly he has emphasised the Doctrine of the Logos—a doctrine which has always found favour with almost all the profound thinkers of Islam, and in recent times has been readvocated by M. Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, probably the profoundest theologian among modern Indian Muhammadans. The chapter ends with a fanciful discussion about the meanings of the different letters of the word Allah each letter of the word, he says, marks a separate Divine Illumination.

The third chapter is a brief discussion of the nature of the Attribute. The author's views on the most interesting question are very important because it is here that his doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines Attribute as an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.⁴ Elsewhere he says that this distinction of Attribute from the underlying reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested because here every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested because there is no combination or disintegration

there. It should be observed how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of Maya; he believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real entity hidden behind the sum of attributes but it is a conception furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in understanding the material world. Berkley and Fichte will so far agree with our author but his view leads him to the most characteristically Hegelian doctrine-Identity of Thought and Being. In the 37th chapter of the 2nd volume of his book, he clearly says that Idea is stuff of which this universe is made: Thought, idea, notion is the material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this doctrine he says, "Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the reality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the idea⁵". Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He would give his hearty assent to the results of Kant's *Kritik of Pure Reason* but, unlike him, he would make this very idea the essence of the Universe. Kant's *Ding an sich* to him is pure non-entity; there is nothing behind the collection of attributes, attributes are but the real things, the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it is the other self of the absolutely another which owes its existence to the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature is the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself. While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, our author calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be noted that the author's our author calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be noted that the author's *phrase* (عالم صفات) (world of attributes) which he uses for the material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal and does

not all exist in the nature of things. It is useful because it facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not all real. It will be understood that the author recognises the truth of Empirical Idealism only tentatively and does not admit the absoluteness of the distinction.

These remarks should not lead us to understand that the author does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the "other", the external expression of the thing in itself. The *Ding an sich* and its external expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really identical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate our understanding. If there are not identical, he says, how could one express the other? In one word, he means by *Ding an sich* or (ذات) the Pure, the Absolute Being and seeks it through its manifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the world of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is brought home to us the veil is removed; we see (ذات) itself everywhere and find that the all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are at one with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases and the inquisitive attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no new information and religion with her role of supernatural authority has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation.

After these profound remarks the author proceeds to classify the different Divine Names and Attributes which have received expression nature or the crystallised (الوہیت) —a doctrine similar to that of the

ants. His classification is as follows :

- ١ - الاسماء والصفات الذاتية : الله - الاحد - الواحد -
الفرد - الوتر - الصمد
(1) (Al-Zaatiyya :—Allah, Al-Ahad, Al-Waahid,
Al-Fard, Al-Witr, Al-Samad).
- ٢ - الاسماء والصفات الجلالية : الكبير المتعال - العزيز العظيم -
الجليل القهار
(2) (Al-Jalaliyya—Al-Kabir-al-Mutaal, Al-Aziz-al-
Azeem, Al-Jalil-al-Qahhar).
- ٣ - الاسماء والصفات المشتركة و بي الكمالية : الرحمن -
الملك - الرب - المهيمن - الخالق - السميع
(3) (Al-Kamaaliyya—Al-Rahmaan, Al-Malik,
Al-Rabb, Al-Muhaimin, Al-Khaliq, Al-Sami).
- ٤ - الاسماء والصفات الجالية : العليم - الرحيم - السلام -
المومن - الباري - المصور -
(4) (Al-Jamaaliyya—Al-Aleem, Al-Raheem, Al-
Salaam, Al-Mumin, Al-Baari, Al-Musawwir).

Each of these names and attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the soul of the perfect man.⁶ How these illuminations take place and how they reach the soul is not explained by the author. His silence about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship.

6. The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (Allah, The One, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living); the name of attributes of God as the source of all Glory (The Great and High, The all-Powerful); The names and attributes of God as all-Perfection The Creator, The Benefactor, The First, The Last); The name and attribute of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all).

Before considering the author's views of particular Divine Names and Attributes we should note, that his conception of God, implied in the above classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While the German Theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single attribute of power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself God is an unchangeable unity and that His attributes "are nothing more than views of Him from different human stand-points, the various appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite intelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the spiritual land-scape"⁷. In His absolute existence He is beyond the limitations of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself, when He leaves his absoluteness when nature is born, names and attributes appear sealed on her very fabric.

Let us now consider what the author teaches about particular Divine Names and Attributes. The first Essential Name is Allah or (الوہیت) (Divinity which forms the subject of the 4th chapter) Divinity means the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference between them is that the latter is visible to the eye but its where is invisible, while the traces of the former are visible, itself is invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, nature is not the real divinity; hence divinity is invisible and its traces in the form of nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice, but ice is not water. The (ذات) is visible to the eye (another proof of our author's

(7) Matheson's *Aids to the Study of German Theology* p. 43.

Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as they are in themselves; their shadows or their effects only are known. For instance, generosity itself is known, only its effect or the fact of giving to the poor is known and seen. This is due to the attributes being incorporated in the very essence of (ذات). If the expression of the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation from the (ذات) would have been possible also.

After these remarks on the Divinity, the author proceeds to explain the other Essential Names of God—The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness of Cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedānta) to the light of manifestation. Although the movement is not attended with any external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow universality. Look at a wall, says the author you see the whole wall but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity—but a unity that comprehends diversity; so the (ذات) or Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the soul of diversity.

The third movement of the Absolute Being is (واحدیت) or Simple Oneness—a step attended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from all particular names and attributes, the Oneness Simple takes on names and attributes but there is no distinction between them; one is the essence of the other. The (الوہیت) is similar to the Simple Oneness, but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even contradictory; as generous is contradictory to

revengeful.⁸ The third step or, as Hegel would say, voyage of the Being, has another appellation (رحمانيّت) (Mercy). The first Mercy. The author says, is the Evolution of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in every atom of the result of His own self-diremption. The author makes this point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah); ice or condensed water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere the author calls water the origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This instance leads the author to guard against the error of looking upon God as immanent in nature or running through the sphere of material existence. He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent because He is Himself the existence. External existence is the other self of God, it is the light through which He sees himself. As the originator of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The difference between God and man (as one may say) is that His ideas materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that

8. This would seem very much like the idea of the Phenomena Brahmana of the Vedanta. Personal Creator or the Prajapati of the Vedanta makes the third step of the Absolute Being or the Noumenal Brahmana. Our author seems to admit two kinds of Brahmana—with or without qualities like the Samkara and Badarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a lowering of the Absolute Thought which is Asat, in so far it is absolute and sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence limited. Notwithstanding the Absolute Monism, our author inclines to a view similar to that of Ramanuja. He seems to admit the reality of individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Samkara, that Iswara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment of the higher knowledge—a remark which tends to free our author's doctrine from the political and social dangers of Vendata.

Hegel would see the same line of argument is freeing himself from the accusation of Pantheism.

These remarks on Mercy are followed by a brief notice of the word رُبُوبِيَّة (Providence). He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in need of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently: He would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a certain force of nature. Our author would call it a manifestation of (رُبُوبِيَّة) but unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate the unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. This brief chapter ends with some verses of his own composition, one of which is given here, though marred in the rendering :

"All that is, owes its existence to you and you owe your existence to all that is".⁹

Another Sufi has expressed a similar thought still more boldly :

"I owe to God as much as God owes to me".

We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God and proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The Arabian Prophet, says the author, was once questioned about the place of God before creation. He said that God, before creation, existed in *Amaa* (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal darkness which the author now proceeds to examine. The chapter is particularly interesting because the world translated into modern phraseology would be "The Unconsciousness". This

single word impresses upon us the foresightedness with which the author anticipates metaphysical doctriness of modern Germany. He says that the unconsciousness the reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending movement; it is free from the attributes Of God and creation; it does not stand in need of any name or quality be it is beyond the sphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Oneness because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of coming down towards manifestation.

This brief but very interesting chapter ends with a very important caution. He says that when we speak of the priority of God and posterity of creation, our words must not be construed to imply time or space. The (ذات) or the real Being is beyond the grasp of human conceptions, not creation. Time, congruity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can one piece of creation intervene between God and His creation? Hence our words before, after, where, whence, etc. in this sphere of thought, should not be construed to imply time or space. The (ذات) or the real Being is beyond the grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be applicable to it, because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. It is a matter of regret that the author does not touch here upon the anthropomorphic conceptions of God inculcated by positive religion, but ends his chapter with some verses which run as follows :

“O Thou who art one having the effect of two. Thou hast comprehended under Thyself all the beauties of perfection, but owing to their being heterogenous to one

another, they became contradictories which became one in thee"¹⁰.

The 13th, 14th and 15th chapters are nothing but a jumble of mystical phraseology. We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has three stages: the first is the modulation of the name which the author calls the illumination of names. He remarks that "when God illuminates a certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the dazzling splendour of that name, and when thou calleth God, the call is responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be, in Schopenhaueros language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it must not be confounded with physical death because the individual goes on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries in pantheistic mood :

"She was I and I was she and there was no one to separate us"¹¹.

The second stage of the spiritual training is what the author calls the Illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the power of receptivity possessed by him—a fact which classifies men according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of life and thus participate in the soul of the universe. The effect of this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the per-

یاجوہر اقامت بہ عرضان—یا واحدافی حکمہ اثنان—(۱۰)

جمعت محاسن العلای قنودت — لک یا اختلاف فیہما ضوان
(جزء الاول ص ۳۶)

فکت اناہی وہی کانت انا و انا — لمعافی وجود مفرد من نیازغ (جزء الاول)

ص ۳۰—(۱۰)

fect man receives illuminations from all the Divine attributes, crosses the sphere of the name and the attributes and steps into the domain of ذات (Essence)—Absolute Existence.

As we have already noticed, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its absoluteness; has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential name which has its own peculiarly illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is the end of our author's spiritual ethics; man has become perfect, he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or has learnt what Hegel called. The Absolute Philosophy. "He becomes the paragon of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the universe."¹² He is the point where عبودیت (Man-ness) and الوهیت (God-ness) become one and result in the birth of the god-man.

Although the author devotes of separate chapter to the perfect man in the second volume of his book, yet we will consider that chapter in order to secure a continuous view of his doctrine. Here he unfolds his Doctrine of the Self-Diremption in a new dress. He says that the perfect man is the pivot round which revolve all the "heavens" of existence, and the sum of the realities of material existence corresponds to his unity. The عرش corresponds to his heart; the کرسی (The Chair) to his I-ness; the سدرۃ المنتهی (The Plum Tree) to his spiritual position; the قلم (Pen) to his intellect; the لوح محفوظ (The Preserved Tablet) to his mind; the elements to his temperament; matter to his faculty of perception; air to the space he occupies; the اطاق (Heaven) to his opinion; the starry heaven to his intelligence; the seventh heaven to his will; the sixth to his imagination; the fifth to his perseverance; the fourth to his understanding; the third to his fancy; the second to his reflection, and the first to his memory. Of the

above-mentioned correspondences, the author has very obscure explanations and goes on to enumerate all the phases of material existence in order to explain the truth that the perfect man is truly a microcosm and moves in every sphere of thought and being.

His doctrine implies that angels have not a separate existence of their own; all have their source in the faculties of the perfect man; in one word they are personifications of his faculties. The *Qalb* (قلب) of the perfect man is the source of *اسرائيل* (the source of life), his intellect the source of *جبرائيل* (the source of revelation), that part of his nature which is subject to the illusions of fear, the source of *عزرائيل* (the angel of fear), his will the source of *ميكائيل* and his reflection the source of the rest of the angels. The interpretation of these phrases is very doubtful, but it seems to be that what are called angels are nothing but different phases of the activity of the different powers of his nature. How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the author does not tell us, but he says that at every stage he has a peculiar spiritual experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the *قلب* (heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical diagram of *Qalb* explains it by saying that it is the eye which sees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind *نفس وروح* and becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the ultimate realities of existence. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel's sense of the word Conscience would approach our author's meaning of the word. All that the *قلب* or the source of what the Vedants calls, the Higher knowledge, reveals is not seen by the individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the intellect the object of which is

always different and separate from the individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, as the Sufis of this school hold, is not permanent; moments of spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold¹³, cannot be at our command. The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has realised himself as god-man, but when that particular spiritual realisation is over, man is man and God is God. Had the experience been permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society overturned.

Let us now sum up the author's Doctrine of the Trinity. We have seen the three movements of the Absolute Being or the first three categories of Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with external manifestation which is the self-diremption of the Essence into God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect man who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. The author holds that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe, hence in his view, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the god-man, the Absolute Being which had left its Absoluteness, returns unto itself and but for the god-man it could not have done for then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which God sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following verses :

If you say that God is one, you are right, but if you say that is two, this is also true.

(13) We can not kindle when we will
The fire which in the heart resides.

If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the real nature of man.¹⁴

The perfect man, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he receives illumination from all the essential names, on the other hand all the divine attributes re-appear in him. These attributes are :

- (1) Independent life or existence.
- (2) Knowledge which is a form of life as the author proves from a verse of the Quran.
- (3) Will—the principle of particularisation or the manifestation of Being. The author defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God according to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations all of which are different names for love, the last is the love in which the lover and the beloved, the knower and the known merge in each other and become identical. This form of love, the author says, Absolute Essence; as Christianity teaches God is love. The author guards, here against the error of looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined.
- (4) Power which expresses itself in self-diremption-creation. The author controverts Shaikh Muhy-ud-Din Ibn 'Arabi's position that the Universe existed before its creation in the

(14) — ان قلت و احدة صداقت و ان تقل — اثنان حق انه اثنان —
او قلت لا بل انه لمثلث — فصدقت ذاك حقيقة الانسان
(جزء الاول صفحہ ۸)

knowledge of God, as Hamilton holds, He says, this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing and holds that the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self of God.

- (5) The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has different names—The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The arrangement of the Divinity. The spread of Oneness, The expression of the Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes, and The object of God's knowledge.
- (6) The Power of hearing.
- (7) The Power of seeing.
- (8) Beauty—that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative; it has no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity.
- (9) Glory or beauty in its intensity.
- (10) Perfection which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore Unlimited and Infinite.

We have now the doctrine of the perfect man completed. All through the author has maintained his argumentation by an appeal to different verses of the Quran¹⁵

(5) While remarking on the Bible the author says, "The Bible begins with the name of the Father, the Son and Mother, just as the Quran begins with the three Divine names الله، رحمن، رحيم. But the people of Christ did not understand the real meanings of the Bible and interpreted the Father, the Mother and the Son as the Spirit, the Virgin and Christ respectively. They could not understand that the Father meant الله; the Mother the real nature of the Pure Being and the Son the Book—the Universe in itself or that which is the offshoot of the deep reality of the Essence. Although the author accuses Christians of a very serious misunderstanding yet he regards their sin as venial holding that their شرک (the splitting up of the Divine Personality) is the Essence of all توحید (Unity).

and to the several traditions of the Prophet the authenticity of which he never doubts. Although he reproduces the Christian doctrine of the Trinity except that his god-man is Muhammad instead of Christ, he never alludes to his having been every influenced by Christian Theology. He looks upon the doctrine as something common between the two forms of religion and accuses Christians of a blasphemous interpretation of the doctrine—of regarding the Personality of God as split up into three distinct personalities. Our own belief, however, is that this splendid doctrine no tbeen well, understood by the majority of Islamic and even Christian thinkers. The doctrine is but another way of stating the truth that the Absolute Unity must have in itself a principle of difference in order to evolve diversity out of itself. Almost all the attacks of Muhammadan theologians are directed against vulgar beliefs while the truth of real Christianity has not sufficiently been recognised. I believe no Islamic thinker will object into the deep meaning of the Trinity as explained by this author, or will hesitate in approving Kant's interpretation of the Doctrine of Redemption. Shaikh Muhy-ud-Din Ibn 'Arabi says that the error of Christianity does not lie in making Christ God but that it lies in making God Christ.

After these remarks on the Doctrine of the Trinity let us now review the remainder of the author's treatise. His principal doctrine is complete before us but he has got something more to say. He devotes a separate chapter to the He-ness, the second movement of the Absolute Being, but drops no new remark here. He then goes on to consider the I-ness, the third movement of the Absolute and defines it as the contrast of God with what is His own manifestation and says that I and He are but the outside and the inside of the same thing. In the three succeeding chapters the author considers the words Eternity and Uncreatableness and guards against the error of understanding them as implying time. The 31st chapter goes under the heading of "The Days of God" by which phrase the author means the different manifestations of the Absolute. The Absolute Being

has two phases; in Himself He is one and unchangeable, but in the second phase He is the cause of all diversity—may is the diversity. That which appears is not unreal, it is the Absolute Being itself. It is interesting to observe that the author uses here the word تحول which exactly means Evolution implying the identity of the object under all its diverse forms. The first volume ends here with brief notices of the Quran, the Old Testament, the book of Psalms and the Bible. The author's remarks on the different Books are very interesting but are not directly connected with the main theory he propounds. We, therefore, proceed to estimate the value of his philosophical labour. While summing up his Doctrine of the Perfect Man, we have seen that although he has anticipated many of the chief doctrines of modern German Philosophy and particularly Hegelianism, yet he is not a systematic thinker at all. He perceives the truth, but being unequipped with the instrumentality of a sound philosophical method, he cannot advance positive proofs for his position or rather cannot present his views in a systematic unity. He is keenly slave to the necessity of philosophical precision, yet his mysticism constantly leads him to drop vague, obscure remarks savouring of Platonic poetry rather than philosophy. His book is a confused jumble of metaphysics, religion, mysticism and ethics, very often excluding all likelihood of analysis. In his defence of the Islamic Institutions, he implies that religion is something quite different from metaphysics, yet in his general treatment he is so firmly convinced of their identity that he regards religion as applied metaphysics and to a great extent anticipates the views of the modern Neo-Hegelian School of England. Amidst the irregularity and general want of clearness, his chief doctrine, however, is sufficiently clear—a doctrine which makes the principle merit of our author and brings him out as the triumphant possessor of the deep metaphysical meaning of the Trinity. In the garb of mysticism he has dropped remarks which might be developed so as to result in a philosophical system, but it is a matter of regret that this sort of Idealistic Speculation did not find favour much with later Islamic thinkers.

CORPOREAL RESURRECTION AFTER DEATH

The following note by Allama Iqbal appeared in the Muslim Revival, of Lahore, in September, 1932, and was reproduced by the Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, in its Iqbal Day Supplement on April 21, 1952.

I was reading the other day a book called the emergence of life. The author has tried to apply mathematical method to philosophical research. His method is based on Boolis system of logic which he further develops in the light of modern mathematical investigation. After having discussed his views of time, space and life, as seen in the light of modern relativity, he refers in his chapter on no-special reality to corporeal resurrection. I am sure this passage will interest the readers of the Muslim Revival.

The noteworthy point in this passage is how modern science and philosophy becoming more and more exact is furnishing rational foundations for certain religious beliefs which the 18th and 19th centuries science rejected as absurd and increatible. Further the Muslim reader will see that the agrument in support of corporeal resurrection advanced in this passage is practically the same as put forward in the Qu'ran over 1300 years ago. The passage is as follows :

Whether indeed such an apparently fantastic notion,

at any rate, to the scientific mind, as to the resurrection of the body, the most wonderful and I should say, almost incredible mystery of theological teaching, one of the most astounding tenets of the Christian faith insisted upon by St. Paul and firmly held even to this day by some of the most earnest and devout scholars of our time, would even admit of the scientific explanation, seems to in the light of this consideration to be not altogether eliminated from the class of possible and rational beliefs. Absurd as it seems, to like an extreme case, that the atoms that compose the body of the person who had been shattered to smithereens by an explosion in the trenches, would by any possibility ever recombine, except by what would truly be called a miracle. There is nothing in the light of these reflections, to hinder the neonads from adopting the right "time and tune" that would enable it one more to respond to one and all of the monads that had served as the chamber of its material environment.

It must be remembered that the Christian belief in resurrection is based upon the supposed fact of the resurrection of Jesus Christ *i.e.*, it is based on the historical event which is believed to have happened 2000 years ago. In the Qu'ran, resurrection is taken as a universal property of living organisms. The Quranic argument is resummed up in the following verses :

Any they used to say : what : when we die and become dust and bones, shall we be raised again ?
An our forefathers too ?

Say : those who have gone before and after all will be brought together at the appointed moment.

We have made death among you and we are not helpless that we should bring the like of you and create you in a form which you know not. And you know your first creation. Why then do you not ponder ?
(56:47:48:60:61:62.)

Do they not see how God created the first time; them. He will create again; surely it is easy for He. Say: Go about the earth and see how He caused first creation: so will God bring about the other creation: (29:19:20.)

Does man think that we will not bring together his bones: Yes, we are powerful that we should complete all his limbs: (75:3:4.)

Any they say: what when we become bones and dust, shall we be raised in a fresh form? Say: Be Ye stones or iron or anything else which seems herder to you. Then they say: who will bring us to life again. Say: He who made you the first time: (17:49-51.)

And man says: what: when I have died, shall I be raised to life again: Does not man consider that we created him before while he was nothing: (19:66:67.)

As may be seen from the italicived lines, the Qu'ran bases its argument in support of resurrection, not many events in history, but on the personal experience of every individuals.

This is exactly the argument which the modern most scientific research as quoted above, has advanced *viz.*, the same "time and tune" which brought the nomads together the first time and caused his creation, may once more summon together, after death, the same nomads and cause the second creation of may.

It may, however, be noted here that this return to-life after death is nothing in the sense of the cycle of births and rebirths as commonly understood. The Qu'ran supports the scientific view that all the life is a forward movement. There is no coming back. Mark the following reasons the point:

Islam death overtake everyone of them, he says my Lord, send me back (to the world) so that I may do good

in what I have left behind. Never.....Infront of him there is a barrier till the day of resurrection: (23:99-101.)

By the moon when it becomes full: of a certainly you will go from stage to stage: (84:19;20.)

Just as the moon goes through various stages, from the crescent to the full moon, even so is man to advance from a lower to a higher form of life.

SOME THOUGHTS ON ISLAMIC STUDIES

Given below is a letter written by Allama Iqbal to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan, then Vice-chancellor of the Muslim University, Aligarh, detailing the aims and objects which should be kept in mind while laying down a syllabus for Islamic Studies.

My Dear Sahibzada,

I have read with great interest your excellent note on Islamic Studies to which, it seems, you have given a great deal of thought and attention. The subject has to be looked at from various points of view and in reference to the birth or rather rebirth of humanism in the world of Islam today. However, I beg to offer a few stray thoughts which have come to me. Before I proceed further I would state the objects of what you call Islamic Studies as follows :

- (1) To educate and train well-qualified theologians, divines, etc. (This is your first object on page 4 of your letter and I fully agree with it).
- (2) To produce scholars who may, by thier researches in the various branches of Muslim literature and thought, be able to trace genetically the continuity of intellectual life between Muslim culture and modern knowledge. (This

requires a little more elucidation. The political fall of Islam in Europe unfortunately took place, roughly speaking, at a moment when Muslim thinkers began to see the futility of deductive science and were fairly on the way to building inductive knowledge. It was practically at this time that Europe took up the task of research and discovery. Intellectual activity in the world of Islam practically ceased at this time and Europe began to reap the fruits of the labours of Muslim thinkers. The Humanist movement in Europe was due to a large extent to the force set free by Muslim thought. It is not at all an exaggeration to say that the fruits of modern European humanism in the shape of modern science and philosophy are in many ways only a further development of Muslim culture. Neither the European nor the Mussalman of today realises this important fact because the extant work of Muslim thinkers still lies scattered and unpublished in the libraries of Europe, Asia and Africa. The ignorance of the Mussalmans of today is so great that they consider thoroughly anti-Islamic what has in the main arisen out of the bosom of their own culture. If, for instance, a Muslim savant knew that something like the theory of Einstein was seriously discussed in the scientific circles of Islam (Abdul Ma'ali quoted by Averroes) the present theory of Einstein would appear to him less outlandish. Again this antipathy to modern Inductive Logic would be very much diminished if he knew that the whole system of modern Logic started from Razi's well-known objection to the deductive logic of Aristotle). The production of such scholars is absolutely necessary as they alone can help in the assimilation of modern knowledge.

- (3) To turn out Muslim scholars well-versed in the various aspects of Muslim History, Art, General

Culture and Civilisation. (This is really your third object mentioned on page 4 of your letter which I have a bit narrowed by excluding science and philosophy from its scope). This will include your object No. 2.

- (4) To produce scholars who may be fitted to carry on researches in the legal literature of Islam. As you know, our legal literature, a good deal of which is still unpublished, is simply enormous. In my opinion it should be treated as a separate branch of Muslim learning. (By law I mean the law relating to fiqh only).

It is in the light of these general considerations that we should devise a scheme of Islamic Studies in the Muslim University at Aligarh.

I will now proceed to consider the practical aspect of the matter :

The Study of Muslim Theology

Our first object in which we both agree is the training of well-qualified theologians to satisfy the spiritual needs of the community. But the spiritual needs of a community change with the expansion of that community's outlook on life. The change in the position of the individual, his intellectual liberation and infinite advance in natural sciences have entirely changed the substance of modern life so that the kind of scholasticism or theological thought which satisfied a Muslim in the Middle Ages would not satisfy him today. This does not mean an injury to the spirit of religion. But it certainly contradicts traditional views. If rejuvenation of Muslim life and the regaining of original depths are desirable then a rebuilding of theological thought is absolutely necessary. The vision of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, on this point, as on many others, was almost prophetic. As you know he himself undertook the

task, which did not, and could not, prosper because it was mainly based on the philosophical thought of a by gone age. I am afraid, I cannot agree with your suggested syllabus in Muslim Theology (para. 4 of your letter). In my opinion it is perfectly useless to institute a school of Muslim Theology on older lines unless it is your object to satisfy the more conservative portion of our community. Spiritually, the older theology is, generally speaking, a set of worn out ideas; educationally, it has no value in view of the rise of new, and restatement of old problems. What is needed today is intellectual activity in fresh channels and the building of a new theology and KALAM. This can obviously be done by men who are properly equipped for such a task. But how to produce such men?

I fully agree with you in your suggestion that a system be devised for utilising the best material from Deoband and Lucknow. But the point is what would you do with these men after having trained them up to the Intermediate standard? Would you make them B.As. and M.As. after the suggestion of Sir Thomas Arnold? I am sure that so far as the study and development of theological thought is concerned they will not serve your purpose. These Deoband and Lucknow men who disclose a special aptitude for theological thinking should, in my opinion, be given a thorough grounding in modern thought and science before you allow them to pass through Arnold's course, which, for their purpose, will have to be very much shortened. After completing their study of modern thought and science they may be required to attend lectures on such subjects in Arnolds course as have a direct bearing on their special study *e.g.*, sects of Islam and Muslim Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. With this equipment they may be made University Fellows to give original lectures on Muslim Theology, KALAM and TAFSIR. Such men alone will be able to found a new school of Muslim Theology in the University and serve your object No. I. My suggestion, therefore, is that if you wish to

satisfy the more conservative portion of our society you can start with a school of Theology on older lines as suggested in the para. 4 of your letter but your ultimate aim must be gradually to displace it by the work of original thinkers produced in the manner I have suggested.

Coming now to our second object, those among the Lucknow and Deoband men who disclose a special aptitude for purely scientific research should be given a thorough grounding in Mathematics, Science or Philosophy according to their respective aptitudes. After having completed their study in modern science and thought they may be permitted to pass through Arnold's course, which will have to be shortened for their purpose also. For instance, a man who has studied Physical Science only should be called upon to attend lectures on "Science in the Muslim World", Arnold's No. 3 in the M.A. course. You can then make him a University Fellow to devote all his time to researches in the particular science he has studied.

Coming to our third object, Arnold's full course should be opened to those who do not happen to possess a special aptitude for science or philosophy but want a general training in the principles of Muslim culture and civilisation. But these need not be confined to men from Deoband and Nadwa only. Your own University men with a better knowledge of Arabic may take it up. I would find a place for Muslim art and architecture in this course.

Coming to our fourth object, *i.e.*, the study of Muhammedan Law and Legal History, we should pick up more brilliant men from Deoband and Lucknow who happen to possess a legal mind and disclose a special aptitude for legal subtleties. In view of the fact that the whole system of Muhammedan Law stands in need of constructive readjustment we should give him a thorough

grounding in modern Jurisprudence and principles of legislation and perhaps also in modern Economics and Sociology. You can make them LL.Bs. if you like and then permit them to pass through Arnold's course, which will have to be shortened in their case also. For instance, they may be required to attend lectures on such subjects as Muslim Political Theory and Development of Muslim Jurisprudence. Some of them may be allowed to take up the profession of law. Others may accept your University Fellowship and devote themselves to legal research work. The present state of the administration of Muhammedan Law in this country is simply deplorable and there are difficulties which can be solved through legislative agencies only. Muhammedan professional lawyers thoroughly well-grounded in the principles of Muhammedan Law will be of the greatest help both in court and council.

Briefly my suggestions are: I accept the course of study suggested by Sir Thomas Arnold. But the whole of it should be opened only to those candidates who do not disclose a special aptitude for Law, Theology and Science. In so far as the study of Theology is concerned, I allow your suggestions (para. 4 of your letter) but consider it is only a tentative measure to be displaced eventually by the work of original thinkers, who shall have to be trained in the manner I have suggested in the course of my letter. For these men as well as for those who take up the study of Law and Special Sciences, Arnold's course will have to be shortened according to their needs. It is hardly necessary here to point out what a workable knowledge of German and French is absolutely necessary for those who take up the study of Muslim thought, literature, art, history and even of Theology.

Yours sincerely,

Muhammad Iqbal.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ISLAM

In the last stages of his life Allama Iqbal had expressed a desire to write a book by the name of Introduction to the Study of Islam, but, owing to ill health he was unable to carry out his idea. In 1937 he managed to chalk out a bare outline of that work in the shape of a few notes and delivered them to Mian Mohammed Shafi, who was his private secretary at the time. These notes of the illustrious poet-philosopher are an evidence of the great and important themes that floated in his mind. Had he been granted a longer lease of life and an opportunity to put them in writing, the book would doubtless have added a glorious chapter to the history of Islamic thought.

A. Religion

Is it morality touched with emotion?

Is it belief in a God or Gods with some kind of worship?

Mithraism

Darkness

Mosque

(i) Is it wholly other worldliness?

لا رهبا نيته الاسلام - لا تنسى نصيبك من الدنيا

(ii) Is it fear of the invisible?

لا خوف عليهم ولا هم يخزنون

(iii) Is it intimacy with the supersensible?

Partly yes, but supersensible opened to be approached in a scientific spirit—

Ibn Khaldun, and idea of finality.

(iv) Is it some secret teaching to be handed orally (mystery)?

All early Magian religions believed in it
Islam—No.

Spengler, p. 246, Vol. II قد يتبين المرشد من الغي

(v) Religion (origin of the word) مذهب not used in the Qu'ran.

Words used in the Qu'ran ملت - منهاج - دين

What is the meaning of دين و ملت

(vi) Martiman, Vol. I.

B. Islam a protest against all religions in the old sense of the word.

(i) Abolition of Prophethood. Islam and time

(هل اتي على اوليا)

(ii) The idea of Salvation in Islam

Is it a salvation—religion?

نجاة is used only once in the Qu'ran. What is Najat?

(iii) No secret teaching.

(iv) Belief in God. (غيب)

Deracialisation of mankind

Economic Equality اختلاف المبتكم الخ وشعوباً
ما ذا قل العنو

C. Church and State

Is Islamic community a juristic person?

Is Islamic State a juristic person?

Relation of Church and State.

What is State? Like marriage or contract.

The Amir and the Shaikhul Islam, etc.

Hereditary monarchy. History of Islamic Priesthood.

Kerbala? Effect of it.

D. Islam and the Woman.**E. Islam and Capitalism.**

- (i) To the Magian culture Revelation is a mystical process in which some spirit enters the body of a person who speak it. من وراى الحجاب

In Islam 'Wahy' (quote verses) is the universal property of life in which a man obtains contact with the ultimate springs of life. It manifests itself in 3 ways. It is abolished as a source of knowledge. In Islam contemplation of Amr spreads into thought and action. It realises the immensity of the world in which old conception of races, community, creed vanish into nothing. It is light. الله نور السموات والارض

It draws the world from darkness to the open day-light و اله يخر جكم من الظلمت الى النور

- (ii) The word Salvation (نجات)

What is Najat? Liberation from what?

Not from the limitations of individuality?

Not liberation from the tension of consciousness.

It is relief of the Ego's loneliness in the Universe.
 The conception of God الى الرفيق الاعلى هو معلم
 (Comrade).

(a) Sleep liberates لا تاخذہ سنتہ ولا نوم

(b) Wine liberates. تم الا الله لا قليلا (اجتنبو)
 Breaks the vigour of consciousness.

(c) Dancing too liberates غرو باللغومرد كراما
 All these means of escape from space and time
 are discouraged.

You should overcome space and time by
 الا بسلطان الخ

Mastering actuality by understanding
 تفكر و في الخلق السموات الخ

Fear of visible actuality, i.e. Space and Time is
 removed when we begin to understand things
 as causal relations. لاخوف عليهم ولا هم يحزنون

Knowledge of world as nature—actuality
 کہ این جا جزوا و نیست الخ

Fear overcome not by charms but by formula

(d) Knowledge of world as movement—history,
 Sufism.

(iii) ایمان Security

Reforms movement is Islam.

Ibn Taimiyya.

Abdul Wahab.

Bab	} Prophethood	{ All more or less magian.
Ahmadiya		

Syed Ahmad—Reationalism

The new movement.

The coming of the expected one (مسیح موعود)

(i) No return.

المنتظر کی آمد

(ii) Traditions—Bukhari.

PART FOUR

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
NEW ERA

There is a general feeling of

(1) No reaction

(2) Reaction - mixed

(3) Reaction - mixed

(4) Reaction - mixed

(5) Reaction - mixed

(6) Reaction - mixed

(7) Reaction - mixed

(8) Reaction - mixed

(9) Reaction - mixed

(10) Reaction - mixed

(11) Reaction - mixed

(12) Reaction - mixed

(13) Reaction - mixed

(14) Reaction - mixed

(15) Reaction - mixed

(16) Reaction - mixed

(17) Reaction - mixed

(18) Reaction - mixed

(19) Reaction - mixed

(20) Reaction - mixed

(21) Reaction - mixed

(22) Reaction - mixed

(23) Reaction - mixed

(24) Reaction - mixed

OUR PROPHET'S CRITICISM OF CONTEMPORARY ARABIAN THOUGHT

In the following article, published in the New York
Review of Books, 1911, the author has, in a brief and
succinct manner, presented the views of the author on the
subject of Arabism.

PART FOUR

History has produced some of the most brilliant of our
Prophets in our history, and it is the duty of the
people to know them.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEW ERA

The first of these is the question of the future of the
Arab world, and it is the duty of the people to know
the answer.

The second is the question of the future of the
Arab world, and it is the duty of the people to know
the answer.

The third is the question of the future of the
Arab world, and it is the duty of the people to know
the answer.

The fourth is the question of the future of the
Arab world, and it is the duty of the people to know
the answer.

PART FOUR

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
NEW ERA

OUR PROPHET'S CRITICISM OF CONTEMPORARY ARABIAN POETRY

In the following article, published in the New Era of Lucknow in July 1917, Allama Iqbal has briefly and cogently described the views of the Holy Prophet of Islam on Poetry.

History has preserved some of the criticisms of our Prophet on contemporary Arabian poetry. But two of these criticisms are most profitable to Indian Muslims whose literature has been chiefly the work of the period of their national decadence, and who are now in search of a new literary ideal. One of these criticisms indicates to us what should not be and the other what is should be :

1. Of the Poet Imra-ul-Qais who flourished about 40 years before Islam, our Prophet is reported to have said :

“اشعر الشعراء وقائدهم الى النار”
“He is the most poetic of all poets
and their leader to Hell.”

Now what do we find in the poetry of Imra-ul-Qais ?

Sparkling wine, enervating sentiments and situations of love, heart-rending moans over the ruins of habitations long swept away by stormy winds, superb pictures of the inspiring scenery of silent deserts—and

all this is the choicest expression of old Arabia. Imra-ul-Qais appeals more to imagination than to will, and on the whole acts as a narcotic on the mind of the reader. The Prophet's criticism reveals this most important art-principle—that the good in art is not necessarily identical with the good in life; it is possible for a poet to write fine poetry, and yet lead his society to Hell. The poet is essentially a seducer; woe to his people, if instead of making the trials of life look beautiful and attractive he embellishes decadence with all the glories of health and power, and seduces his people to extinction. Out of the richness of his nature he ought to lavish on others something of the super-abundance of life and power in him, and not steal away, thief-like, the little they already, happen to possess.

2. Again the following verse of Antra of the tribe of Abs was read to our Prophet :

ولقد ابيت على المطوى واطن - حتى انبل به كريم الكامل

“Verily I pass through whole nights of toil to merit a livelihood worth of an honourable man.”

The Prophet whose mission was to glorify life and to beautify all its trials was immensely, please, and said to his companions:

“The praise of an Arabian has never kindled in me a desire to see him, but I tell you I do wish to meet the author of this verse.”

Imagine the man, a single look at whose face was a source of infinite bliss to the looker desiring to meet an infidel Arab for his verse! What is the secret of this unusual honour which the Prophet wished to give to the poet? It is because the verse is so healthful and vitalising, it is because the poet idealises the pain of honourable labour. The Prophet's appreciation of this verse indicates to us another art-principle of great value—that art is subordinate to life, not superior to it. The

OUR PROPHET'S CRITICISM OF CONTEMPORARY 159 ARABIAN POETRY

ultimate end of all human activity is Life—glorious powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force, and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around—on the mastery of which alone life depends—is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power.

Thus the Prophet's appreciation of Antra's verse gives us the ultimate principle for the proper evaluation of all arts.

ISLAM AND MYSTICISM

Allama Iqbal believed that the pessimistic Mysticism of Persia had done great harm to Islam. The following article on this vital issue appeared in the New Era of Lucknow, in July, 1917.

The present day Moslem prefers to roam about aimlessly in the dusky valleys of Hellenic-Persian Mysticism which teaches us to shut our eyes to the hard Reality around, and to fix our gaze on what it describes as "Illuminations"—blue, red, and yellow Reality springing up from the cells of an overworked brain. To me this self-mystification, this Nihilism, *i.e.*, seeking Reality in quarters where it does not exist, is a physiological symptom which gives me a clue to the decadence of the Muslim world. The intellectual history of the ancient world will reveal to you this most significant fact that the decadent in all ages have tried to seek shelter behind self-mystification and Nihilism. Having lost the vitality to grapple with the temporal, these prophets of decay apply themselves to the quest of a supposed eternal; and gradually complete the spiritual impoverishment and physical degeneration of their society by evolving a seemingly charming ideal of life which seduces even the healthy and powerful to death! To such a peculiarly constructed society as Islam the work of these sentimental obscurantists has done immense harm. Our birth as a society repudiating the ideas of race and

language as principles of social reconstruction, was due only to our subjecting ourselves to a system of law believed to be Divine in its origin; yet the old Mystic frankly held and secretly preached it to be merely Phenomenal; nothing more than an outer husk of the real which is to be attained by means other than the Law of God. In most cases the observance of the Law, even though held to be Phenomenal, was retained to avoid social odium; but no student of Moslem thought and literature can deny that the tendency to ignore the Law—the only force holding together Moslem Society—was the direct consequence of a false Mysticism born of the heart and brain of Persia. Thus Moslem Democracy was gradually displaced and ensaved by a sort of spiritual Aristocracy pretending to claim knowledge and power not open to the average Moslem. The danger of this Persianisation of Islam was clearly seen by the great Moslem Saint, Sheikh Ahmad Rifai (peace be on him). Writing to Abdul Sami 'Hashimi' the Sheikh says :

”خبر دار ! اہل عجم کی زیادتیوں سے دھوکہ نہ کھانا کہ ان میں سے بعض حد سے گزر گئے ہیں۔“

Elsewhere the great Saint strikes at the very root of Persian Mysticism (*i.e.* the distinction of inner and outer, Phenomenal and Real, to which I have alluded before) and declares :

”شیخ وہ ہے جس کا ظاہر و باطن شرع ہو۔ ظریقت عین شریعت ہے۔ جھوٹا اس فرق کو نہاست سے آلودہ کرتا اور کہتا ہے کہ باطن اور ہے ظاہر اور ہے۔“
(رسالہ الحکم الرفاعیہ - ترجمہ : مولانا شرر :

The Moslems of Spain, with their Aristotelean spirit and away from the enervating influences of the thought of Western and Central Asia, were comparatively much closer to the spirit of Islam than the Moslem races of Asia, who let Arabian Islam pass through all the solvents of Ajam and finally divested it of its original

character. The conquest of Persia meant not the conversion of Persia to Islam, but the conversion of Islam to Persianism; Read the intellectual history of the Moslems of Western and Central Asia from the 10th century downwards, and you will find therein verified every word that I have written above.

Such are the charms of decadence! We drink the poison and kiss the hand of those who administer it!

Remember that Islam was born in the broad daylight of history. The great democratic Prophet lived and worked among intelligent men who have transmitted to posterity every word that dropped from his sacred lips. There is absolutely nothing esoteric in his teachings. Every word of the Qu'ran is brimful of light and joy of existence. Far from justifying any gloomy, pessimistic Mysticism, it is an open assault on those religious teachings which have for centuries mystified mankind. Accept, then, the reality of the world cheerfully and grapple with it for the glorification of God and His Prophet. Do not listen to him who says there is a secret doctrine in Islam which cannot be revealed to the uninitiated. Herein lies the power of this pretender and your thralldom. See how in the spirit of Roman Christianity he builds fortifications round himself with a view to save his realms of darkness against the possible invasions of the historian. He enslaves you by exploiting your ignorance of the history of Islam; but seeing clearly that the light of history may sometime dispel the mist of his teaching from your intellectual atmosphere, he teaches you to regard sense-perception as "the greatest veil" (اعلمه حجاب الأكبر). Thus this enemy of sense-reality blunts your sense for fact, and undermines the very foundations of the science of history!

Moslem youngmen! Beware of the mystifier! His noose has now been too long round your neck. The

regeneration of the Moslem world lies in the strong uncompromising, ethical Monotheism which was preached to the Arabs thirteen hundred years ago. Come, then, out of the fogs of Persianism and walk into the brilliant desert-sunshine of Arabia.

MUSLIM DEMOCRACY

The short note on Muslim Democracy was published in the New York Tribune dated July 28, 1910.

The Democracy of Europe—overshadowed by socialist agitation and anarchical terrorism in the economic regeneration of European States. Muslim Democracy shows the "rule of the just", and hopes of the Moslem to have all higher culture on the earth and growth of an Arabocracy of Government. But a theocratic so absolutely proper? The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity, it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every being is a centre of force, the possibility of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the highest material Islam has formed none of the noblest type of life and power. It is not Islam, the Democracy of earth, Islam an experimental extension of the power of earth.

MUSLIM DEMOCRACY

This short note on Muslim Democracy was published in the New Era, Lucknow, dated July 28, 1917.

The Democracy of Europe—overshadowed by socialistic agitation and anarchical fear—originated mainly in the economic regeneration of European Societies. Nietzsche, however, abhors this “rule of the herd”, and, hopeless of the plebeian he bases all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an Aristocracy of Supermen. But is the plebeian so absolutely hopeless? The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity, it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every being is a centre of latent power the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebeian material Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and Power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche?

NIETZSCHE AND JALAL-UD-DIN RUMI

This literary comparison between two great poet-philosophers, Rumi and Nietzsche was published in the New Era of Lucknow in August, 1917.

Comparisons, they say, are odious. I want, however, to draw your attention to a literary comparison which is exceedingly instructive and cannot be regarded as odious. Nietzsche and Maulana Jalal-ud-din Rumi stand at the opposite pole of thought; but in the history of literature and thought it is the points of contact and departure which constitute centres of special interest. In spite of the enormous intellectual distance that lies between them these two great Poet-Philosophers seem to be in perfect agreement with regard to the practical bearing of their thought of life. Nietzsche saw the decadence of the human type around him, disclosed the subtle forces that had been working for it, and finally attempted to adumbrate the type of life adequate to the task of our planet. "Not how man is preserved, but how man is surpassed," was the keynote of Nietzsche's thought. The superb Rumi—born to the Moslem world at a time when enervating modes of life and thought, and an out-wardly beautiful but inwardly devitalising literature had almost completely sucked up the blood of Moslem Asia and paved the way for an easy victory for the Tartar—was not less keenly alive than Nietzsche to the poverty of life, incompetence, inadequacy and decay

of the body-social of which he formed a part and parcel. See with what unerring insight he describes the corroding disease of his society and suggests the ideal type of Moslem manhood :

دی شیخ با چراغ همی گشت گرد شهر
کز دام و ددملولم و انسانم آرزوست
زین همربان هست عناصر دلم گرفت
شیر خدا و رستم دستا تم آرزوست
گفتم که یافت می نه شود جسته ایم ما
گفت آنکه یافت می نه شود آنم آرزوست

Comparisons they are obvious. I want, however, to draw your attention to a literary comparison which is exceedingly instructive and cannot be regarded as either Nietzschean and Mahanian. Iqbal and the Rumi stand at the opposite pole of thought; but in the history of literature and thought it is the points of contact and departure which constitute centres of special interest. In spite of the enormous intellectual distance that lies between them these two great Post-Philosophers seem to be in perfect agreement with regard to the essential bearing of their thought of the Nietzschean was the doctrine of the human type around him, which the subtle forces that had been working for it, and finally attempted to administer the type of life adequate to the task of our planet. "Not how man is preserved, but how man is surpassed," was the keynote of Nietzsche's thought. The superb Rumi—born to the Moslem world at a time when conventional modes of life and thought, and an outwardly beautiful but inwardly devastating literature had almost completely sucked up the blood of Moslem Asia and paved the way for an easy victory for the Tartar—was not less keenly alive than Nietzsche to the poverty of life, incompetence, inadequacy and decay

TOUCH OF HEGELIANISM IN LISAN- UL-ASR AKBER

In this brief article Allama Iqbal dwells on the similarity of thought in the well known German Philosopher Hegel and the famous Urdu poet Syed Akbar Husain of Allahabad popularly known as Akber Ilahabadi. It was published in the New Era, Lucknow in August, 1917.

To the great German Idealist Hegel creation means the Absolute Reason leaving its absoluteness and returning to itself by visualising or objectifying itself in the form of a universe which, in its essence, is no more than the unity of the Absolute Reason powdered up in a visible perceptible plurality. Whether this process of return is temporal or non-temporal (for on this point Hegelians differ) it is clear that according to the Master its motive-force is the necessarily self-contradictory categories through which the Absolute Reason has to pass synthetically to regain its primeval Absoluteness. At the beginning of the process, since we are distant from the original Absoluteness, the contradictions are sharp and mutually exclusive, but when we approach the end of the process their sharpness begins to disappear until we reach the Absolute Idea in which all contradictions embrace each other, and are transformed into a single unity. Thus the central idea of Hegel's Philosophy can be summoned up in a few words—Infinite becoming Finite and regaining itself through a synthesis of self-evolved oppositions. The life of the universe, then, is

necessarily constituted by a perpetual conflict of opposing forces. This brief sketch of Hegel's Idea, I am afraid, is not quite luminous, but I venture to hope it will assist you in realising the depth of Akber's apparently simple verse.

جہاں ہستی ہوئی محدود لا کھوں پیچ پڑتے ہیں
عقیدے عقل سب کے سب آپس میں لڑتے ہیں

The endless conflict of Nature's creative forces is too palpable to escape the observation of poets and thinkers. Tennyson has perhaps given it a fuller and more pathetic expression; and our own Urfi has seized it in a majestic verse:

بچشم مصلحت بنگر مصاف نظم ہستی را
کہ ہر خارے دریں وادی در افش کاویان بینی

The special feature of Akbar, however, is that in a few simple and well-chosen words he reveals to you not only the conflict, but also the cause (*i.e.* Limitation of the Limitless) which has generated it. And in the words عقل and عقیدہ he further suggests that this conflict is not limited to the material Plane *عنصر* only, but extends itself to the mental plane as well. In Alexander's well-known book—"Moral Order and Progress"—you will find how our ideas, ideals, beliefs and modes of life are constantly engaged in a quiet, bloodless, fight, and how they displace, kill and absorb one another.

STRAY THOUGHTS

Under the caption Stray Thoughts, Allama Iqbal frequently wrote for the New Era of Lucknow. Reproduced below are some interesting and thought provoking extracts from these columns, published during the year, 1917.

The result of all Philosophical thought is that absolute knowledge is an impossibility. The poet Browning turns this impossibility to ethical use by a very ingenious argument. The uncertainty of human knowledge, teaches the poet, is a necessary condition of moral growth, since complete knowledge will destroy the liberty of human choice.



Literary criticism sometimes preceeds the creation of a great Literature. We find lessing on the very threshold of German Literature.



So are we drawn as wood is shoved,
By other's sinews each way moved.

Montaigne remarks on the above lines of Horace:—

"We go not, but we are carried, as things that float,
now gliding gently, now hulling, violently, according
as the water is either stormy or calm"

While reading the above in Montaigne, I was put in mind of a verse by our late and lamented writer Azad, who has given an expression to this idea much more beautifully than either Horace or Montaigne. Says he :

جہاز عمر رواں میں سوار بیٹھے ہیں

سوار کا اپنے کو اپنے اختیار بیٹھے ہیں



Both Shakespeare and Goethe rethink the thought of Divine creation. There is, however, one important difference between them. The Realist Englishman rethinks the individual; the Idealist German, the Universal. Faust is a seeming individual only. In reality he is humanity individualised.



As a plant growing on the bank of a stream heareth not the sweet silver-music which sustains it from beneath, so man, growing on the brink of Infinity listeneth not to the Divine undertone that maketh the life and harmony of his soul.



The attitude of toleration and even conformity without belief in dogma is probably the most incomprehensible thing to the vulgar mind. If such is your attitude, keep quiet and never try to defend your position.



Nations are born in the hearts of Poets; they prosper and die in the hands of politicians.



Democracy has a tendency to foster the spirit of legality. This is not in itself bad; but unfortunately it tends to displace the purely moral standpoint, and to make the illegal and the wrong identical in meaning.



No religious system can ignore the moral value of suffering. The error of the builders of Christianity was that they based their religion on the fact of suffering alone, and ignored the moral value of other factors. Yet such a religious system was a necessity to the European mind in order to supplement the beautiful but one-sided Hellenic Ideal. The Greek dream of life was certainly the best, as Goethe says; but it was wanting in the color-element of suffering which was supplied by Christianity.



Life, like the arts of Poetry and Painting, is wholly expression. Contemplation without action is death.



Mathew Arnold is a very precise poet. I like, however, an element of vagueness in poetry; since the vague appears profound to the emotions.



At least in one respect sin is better than piety. There is an imaginative element in the former which is lacking in the latter.



Suffering is a gift from the gods in order to make men see the whole of life.



Self-control in individuals builds families, in communities it builds Empires.



Power is more divine than truth. God is Power. Be ye, then, like your Father who is in heaven.



The powerful man creates environment; the feeble have to adjust themselves to it.



Mathew Arnold defines poetry as criticism of life. That life is criticism of poetry is equally true.



The fate of the world has been principally decided by minorities. The history of Europe bears ample testimony to the truth of this proposition. It seems to me that there are psychological and physiological reasons why minorities should have been a powerful factor in the history of mankind. Character is the invisible force which determines the destinies of nations, and an intense character is not possible in a majority. It is a force, the more it is distributed the weaker it becomes.

I would not exchange for half a dozen systems of Philosophy this one verse of Naziri :

نیست در خشک و تر بیشه من کوتاهی
چوب پر نخل که ممبر نه شود دار کنم



History is a huge gramophone in which the voices of Nations are preserved.



Human Intellect—Nature's attempt at self-criticism.



Our soul discovers itself when we come into contact with a great mind. It is not until I had realised the infinitude of Goethe's mind that I discovered the narrow breadth of my own.



Belief is a great power. When I see that a proposition of mine is believed by another mind, my own conviction of its truth is hereby immensely increased.



When we fail in an enterprise we feel inclined to leave our home and try our luck in alien climes. If such is your situation, study your soul/closely before deciding one way or the other. Is it because your ambition has received a fresh spur from your failure, or because you wish to hide your face from those who have witnessed your failure ? Excuse this bit of cruel Psychology.



Hegel's system of Philosophy is an epic poem in prose.



I have the highest respect for Aristotle. Not only because I (living in the 20th century) know him better than the oldest generations of my community, but also because of his vast influence on the entire thought of my people. The tinge, however, of ingratitude revealed in his criticism of Plato's doctrine of Ideas withholds me from giving him my fullest admiration. I do not deny the element of truth in his criticism, but I do detest the spirit in which he chooses to handle his master.



A woman of superb beauty with an complete absence of self-consciousness is probably the most charming thing on God's Earth.



Both God and the Devil give man opportunities only, leaving him to make use of those opportunities in the way he thinks best.



God! I thank Thee for my birth in this world of rosy dawns, flame-clad sunsets and thick forests wherein the gloom of Nature's bygone nights rests in eternal slumber !



Philosophy ages; Poety rejuvenates.



Science and Philosophy have limits, Art is boundless.



The soul of Oscar Wilde is more Persian than English.



PART FIVE

PART FIVE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF

SELF IN THE LIGHT OF RELATIVITY

The theory of relativity interested Iqbal greatly and he wrote the following article giving a new angle to his Philosophy of Self. This article was published in the Crescent, Lahore in 1925.

I

The ease with which we perceive external things hides from us the mystery of human perception. According to modern science all that is necessary for an act of perception happens inside the observer; yet the thing perceived appears outside, and even at an enormous distance from the observer, as in the case of a star. If the star is mere interpretation of happenings within, then, why does it look external? You may say that it looks external because it is external. I do not contend this point. The star may be a reality situated outside me in an absolute space. My point is that if the account of perception given by modern science is correct, the star ought not to look external.

II

But is the thing known independent of the act of knowledge? Or, is the act of knowledge a constitutive element in the making of the object? Objective reality as understood by Physical Science is entirely independent of the act of knowledge. Knowing does not make any difference to it. It is whether one knows it or not. In

studying its behaviour the act of knowledge can be ignored. Thus, Physics ignored Metaphysics in the sense of theory of knowledge in its onward march. But this attitude of Physical Science, though highly advantageous to itself, could not have been maintained for a long time. The act of knowledge is a fact among facts of experience which Empirical Science claims as its exclusive subject of study. Physics cannot afford to ignore Metaphysics. It must recognise it as a great ally in the organisation of experience. Happily it is not a Metaphysician but a Scientist who justifies Metaphysics—I mean Einstein, who has taught us that the knower is intimately related to the object known, and that the act of knowledge is a constitutive element in the objective reality, thus confirming, in a sense, the idealistic position of Kant. A further advance in our knowledge of the relationship between the act of knowledge and the object known will probably come from Psychology.

III

The object known, then, is relative to the observing self; its size and shape change as his position and speed change. *But whatever the position and speed of the observer, whatever his frame of reference, something must always remain which confronts him as his 'other'.* What does this mean? Does it mean that there is something absolute in what appears to us as objective reality? No. We cannot construe everpresent externality to mean the total independence or absoluteness of what appears as external to the self. Such an interpretation would contradict the very principle which discloses its relativity. If, then, in view of the principle of relativity, the object confronting the subject is really relative, *there must be some self to whom it ceases to exist as a confronting 'other'.* This self must be non-spatial, non-temporal—Absolute, to whom what is external to us must cease to exist as external. Without such an assumption objective reality cannot be relative to the spatial and temporal self. To the Absolute Self, then the Universe is not a

reality confronting him as his 'other', it is only a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite life. Einstein is quite right in saying that the Universe is finite, but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase (شان) in the Quranic language) of God's extensively infinite consciousness, and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite. The Quranic way of expressing the same truth is that the Universe is liable to increase. This simple truth mentioned in the Qu'ran was the greatest blow given to the, Deductive systems of thought that existed before Islam, and to the circular view of the movement of Time, common to all the Aryan modes of thought. But the age of the Qu'ran was hardly ready to assimilate it.

IV

We have seen that the Universe does not confront the Absolute Self in the same way as it confronts the human self. To Him it is a phase of His consciousness to us it presents itself as an independent reality. But is the human self also a phase of God's consciousness, or something more substantial than a mere idea? The nature of self is such that it is self-centred and exclusive. Are, then, the Absolute Self and the human self so related to each other that they mutually exclude each other? Pringle-Pattison deplors that the English language possesses only one word—creation—to express the relation of God and the Universe on the one hand, and the relation of God and the self of man on the other. The Arabic language is, however, more fortunate in this respect. It has two words to express this relation, i.e., *Khalq* and *amr*. The former is used by the Qu'ran to indicate the relation of the Universe of matter to God, and the latter indicates the relation of the human self to the Divine Self. All that we can say in answer to the extremely difficult question raised above is that the *amr* is not related to God in the same way as the *Khalq* is. The *amr* is distinct but not isolated from God.

But I confess I cannot intellectually apprehend this relationship any more than Rumi, who says :

اتصال بے تخیل بے قیاس هست رب الناس را با جان نامس

V

The next question is whether it is possible for the human observer to reach the Divine point of view, and to realise its freedom from the universe as a confronting "other." The mystic says it is possible to reach a super-intellectual standpoint, and his method is to escape from the conditions which make the movement of intellect possible. The mystic method has attracted some of the best minds in the history of mankind. Probably there is something in it. But I am inclined to think that it is detrimental to some of the equally important interests of life, and is prompted by a desire to escape from the arduous task of the conquest of matter through intellect. The surest way to realise the potentialities of the world is to associate with its shifting actualities. I believe that Empirical Science—association with the visible—is an indispensable stage in the life of contemplation. In the words of the Qu'ran, the Universe that confronts us is not 'باطل'. It has its uses ; and the most important use of it is that the effort to overcome the obstruction offered by it sharpens our insight and prepares us for an insertion into what lies below the surface of phenomena. As the poet Naziri says :

نه هر مغزى كه بويد نگهت از مصر و يمن گيرد
شام تيز بايد تا نصيب از پيرهن گيرد

A keen insight is needed to see the non-temporal behind the perpetual flux of things. The mystic forgets that reality lives in its own appearances, and that the surest way to reach the core of it lies through its appearances. The Prophet of Arabia was the first to protest

against this unhealthy Asiatic mysticism, and to open our eyes to the great fact of change within and without through the appreciation of which alone it is desirable to reach the eternal. The Quran describes God as *كل يوم هو في شان* and fixes our gaze on change and variety as the greatest "Signs" of God. Thus the Quran has its own method for the elevation of the human self to the Divine standpoint. But I can only suggest this method in the following paragraph.

VI

"The impulse which drives me into the wide world is precisely the same as that which drives so many into monasteries—the desire for self realisation." So says Count Keyserling in his Diary recently translated into English. The Count is quite right. The world of matter which confronts the self of man as its "other" is an indispensable obstruction which forces our being into fresh formations. I am afraid, however, that the Count's view of self realisation is one-sided. He tells us further. "I want to let the climate of the Tropics, the Indian modes of consciousness, the Chinese code of life, and many other factors which I cannot envisage in advance, to work their spell on me, one after the other, and then watch what will become of me." Now, such a process may bring about the realisation of our intellectual self. It may give us an acute thinker who can work out the spell of impressions into a coherent system of ideas, but it cannot shape our clay into an ideal human being. The intellectual self is only one aspect of the activity of our total self. The realisation of the total self comes not by merely permitting the wide world to throw its varied impressions on our mind, and then watching what becomes of us. It is not merely by receiving and intellectually shaping the impressions, but mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without

losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation.

The Quran describes God as "the greatest 'Signs' of God." Thus the Quran has its own method for the elevation of the human self to the Divine standpoint. But I can only suggest this method in the following paragraph.

"The impulse which drives me into the wide world is precisely the same as that which drives so many into monasteries—the desire for self-realisation." So says Gopal Keshab in his *Discs* recently translated into English. The Quran is quite right. The world of matter which contains the self of man is not other.

It is an indispensable obstruction which forces our being into fresh formations. I am afraid, however, that the Quran's view of self-realisation is one-sided. He tells us further, "I want to feel the climate of the Tropics, the Indian mists of consciousness, the Chinese code of life, and many other factors which I cannot envisage in advance to work their spell on me, one after the other, and then watch what will become of me." Now, such a process may bring about the realisation of our intellectual self. It may give us an acute insight who can work out the spell of impressions into a coherent system of ideas, but it cannot shape our life into an ideal human being. The intellectual self is only one aspect of the activity of our total self. The realisation of the total self comes not by merely perceiving the wide world to throw its varied impressions on our mind, and then watching what becomes of us. It is achieved by looking at and intellectually grasping the impressions not mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal standards but by moulding the self of man into itself as the purpose that the total self of man realises itself as the stage of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without

BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE ASRAR-I-KHUDI

Allama Iqbal wrote a comprehensive note to Dr. Nicholson explaining his Philosophy of the Self. It was published in 1920. The following article reproduced from the Meezan, Hyderabad, Deccan, gives the substance of that valuable note.

"That experience should take place in finite centres and should wear the form of finite this-ness is in the end inexplicable". These are the words of Prof. Bradley. But starting with these inexplicable centres of experience, he ends in a unity which he calls Absolute and in which the finite centres lose their finiteness and distinctness. According to him, therefore, the finite centre is only an appearance. The test of reality, in his opinion, is all-inclusiveness; and since all finiteness is "infected with relativity", it follows that the latter is a mere illusion. To my mind, this inexplicable finite centre of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe. All life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life. God Himself is an individual: He is the most unique individual. The universe, as Dr. McTaggart says, is an association of individuals; but we must add that the orderliness and adjustment which we find in this association is not internally achieved and complete in itself. It is the result of instinctive or conscious efforts. We are gradually travelling from chaos to cosmos and are helpers in this achievement. Nor are the members of the association fixed; new members are ever coming to

birth to co-operate in the great task. Thus the universe is not a completed act: it is still in the course of formation. There can be no complete truth about the universe for the universe has not yet become 'whole'. The process of creation is still going on, and man too takes his share in it, in as much as he helps to bring order into at least a portion of the chaos. The Koran indicates the possibility of other creators than God.*

Obviously, this view of man and the universe is opposed to that of the English Neo-Hegelians as well as to all forms of pantheistic Sufism which regard absorption in a universal life or soul as the final aim and salvation of man. The moral and religious ideal of man is not self-negation but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. The Prophet said, *تخلقوا باخلاق الله* 'Create in yourselves the attributes of God.' Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique individual. What then is life? It is individual: its highest form, so far, is the Ego (خودی) in which the individual becomes a self-contained exclusive centre. Physically as well as spiritually man is a self-contained centre, but he is not yet a complete individual. The greater his distance from God, the less his individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. Not that he is finally absorbed in God. On the contrary, he absorbs God into himself. The true person not only absorbs the world of matter; by mastering it he absorbs God Himself into his Ego. Life is a forward assimilative movement. It removes all obstructions in its march by assimilating them. Its essence is the continual creation of desires and ideals; and for the purpose of its preservation and expansion it has invented or developed out of itself, certain instruments, *e.g.*, senses, intellect, etc., which help it to assimilate obstructions. The greatest obstacle in the way of life is matter, Nature;

* Quran 23:5:14—Blessed is God, the best of those who create.

yet Nature is not evil, since it enbales the inner powers of life to unfold themselves.

The Ego attains to freedom by the removal of all obstructions in its way. It is partly free, partly determined, and reaches fuller freedom by approaching the individual who is most free—God. In one word, life is an endeavour for freedom.

In man the centre of life becomes an Ego or Person, Personality is a state of tension and can continue only if that state is maintained. If the state of tension is not maintained, relaxation will ensue. Since personality, or the state of tension, is the most, valuable achievement of man, he should see that he does not revert to a state of relaxation. That which tends to maintain the state of tension tends to make us immortal. Thus the idea of personality gives us a standard of value; it settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion, and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality. My criticism of Plato is directed against those philosophical systems which hold up death rather than life as their ideal—systems which ignore the greatest obstruction to life, namely, matter, and teach us to run away from it instead of absorbing it.

As in connexion with the question of the freedom of the Ego we have to face the problem of matter, similarly in connexion with its immortality we have to face the problem of time. Bergson has taught us that time is not an infinite line (in the spatial sense of the word 'line') through which we must pass whether we wish it or not. This idea of time is adulterated. Pure time has no length. Personal immortality is an aspiration; you can have it if you make an effort to achieve it. It depends on our adopting in this life modes of thought and activity which tend to maintain the state of tension. Buddhism, Persian Sufism and allied forms of ethics will not serve our purpose. But they are not wholly useless,

because after periods of great activity we need opiates, narcotics, for some time. These forms of thought and action are like nights in the days of life.

Thus, if our activity is directed towards the maintenance of a state of tension, the shock of death is not likely to affect it. After death there may be an interval of relaxation, as the Quran speaks of a (برزخ) or intermediate state, which lasts until the Day of Resurrection. Only those Egos will survive this state of relaxation who have taken good care during the present life. Although life abhors repetition in its evolution, yet on Bergson's principles the resurrection of the body too, as Wildon Carr says, is quite possible. By breaking up time into moments we spatialise it and then find difficulty in getting over it. The true nature of time is reached when we look into our deeper self. Real time is life itself, which can preserve itself by maintaining that particular state of tension (personality) which it has so far achieved. We are subject to time so long as we look upon time as something spatial. Spatialised time is a fetter which life has forged for itself in order to assimilate the present environment. In reality we are timeless, and it is possible to realise our timelessness even in this life. This revelation, however, can be momentary only.

The Ego is fortified by love (عشق). This word is used in a very wide sense and means the desire to assimilate, to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realise them. Love individualises the lover as well as the beloved. The effort to realise the most unique individuality individualises the seeker and implies the individuality of the sought, for nothing else would satisfy the nature of the seeker. As love fortifies the Ego, asking (سوال) weakens it. would satisfy the nature of the seeker. All that is achieved without personal effort comes under 'asking'. The son of a rich man who inherits his father's wealth is an

'asker, (beggar); so is every one who thinks the thoughts of others. Thus, in order to fortify the Ego we should cultivate love, *i.e.*, the power of assimilative action, and avoid all forms of 'asking', *i.e.*, inaction. The lesson of assimilative action is given by the life of the Prophet, at least to a Mohammedan.

In another part of the poem 'Asrar-i-Khudi' I have hinted at the general principles of Muslim ethics and have tried to reveal their meaning in connexion with the idea of personality. The Ego in its movement towards uniqueness has to pass through three stages :

(a) اطاعت Obedience to the Law.

(b) ضبط نفس Self-control, which is the highest form of self-consciousness or Ego-hood.

(c) نيايت الهی Divine Vicegerency.

This divine vicegerency, (نيايت الهی) is the third and last stage of human development on earth. The نائب (vicegerent) is the vicegerent of God on earth. He is the completest Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trails of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth. Out of the richness of his nature he lavishes the wealth of life on others, and brings them nearer and nearer to himself. The more we advance in evolution the nearer we get to him. In approaching him we are raising ourselves in the scale of life. The development of humanity both in mind and body is a condition precedent to his birth. For the present he is a mere ideal; but the evolution of humanity is tending towards

the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who will become his fitting parents. Thus the Kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth. Nietzsche had a glimpse of this ideal race, but his atheism and aristocratic prejudices marred his whole conception.

In another part of the poem 'Azan-i-Khalid' I have hinted at the general principles of Muslim ethics and have tried to reveal their meaning in connection with the idea of personality. The Ego in its movement towards uniqueness has to pass through three stages:

(1) *Qadl* (Obedience to the Law) — *Qadl* is the first stage of the development of the Ego.

(2) *Qadr* (Self-control) — *Qadr* is the highest form of self-consciousness or ego-hood.

(3) *Qadr* (Divine Vicegerency) — *Qadr* is the highest form of self-consciousness or ego-hood.

This divine vicegerency (*Qadr*) is the third and last stage of human development on earth. The *Qadr* (vicegerent) is the vicegerent of God on earth. He is the completest Ego, the soul of humanity; the scene of his birth in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last link of the line of humanity, and all the traits of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the Kingdom of God on earth. Out of the richness of his nature he lavishes the wealth of his on others, and brings them nearer and nearer to himself. The more we advance in evolution the nearer we get to him. In approaching him we are realizing ourselves in the state of life. The development of humanity both in mind and body is a condition precedent to his birth. For the present he is a mere ideal; but the evolution of humanity is tending towards

IN DEFENCE OF THE SELF

The English translation of Iqbal's *Asrar-i-Khudi* was published in 1920. Some critics unable to appreciate his philosophy of the Self-commented adversely on it. In January 1921, Iqbal wrote the following letter to Dr. Nicholson detailing his arguments in reply to questions raised by Mr. Dickenson. It was reproduced in the Dawn, Karachi in its Iqbal Day Supplement on April 21, 1949.

My Dear Dr. Nicholson,

I was very glad to learn from your letter to Shafi* that your translation of the *Asrar-i-Khudi* had been favourably received and excited much attention in England. Some of the English reviewers, however, have been misled by the superficial resemblance of some of my ideas to those of Nietzsche.

The view of the writer in the *Athenaeum* (London) is largely affected by some mistakes of fact for which, however, the writer does not seem to be responsible. But I am sure if he had known some of the dates of the publication of my Urdu poems referred to in his review, he would have certainly taken a totally different view of the growth of my literary activity. Nor does he rightly understand my idea of the Perfect Man which he con-

*Late Principal Mohammad Shafi of Oriental College, Lahore.

founds with the German thinker's Superman. I wrote on the Sufi doctrine of the Perfect Man more than 20 years ago—long before I had read or heard anything of Nietzsche. This was then published in the *Indian Antiquary* and later in 1908 formed part of my *Persian Metaphysics*. The English reader ought to approach this idea not through the German thinker, but through an English thinker of great merit—I mean Alexander—whose Gifford lectures, delivered at Glasgow, were published last year. His chapter on Deity and God (Chapter I, Book IV, P. 341, Vol. II) is worth reading. On page 347 he says, "Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. That the universe is pregnant with such a quality—we are speculatively assured. What that quality is, we cannot know; for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars still are raised to the Unknown God. If we could know what Deity is, how it feels to be Divine, we should first have to become as God." Alexander's thought is much bolder than mine.

I believe there is a Divine tendency in the universe, but this tendency will eventually find its complete expression in a higher man, not in a God subject to Time, as Alexander implies in his discussion of the subject. I do not agree with Alexander's view of God; but it is clear that my idea of the Perfect Man will loss much of its outlandishness in the eyes of the English reader if he approaches it through the ideas of a thinker of his own country.

But it was Mr. Dickinson's review which interested me most, and I want to make a few remarks on it. Kindly pass on this letter to him I am sure he will be interested to know what I think of his review.

(1) Mr. Dickinson thinks, as I understand from his private letter to me, that I have defied physical force, in the poem. I am afraid he is mistaken in his view.

I believe in the power of the spirit, not brute force. When a people is called to a righteous war, it is, according to my belief their duty to obey the call, but I condemn all was of conquest (the story of Mianmir and the Emperor of India). Mr. Dickinson, however, is quite right when he says that war is destructive whether it is waged in the interests of Truth and Justice, or in the interest of conquest and exploitation. It must be put on end to in any case. We have seen, however, that, Treaties, Leagues, Arbitrations and Conferences cannot put an end to it. Even if we secure these in a more effective manner than before, ambitious nations will substitute more peaceful forms of the exploitation of races supposed to be less favoured or less civilised. The truth is that we stand in need of a living personality to solve out social problems, to settle our disputes, and to place international morality on a surer basis. How very true are the last two paragraphs of Prof. MacKenzie's introduction to Social Philosophy :

"There can be no ideal society without ideal man; and for the production of these we require not only insight but a motive power; fire as well as light. Perhaps, a philosophic understanding of our social problems is not even the chief want of our time. We need prophets as well as teachers, men like Carlyle or Ruskin or Tolstoy, who are able to add for us a new severity to conscience or a new breadth to duty. *Perhaps we want a new Christ*..... It has been well said that the prophet of our time must be a man of the world, and not merely a voice in the wilderness. For indeed the wilderness of the present is in the streets of our crowded cities, and in the midst of the incessant war by which we are trying to make our way upwards. It is there that the prophet must be.

"Or perhaps our chief want is rather for the poet of the new age than for its prophet—or for one who should be poet and prophet in one. Our poets of recent generations have taught us the love of nature; and enabled us

to see in it the revelation of the Divine. We still look for one who shall show us with the same clearness the present of the Divine in the human. . . . We still need one who shall be fully and in all seriousness what Heine playfully called himself a "Ritter von dem Heiligen Geish", one who shall teach us to see the working out of our highest ideals in the every day life of the world, and to find in devotion to the advancement of that life, not merely a sphere for an ascetic self-sacrifice, but a supreme object in the pursuit of which all thoughts, all passions, all delights may receive their highest development and satisfaction."

It is in the light of the above thoughts that I want the British public to read my description of the ideal man. It is not our treaties and arbitrations which will put an end to the internecine wars of the human family.

2. Mr. Dickinson further refers to my "Be hard" This is based on the view of reality that I have taken in the poem. According to my belief, reality is a collection of individualities tending to become a harmonious whole through conflict which must inevitably lead to mutual adjustment. This conflict is a necessity in the interests of the evolution of higher forms of life, and of personal immortality. Nietzsche did not believe in personal immortality. To those desiring it, he ruthlessly, says "Do you wish to be a perpetual burden on the shoulder of time?" He was led to say this because he had a wrong notion of time, and never tried to grapple with the Ethical issue involved in the question of time. On the other hand I look upon immortality as the highest aspiration of man on which he should focus all his energies, and consequently I recognise the need of all forms of activity, including conflict, which tend to make the human person more and more stable. And for the same consideration I condemn speculative mysticism and inactive quietism. My interest in conflict is mainly ethical and not political, whereas Nietzsche's was

probably only political. Modern physical science has taught us that the atom of material—energy has achieved its present form through thousands of years of evolution. Yet it is unstable, and can be made to disappear. The same is the case with the atom of mind-energy, *i.e.*, the human person. It has achieved its present form through ions of incessant effort and conflict; yet, in spite of all this, its instability is clear from the various phenomena of mental pathology. If it has to continue intact it cannot ignore the lessons learnt from its past career, and will require the same or similar forces to maintain its stability which it has availed of before. It is possible that in its onward march nature may modify or eliminate altogether some of the forces (*e.g.*, conflict in the way of mutual wars) that have so far determined and helped its evolution, and introduce new forces hitherto unknown to mankind to secure its stability. But, I confess I am not an idealist in this matter, and believe this time to be very distant. I am afraid mankind will not, for a very long time to come, learn the lesson that the Great European war has taught them. Thus it is clear that my purpose in recognising the need of conflict is mainly ethical. Mr. Dickinson has unfortunately altogether ignored this aspect of the “Be hard.”

3. Mr. Dickinson further remarks that while my philosophy is universal may application of it is particular and exclusive. This is in a sense true. The humanitarian ideal is always universal in poetry and philosophy, but if you make it an effective ideal, and work it out in acutal life, you must start, not with poets and philosophers, but with a society exclusive in the sense of having a creed and well-defined outline, but ever enlarging its limits by example and persuasion. Such a society, according to my belief, is Islam. This society has so far proved itself a more successful opponent of the race-idea which is probably the hardest barrier in the way of the humanitarian ideal. Renan was wrong when he said that science was the greatest enemy of Islam. No, it is the race-idea which is the greatest enemy of

Islam—in fact, of all humanity, and it is the duty of all lovers of mankind to stand in revolt against this dreadful invention of the Devil. Since I find that the idea of nationality based on race or territory is making headway in the world of Islam, and since I fear that the Muslims, losing sight of their own ideal of a universal humanity, are being lured by the idea of a territorial nationality, I feel it is my duty, as a Muslim and as a lover of all mankind, to remind them of their true function in the evolution of mankind. Tribal or national organisations on the lines of race or territory are only temporary phases in the unfoldment and upbringing of collective life, and as such I have no quarrel with them; but I condemn them in the strongest possible terms when they are regarded as the ultimate expression of the life of mankind. While I have the greatest love for Islam, it is in view of practical and not patriotic considerations, as Mr. Dickinson thinks, that I am compelled to start with a specific society (*e.g.*, Islam) which, among the societies of the world, happens to be the only one suitable to my purpose. Nor is the spirit of Islam so exclusive as Mr. Dickinson thinks. In the interest of a universal unification of mankind the Qu'ran ignores their minor differences and says "Come let us unite on what is common to us all".

I am afraid the old European idea of a blood-thirsty Islam is still ingering in the mind of Mr. Dickinson. All men and not Muslims alone are meant for the Kingdom of God on earth, provided they say good-bye to their idols of race and nationality, and treat one another as personalities. Leagues, mandates, treaties, like the one described by Mr. Keynes, and Imperialisms, however draped in democracy, can never bring salvation to mankind.

The salvation of man lies in absolute equality and freedom of all. We stand in need of a thorough overhauling of the aims of science which has brought so much misery to mankind, of a total abandonment of

what may be called esoteric politics which is ever planning the ruin of less clever or weaker races.

That Muslim peoples have fought and conquered like other peoples, and that some of their leaders have screened their personal ambition behind the veil of religion I do not deny; but I am absolutely sure that territorial conquest was no part of the original programme of Islam. As a matter of fact, I consider it a great loss that the progress of Islam as a conquering faith stultified the growth of those germs of an economic and democratic organisation of society which I find scattered up and down the pages of the Qu'ran and the tradition of the Prophet. No doubt, the Muslims succeeded in building a great empire, but thereby they largely repaganised their political ideals, and lost sight of some of the most important potentialities of their faith. Islam certainly aims at absorption. This absorption, however, is to be achieved not by territorial conquest but by the simplicity of its teaching, its appeal to the common sense of mankind and its aversion to abstruse metaphysical dogma. That Islam can succeed by its inherent force is sufficiently clear from the Muslim Missionary work in China, where it has won millions of adherents without the help of any political power. I hope more than twenty year's long study of the world's thought has given me sufficient training to judge things impartially.

The object of my Persian poems is not to make out a case for Islam; my aim is simply to discover a universal social reconstruction; and in this endeavour. I find it philosophically impossible to ignore a social system which exists with the express object of doing away with all the distinctions of caste, rank and race; and which, while keeping a watchful eye on the affairs of this world, fosters a spirit of unworldliness so absolutely essential to man in his relations with his neighbours. This is what Europe lacks and this is what she can still learn from us.

One word more. In my notes which now form part of your introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi*, I deliberately explained my position in reference to Western thinkers, as I thought this would facilitate the understanding of my views in England. I could have easily explained myself in the light of the Qu'ran and Muslim Sufis and thinkers e.g., Ibn Arabi and Iraqi (Pantheism), Wahid Mahmud (Reality as a Plurality), Al-Jili (the idea of the Perfect Man) and Mujaddid Sarhindi (the human person in relation to the Divine Person). As a matter of fact, I did so explain myself in my Hindustani introduction to the Islam edition of the *Asrar*.

I claim that the philosophy of the *Asrar* is a direct development out of the experience and speculation of old Muslim Sufis and the thinkers. Even Bergson's idea of time is not quite foreign to our sufis. The Qu'ran is certainly not a book of metaphysics, but it takes a definite view of the life and destiny of man, which must eventually rest on propositions, especially when it is done in the light of religious experience and philosophy invoked by that great book, is not putting new wine in old bottles. It is only a restatement of the old in the light of the new. It is unfortunate that the history of Muslim thought is so little known in the West. I wish I had time to write an extensive book on the subject to show to the Western student of philosophy how philosophic thinking makes the whole world kin.

Yours sincerely,

Muhammad Iqbal

AN EXPOSITION OF THE SELF

Some people wrongly believe that Allama Iqbal borrowed his philosophy of the self from the famous German thinker Nietzsche. The following note, dictated by the Allama to Syyed Nazir Niazi in the Summer of 1937, also contains Iqbal's views on Nietzsche's philosophy and it should remove this misconception.

The Ego

The teaching of the "Asrar-i-Khudi" rests on two points :

(a) That personality is the central fact of the universe. The Old Testament describes this ultimate fact as the great 'I am'. The Qu'ran, however, describes the ultimate personality in much grander terms (59 : 23, 24)

هو الله الذي لا اله الا هو الملك القدوس السلام المؤمن المهيمن
العزیز الجبار المتكبر --- وهو العزيز الحكيم --- حشر

Read in this connection 'Asrar-i-Khudi'.

در معنی این که اصل نظام عالم از خودی است

Tr.—The ego is the root of all existence.

(b) That personality, 'I am', is the central fact in the constitution of man. This smaller or dependent 'I am' is variously described in the Qu'ran - قَتُور - ضعیف - کفور yet it is also described as جہول - ظلوم - عجول - کفور the bearer of Divine trust علی نفسه بصیرة. The case of man, therefore, inspite of his constitutional shortcomings is not hopeless. On the other hand the Qu'ran says :

۱ - بلی قادرین علی ان نسوی بنانه

۲ - الیحب الانسا ان یترب سدی

The slender 'I' which appears to be capable of dissolution by the smallest of shocks appears to have a future and can achieve permanence as an element in the constitution of the universe provided it adopts a certain mode of life. It has the quality of growth قد افلح من زکها as well as the quality of corruption اقد خاب حسن دسها It has the power to expand by absorbing the elements of the universe of which it appears to be an insignificant part, it has also the power of absorbing the attributes of God, تخلقوا با خلاق الله and thus attain to the vicegerency of God on earth. The various stages of its spiritual expansion are described in the "Asrar-i-Khudi" as follows :

(i) اطاعت Complete surrender to the Law.
This is symbolised by the camel.

(ii) ضبط نفس Self Control.

(iii) نیابت الہیہ Vicegerency of God.

The superficial resemblance of these three parts of the growth of human, 'I' with Nietzsche's three metamorphosis of the spirit may mislead some readers. It is therefore, necessary to warn the reader of 'Asrar-i-Khudi' that Nietzsche does not at all believe in the

spiritual fact which I have described *خودی* in the poem *vide*—Will to Power, Vol. 2, No. 12-20.

According to Nietzsche the 'I' is a fiction. It is true that looked at from a purely intellectual point of view this conclusion is inevitable. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ends in the conclusion that God, immortality and freedom are more fictions though useful for practical purposes. Nietzsche only follows Kant in this conclusion. There is, however, another point of view that is to say the point of view of inner experience. From this point of view the 'I' is an indubitable fact, (*vide* Bradley's discussion on this point) which stares us in the face in spite of our intellectual analysis of it. In this respect Leibnitz is nearer to truth than either Kant or Nietzsche. The monad or the I—alone according to him is an ultimate fact. His mistake, however, is that he regards the I (alone) as something closed and windowless. This, however, is contradicted by experience, because we know that the 'I' grows and expands by education. The question, therefore, which should be raised in regard to the human, 'I' is not whether it is a substance or not. The question was raised by our theologians whose philosophical discussion achieved nothing. The question which ought to be raised in my opinion is whether this weak, created and dependent Ego or 'I' can be made to survive the shock of death and thus become a permanent element in the constitution of universe. The answer that "Asrar-i-Khudi" tries to give to this question, of course in a poetical way and not in a philosophical manner, is this that the human ego can be made permanent by adopting a certain mode of life and thereby bringing it into contact with this ultimate source of life. The various stages of its growth are mentioned in the 'Asrar-i-Khudi'. Thus in its essence 'Asrar-i-Khudi' and Nietzsche are diametrically opposed to each other. 'Asrar-i-Khudi' wholly depends on the factum of *خودی* in which Nietzsche does not believe.

The Superman

The conception of the Superman in Nietzsche is purely materialistic. This conception may be new in European literature. It is, however, the same as the idea of the Overman in Emerson. It is probable that Nietzsche borrowed it from the literature of Islam or of the East and degraded it by his materialism. In the literature of Islamic mysticism the expression used for the higher man is 'انسان کامل'. I wrote on this subject about 36 years ago immediately after leaving the College. My dissertation was published in the "Antiquary" of Bombay and now forms part of my "Development of Metaphysics in Persia." Being a thorough-going materialist, Nietzsche cannot use the term spirit except in the sense of life in its metaphysical manifestations. The first metamorphosis of life according to him is camel, which from his point of view is a symbol of load bearing strength. The second is lion that is to say the strength to kill without pity, for pity is a vice and not virtue with Nietzsche. The third metamorphosis is child that is to say the Superman passing beyond good and evil like the child and becoming a law unto himself. This is materialism turning the human ego into a monster, which, according to Nietzsche's idea of immortality, has repeated itself and will repeat itself infinite numbers of times. Nietzsche fell into this error of the world repeating itself on account of his fatal error namely that clock time is the real time. On this point again 'Asrar-i-Khudi' is opposed to Nietzsche's teaching. He never grappled with the problem of time and accepted without criticism the old Hindu and Greek idea of time. The time movement to him is circular. In the 'Asrar-i-Khudi' it is regarded as a straight-line. Life, therefore, to Nietzsche is repetition, to 'Asrar-i-Khudi' creation. The perfection of the perfect man according to Islam consists in realising this aspect of time which can be described only as the eternal Now. To Nietzsche there is no such thing as the eternal Now. Further Nietzsche's

Superman is a biological product. The Islamic perfect man is the product of moral and spiritual forces.

Nietzsche's Materialism

Nietzsche recognises no spiritual purpose in the universe. To him, there is no ethical principle resident in the forces of history. Virtue, Justice, Duty, Love all are meaningless terms to him. The process of history is determined purely by economical forces and the only principle that governs is 'Might is Right'. It must be noted that Karl Marx and Nietzsche borrowed this materialistic interpretation of the historical process from the left wing followers of Hegel and accepted it without criticism. They, however, drew absolutely opposite inferences from this interpretation. Karl Marx predicts that power will eventually fall into the hands of the proletariat by the sheer force of historical causes. The proletariat, therefore, will wrest by force the power from the hands of the rich and impose upon the world a new social order. Nietzsche on the other hand says that it is the superior man who has been robbed of power and he should assert himself and tell the inferior to remain where they should be *i.e.*, hovers of wood and drawers of water. The truth is that this materialistic interpretation of the historical process has marred the teachings of both Karl Marx and Nietzsche. It has, however, done more harm to the teachings of Nietzsche than to the teachings of Karl Marx.

The Meaning of Khudi

The word 'Khudi' was chosen with great difficulty and most reluctantly. From a literary point of view it has many shortcomings and ethically it is generally used in a bad sense both in Urdu and Persian. The other words for the metaphysical fact of the 'I' are equally bad *e.g.*, 'انايت - نفس - شخص - انا'. What is needed is a colourless word for self, ego, having no ethical significance. As far as I know there is no such word

in either Urdu or Persian. The word 'من' in Persian is equally bad. However, considering the requirement of verse, I thought that the word 'خودی' was the most suitable. There is also some evidence in the Persian language of the use of the word 'خودی' in the simple sense of self, *i.e.*, to say the colourless fact of the 'I'. Thus metaphysically the word 'خودی' is used in the sense of that indescribable feeling of 'I' which forms the basis of the uniqueness of each individual. Metaphysically it does not convey any ethical significance for those who cannot get rid of its ethical significance. I have already said in the 'Zuboor-i-Ajam' :

گرفتم این که شراب خودی بسے تلخ است
بدرد خویش نگر زهر ما بدر ما کش

The wine of egohood is no doubt bitter, but do look to thy disease and take my poison for the sake of thy health.

When I condemn self negation I do not mean self denial in the moral sense; for self denial in the moral sense is a source of strength to the ego. In condemning self negation I am condemning those forms of conduct which lead to the extinction of the 'I' as a metaphysical force, for its extinction would mean its dissolution, its incapacity for personal immortality. The ideal of Islamic Mysticism according to my understanding is not the extinction of the 'I'. The 'فنا' in the Islamic mysticism means not extinction but complete surrender of the human ego to the Divine Ego. The ideal of Islamic mysticism is a stage beyond the stage of 'فنا' *i.e.*, 'بقا' which from my point of view is the highest stage of self-affirmation. When I say "Be as hard as the diamond", I do not mean as Nietzsche does callousness or pitilessness. What I mean is the integration of the elements of the ego so that it may be able to obstruct the forces of destruction in its means towards personal immortality.

Ethically the word 'خودی' means (as used by me) self-reliance self-respect, self-confidence, self-preservation; even self-assertion when such a thing is necessary in the interests of life and the power to stick to the cause of truth, justice, duty, etc., etc., even in the face of death. Such behaviour is moral in my opinion because it helps in the integration of the forces of the Ego, thus hardening it, as against the forces of disintegration and dissolution (vide *Reconstruction*); practically the metaphysical Ego is the bearer of two main rights that is the right to life and freedom as determined by the Divine Law.

McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY

Dr. McTaggart, the well-known philosopher, was Allama Iqbal's tutor at Cambridge. Iqbal wrote an article on certain aspects of his philosophy dealing in detail with his view of the Self. The article was published in the Indian Art and Letter, London in 1932.

I was reading the other day Mr. Dickinson's memoir of the late and lamented Dr. McTaggart, that philosopher-saint whose lectures on Kant and Hegel I had the privilege to attend as an advanced student of Trinity College, Cambridge, about a quarter of a century ago. I should like to note a few points which occurred to me while reading this interesting book, whose value is very much enhanced by the personal reminiscences of those who had the good fortune of coming into contact with that great thinker.

"As we have pointed out more than once", says Mr. Dickinson, "the origin of McTaggart's philosophy was not in his intellect but in his emotions." This is true—perhaps more or less true of all thinkers—if we look at McTaggart as a thinker torn as under from the general current of British thought. In order to understand the true significance of his philosophy we must put him back into that current.

Agnosticism is not a permanent mode of thought. It comes and goes. The British mind tried to escape

from it in two ways. One is the total elimination of what is called ultimate Reality. The 'Unknown and Unknowable' of Herbert Spencer simply does not exist. Why, then, look for it? The universe is nothing but perishable phenomena without any eternal reality behind it. The other way is that an Eternal Reality does exist behind the world of perishable phenomena, and is approachable by a purely speculative method. The first course was adopted by Hume, the second by Green. In opposition to British Phenomenalism, Green affirmed the existence of an Eternal Consciousness. The temporal process according to Green is unthinkable without a non-temporal consciousness, for consciousness of change cannot be identical with the process of change. But the Eternal Consciousness, so regarded, is nothing more than a kind of Newtonian space holding together the world of eternally inter-related appearances. This view makes it impossible to develop the living concrete self out of a dead immobile system of abstract relations. Bradley's philosophy is the logical outcome of Green. The criterion of reality is coherence and freedom from contradiction. Applying this test, the world of appearance—time, change, movement, multiplicity—turns out to be a mere illusion. The ultimate Reality is one and immutable. This is the ancient Hindu doctrine of Maya and the Greek Parmenides. But how did this illusion originate? Nobody knows. Bradley, however, admits in spite of the contradictions involved in the notion of self, that the human self must, in some sense, be real. In what sense is it real? He does not explain. McTaggart reaches the Absolute by means of Dialectic method, but he does not stop at the Absolute. The Absolute, according to him, further differentiates itself into concrete egos. The universe is not an illusion, it is a system of real selves, which cannot be regarded as mere predicates or adjectives of the Absolute. As he wrote to me in December, 1919:

"I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the

Absolute. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not that."

In this aspect of his teaching McTaggart is much more genuinely British than either Bradley or Green or Bosanquet. Indeed he was to Hegel as Leibnitz was to Spinoza. Thus the character of McTaggart's philosophy was determined, not so much by his private emotions as by the intellectual difficulties as well as the un-British character of neo-Hegelian, thought in England. It was also determined by what he called the needs of his country. I quote from another letter of 1920, which he appears to have written after he had read Nicholson's English translation of my *Secrets of the Self* :

"I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much? Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a Pantheist and mystic.

"For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the ultimate reality, but as to their true content and their true goal, my position is, as it was, that is to be found in eternity and not in time, and in love rather than action.

"Perhaps however, the difference is largely a question of emphasis—we each lay most weight on what our own country needs. I dare say you are right when you say that India is too contemplative. But I am sure that England—and all Europe—is not contemplative enough. That is a lesson we ought learn from you—and no doubt we have something to teach in return."

The point of interest in McTaggart's philosophy, however, is that in his system mystical intuition, as a source of knowledge, is much more marked than in the system of Bradley. The need of such a direct revelation

is the natural outcome of the failure of a purely speculative method. An Italian writer describes McTaggart's philosophy as mystical degeneration of English Neo-Hegelianism. Nothing of the kind. Some of the greatest minds of the world have felt the need of a direct contact with the ultimate Reality, and have indeed, in some cases, achieved such contact. Plotinus, Ghazali, chelling Sand Bergson are instances in point. In his spiritual evolution Kant himself reached that stage; but unlike Ghazali and others he was led to achieve the ultimate Reality as a regulative idea only. The result of his critical philosophy is that God cannot be proved to exist, but that we should act as if He does exist. Not William James but Kant was the real founder of modern Pragmatism. Will, then, the Italian writer referred to above, describe Kant's philosophy as a pragmatic degeneration of German thought?

It must, however, be remembered in the case of McTaggart that the mystic revelation of Reality came to him as a confirmation of his thought. His system is deductive not in the sense in which the philosophy of Bergson and Plotinus is deductive. He started with a firm conviction in the power of human reason, and that conviction remained with him to the end of his days. His illumination came, I think, as an accidental confirmation of what he had reached through pure reason. That is why he had such an unshakable faith in his philosophy. This is clear from the last words which he said to his wife: "I am grieved that we must part, but you know I am not afraid of death." Such a triumphant faith is the result of a direct revelation alone. And this revelation has nothing to do with what our psychology calls emotion; it is, as Mrs. McTaggart rightly insists, "an actual perception of the senses." Like a true mystic McTaggart rarely mentioned his experiences to others. The ultimate basis of religion is an experience which is essentially individual and incommunicable. It is because of its essentially private character that mystics see to no use in talking about it

except to experts, and that, too for the purposes of verification only. In the history of Islamic mysticism we find many recorded instances in which some mystics have been reported to have travelled thousands of miles for the verification of a single experience. This is technically known as *tasdiq*, i.e., verification by an appeal to another man's experience. Knowledge and direct revelation are not mutually opposed: they are complimentary to each other. The philosophical theologian simply tries, for the sake of less fortunate persons, to socialize through reason what is essentially individual. When the mystic Sultan Abu Said met the philosopher Abu Ali ibn Sina he is reported to have said, "I see what he knows." McTaggart both knew and saw; but his vision, I believe, did not precede his system. It did not initially inspire his thought, though it did bring to him the warmth of conviction. This, to my mind, indicates a far more powerful intellect than that of Plotinus or Bergson. Yet the vision of McTaggart, in view of its static character, is not free from the unhealthy influences of his Hegelian inspiration. But perhaps we possess no criterion to decide whether the universe in its ultimate essence is at rest or in motion.

Another point on which I would like to say a few words is McTaggart's view of the self. Hegel's indifference to personal immortality has more or less affected all those who received inspiration from him. With Bosanquet and Bradley the self is not a substance in the sense of Spinoza. It is a construction of thought, a mere predicate or adjective of the Absolute. And this self-hood, according to these thinkers, is further transcended in the Absolute. This account of self disregards even the elementary conditions of self-hood as known to living experience. The self as known to experience, is much more than a mere predicate of the Absolute; it is a dynamic centre of experience. By this criticism of the common Neo-Hegelian view of the self I do not mean to argue for McTaggart's view. All that I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the results of English Neo-Hegelianism. To

McTaggart the self is a real substance. He reached the Absolute through the method of Hegel. But with him the Absolute has further determinations—*i.e.*, egos of actual experience which participate in the elemental eternity of the Absolute. This amounts to a total dismissal of the Hegelian Absolute. But the result of this dismissal is not a return to Empiricism. It gives us not a world of inter-related appearances, but a living world of inter-related egos. Mr. Dickinson thinks that it cuts out science at one stroke. It does nothing of the kind any more than the spiritual pluralism of Leibnitz. But while I agree that the self is more than a mere predicate of the Absolute, I cannot agree with McTaggart in the view that the self is elementally immortal. From the mere fact that the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute, it by no means, follows that, even in its finitude, the human self retains the character which belongs to its source alone. To my mind such a differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself. Personally, I regard immortality as an inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego. I venture here to translate for the English reader one or two passages from my poem called *The New Garden of Mystery* :

If you say that the 'I' is a mere illusion—
An appearance among other appearances—
Then tell me who is the subject of this illusion?
Look within and discover.

The word is *visible*;

Yet its existence needs proof!

Not even the intellect of an angel can comprehend it.

The 'I' is invisible and needs no proof

Think a while and see thine own secret!

The 'I' is Truth, it is no illusion.

When it ripens, it becomes eternal
 Lovers, even though separated from the Beloved,
 live in blissful union.

It is possible to give wings to a mere spark.

And to make it flutter for ever and for ever;

*The Eternity of God is elemental and not the reward
 of His action !*

*That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
 Wins for herself by love's frenzy.*

Why fear that death which comes from without ?

For when the 'I' ripens into a self

It has no danger of dissolution.

There is a more subtle inner death which makes
 me tremble !

This death is falling down from love's frenzy.

Saving one's spark and not giving it away freely
 to the heaps of chaff,

Cutting one's shroud with one's own hands,

Seeing one's death with one's own eyes,

This death lies in ambush for thee!

Fear it, for that is really our death.

But while I disagree with McTaggart in his view of immortality, I regard this part of his work as almost apostolic. He emphasized personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in Europe, and when the European man was about to face death on an enormous scale. Indeed in this aspect of his work he may be compared to the great Muslim Hallaj, whose undying phrase "I am the creative Truth" was thrown as a challenge to the whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was moving in a direction which tended to obscure the reality and destiny of the human ego. Hallaj never

ceased to utter what he had personally seen to be the Truth until the Mullahs of Islam prevailed upon the state to imprison him and finally to crucify him. He met his death with perfect calm.

There is one more point which I would like briefly to consider here—I mean his atheism. I used to meet him almost every day in his rooms in Trinity, and very often our talk turned on the question of God. His powerful logic often silenced me but he never succeeded in convincing me. There is no doubt, as Mr. Dickinson points out in his memoir, that he had a positive dislike for the transcendent God of Western theology. The Absolute of the Neo-Hegelian lacks life and movement. The Eternal Consciousness of Green is hardly distinguishable from Newtonian space. How could these satisfy him? In a letter already quoted he wrote to me :

“As far as the life of the individual remains the same in the course of amplification and expression, I am inclined to think (for an European, you know, can also be a mystic) that the solution rests in loving the same persons. But indeed it still seems to me, as it did when we first knew one another, that the solution of all problems is found only in love.”

Indeed his description of love as the essence of Reality indicates that, in spite of his thorough-going intellectualism, his soul revolted against the inert Absolute of Neo-Hegelians. Yet in a letter from which I have quoted above he seems to oppose love to action. I do not see the opposition. Love is no passivity. It is active and creative. Indeed, on the material plane, it is only force which circumvents death: for when death carries away one generation, love creates another. He tells us that this love which he regarded as the essence of Reality is just the love of one person for another, and further, it is the cause and not the effect of the proximity of two persons. Now it is because of its character as an active cause that, in spite of variety in content of the

mutual loves of various persons, it is capable of being experienced as a unity embracing the entire universe. But the crucial point is whether this central unity is an all-inclusive self. This was McTaggart's real difficulty. The self is unique and impervious. How could one self, however superior, include other selves? The mystic poet Rumi felt the same difficulty. "Between the individual egos and their Sustainer," he says, "obtains a contact which can neither be imagined nor intellectually conceived." In his *Idea of God* Professor Pringle-Pattison also regards this relation as inscrutable by human intellect. But is not the individual ego himself a colony of egos?

اسرار ازل خواہی بر خود نظرے واکن
یکنائی و بسیاری، پنهائی و پیدائی

Shall I point the way to the eternal secret?

Open thine eye on thyself!

Thou art visible and invisible, many and one!

Perhaps it is not possible intellectually to conceive this ultimate unity as an all-embracing self. It is my belief, as I have pointed out before, that McTaggart's Hegelian inspiration marred the vision which was vouchsafed him. A more serious thing happened to poor Nietzsche, whose peculiar intellectual environment led him to think that his vision of the ultimate Ego could be realized in a world of space and time. What grows only out of the inner depths of the heart of man he proposed to create by an artificial biological experiment. He was taken as a madman and was placed in the hands of those who administer drugs and mixtures. As I said of him in my *Javid Nama*:

بود حلاجی به شهر خود غریب
جان ز سلا بردو کشت او را طبیب

A Hallaj! A stranger in his own land! Safe from the Mula's hit, killed by the Physician's hand!

The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. Does Reality respond to us? It does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself—*i.e.*, the act of worship. In McTaggart's case reflection took the place of worship. The orders of Muslim mystics have invented various rules and practices by which to come into direct contact with the Ultimate Reality. The truth, however is that neither worship nor reflection nor any kind of practices entitle a man to this response from the Ultimate Love. It depends eventually on what religion calls "grace". The philosophy of McTaggart has in fact raised the great problem of the nature of Love. How will it be solved in Europe if at all? Surely analytic psychology will never be able to solve it. Its secret lies in the pangs of separation, detachment, or, as McTaggart would say, differentiation.

If the ultimate Reality—*i.e.*, Love—has any significance for the life of its own ego-differentiations, it must itself be an all-inclusive ego which sustains, responds, loves, and is capable of being loved. In McTaggart's view there is no guarantee that the process of birth, death and rebirth will be endless. On the other hand, he himself suggests in his *Some Dogmas of Religion*, that "it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself, and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change." In this eventuality we come back to the Absolute again, and McTaggart's system defeats its own purpose. The possibility of ego-differentiations merging again into a perfection transcending time and change must be counteracted, however remote it may be. And this can be done only by taking immortality as a hope, an inspiration, a duty, and not as an eternal fact.

مراد دل سوخت بر تنهائی او
کنم سامان بزم آرائی او
مثال دانه می کارم خودی را
نگهدارم ، نگهدارم خودی را
(گلشن راز جدید)

My heart burns on the loneliness of God !
In order, therefore, to maintain intact His Ego
Society,

I sow in my dust the seed of self-hood.

And keep a constant vigil over my 'I'.

(New Garden of Mystery).

PART SIX

ISLAM AND QADIANISM

PART SIX

ISLAM AND QADIANISM

QADIANIS AND ORTHODOX MUSLIMS

The controversy between Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims created a very important issue for the world of Islam, and the following article was written by Allama Iqbal with a view to explaining the social, political and religious implications of this issue. It was published in the Statesman (Calcutta) on 14th May, 1935.

The issue created by the controversy between the Qadianis and the orthodox Muslims have only recently begun to realize its importance. I intended to address an open letter to the British people explaining the social and political implications of the issue. But unfortunately my health prevented me from doing so. I am, however, glad to say a few words for the present on a matter which, to my mind, affects the entire collective life of the Indian Muslims. It must however, be pointed out at the outset that I have no intention to enter into any theological argument. Nor do I mean to undertake a psychological analysis of the mind of the founder of the Qadiani movement; the former will not interest those for whom this statement is meant and the time for the latter has not yet arrived in India. My point of view is that of a student of general history and comparative religion.

India is a land of many religious communities; and Islam is a religious community in a much deeper sense than those communities whose structure is determined partly by the religious and partly by the race idea.

Islam repudiates the race idea altogether and founds itself on the religious idea alone. Since Islam bases itself on the religious idea alone, a basis which is wholly spiritual and consequently far more etherial than blood relationship, Muslim society is naturally much more sensitive to forces which it considers harmful to its integrity. Any religious society historically arising from the bosom of Islam, which claims a new prophethood for its basis, and declares all Muslims who do not recognize the truth of its alleged revelation as *Kafirs*, must, therefore be, be regarded by every Muslim as a serious danger to the solidarity of Islam. This must necessarily be so; since the integrity of Muslim society is secured by the idea of the Finality of Prophethood alone.

This idea of Finality is perhaps the most original idea in the cultural history of mankind; its true significance can be understood only by those who carefully study the history of pre-Islamic Magian culture in Western and Middle Asia. The concept of Magian culture, according to modern research, includes cultures associated with Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Jewish Christianity, Chaldean and Sabeian religions. To these creed-communities the idea of the continuity of prophethood was essential, and consequently they lived in a state of constant expectation. It is probable that the Magian man psychologically enjoyed this state of expectation. The modern man is spiritually far more emancipated than the Magian man. The result of the Magian attitude was the disintegration of old communities and the constant formation of new ones by all sorts of religious adventurers. In the modern world of Islam, ambitious and ignorant *mullaism* taking advantage of the modern Press, has shamelessly attempted to hurl the old pre-Islamic Magian outlook in the face of the twentieth century. It is obvious that Islam which claims to weld all the various communities of the world into one single community cannot reconcile itself to a movement which threatens its present solidarity and holds the promise of further rifts in human society.

Of the two forms which the modern revival of pre-Islamic Magianism has assumed Bahaism appears to me to be far more honest than Qadianism; for the former openly departs from Islam, whereas the latter apparently retains some of the more important externals of Islam with an inwardness wholly inimical to the spirit and aspirations of Islam. Its idea of a jealous God with an inexhaustible store of earthquakes and plagues for its opponents; its conception of the Prophet as a soothsayer; its idea of the continuity of the spirit of Messiah are so absolutely Jewish that the movement can easily be regarded as a return to early Judaism. The idea of the continuity of the spirit of Messiah belongs more to Jewish mysticism than to positive Judaism. Professor Buber who has given an account of the movement initiated by the Polish Messiah Baalshem tells us that "it was thought that the spirit of the Messiah descended upon the earth through the prophets and even through a long line of holy men stretching into the present time—the *Zaddiks*" (*Sadiqs*). Heretical movements in Muslim Iran under the pressure of pre-Islamic Magian ideas invented the words "*buruz*" "*hulul*" "*zill*" to cover this idea of a perpetual reincarnation. It was necessary to invent new expressions for a Magian idea in order to make it less shocking to Muslim conscience. Even the phrase "promised Messiah" is not a product of Muslim religious consciousness. It is a bastard expression and has its origin in the pre-Islamic Magian outlook.

We do not find it in early Islamic religious and historical literature. This remarkable fact is revealed by Prof. Wensincks' "Concordance of the Traditions of the Holy Prophet" which covers no less than 11 collections of the traditions and three of the earliest historical documents of Islam. One can very well understand the reason why early Muslims never used this expression. The expression did not appeal to them probably because they thought that it implied a false conception of the historical process. The Magian mind regarded time as a circular movement; the glory of

elucidating the true nature of the historical process as a perpetually creative movement was reserved for the great Muslim thinker and historian, Ibn Khaldun.

The intensity of feeling which the Indian Muslims have manifested in opposition to the Qadiani movement is, therefore, perfectly intelligible to the student of modern sociology. The average Muslim who was the other day described as "*mulla-ridden*" by a writer in the *Civil & Military Gazette*, is inspired in his opposition to the movement more by his instinct of self-preservation than by a fuller grasp of the meaning of the idea of Finality in his faith. The so-called "enlightened" Muslim has seldom made an attempt to understand the real cultural significance of the idea of Finality in Islam, and a process of slow and imperceptible Westernization has further deprived him even of the instinct of self-preservation. Some of these so-called enlightened Muslims have gone to the extent of preaching 'tolerance' to their brethern-in-faith. I can easily excuse Sir Herbert Emerson* for preaching toleration to Muslims; for a modern European who is born and brought up in an entirely different culture does not, and perhaps cannot, develop the insight which makes it possible for one to understand an issue vital to the very structure of a community with an entirely different cultural outlook.

In India circumstances are much more peculiar. This country of the religious communities where the future of each community rests entirely upon its solidarity, is ruled by a Western people who cannot but adopt a policy of non-interference in religion. This liberal and indispensable policy in a country like India has led to most unfortunate results. In so far as Islam is concerned, it is no exaggeration to say that the solidarity of the Muslim community in India under the British is far less safe than the solidarity of the Jewish community was in the days of Jesus under the Romans.

* Governor of the Punjab.

Any religious adventurer in India can set up any claim and carve out a new community for his own exploitation. This liberal state of ours does not care a fig for the integrity of a parent community, provided the adventurer assures it of his loyalty and his followers are regular in the payments of taxes due to the state. The meaning of this policy for Islam was quite accurately seen by our great poet Akbar who, in his usual humorous strain, says :

گورنمنٹ کی خیر یارو مناؤ
انا الحق کہو اور پھانسی نہ پاؤ

"O friend! pray for the glory of the Briton's name, Say 'I am God' *sans* chain, *sans* cross, *sans* shame."

I very much appreciate the orthodox Hindu's demand for protection against religious reformers in the new constitution. Indeed, the demand ought to have been first made by the Muslims who, unlike the Hindus, entirely eliminate the race idea from their social structure. The Government must seriously consider the present situation and try, if possible, to understand the mentality of the average Muslim in regard to this issue which he regards as absolutely vital to the integrity of his community. After all, if the integrity of a community is threatened, the only course open to that community is to defend itself against the forces of disintegration.

And what are the ways of self-defence ?

Controversial writings and refutations of the claims of the man who is regarded by the parent community as a religious adventurer. Is it then fair to preach toleration to the parent community whose integrity is threatened and to allow the rebellious group to carry on its propaganda with impunity, even when the propaganda is highly abusive?

If a group, rebellious from the point of view of the parent community, happens to be of some special service to Government, the latter are at liberty to reward their services as best as they can. Other communities will not grudge it. But it is too much to expect that a community should calmly ignore the forces which tend seriously to affect its collective life. Collective life is as sensitive to the danger of dissolution as individual life. It is hardly necessary to add in this connection that the mutual theological bickerings of Muslim sects do not affect vital principles on which all these sects agree with all their differences in spite of their mutual accusations of heresy.

There is one further point which demands Government's special consideration. The encouragement in India of religious adventurers on the ground of modern liberalism tends to make people more and more indifferent to religion and will eventually completely eliminate the important factor of religion from the life of Indian communities. The Indian mind will then seek some other substitute for religion, which is likely to be nothing less than the form of atheistic materialism which has appeared in Russia.

But the religious issue is not the only issue which is at present agitating the minds of the Punjab Muslims. There are other quarrels of a political nature to which, according to my reading, Sir Herbert Emerson hinted in his speech at the Anjuman's* anniversary. These are, no doubt, of a purely political nature, but they affect the unity of Punjab Muslims as seriously as the religious issue. While thanking the Government for their anxiety to see the Punjab Muslims united, I venture to suggest a little self-examination to the Government themselves. Who is responsible, I ask, for the distinction of rural and urban Muslims—a distinction which has cut up the Muslim community into two groups and the rural group into several sub-groups constantly at war with one another?

*Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam, Lahore.

Sir Herbert Emerson deplores the lack of proper leadership among the Punjab Muslims. But I wish Sir Herbert Emerson realised that the rural-urban distinction created by the Government and maintained by them through ambitious political adventurers whose eyes are fixed on their own personal interests and not on the unity of Islam in the Punjab has already made the community incapable of producing a real leader. It appears to me that this device probably originated in a desire rather to make it impossible for real leadership to grow. Sir Herbert Emerson deplores the lack of leadership in Muslims; I deplore the continuation by the Government of a system which has crushed out all hope of a real leader appearing in the province.

POSTSCRIPT :

I understand that this statement has caused some misunderstanding in some quarters. It is thought that I have made a subtle suggestion to the Government to suppress the Qadiani movement by force. Nothing of the kind. I have made it clear that the policy of non-interference in religion is the only policy which can be adopted by the rulers of India. No other policy is possible. I confess, however, that to my mind this policy is harmful to the interests of religious communities; but there is no escape from it and those who suffer will have to safeguard their interests by suitable means. The best course for the rulers of India is in my opinion to declare the Qadianis a separate community. This will be perfectly consistent with the policy of the Qadianis themselves and the Indian Muslim will tolerate them just as he tolerates the other religions.

SEPARATION OF QADIANIS FROM THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Allama Iqbal's statement on Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims was published by the Statesman, Calcutta with a criticism in its leading article. Iqbal's reply to the criticism appeared in the same newspaper on June, 10, 1935.

I am very thankful to you for your critical leader on my statement which was published in your issue of the 14th May. The question which you have raised in your letter is a very important one, and I am really very glad that you have raised it. I did not raise it in my statement because I felt that, considering the separatist policy of the Qadianis which they have consistently pursued in religious and social matters ever since the birth of the idea of building a new community on the foundations of a rival prophethood and the intensity of the Muslim feeling against this move, it was rather the duty of the Government to take administrative cognizance of such a fundamental difference between the Qadianis and the Muslims without waiting for a formal representation on behalf of the Muslim community of India. I was encouraged in this feeling by the Government's attitude in the matter of the Sikh community which till 1919 was not administratively regarded as a separate political unit but which was later treated as such without any formal representation on the part of the Sikhs, inspite of the Lahore High Court's finding that the Sikhs were Hindus.

However, now that you have raised this question I should like to offer a few observations on a matter which I regard as of the highest importance both from the British and the Muslim points of view. You want me "to make it perfectly clear whether when or where I can tolerate official cognizance of any one community's religious differences". Let me point out :

First, that Islam is essentially a religious community with perfectly defined boundaries—belief in the Unity of God, belief in all the Prophets and belief in the Finality of Muhammad's Prophethood. The last mentioned belief is really the factor which accurately draws the line of demarcation between Muslims and non-Muslims and enables one to decide whether a certain individual or group is a part of the community or not. For example, the Brahmos believe in God, they also regard Muhammad (on whom be peace) as one of the prophets of God, yet they cannot be regarded as part and parcel of Islam because they, like the Qadianis, believe in the theory of perpetual revelation through prophets and do not believe in the Finality of Prophethood in Muhammad. No Islamic sect, as far as I know, has ever ventured to cross this line of demarcation. The Bahais in Iran have openly rejected the principle of Finality but have at the same time frankly admitted that they are a new community and not Muslims in the technical sense of the word. According to our belief Islam as a religion was revealed by God, but the existence of Islam as a society or nation depends entirely on the personality of the Holy Prophet. In my opinion, only two courses are open to the Qadianis, either frankly to follow the Bahais or to eschew their interpretations of the idea of Finality in Islam and to accept the idea with all its implications. Their diplomatic interpretations are dictated merely by a desire to remain within the fold of Islam for obvious political advantages.

Secondly, we must not forget the Qadianis' own policy and their attitude towards the world of Islam.

The founder of the movement described the parent community as "rotten milk" and his own followers as "fresh milk," warning the latter against mixing with the former. Further, their denial of fundamentals, their giving themselves a new name (Ahmadis) as a community, their non-participation in the congregational prayers of Islam, their social boycott of Muslims in the matter of matrimony, etc., and above all their declaration that the entire world of Islam is *Kafir*—all these things constitute an unmistakable declaration of separation by the Qadianis themselves. Indeed, the facts mentioned above clearly show that they are far more distant from Islam than Sikhs from Hinduism, for the Sikhs at least intermarry with the Hind, even though they do not worship in the Hindu temples.

Thirdly, it does not require any special intelligence to see why the Qadianis, while pursuing a policy of separation in religious and social matters, are anxious to remain politically within the fold of Islam. Apart from the political advantages in the sphere of Government service which accrue to them by remaining within the fold of Islam, it is obvious that in view of their present population, which, according to the last census, is fifty-six thousands only, they are not entitled even to a single seat in any legislature of the country and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a political minority in the sense in which you seem to be using the expression. The fact that the Qadianis have not so far asked for separation as a distinct political unit shows that in their present position they do not find themselves entitled to any representation in legislative bodies. The new constitution is not without provisions for the protection of such minorities. To my mind, it is clear that in the matter of approaching the Government for separation the Qadianis will never take the initiative. The Muslim community is perfectly justified in demanding their immediate separation from the parent community. If the Government does not immediately agree to this demand, the Indian Muslims, will be driven to the suspicion that the British Government is keeping the

SEPARATION OF QADIANIS FROM THE MUSLIM 227 COMMUNITY

new religion in store, as it were, and delaying the separation because in view of the small number of its adherents it is, for the present, incapable of functioning as a fourth community in the province which may effectively damage the already marginal majority of Punjab Muslims in the local legislature. The Government did not wait for a formal representation for separation by the Sikhs in 1919: why should they wait for a formal representation by the Qadianis ?

Alfred Phipps had expressed the hope of some good something from the Qadian movement in a paper he read at the Aligarh University, Aligarh in 1910. Twenty-five years later when his statement on Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims appeared in the Statesman the Qadianis accused him of inconsistency. Phipps' reply to this accusation was as follows:

I am sorry I have no copy of the lecture in question either in the original English or in the Urdu translation which was made by Mahabub Khatun Ali Khan. As far as I remember the lecture was delivered in 1911, or perhaps earlier. I have no hesitation in admitting that about a quarter of a century ago I had hopes of good results following from this movement. Phipps still even then admitted Muslim the late Stanley Cheong Ali, the author of several English books on Islam, co-operated with the founder of the movement, and I understood made valuable contributions to the book called *Islamism*. But the real earnest and sincere of a religion movement does not reveal itself in days. It takes decades to unfold itself. The important points between the two sections of the movement is evidence of the fact that even those who were in personal contact with the founder were not quite aware of how the movement would evolve itself. Personally I became suspicious of the movement when the claim of a new prophetic and superior even to the Prophet

TRUTH BEHIND QADIANISM

Allama Iqbal had expressed the hope of some good emanating from the Qadiani movement in a paper he read at the Muslim University, Aligarh in 1910. Twenty-five years later when his statement on Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims appeared in the Statesman the Qadianis accused him of inconsistency. Iqbal's reply to this accusation was as follows :

I am sorry I have no copy of the lecture in question either in the original English or in the Urdu translation which was made by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan. As far as I remember the lecture was delivered in 1911, or perhaps earlier. I have no hesitation in admitting that about a quarter of a century ago I had hopes of good results following from this movement. Earlier still, even that eminent Muslim, the late Maulvi Chiragh Ali, the author of several English books on Islam, co-operated with the founder of the movement and, I understand, made valuable contributions to the book called *Barahin-i-Ahmadiyya*. But the real content and spirit of a religious movement does not reveal itself in a day. It takes decades to unfold itself. The internal quarrels between the two sections of the movement is evidence of the fact that even those who were in personal contact with the founder were not quite aware of how the movement would evolve itself. Personally, I became suspicious of the movement when the claim of a new prophethood, superior even to the Prophethood

of the Founder of Islam, was definitely put forward, and the Muslim world was declared *Kafir*. Later my suspicions developed into a positive revolt when I heard with my own ears an adherent of the movement mentioning the Holy Prophet of Islam in a most disparaging language. Not by their roots but by their fruits will you know them. If my present attitude is self-contradictory, then, well, only a living and thinking man has the privilege of contradicting himself. Only stones do not contradict themselves, as Emerson says.

ISLAM AND AHMADISM

The following is a reply to questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in his criticism of Allama Iqbal's statement on Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims. Nehru's criticism had appeared under the title "Solidarity of Islam". Comment on Iqbal's article," in the Modern Review of Calcutta and the Allama's reply to the Pandit was published in the Islam of Lahore in January 1936.

On the appearance of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru's three articles in the *Modern Review* of Calcutta I received a number of letters from Muslims of different shades of religious and political opinion. Some writers of these letters want me further to elucidate and justify the attitude of the Indian Muslims towards the Ahmadis. Others ask me what exactly I regard as the issue involved in Ahmadism. In this statement I propose first to meet these demands which I regard as perfectly legitimate, and then to answer the questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. I fear, however, that parts of this statement may not interest the Pandit, and to save his time I suggest that he may skip over such parts.

It is hardly necessary for me to say that I welcome the Pandit's interest in what I regard as one of the greatest problems of the East and perhaps of the whole world. He is, I believe, the first nationalist Indian leader who has expressed a desire to understand the

present spiritual unrest in the world of Islam. In view of the many aspects and possible reactions of this unrest it is highly desirable that thoughtful Indian political leaders should open their minds to the real meaning of what is, at the present movement, agitating the heart of Islam.

I do not wish, however, to conceal the fact either from the Pandit or from any other reader of this statement that the Pandit's articles have for the moment given my mind rather a painful conflict of feelings. Knowing him to be a man of wide cultural sympathies, I cannot but incline to the view that his desire to understand the questions he has raised is perfectly genuine; yet the way in which he has expressed himself betrays a psychology which I find difficult to attribute to him. I am inclined to think that my statement on Qadianism—no more than a mere exposition of a religious doctrine on modern lines—has embarrassed both the Pandit and the Qadianis, perhaps because both inwardly resent, for different reasons, the prospects of Muslim political and religious solidarity, particularly in India. It is obvious that the Indian nationalist whose political idealism has practically killed his sense for fact, is intolerant of the birth of a desire for self-determination in the heart of north-west Indian Islam. He thinks, wrongly in my opinion, that the only way to Indian nationalism lies in a total suppression of the cultural entities of the country through the interaction of which alone India can evolve a rich and enduring culture. A nationalism achieved by such methods can mean nothing but mutual bitterness and even oppression. It is equally obvious that the Qadianis, too, feel nervous by the political awakening of the Indian Muslims, because they feel that the rise in political prestige of the Indian Muslims is sure to defeat their designs to carve out from the *ummat* of the Arabian Prophet a new *ummat* for the Indian prophet. It is no small surprise to me that my effort to impress on the Indian Muslims the extreme necessity of internal cohesion in the present critical moment of their history in India, and my warn-

ing them against the forces of disintegration, masquerading as reformist movements, should have given the Pandit an occasion to sympathize with such forces.

However, I do not wish to pursue the unpleasant task of analysing the Pandit's motives. For the benefit of those who want further elucidation of the general Muslim attitude towards the Qadianis, I would quote a passage from Durant's *Story of Philosophy* which, I hope, will give the reader a clear idea of the issue involved in Qadianism. Durant has in a few sentences summed up the Jewish point of view in the *ex-communication* of the great philosopher, Spinoza. The reader must not think that in quoting this passage I mean to insinuate some sort of comparison between Spinoza and the founder of Ahmadism. The distance between them, both in point of intellect and character, is simply tremendous. The "God-intoxicated" Spinoza never claimed that he was the centre of a new organization and that all the Jews who did not believe in him were outside the pale of Judaism. Durant's passage, therefore, applies with much greater force to the attitude of Muslims towards Qadianism than to the attitude of the Jews towards the *ex-communication* of Spinoza. The passage is as follows :

"Furthermore, religious unanimity seemed to the elders their sole means of preserving the little Jewish group in Amsterdam from disintegration, and almost the last means of preserving the unity, and so ensuring the survival, of the scattered Jews of the world. If they had their own state, their own civil law, their own establishments of secular force and power, to compel internal cohesion and external respect, they might have been more tolerant; but their religion was to them their patriotism as well as their faith; the synagogue was their centre of social and political life as well as of ritual and worship; and the Bible, whose veracity Spinoza had impugned, was the

'portable fatherland' of their people; under the circumstances they thought heresy was treason, and toleration suicide."

Situated as the Jews were—a minority community in Amsterdam—they were perfectly justified in regarding Spinoza as a disintegrating factor threatening the dissolution of their community. Similarly the Indian Muslims are right in regarding the Qadiani movement, which declares the entire world of Islam as *Kafir* and socially boycotts them, to be far more dangerous to the collective life of Islam in India than the metaphysics of Spinoza to the collective life of the Jews. The Indian Muslim, I believe, instinctively realizes the peculiar nature of the circumstances in which he is placed in India and is naturally much more sensitive to the forces of disintegration than the Muslims of any other country. This instinctive perception of the average Muslims is in my opinion absolutely correct and has, I have no doubt, a much deeper foundation in the conscience of Indian Islam. Those who talk of toleration in a matter like this are extremely careless in using the word "toleration" which, I fear, they do not understand at all. The spirit of toleration may arise from very different attitudes of the mind of man. As Gibbon would say: "There is the toleration of the philosopher to whom all religions are equally true; of the historian to whom all are equally false; and of the politician to whom all are equally useful. There is the toleration of the man who tolerates other modes of thought and behaviour because he has himself grown absolutely indifferent to all modes of thought and behaviour. There is the toleration of the weak man who, on account of sheer weakness, must pocket all kinds of insults heaped on things or persons that he holds dear." It is obvious that these types of tolerance have no ethical value. On the other hand, they unmistakably reveal the spiritual impoverishment of the man who practises them. True toleration is begotten of intellectual breadth and spiritual expansion. It is the toleration of the spiritually powerful man who, while jealous of the frontiers of his own faith, can

tolerate and even appreciate all forms of faith other than his own. Of this type of toleration the true Muslim alone is capable. His own faith is synthetic, and for this reason he can easily find grounds of sympathy and appreciation in other faiths. Our great Indian poet, Amir Khusro, beautifully brings out the essence of this type of toleration in the story of an idol worshipper. After giving an account of this intense attachment to his idols the poet addresses his Muslim readers as follow:

اے کہ زبت طعنہ بہ ہندو بری ہم زوے آموز پرستش کری

Only a true lover of God can appreciate the value of devotion even though it is directed to gods in which he himself does not believe. The folly of our preachers of toleration consists in describing the attitude of the man who is jealous of the boundaries of his own faith as one of intolerance. They wrongly consider this attitude as a sign of moral inferiority. They do not understand that the value of his attitude is essentially biological, where the members of a group feel, either instinctively or on the basis of rational argument, that the corporate life of the social organism to which they belong is in danger, their defensive attitude must be appraised in reference mainly to a biological criterion. Every thought or deed in this connection must be judged by the life value that it may possess. The question in this case is not whether the attitude of an individual or community towards the man who is declared to be a heretic is morally good or bad. The question is whether it is life-giving or life-destroying. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru seems to think that a society founded on religious principles necessitates the institution of inquisition. This is indeed true of the history of Christianity; but the history of Islam, contrary to the Pandit's logic, shows that during the last thirteen hundred years of the life of Islam, the institution of Inquisition has been absolutely unknown in Muslim countries. The Quran expressly prohibits such an institution. "Do not seek out the shortcomings of others and carry not tales against your brethren". Indeed the Pandit will find from the history of Islam

that the Jews and Christians, fleeing from religious persecution in their own lands, always found shelter in the lands of Islam. The two propositions on which the conceptual structure of Islam is based are so simple that it makes heresy in the sense of turning the heretic, outside the fold of Islam almost impossible. It is true that when a person declared to be holding heretical doctrines threatens the existing social order, an independent Muslim State will certainly take action; but in such a case the action of the State will be determined more by political considerations than by purely religious ones. I can very well realize that a man like the Pandit, who is born and brought up in a society which has no well-defined boundaries and consequently no internal cohesion, finds it difficult to conceive that a religious society can live and prosper without state-appointed commissions of enquiry into the beliefs of the people. This is quite clear from the passage which he quotes from Cardinal Newman and wonders how far I would accept the application of the Cardinal's dictum to Islam. Let me tell him that there is a tremendous difference between the inner structure of Islam and Catholicism wherein the complexity, the ultra-rational character and the number of dogmas has, as the history of Christianity shows, always fostered possibilities of fresh heretical interpretations. The simple faith of Muhammad is based on two propositions—that God is One, and that Muhammad is the last of the line of those holy men who have appeared from time to time in all countries and in all ages to guide mankind to the right ways of living. If, as some Christian writers think, a dogma must be defined as an ultrarational proposition which, for the purpose of securing religious solidarity, must be assented to without any understanding of its metaphysical import, then these two simple propositions of Islam cannot be described even as dogmas; for both of them are supported by the experience of mankind and are fairly amenable to rational argument. The question of a heresy, which needs the verdict, whether the author of it is within or without the fold, can arise, in the case of a religious society founded on such simple

proposition, only when the heretic rejects both or either of these propositions. Such heresy must be and has been rare in the history of Islam which while jealous of its frontiers, permits freedom of interpretation within these frontiers. And since the phenomenon of the kind of heresy which affects the boundaries of Islam has been rare in the history of Islam, the feeling of the average Muslim is naturally intense when a revolt of this kind arises. This is why the feeling of Muslim Iran was so intense against the Bahais. That is why the feeling of the Indian Muslims is so intense against the Qadianis.

It is true that mutual accusations of heresy for differences in minor points of law and theology among Muslim religious sects have been rather common. In this indiscriminate use of the word *Kufr* both for minor theological points of difference as well as for the extreme cases of heresy which involve the *ex*-communication of the heretic, some present-day educated Muslims, who possess practically no knowledge of the history of Muslim theological disputes, see a sign of social and political disintegration of the Muslim community. This, however, is an entirely wrong notion. The history of Muslim theology shows that natural accusation of heresy on minor points of difference has, far from working as a disruptive force, actually gives an impetus to synthetic theological thought. "When we read the history of development of Mohammadan Law," says Prof. Hurgrounje, "we find that, on the one hand, the doctors of every age, on the slightest stimulus, condemn one another to the point of mutual accusations of heresy; and, on the other hand, the very same people with greater and greater unity of purpose try to reconcile the similar quarrels of their predecessors." The student of Muslim theology knows that among Muslim legists this kind of heresy is technically known as "heresy below heresy", *i.e.*, the kind of heresy which does not involve the *ex*-communication of the culprit. It may be admitted, however, that in the hands of *mullas*,

whose intellectual laziness takes all oppositions of theological thought as absolute and is consequently blind to the unity in difference, this minor heresy may become a source of great mischief. This mischief can be remedied only by giving to the students of our theological schools a clearer vision of the synthetic spirit of Islam, and by reinitiating them into the function of logical contradiction as a principle of movement in theological dialectic. The question of what may be called major heresy arises only when the teaching of a thinker or a reformer affects the frontiers of the faith of Islam. Unfortunately this question does arise in connection with the teachings of Qadianism. It must be pointed out here that the Ahmadi movement is divided into two camps, known as the Qadianis and the Lahoris. The former openly declare the founder to be a full prophet; the latter, either by conviction or policy, have found it advisable to preach an apparently toned down Qadianism. However, the question whether the founder of Ahmadism was a prophet, the denial of whose mission entails what I call the "major heresy", is a matter of dispute between the two sections. It is unnecessary for my purposes to judge the merits of this domestic controversy of the Ahmadis. I believe for reasons to be explained presently, that the idea of a full prophet whose denial entails the denier's *ex-communication* from Islam is essential to Ahmadism; and that the present head of the Qadianis is far more consistent with the spirit of the movement than the Imam of the Lahoris.

The cultural value of the Idea of Finality in Islam I have fully explained elsewhere. Its meaning is simple: No spiritual surrender to any human being after Muhammad who emancipated his followers by giving them a law which is realizable as arising from the very core of human conscience. Theologically the doctrine is that the socio-political organization called "Islam" is perfect and eternal. No revelation, the denial of which entails heresy, is possible after Muhammad. He who claims such a revelation is a traitor to Islam.

Since the Qadianis believe the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement to be the bearer of such a revelation, they declare that the entire world of Islam is infidel. The founder's own argument, quite worthy of a mediaeval theologian, is that the spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam must be regarded as imperfect if it is not creative of another prophet. He claims his own prophethood to be an evidence of the prophet-rearing power of the spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam. But if you further ask him whether the spirituality of Muhammad is capable of rearing more prophets than one, his answer is "No". This virtually amounts to saying: "Muhammad is not the last Prophet; I am the last." For from understanding the cultural value of the Islamic idea of Finality in the history of mankind generally and of Asia especially, he thinks that Finality in the sense that no follower of Muhammad can ever reach the status of prophethood is a mark of imperfection in Muhammad's Prophethood. As I read the psychology of his mind he, in the interest of his own claim to prophethood, avails himself of what he describes as the creative spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam and at the same time deprives the Holy Prophet of his Finality by limiting the creative capacity of his spirituality to the rearing of only one prophet, *i.e.*, the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement. In this way does the new prophet quietly steal away the Finality of one whom he claims to be his spiritual progenitor.

He claims to be *buruz* (بروز) of the Holy Prophet of Islam, insinuating thereby that being a *buruz* his 'Finality' is virtually the Finality of Muhammad; and that this view of the matter, therefore, does not violate the Finality of the Holy Prophet. In identifying the two finalities, his own and that of the Holy Prophet, he conveniently loses sight of the temporal meaning of the idea of Finality. It is, however, obvious that the word *buruz* in the sense even of complete likeness, cannot help him at all; for the *buruz* must always remain the other side of its original. Only in the sense of reincarnation a *buruz* becomes identical with the original.

Thus, if we take the word *buruz* to mean "like in spiritual qualities" the argument remains ineffective; if, on the other hand, we take it to mean reincarnation of the original in the Aryan sense of the word, the argument becomes plausible; but its author turns out to be only a Magian in disguise.

It is further claimed on the authority of the great Muslim mystic, Muhyuddin Ibn-al-'Arabi of Spain, that it is possible for a Muslim saint to attain, in his spiritual evolution, to the kind of experience characteristic of the prophetic consciousness. I personally believe this view of Sheikh Muhyuddin Ibn-al-'Arabi to be psychologically unsound; but assuming it to be correct, the Qadiani argument is based on a complete misunderstanding of his exact position. The Sheikh regards it as a purely private achievement which does not, and in the nature of things cannot, entitle such a saint to declare that all those who do not believe in him are outside the pale of Islam. Indeed, from the Sheikh's point of view, there may be more than one saint, living in the same age or country, who may attain to prophetic consciousness. The point to be seized is that while it is psychologically possible for a saint to attain to prophetic experience, his experience will have no socio-political significance making him the centre of a new organization and entitling him to declare this organization to be the criterion of the faith or disbelief of the followers of Muhammad.

Leaving his mystical psychology aside I am convinced from a careful study of the relevant passages of the *futuhat* that the great Spanish mystic is as firm a believer in the Finality of Muhammad as any orthodox Muslim. And if he had seen in his mystical vision that one day in the East some Indian amateur in Sufism would seek to destroy the Holy Prophet's Finality under the cover of his mystical psychology he would have certainly anticipated the Indian *ulama* in warning the Muslims of the world against such traitors to Islam.

Coming now to the essence of Ahmadism. A discussion of its sources and of the way in which pre-Islamic Magian ideas have, through the channels of Islamic mysticism, worked on the mind of its author would be extremely interesting from the standpoint of comparative religion. It is, however, impossible for me to undertake this discussion here. Suffice it to say that the real nature of Ahmadism is hidden behind the mist of mediaeval mysticism and theology. The Indian *ulama*, therefore, took it to be a purely theological movement and came out with theological weapons to deal with it. I believe, however, that this was not the proper method of dealing with the movement; and that the success of the *ulama* was therefore, only partial. A careful psychological analysis of the revelations of the founder would perhaps be an effective method of dissecting the inner life of his personality. In this connection I may mention Maulvi Manzoor Elahi's collection of the founder's revelations which offer rich and varied material for psychological research. In my opinion the book provides a key to the character and personality of the founder; and I do hope that one day some young student of modern psychology will take it up for serious study. If he takes the Quran for his criterion, as he must for reasons which cannot be explained here, and extends his study to a comparative examination of the experiences of the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement and contemporary non-Muslim mystics, such as Ram Krishna of Bengal, he is sure to meet more than one surprise as to the essential character of the experience on the basis of which prophethood is claimed for the originator of Ahmadism.

Another equally effective and more fruitful method, from the standpoint of the plain man, is to understand the real content of Ahmadism in the light of the history of Muslim theological thought in India, at least from the year 1799. The year 1799 is extremely important in the history of the world of Islam. In this year fell Tippu and his fall meant the extinguishment of Muslim hopes for political prestige in India. In the same year was

fought the battle of Navarino which saw the destruction of the Turkish fleet. Prophetic were the words of the author of the chronogram of Tippu's fall which visitors of Serangapatam find engraved on the wall of Tippu's mausoleum :

"Gone is the glory of Ind as well as Roun."

Thus in the year 1799 the political decay of Islam in Asia reached its climax. But just as out of the humiliation of Germany on the day of Jena arose the modern German nation, it may be said with equal truth that out of the political humiliation of Islam in the year 1799 arose modern Islam and her problems. This point I shall explain in the sequel. For the present I want to draw the reader's attention to some of the questions which have arisen in Muslim India since the fall of Tippu and the development of European imperialism in Asia.

Does the idea of Caliphate in Islam embody a religious institution? How are the Indian Muslims, and for the matter of that all Muslims outside the Turkish Empire, related to the Turkish Caliphate? Is India *Dar-ul-Harb* or *Dar-ul-Islam*? What is the real meaning of the doctrine of *Jihad* in Islam? What is the meaning of the expression "from amongst you, in the Quranic verse: "Obey God, obey the Prophet and the masters of the affairs (*i.e.*, rulers) from amongst you?" What is the character of the tradition of the Prophet foretelling the advent of Imam Mehdi? These questions and some others which arose subsequently were, for obvious reasons, questions for Indian Muslims only. European imperialism, however, which was then rapidly penetrating the world of Islam was also intimately interested in them. The controversies which these questions created form a most interesting chapter in the history of Islam in India. The story is a long one and is still waiting for a powerful pen. Muslim politicians whose eyes were mainly fixed on the realities of the situation succeeded in winning over a section of the

ulama to adopt a line of theological arguments which, as they thought, suited the situation; but it was not easy to conquer by mere logic the beliefs which had ruled for centuries the conscience of the masses of Islam in India. In such a situation logic can either proceed on the ground of political expediency or on the lines of a fresh orientation of texts and traditions. In either case the argument will fail to appeal to the masses. To the intensely religious masses of Islam only one thing can make a conclusive appeal, and that is divine authority. For an effective eradication of orthodox beliefs it was found necessary to find a revelational basis for a politically suitable orientation of theological declaring involved in the questions mentioned above. This revelational basis is provided by Ahmadism. And the Ahmadis themselves claim this to be the greatest service rendered by them to British Imperialism. The prophetic claim to a revelational basis for theological views of a political significance amounts to declaring that those who do not accept the claimant's views are infidels of the first water and destined for the flames of hell. As I understand the significance of the movement, the Ahmadi belief that Christ died the death of an ordinary mortal, and that his second advent means only the advent of a person who is spiritually 'like unto him,' gives the movement some sort of a rational appearance; but they are not really essential to the spirit of the movement. In my opinion they are only preliminary steps towards the idea of full prophethood which alone can serve the purposes of the movement eventually brought into being by new political forces. In primitive countries it is not logic but authority that appeals. Given a sufficient amount of ignorance, credulity which strangely enough sometimes co-exists with good intelligence, and a person sufficiently audacious to declare himself a recipient of divine revelation whose denial would entail eternal damnation, it is easy, in a subject Muslim country, to invent a political theology and to build a community whose creed is political servility. And in the Punjab even an ill-woven net of vague theological expressions can easily capture

the innocent peasant who has been for centuries exposed to all kinds of exploitation. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru advises the orthodox of all religions to unite and thus not to delay the coming of what he conceives to be Indian nationalism. This ironical advice assumes that Ahmadism is a reform-movement; he does not know that as far as Islam in India is concerned, Ahmadism involves both religious and political issues of the highest importance. As I have explained above, the function of Ahmadism in the history of Muslim religious thought is to furnish a revelational basis for India's present political subjugation. Leaving aside the purely religious issues, on the ground of political issues alone, I think, it does not lie in the mouth of a man like Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to accuse Indian Muslims of reactionary conservatism. I have no doubt that if he had grasped the real nature of Ahmadism he would have very much appreciated the attitude of Indian Muslims towards a religious movement which claims divine authority for the woes of India.

Thus the reader will see that the pallor of Ahmadism which we find on the cheeks of Indian Islam today is not an abrupt phenomenon in the history of Muslim religious thought in India. The ideas which eventually shaped themselves in the form of this movement became prominent in theological discussions long before the founder of Ahmadism was born. Nor do I mean to insinuate that the founder of Ahmadism and his companions deliberately planned their programme. I dare say the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement did hear a voice: but whether this voice came from the God of Life and Power or arose out of the spiritual impoverishment of the people must depend upon the nature of the movement which it has created and the kind of thought and emotion which it has given to those who have listened to it. The reader must not think that I am using metaphorical language. The life-history of nations shows that when the tide of life in a people begins to ebb, decadence itself becomes a source of inspiration, in-

spiring their poets, philosophers, saints, statesmen, and turning them into a class of apostles whose sole ministry is to glorify, by the force of a seductive art of logic, all that is ignoble and ugly in the life of their people. These apostles unconsciously clothe despair in the glittering garment of hope, undermine the traditional values of conduct and thus destroy the spiritual virility of those who happen to be their victims. One can only imagine the rotten state of a people's will who are, on the basis of divine authority, made to accept their political environment as final. Thus all the actors who participated in the drama of Ahmadism were, I think, only innocent instruments in the hands of decadence. A similar drama had already been acted in Iran; but it did not lead, and could not have led, to the religious and political issues which Ahmadism has created for Islam in India. Russia offered tolerance to Babism and allowed the Babis to open their first missionary centre in Ishqabad. England showed Ahmadis the same tolerance in allowing them to open their first missionary centre in Working. Whether Russia and England showed this tolerance on the ground of Imperial expediency or pure broad-mindedness is difficult for us to decide. This much is absolutely clear that this tolerance has created difficult problems for Islam in Asia. In view of the structure of Islam, as I understand it, I have not the least doubt in my mind that Islam will emerge purer out of the difficulties thus created for her. Times are changing. Things in India have already taken a new turn. The new spirit of democracy which is coming to India is sure to disillusion the Ahmadis and to convince them of the absolute futility of their theological invention.

Nor will Islam tolerate any revival of mediaeval mysticism which has already robbed its followers of their healthy instincts and given them only obscure thinking in return. It has, during the course of the past centuries, absorbed the best minds of Islam leaving the affairs of the state to mere mediocrities. Modern

Islam cannot afford to repeat the experiment. Nor can it tolerate a repetition of the Punjab experiment of keeping Muslims occupied for half a century in theological problems which had absolutely no bearing on life. Islam has already passed into the broad daylight of fresh thought and experience; and no saint or prophet can bring it back to the fogs of mediaeval mysticism.

Let me now turn to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru's questions. I fear the Pandit's articles reveal practically no acquaintance with Islam or its religious history during the nineteenth century. Nor does he seem to have read what I have already written on the subject of his questions. It is not possible for me to reproduce here all that I have written before. Nor is it possible to write here a religious history of Islam in the nineteenth century without which a thorough understanding of the present situation in the world of Islam is impossible. Hundreds of books and articles have been written on Turkey and modern Islam. I have read most of this literature and probably the Pandit has also read it. I assure him, however, that not one of these writers understands the nature of the effect or of the cause that has brought about that effect. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly indicate the main currents of Muslim thought in Asia during the nineteenth century.

I have said above that in the year 1799 the political decay of Islam reached its climax. There can, however, be no greater testimony to the inner vitality of Islam than the fact that it practically took no time to realize its position in the world. During the nineteenth century were born Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in India, Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani in Afghanistan and Mufti Alam Jan in Russia. These men were probably inspired by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab who was born in Nejd in 1700, the founder of the so-called Wahabi movement which may fitly be described as the first throb of life in modern Islam. The influence of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan remained on the whole confined to India. It is probable however, that he was the first modern Muslim to catch

Their mission was to open the eye of the Muslims to the spirit of Islam which aimed at the conquest of matter and not flight from it.

(iii) *Muslim Kings*.—The gaze of Muslim kings was solely fixed on their own dynastic interests and so long as these were protected, they did not hesitate to sell their countries to the highest bidder. To prepare the masses of Muslims for a revolt against such a state of things in the world of Islam was the special mission of Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani.

It is not possible here to give a detailed account of the transformation which these reformers brought about in the world of Muslim thought and feeling. One thing, however, is clear. They prepared to a great extent the ground for another set of men, *i.e.*, Zaghlul Pasha, Mustafa Kamal and Raza Shah. The reformers interpreted, argued and explained; but the set of men who came after them, although inferior in academic learning, were men who, relying on their healthy instincts, had the courage to rush into sun-lit space and do, even by force, what the new conditions of life demanded. Such men are liable to make mistakes; but the history of nations shows that even their mistakes have sometimes borne good fruit. In them it is not logic but life that struggles restless to solve its own problems. It may be pointed out here that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and hundreds of the latter's disciples in Muslim countries were not Westernized Muslim. They were men who had sat on their knees before the *mullas* of the old school and had breathed the very intellectual and spiritual atmosphere which they later sought to reconstruct. Pressure of modern ideas may be admitted; but the history thus briefly indicated above clearly shows that the upheaval which has come to Turkey and which is likely, sooner or later, to come to other Muslim countries, is almost wholly determined by the forces within. It is only the superficial observer of the modern world of Islam who thinks that the present crisis in the world of Islam is wholly due to the working of alien forces.

Has then the world of Islam outside India, especially Turkey, abandoned Islam? Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru thinks that Turkey had ceased to be a Muslim country. He does not seem to realize that the question whether a person or a community has ceased to be a member of Islam is, from the Muslim points of view, a purely legal question and must be decided in view of the structural principles of Islam. As long as a person is loyal to the two basic principles of Islam, *i.e.*, the Unity of God and Finality of the Holy Prophet, not even the strictest *mulla* can truh him outside the pale of Islam even though his interpretations of the law or of the text of the Quran are believed to be erroneous. But perhaps Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru has in his mind the supposed or real innovations which the Ataturk has introduced. Let us for a moment examine these. It is the development of a general materialist outlook in Turkey which seems inimical to Islam? Islam has had too much of renunciation, it is time for the Muslims to look to realities. Materialism is a bad weapon against religion; but it is quite an effective one against *mulla-craft* and *Sufi-craft* which deliberately mystify the people with a view to exploit their ignorance and credulity. The spirit of Islam is not afraid of its contact with matter. Indeed the Quran says: "Forget not thy share in the world." It is difficult for a non-Muslim to understand that, considering the history of the Muslim world during the last few centuries, the progress of a materialist outlook is only a form of self-realization. Is it then the abolition of the old dress or the introduction of the Latin script? Islam as a religion has no country; as a society it has no specific language, no specific dress. Even the recitation of the Quran in Turkish is not without some precedent in Muslim history. Personally I regard it as a serious error of judgement; for the modern student of the Arabic language and literature knows full well that the only non-European language which has a future is Arabic. But the reports are that the Turks have already abandoned the vernacular recitation of the Quran. Is it then the abolition of polygamy or the licentiate *ulama*? According to the law of Islam the

Amir of a Muslim state has the power to revoke the "permissions" of the law if he is convinced that they tend to cause social corruption. As to the licentiate *ulama* I would certainly introduce it in Muslim India if I had the power to do so. To the inventions of the myth-making *mulla* is largely due the stupidity of the average Muslim. In excluding him from the religious life of the people the Ataturk has done what would have delighted the heart of an Ibn Taimiyya or Shah Wali Ullah. There is a tradition of the Holy Prophet reported in the *Mishkat* to the effect that only the Amir of the Muslim state and the persons appointed by him are entitled to preach to the people. I do not know whether the Ataturk ever knew of this tradition, yet it is striking how the light of his Islamic conscience has illumined the zone of his action in this important matter. The adoption of the Swiss code with its rule of inheritance is certainly a serious error which has arisen out of the youthful zeal for reform excusable in a people furiously desiring to go ahead. The joy of emancipation from the fetters of a long-standing priest-craft sometimes drives a people to untried courses of action. But Turkey as well as the rest of the world of Islam has yet to realize the hitherto unrevealed economic aspects of the Islamic law of inheritance which Von Kremer describes as the "supremely original branch of Muslim law." Is it the abolition of the Caliphate or the separation of Church and State? In its essence Islam is not Imperialism. In the abolition of the Caliphate which since the days of Omayyads had practically become a kind of Empire it is only the spirit of Islam that has worked out through the Ataturk. In order to understand the Turkish *Ijtihad* in the matter of the Caliphate we cannot but seek the guidance of Ibn Khaldun—the great philosophical historian of Islam, and the father of modern history. I can do no better than quote here a passage from My Reconstruction.*

"Ibn Khaldun in his famous Prolegomena mentions three distinct views of the idea of universal

*Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam : Oxford University Press.

Caliphate in Islam; (i) That universal Imamate is a divine institution and is consequently indispensable, (ii) That it is merely a matter of expediency; (iii) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken by the Khwarij, the early republicans of Islam. It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to the second view, i.e., to the view of the Mu'tazila' who regarded universal Imamate as a matter of political expediency only. The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past political experience which points unmistakeably to the fact that the idea of universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire, independent units have arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam."

Nor is the idea of separation of Church and State alien to Islam. The doctrine of the major occultation of the Imam in a sense effected this separation long ago in Shia Iran. The Islamic idea of the division of the religious and political functions of the state must not be confounded with the European idea of the separation of Church and State. The former is only a division of functions as is clear from the gradual creation in the Muslim State of the offices of *Shaikh-ul-Islam* and Ministers; the latter is based on the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter. Christianity began as an order of monks having nothing to do with the affairs of the world; Islam was, from the very beginning, a civil society with laws civil in their nature though believed to be revelational in origin. The metaphysical dualism on which the European idea is based has borne bitter fruit among Western nations. Many years ago a book was written in America called *If Christ Came to Chicago*. In reviewing this book an American author says :

"The lesson to be learned from Mr. Stead's book is that the great evils from which humanity is suffering today are evils that can be handled only

by religious sentiments; that the handling of those evils has been in the great part surrendered to the State; that the State has itself been delivered over to corrupt political machines; that such machines are not only unwilling, but unable, to deal with those evils; and that nothing but a religious awakening of the citizens to their public duties can save countless millions from misery, and the State itself from degradation."

In the history of Muslim political experience this separation has meant only a separation of functions, not of ideas. It cannot be maintained that in Muslim countries the separation of Church and State means the freedom of Muslim legislative activity from the conscience of the people which has for centuries been trained and developed by the spirituality of Islam. Experience alone will show how the idea will work in modern Turkey. We can only hope that it will not be productive of the evils which it has produced in Europe and America.

I have briefly discussed the above innovations more for the sake of the Muslim reader than for Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. The innovation specifically mentioned by the Pandit is the adoption by the Turks and Iranians of racial nationalist ideals. He seems to think that the adoption of such ideals means the abandonment of Islam by Turkey and Iran. The student of history knows very well that Islam was born at a time when the old principles of human unification, such as blood relationship and throne-culture, were failing. It, therefore, finds the principle of human unification not in the blood and bones but in the mind of man. Indeed, its social message to mankind is: "Deracialize yourself or perish by internecine war." It is no exaggeration to say that Islam looks askance at nature's race-building plans and creates by means of its peculiar institutions, an outlook which would contract counteract the race-building forces of nature. In the direction of human domestication it has done in one thousand years more important work than Christianity and Buddhism ever

did in two thousand years or more. It is no less than a miracle that an Indian Muslim finds himself at home in Morocco in spite of the disparity of race and language. Yet it cannot be said that Islam is totally opposed to race. Its history shows that in social reform it relies mainly on its scheme for gradual deracialization and proceeds on the lines of least resistance. "Verily", says the Quran. "We have made you into tribes and sub-tribes so that you may be identified; but the best among you in the eye of God is he who is the purest in life". Considering the mightiness of the problem of race and the amount of time which the deracialization of mankind must necessarily take, the attitude of Islam towards the problem of race, *i.e.*, stopping to conquer without itself becoming a race-making factor, is the only rational and workable attitude. There is a remarkable passage in Sir Arthur Keith's little book, *The Problem of Race*, which is worth quoting here :

"And now man is awakening to the fact that nature's primary end—race-building—is incompatible with necessities of the modern economic world and is asking himself: What must I do? Bring race-building as practised hitherto by nature to an end and have eternal peace? Or permit nature to pursue her old course and have, as a necessary consequence—War. Man has to choose the one course or the other. There is no intermediate course possible."

It is, therefore, clear that if the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism he is going not so much against the spirit of Islam as against the spirit of the time. And if he is a believer in the absoluteness of races, he is sure to be defeated by the spirit of modern time which is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Islam. Personally, however, I do not think that the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism, as I believe that his Pan-Turanianism is only a political retort to Pan-Slavonism, or Pan-Germanism, or Pan-Anglo-Saxonism.

If the meaning of the above paragraph is well understood it is not difficult to see the attitude of Islam towards nationalist ideals. Nationalism in the sense of love of one's country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of the Muslim's faith; it comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of a political concept and claims to be a principle of human solidarity demanding that Islam should recede to the background of a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life. In Turkey, Iran, Egypt and other Muslim countries it will never become a problem. In these countries Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority and their minorities, i.e., Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, according to the law of Islam, are either "People of the Book" or "like the People of the Book" with whom the law of Islam allows free social relations including matrimonial alliances. It becomes a problem for Muslims only in countries where they happen to be in a minority, and nationalism demands their complete self-effacement. In majority countries Islam accommodates nationalism; for there Islam and nationalism are practically identical; in minority countries it is justified in seeking self-determination as a cultural unit. In either case, it is thoroughly consistent with itself.

The above paragraphs briefly sum up the exact situation in the world of Islam today. If this is properly understood it will become clear that the fundamentals of Islamic solidarity are not in any way shaken by any external or internal forces. The solidarity of Islam, as I have explained before, consists in a uniform belief in the two structural principles of Islam supplemented by the five well-known "practices of the faith." These are the first essentials of Islamic solidarity which has, in this sense, existed ever since the days of the Holy Prophet until it was recently disturbed by the Bahais in Iran and the Qadianis in India. It is a guarantee for a practically uniform spiritual atmosphere in the world of Islam. It facilitates the political combination of Muslim States, which combination may either assume

the form of a world-state (ideal) or of a league of Muslim States, or of a number of independent states whose pacts and alliances are determined by purely economic and political considerations. That is how the conceptual structure of this simple faith is related to the process of time. The profundity of this relation can be understood only in the light of certain verses of the Quran which it is not possible to explain here without drifting away from the point immediately before us. Politically then, the solidarity of Islam is shaken only when Muslim States war on one another; religiously it is shaken only when Muslim rebel against any of the basic beliefs and practices of the Faith. It is in the interest of this eternal solidarity that Islam cannot tolerate any rebellious group within its fold. Outside the fold such a group is entitled to as much toleration as the followers of any other faith. It appears to me that at the present moment Islam is passing through a period of transition. It is shifting from one form of political solidarity to some other form which the forces of history have yet to determine. Events are so rapidly moving in the modern world that it is almost impossible to make a prediction. As to what will be the attitude towards non-Muslims of a politically united Islam, if such a thing ever comes, is a question which history alone can answer. All that I can say is that, lying midway between Asia and Europe and being a synthesis of Eastern and Western outlooks on life, Islam ought to act as a kind of intermediary between the East and the West. But what if the follies of Europe create an irreconcilable Islam? As things are developing in Europe from day to day they demand a radical transformation of Europe's attitude towards Islam. We can only hope that political vision will not allow itself to be obscured by the dictates of Imperial ambition or economic exploitation. In so far as India is concerned I can say with perfect confidence that the Muslims of India will not submit to any kind of political idealism which would seek to annihilate their cultural entity. Sure of this they may be trusted to know how to reconcile the claims of religion and patriotism.

One word about His Highness the Agha Khan. What has led Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to attack the Agha Khan it is difficult for me to discover. Perhaps he thinks that the Qadianis and the Ismailis fall under the same category. He is obviously not aware that, however, the theological interpretation of the Ismailis may err, they believe in the basic principles of Islam. It is true that they believe in a perpetual imamate; but the Imam according to them is not a recipient of divine revelation. He is only an expounder of the law. It is only the other day (*vide* the *Star* of Allahabad, March 12, 1934) that His Highness the Agha Khan addressed his followers as follows :

“Bear witness that Allah is One. Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah. Quran is the Book of Allah. *Kacba* is the *Qibla* of all. You are Muslims and should live with Muslims. Greet Muslims with *Assalam-o-Alaikum*.

“Give your children Islamic names. Pray with Muslim congregations in mosques. Keep fast regularly. Solemnize your marriages according to Islamic rules of *nikah*. Treat all Muslims as your brothers.”

It is for the Pandit now to decide whether the Agha Khan represents the solidarity of Islam or not.

PART SEVEN

MISCELLANEOUS

PART SEVEN

MISCELLANEOUS

THE INNER SYNTHESIS OF LIFE

This short note, written by Allama Iqbal on 5th December, 1925, appeared in the Indian Review of Madras in its January, 1926 issue.

The spirit of Ancient India aimed at the discovery of God and found Him. Fortified by this valuable possession Modern India ought to focus on the discovery of man as a personality—as an independent “whole” in an all embracing synthesis is of life—if she wants to secure a permanent foundation for her New Nationalism. But does our education today tends to awake in us such a sense of inner wholeness? My answer is no. Our education does not recognise man as a problem, it impresses on us the visible fact of multiplicity without giving us an insight into the inner unity of life, and thus tends to make us more and more immersed in our physical environment. The soul of man is left untouched and the result is a superficial knowledge with a mere illusion of culture and freedom. Amidst this predominantly intellectual culture which must accentuate separate centres within the “whole” the duty of higher minds in India is to reveal the inner synthesis of life.

KHUSH-HAL KHAN KHATTAK

The following note on Khush-hal Khan Khattak, the Afghan warrior poet, alongwith some specimens of his poetry, was published in the Islamic Culture, Hyderabad—Deccan in its October, 1928 issue.

The unification of the Afghan race—a process which is still going on before our eyes—forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of Central Asia. Bahlol Lodhi and Sher Shah Suri in India, the Khattak poet Khush-hal Khan and Pir Roshan among the frontier tribes, the late Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and his grandson King Aman Ullah Khan in Afghanistan proper, are the most outstanding figures in the history of this interesting movement. The day is not far off when some Afghan historian will tell us the story of the unity of his race much in the same way as Bolton King has told the story of the unity of Italy.

I want to place before the readers of "Islamic Culture" some specimens of Khush-hal Khan's poetry, the value and importance of which is yet to be realised by the Afghans. He was born in 1613, and rose to the chieftainship of his tribe at the age of 27. He served the Emperor Shah Jahan loyally, but fell under the suspicion of Aurangzeb who imprisoned him in the fortress of Gwalior. He was released after seven years, but on his return to his native land openly revolted against the Emperor and founded the great Afghan

confederacy against the Mughals. He personally went from tribe to tribe, and by negotiations as well as his charming poetry tried to infuse something of his own burning soul into his countrymen. The diplomacy and gold of Aurangzeb, however, were too powerful for him and he was finally compelled to retire in the Afridi country where he died at the age of 78. He was a versatile mind and wrote on various subjects, such as Poetry, Philosophy, Ethics, Medicine and his own autobiography which is unfortunately lost. Throughout his poetry, the major portion of which was written in India and during his struggles with the Mughals, breathes the spirit of early Arabian poetry. We find in it the same simplicity and directness of expression, the same love of freedom and war, the same criticism of life. I hope the Education Minister of Afghanistan will appoint some Afghan scholar to make a critical study of this great warrior-poet of the Pushto language and to bring out a complete edition of his works with the necessary historical notes. This must be the first literary undertaking of modern Afghanistan.

The following specimens of Khush-hal Khan's poetry are taken from Captain Raverty's literal English Translation which was published in 1862. The selection is sure to give the reader some idea of the poet's passionate patriotism, his aspirations, and the keenness of his observation of men. The poet has no doubt said some bitter things against Aurangzeb, but we must not forget that these are the judgements of an enemy who had passed seven long years as the Emperor's prisoner in a country of which he himself says :

"Defend us from Hind, tho' it should teem with all
the world's luxuries besides."

(1)

A year hath passed since Aurangzeb is encamped against
us.

Disordered and perplexed in appearance, and wounded in heart.

It is now year after year that his nobles fall in battle;
But his armies swept away, who shall number them!

The treasures of India have been spread out before us:
The red gold muhurs have been engulfed in the hills.

It would not have entered one's head in eighteen guesses
That such events would e'er have happened in these parts.

Still Aurangzeb's malevolence hath not a whit diminished
Though the curse of his father it before drew down.

For this reason, also, no one can place dependence on him:

He is malignant and perfidious; a breaker of his word.

For this state of things, no other termination can be seen,
Than that the Mughals be annihilated, or the Afghans undone.

If this, which is beheld, be the revolutions of destiny—
If in this be the will of the Almighty, the time is come.

Fate revolveth not in the same fashion at all times—
Now 'tis propitious to the rose; now favourable to the thorn.

At a period so pregnant with honour and glory as the present.

In what manner do these base and recreant Afghans cat?

There is no deliverance in any thing save the sword:
Afghans, who nourish any other idea than this, are lost, indeed.

The Afghans are superior to the Mughals at the sword,
Were but the Afghans, in intellect, a little discreet.

If the different tribes would but support each other,
 Kings would have to bow down in prostration before
 them.

But whether it be concord or strife, or folly or wisdom,
 The affairs of everyone are in the hands of the Almighty.

(2)

I have beheld fortune's practices—its different usages
 and ways—
 It clambereth unto thee with difficulty; but like a stone
 from a mountain, rolleth away!

(3)

Though the king may cast him into prison, he will not
 grieve;
 For the liberty of the free is from the beginning of time.

(4)

Let it not be, that every bad rider should mount fortune's
 steed:
 If it be ridden by any one, at least a good horseman let
 him be.

(5)

Neither doth any one here seek to avail himself of my
 abilities and experience,
 Nor are the capabilities of this country's people of any
 advantage unto me.
 We converse together in one tongue—we speak the
 Pushto language;
 But we do not, in the least, understand what we to one
 another say.
 The Suwatis account themselves exceeding wise, whilst
 they are but fools,
 And 'tis amongst such a set as these, that the Almighty
 my lot hath cast.

Now that I have beheld the Suwat valley, I have this
much discovered,
That there is no tribe more abject and contemptible than
the Yusufzais.
Tyranny and self-conceit seem to be the inmates of all;
And every man amongst them is covetous and ready
to beg.
Although, in their dwellings, they have wealth and goods,
they are hungry-eyed;
And their head-men, than the rest, are more villainous
and Infamous still.
'Tis said, that the watermelon deriveth its colour from
the watermelon,
But their wise men and elders are more worthless than
the people themselves.
The rights of the poor and helpless, they make out wrong
and unjust,
If they can a single penny obtain by way of a present, or
a bribe.
As to these I have seen myself; about others I am unable
to speak—
They are all either bullocks or skimmers, without any
exception soever.

(6)

The Turanis are all turbulent, quarrelsome, and
oppressive;
Liars, perjurers, and concocters of calumny and slander.
The Iranis are of a friendly disposition—they are true and
faithful;
They have urbanity and breeding—are respectable and
deserving.
The Afghans are malevolent and ruthless and contentious
But give them for their modesty and valour due praise.
Whether Baluch or Hazarah, both are dirty, and abomin-
able;
They have neither religion nor faith—may shame
attend them!
Whether Hindustani or Sindhi, may their faces be
blackened!

For they have neither modesty nor shame, neither
bread nor meat.
The Kashmiris, whether male or female—may they all
be undone!
They have none of the chattels of humanity amongst
them.

Behold they are not of the human race—what are they?
May perdition swallow them—both Uzbek and Kazal-
bash!

The Laghmanis, Bangashis, Suwatis, Tirahis—all of
them,
Are dancers and fiddlers—and who will be friends
with such?

Unto him, all matters are manifest, regarding other
folks ways;
Then render unto Khush-hal's shrewdness, its due meed
of praise.

(7)

Gentle breeze of the morn, shouldst thou pass over
Khairabad,

Or should thy course lead thee by Sarae, on the banks
of the Sind.

Hail them, again and again, with my greetings and
salutations!

And with them, many, many expressions of my regard
and love.

Cry out unto the swift Aba-Sind with sonorous voice;
But unto the Laddaey, midly and whisperingly say—

“Perhaps, I may drink, once more, a cup of thy water;
For, whilom, I was not on Gange's nor on Jamna's
banks.”

Of the climate of Hind should I complain, how long shall
I cry out?

Whilst the vileness of its water is far more horrid still.
Shouldst thou drink water from a rivulet, it racketh the
vitals;

And that of the wells, too, is not free from danger
and peril.
Since therein, from hill streams, the cool element is not
to be had,
Defend us from Hind, tho' it should teem with all the
world's luxuries besides.

(8)

Do they belong to the afrit, the demon, or the goblin
race?
For among the lineage of Adam, the Afghans I cannot
account.
Notwithstanding thou mayest give one of them the best
of counsel and advice.
Still, even the counsel of his father is not acceptable to
his heart.
The whole of the deeds of the Pathans are better than
those of the Mughals!
But they have no unity amongst them, and a great pity
it is.

The fame of Bahlol, and of Sher Shah too, resoundeth in
my ears—
Afghan Emperors of India, who swayed its sceptre
effectively and well.

For six or seven generations, did they govern so wisely,
That all their people were filled with admiration of
them.

Either those Afghans were different, or these have greatly
changed;
Or otherwise, at present, such is the Almighty's decree.
If the Afghans shall acquire the gift of concord and unity,
Old Khushhal shall, a second time, grow young there-
from.

Every Khattak, by the bridle-rein, should lead a
Mughal away.

Amongst the Khattak, O Khushhal, no council of
honour existeth;

Hence, I cannot conceive from what lineage they
have sprung.

(11)

Whether it is the wise man, or the ignorant—the honest
man or the robber;

I do not see anyone a true colleague united with me in
my task.

A sincere friend in distress I cannot discover throughout
the land;

For people merely give the empty consolation of their
tongues.

Like unto the ants, directed towards the grain are the
steps

Of those who favour me with their coming and their
going.

Did not these ants entertain the hope of obtaining a
store,

They would never make any journey in that direction
at all.

Abandon not thine own stricken mountain-land, O
Khushhal!

Though blood is at every footstep and in every direction
shed.

(12)

If the damsels of Kashmir are famed for their beauty,
Or those of Chin, or Ma-chin, or Tartary, noted
likewise;

Yet the sweet Afghan maidens that mine eyes have beheld
Put all the others to shame, by their conduct and ways.

As to their comeliness, this, once for all, is the fact of the matter.

That they are, in lineage, of the tribe and posterity of Yakub.

Of the fragrance of musk, or of rosewater, they have not need—

They are as the attar of the perfumer, by prayer five times a day.

Whether jewels for forehead or for neck, or any other trinkets,

All these are contemptible, with their dark locks compared.

Whether veils of gold brocade, or whether silken mantles,
All are a sacrifice unto the snow-white kerchief of theirs.

The beauty of their minds excelleth their personal privacy:

Not seen in the markets, with garments open and persons exposed.

They cannot look one full in the face, through modesty.
They are unused to abuse, and the discipline of the shoe.
Khushhal hath mentioned, more or less, somewhat of the matter;

But much remaineth that may be suitable, or unsuitable to the case.

(13)

If the Afghan people are of the human race,

In disposition and ways they are very Hindus.

They are possessed of neither skill, nor intellect;

But are happy in ignorance, and in strife.

Neither do they obey words of their fathers;

Nor do they unto the teachers' instructions give ear.
When there may be one worthy man amongst them

They are the destroyers of his head and life.

They ever lie in wait, one to injure the other;

Hence they are always by calamity remembered.

They neither possess worth, nor do others esteem them,
 Though they are more numerous than locusts or than
 ants.

First, I, then others, as many as there may be—
 We all of us require aid, and a helping hand.

Whether it is valour, or whether liberality,
 They have cast, through dissension, them both away.

But still, O Khushhal, thank God for this,
 That they are not slaves, but free-born men.

(14)

Doth the gnat ever attain unto the high rank of the
 falcon,

Even though he is furnished, both with feathers and
 with wings?

(15)

Though all the world may agree to disparage and speak
 ill of him,

Poor Khushhal is Khushhal in his own merits and
 integrity:

(16)

However tortuously the snake moveth about,
 It proceedeth straight enough unto its hole.

(17)

What is it, a sound and healthy body,
 Which, more than empire and sovereignty, is preferred?

Altho' the world's wealth is an excellent thing,
 Glory and renown are, than riches, more precious still.

What are more inestimable than the most perfect thing?
 The one is purity—the other is sincerity of heart.

What is it that disenthralleth a man from sorrow?
 Yea, what is it?—it is contentedness of mind.

Shouldst thou boast thyself of thy godliness,
That godliness, thereby, is rendered bootless and vain.

What is that, what hath a value beyond compute?

Yea, what is it?—it is deliberation in all our affairs.
That, which as a favour and obligation is conferred,
As generosity or liberality, was it ever accounted?
What is that, which, in this world, is a Hell indeed?

Verily, it is the society and acquaintance of a fool.
Then, O Khushhal, guard thou well thy mind;
For if therebe aught good, 'tis a mind upright.

(18)

Verily, the Afghans are deficient in sense and under-
standing—

They are the tail-cut curs of the butcher's slaughter
house.

They have played away dominion for the gold of the
Mughals;

And they lust after the offices, that the Mughals can
give.

Though the camel, with its lading, hath entered their
dwelling,

They are first taken up with stealing the bell from its
neck.

Out upon him who first the name of Sarrahban bore,
And malediction upon the whole of them, that after
follow.

The recreant occupy themselves in baseness and
dishonour;

But every breath of the noble is devoted to the cause
of renownr.

They commence from Kandahar, and reach unto
Damghar,

And all are worthless and good for nothing, who dwell
between.

(19)

The Mughals whom I now set eyes upon, are not such as
were wont to be;

The day of their swords is past and gone, and but the
pen remaineth unto them:
They gain over the Afghans by gold; and by fraud and
deception entangle them.

Upon me these things have no effect, for the favour of
God is still upon me.
I am neither a fly nor a crow, that I should hover over
rottenness and filth.
The hawk or the falcon am I, that must my heart, with
my own quarry, delight;

Were there but others like unto me in this affair, I should
rejoice indeed;
But since there are none like me, with distress and grief
I am o'erwhelm'd.

POSITION OF WOMEN IN EAST

In the following article Allama Iqbal has briefly discussed the position of Muslim Women in the Eastern Countries and has expressed his views on Polygamy, divorce and the veil. It was published in the Liverpool Post in 1932 and was reproduced by the Weekly Light, Lahore, in its issue dated July 24, 1933.

I wish to clear up a few points regarding the position of our women in the East, and how they compare with the women of West. In London streets I see a lot which Londoners do not notice. They are too familiar with the sights to notice subtleties. But those who see a country after a long absence come with a fresh vision.

What strikes me most is that the country towards the female sex, for which Europeans were one time famous, is becoming atamistic. In the underground men do not surrender their seats to ladies, or do so very seldom. In getting out of the cars they have no thought of letting the ladies out first. I do not want to blame them. The women themselves have brought it about. They wanted emancipation, equal rights with the male sex. The change that has come was inevitable.

Perhaps I may here try and eradicate the totally erroneous notions which are held in Europe about the

Eastern, and first of all, Muslim women, their life, and the treatment they receive from men. European woman, according to her own wish, has descended from the pedestal on which she stood, but the Eastern, the Muslim woman has remained the recipient of the same honour as before.

In Europe the belief is still there that the Turkish woman plays an inferior role in Turkish life. They misunderstand many of our customs, especially the psychology of the veil. The origin of the veil is not men's jealousy, but the feeling that woman is sacred, so much so that a stranger's eyes should not fall on her. The meaning of the word "HAREM" in Arabic is "Sacred ground", into which no stranger can enter.

There are other reasons for the practice of the veil. These are biological in nature; it is not possible to discuss them here. I can only indicate what lies at the back of this institution. The woman is predominantly the creative element in life, and all creative forces in nature are hidden.

The sources and symbol of the greater respect which Eastern women enjoy is in that very veil. Nothing has happened to diminish the respect in which they were held for centuries, and the principle of protecting them from approaches of strangers and from all humiliations has been safely maintained. According to the Holy Book of Islam, there are several rules relating to the segregation of woman. The veil is only one of them. Another rule is that when men and women meet each other, they should not stare into the eyes of each other. If this were the universal practice, the ordinary veil would be unnecessary.

Many women of India and of other countries of Islam wear no veil. The veil is really the name of a specific attitude of the mind. In order to reinforce the attitude of mind, certain concrete forms are needed, which depend on the circumstance of each people, age, and country.

The *harem* is also maligned. It should be remarked, first of all, that only the kings had *harems*.

When I am speaking of women and the respect that we show to them, you will think of polygamy. Polygamy is certainly permitted according to Mohammaden Law. It is only a method of evading a social evil, *i.e.* public prostitution. Monogamy is our ideal as well as your, but the main defect of monogamy is that it has no outlet for surplus women.

The middle age in Europe furnished the convent and the monastery for the absorption of surplus women. But you in Europe cannot follow this method today. The so-called industrial revolution the parent of the so-called women emancipation movement—has given both man and woman the kind mentality which is apparently opposed to polygamy but I am afraid the social evil is there. I am not suggesting that polygamy is the only cure, but I do mean to say that the state of affairs which drives woman to earn her own livelihood is awful, and is likely eventually to deprive the woman of the best in her—that is to say the woman in her.

However, the institution of polygamy in Islam, is not an eternal institution. According to the law of Islam, all legal permissions can be revoked by the State, if they lead to social corruption.

According to Mohammaden Law, a woman has the right to the custody of her children even after divorce. She can trade, contract and litigate in her own name. According to some lawyers, she can even be elected as the Caliph of Islam; she is entitled to maintenance from her husband besides the fixed dowry to secure which, she can hold the whole property of her husband.

The laws of divorce in Islam are also of great interest. The Muslim woman has equality of divorce with her husband. This, however, is secured in Mohammaden Law by the wife calling upon her husband at the time of marriage to delegate his right of divorce to her, to

her father, brother or any stranger. This is technically known as "tafviz"—that is to say, handing over, or transfer. The reason why this round about way of security is adopted I leave to the lawyers of Europe to understand.

JAVID NAMA

In November, 1931, Allama Iqbal went to London to attend the Round Table Conference. That was the time when his well known work Javid Nama was published and his admirers in England were expressing their keen interest in that book. A society known as Iqbal Literary Association was formed in London and on the instence of its members the Allama had dictated an outline of Javid Nama as given below. It was published in the Eid Number of the Morning News of Calcutta in 1944.

The book *جاوید نامہ* opens with a *Munajat* مناجات and begins with the Poet standing on the sea-shore about evening time, reading a few verses from Rumi. This makes the soul of Rumi to appear. The Poet puts all sorts of questions to the Spirit of Rumi, the principal question being as to how the Soul of Man passes beyond Space and Time. The idea is to give a kind of philosophy of *Mi'raj* معراج. Then appears the Spirit of Space-Time which is pictured by the Poet as a double-faced angel, one of the two faces as dark and sleeping and the other as bright and awake. This spirit exercises some kind of charm on the Poet and carries him up. Both the Spirits of Rumi and the Poet swim in Space and continue to do so until the mountains of the Moon become visible. Here they hear a song from the Stars—a sort of welcome given to human beings who have the courage to pass beyond Space. They alight on the Moon and

enter some of its caves. In one of the caves they meet the Spirit of the great Indian ascetic, Wishwamitra, whose name the Poet translates as *Jahan Dost* جهان دوست. The ascetic is found sitting absorbed in contemplation with a White Snake, circling round his head. Recognising Rumi, the ascetic asks as to who is the new comer. Rumi gives a short description of his companion. Thereupon the ascetic puts some questions to the new comer in order to test his spiritual attainments. One of the questions, for instance is; "In what respect is Man superior to God?" The answer is: "In his knowledge of Death." Similarly he puts other questions and finding the answers satisfactory, he discloses certain truths about various things, entitled in the Poem :

نه تا سخن از عارف هندی

They leave the cave and pass on to the valley of the Moon where they find a huge rock on which four pictures are carved. They are called the tablet of Buddha, the tablet of Jesus, the tablet of Zoroaster and the tablet of Muhammad. Descriptions of the tablets are given in the Poem. So they pass on from planet to planet. In Mars is shown a woman-prophet originally stolen from Europe as a child by the Devil and who teaches the women of Mars a new view of evolution which according to this woman-prophet tends to eliminate the male. Her message is that the world will, eventually, be ruled by woman and her practical advice to her sisters is, in the first place, not to marry and if they marry and have children to kill the male and retain the female children. This gives an occasion to Rumi to criticise some of the aspects of modern civilization.

In the planet Mercury they find the spirits of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and Saeed Halim Pasha, the head of the religious reform movement in Turkey. Afghani sends a message to the people of Russia wherein the Spirit of Islam is compared with the Spirit of Bolshevism, and Karl Marks is described as a prophet without an engel.

Passing on to another planet they find three spirits, Mansur Hallaj, Ghalib and Qurrat-ul-Ain. They are supposed to have been offered a home in Paradise which they refused to accept and preferred constant movement in the immensity of the Universe. Hallaj explains his position as a Muslim mystic. Certain questions of literary and religious nature arising from Ghalib's poetry are put to him. Qurrat-ul-Ain gives a song of her own. As a contrast to this in another planet two spirits are shown who went to seek a Home in the flames of Hell but Hell refused them admittance. They are Mir Ja'far of Bengal and Mir Sadiq of Mysore. In another planet underneath a transparent sea, are shown the spirits of the Pharaoh and Kitchener. Their conversation attracts the attention of the Mahdi Soudani from Paradise. It comes down, penetrates into the sea and has a talk with Kitchener. The Spirit of the Mahdi works itself up and finally addresses the whole of the Arabic-speaking world.

Having passed through all the planets, the Poet enters Paradise and meets Saints as well as Kings. He finds there the palace of Sharaf-un-Nisa, daughter of Abdus Samad Khan, Governor of Lahore. One of the Saints whom the poet meets in Paradise is Shah Hamdan, the patron saint of Kashmir, who brings in certain questions with regard to the history and people of Kashmir. The Poet further meets King Nadir Shah of Persia, Ahmad Shah Abdali of Afghanistan and Sultan Tipu.

At the moment of leaving Paradise, the Houris of Paradise besiege the Poet and insist on his staying with them. The Poet refuses to stay. The real meaning of Muslim Paradise which is not an end in itself but a stage in the spiritual development of man is here explained. However, a compromise is arrived at, the Houris agree to let him go provided he gave them a song which he does. He then leaves the Paradise and gradually reaches the point where Rumi leaves him for *man must enter the divine presence alone*. Here the Poet

puts some very serious questions to God and finally wants a complete revelation of the destiny of his own people which is granted to him. The book ends, with a song from the Spirit of Universe.

At the end of the book the poet addresses his son, which is viturally an address to the coming generation.

FOREWORD

A History of Persian Navigation

Allama Iqbal wrote this foreword to A History of Persian Navigation by Prof. Hadi Hasan of the Muslim University, Aligarh. It was published in 1928.

I have read parts of Prof. Hadi's book on Persian Navigation with great interest and profit. Besides the innumerable Persian, Arabic and Chinese sources, he has utilized all the available sculptural, pictorial and numismatic material in establishing the conclusion that whilst the land empire of the Sasanids perished with the fall of Yazdigird the maritime activity of the Persians continued till the Caliphate of al-Mutawakkil, when it began to be displaced by the Arabs. The author's great capacity for sustained work, his infinite patience in sifting the details of evidence, and above all his youthful enthusiasm for the subject of his study—all this is abundantly clear from the remarkable work that he has produced. I have no doubt that Prof. Hadi's work is a very important contribution to modern historical research relating to Persian antiquities. It is needless to add that Prof. Hadi is a brilliant Persian scholar from whose pen yet greater things are expected.

Lahore.

Muhammad Iqbal

FOREWORD

Muraqqa-i-Chughtai

Allama Iqbal expressed his views on art in his foreword to Muraqqa-i-Chughtai—Ghalib's illustrated Edition by the well known artist Abdul Rahman Chughtai. This foreword, given below, was published in 1928.

I welcome 'Muraqqa-i-Chughtai'—Ghalib's illustrated Edition by Mr. M.A. Rahman Chughtai—a unique enterprise in modern Indian painting and printing. Unfortunately I am not competent enough to judge the technical side of painting, and refer the reader to Dr. Cousin's admirable introduction in which he has analysed some of the more Important forces that are shaping Chughtai's artistic ideal. All that I can say is that I look upon Art as subservient to life and personality. I expressed this view as far back as 1914 in my *Asrar-i-Khudi*, and twelve years later in the last poem of the *Zubur-i-Ajam*, wherein I have tried to picture the soul-movement of the ideal artist in whom Love reveals itself as a unity of Beauty and Power.

دلبری ہے قاہری جادو گری است
دلبری با قاہری پیغمبری است

From this point of view some of the more recent paintings of Mr. Chughtai are indeed remarkable. The spiritual health of a people largely depends on the kind of inspiration which their poets and artists receive. But

inspiration is not a matter of choice. It is a gift, the character of which cannot be critically judged by the recipient before accepting it. It comes to the individual unsolicited, and only to socialise itself. For this reason the personality that receives and the life-quality of that which is received are matters of the utmost importance for mankind. The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Attila or a Changez. As the Prophet of Islam said of Imra'ul Qais—the greatest Poet of Pre-Islamic Arabia.

اشعر الشعراء وقائد هم الى النار

To permit the visible to shape the invisible, to seek what is scientifically called adjustment with Nature is to recognise her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimuli, and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance of what is with a view to create what ought to be, is health and life. All else is decay and death. Both God and man live by perpetual creation.

حسن را از خود بروں جستن خطاست
آنچه می یایمت پیش ما کجاست

The artist who is a blessing to mankind defies life. He is an associate of God and feels the contact of Time and Eternity in his soul. In the words of Fichte, he "Sees all Nature full, large and abundant as opposed to him who sees all things thinner, smaller and emptier than they actually are." The modern age seeks inspiration from Nature. But Nature simply 'is' and her function is mainly to obstruct our search for 'ought' which the artist must discover within the deeps of his own being.

And in so far as the cultural history of Islam is concerned, it is my belief, that, with the single exception of

Architecture, the art of Islam (Music, Painting and even Poetry) is yet to be born—the art, that is to say, which aims at the human assimilation of Divine attributes
 تخلقوا باخلاق الله gives man infinite aspiration,
 اجر غير ممنون and finally wins for him the status of
 God's Representative on earth.

مقام آدم خاکی نہاد دریا بند
 مسافران حرم را خدا دھد توفیق

There are, however, indications to show that the young artist of the Punjab is already on the way to feel his responsibility as an artist. He is only twenty-nine yet. What his art will become when he reaches the maturer age of forty, the future alone will disclose. Meanwhile all those who are interested in his work will keenly watch his forward movement.

Lahore,
 21st July, 1928.

Muhammad Iqbal

FOREWORD

Afghanistan—A Brief Survey

Iqbal wrote this foreword to "Afghanistan—A Brief Survey" by Jamaluddin Ahmed and Mohammed Abdul Aziz. The book was published by Dar-ul-Taleef, Kabul in 1934.

I am asked to write a line or two by way of a foreword to this excellent book on modern Afghanistan. I have great pleasure in doing so, not only because I have always regarded the Afghans as a people of inexhaustible vitality, but also because I have had the privilege of personally knowing the late and lamented King Nadir Shah—that soldier-statesman, whose genius infused a new life into his people and opened their eyes to the modern world. The history of the Afghans has yet to be read and appreciated. Mere record of events is not history, it is only material for history. Events are like words and have meanings which it is the duty of the genuine historian to discover. This work has yet to be done in regard to the history of Afghans both in India and Afghanistan. A people, who have produced such men as Muhammad Ghauri, Alauddin Khilji, Sher Shah Suri, Ahmad Shah Abdali, Amir Abdul Rehman Khan, King Nadir Shah, and above all Maulana Sayyid Jamal-ud-Din Afghani—in many respects the greatest Muslim, and certainly one of the greatest Asiatics of our times—cannot but be regarded as an important factor in the life of Asia. For long periods

in the past, Balkh, Bamian, Hadda, Kabul, Ghazni and Herat have been great centres of culture; and the earnestness of the present ruling dynasty does certainly hold out a promise that they may well revive their past glories again.

Whenever I think of Afghanistan, as I do quite often, my mind conjures up before me a picture of the country as I saw it last autumn. I sit in a simply furnished study which overlooks a garden. Beyond the garden, a broad stretch of land rises in a gentle slope to meet the hills, which lie in ever-ascending waves one behind the other till they culminate in the towering range of the Hindukush. A line of huge pylons, that bring the high tension current from distant falls, lies a thwart the landscape. Overhead the sky is painted in gorgeous colours by the approaching sunset below the shadows move swiftly across the valley. Innumerable poplars, straight, slim and tall, sway gently in the gathering shadows as the soft evening breeze kisses their searing leaves. In the calm of that twilight, the valley, the trees, the distant villages and the mountains floating in a sea of hazy mist present a scene of dream-like beauty. Suddenly the hush of the evening is broken by the call to prayer. One by one all my companions leave their seats; transported beyond myself by the swelling chant of the *Muezzin*, I am the last to reach the prayer-room, where my fellow-guests are already gathered along with our Royal host and the humblest of his retainers!

This little episode reveals three of the most striking qualities of the Afghans—their deep religious spirit, their complete freedom from distinctions of birth and rank, and the perfect balance with which they have always maintained their religious and national ideals. This spirit of conservatism has always been, and will always remain, a great source of strength to the Afghans. It keeps them in living contact with their past, without rendering them incapable of response to the calls of a new age. Their conservative wisdom makes them

cherish their traditions; but the weight of these traditions does not in any way kill the forward movement of the soul within. Only the other day, I met in Lahore a remarkable old Afghan druggist, who had spent more than half a century in the West and had finally settled in Australia. He could not read and write, but spoke good Australian English. "Do you still remember your Pashto?" I said. My question went straight to his heart. His slightly bedewed eyes became brighter. The memories of the youth seemed to be crowding in his mind, until they found unrestrained expression in an old Pashto love-song which, for the moment, transported this hoary Afghan from the scorching heat of Lahore to the cool valleys of his fatherland. The Afghan conservatism is a miracle; it is adamant yet fully sensitive to and assimilative of new cultural forces. And this is the secret of the eternal organic health of the Afghan type.


Afghanistan was a great commercial centre in the ancient world and remained so during the Middle Ages, till the development of sea-borne traffic in the modern world. She has occupied and will continue to occupy the key position in the politics and history of Asia. "Here" writes Professor Lyde, "we have one of the most important areas of Asia, full of fascination to those who believe in both the national and international, but do not believe that it is the destiny of the world to be for ever at war." So this plain, straightforward and unvarnished account of the country by two brothers, who during their long residence in that land, have supplemented the fruits of personal observation, by a study of the best sources and have been able to draw upon the latest official information, is doubly welcome.


The authors of the book have rightly focussed their attention upon those periods, during which the arts of peace have flourished and not upon the periods of numberless wars, invasions and internal dissensions, which at first sight appear to be the most striking feature of the history of Afghanistan. Besides providing in-

valuable and authentic information regarding the country, the authors have raised some very interesting questions about the position of Afghanistan in relation to cultural advancement of the world. There is no doubt that archaeological and historical research in Afghanistan will throw a new light on our knowledge of the ancient world; but much work yet remains to be done, and I hope that Afghan scholars will diligently try to lay bare the past greatness of their country.

Lahore :
September, 1934.

Muhammad Iqbal





RUBAIYAT OF IQBAL

Done into English

By : A. R. TARIQ

This is the most emphatic, descriptive and enlightening English Translation of Iqbal's Persian and Urdu Rubaiyat!

Pages : 218 — Price Rs. 15/-

RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM

Done into English

By : A. R. TARIQ

This is the most perfect and musical versified Translation of Omar Khayyam's philosophical and romantic Rubaiyat!

Pages : 220 — Price Rs. 5/-

Order to :

SH. GHULAM ALI & SONS

Publishers - Booksellers

Addi Market, Chowk Anarkali - Lahore